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“Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi.”
 – Tancredi Falconieri, “Il Gattopardo”

Prologue
In the summer of 2005 I participated in a week-long course on NATO Network Enabled 
Capabilities hosted by the Royal Netherlands Army and supported by the Pentagon’s 
Office of Force Transformation. The course was attended by European officers from 
roughly twenty different states. At the seminar a Dutch Lieutenant-Colonel gave an over-
sight of how the Dutch armed forces were adopting new technologies to obtain what he 
called “full-spectrum battlefield awareness” and “information superiority” to eventually 
obtain “decision superiority”. Hearing this presentation for the first time, the claim of “supe-
riority” seemed boisterous to me. War is a messy and chaotic exercise in the application of 
force. Presuming superiority before shots were fired, irrespective of the adversary, was a 
utopia. I believed in Von Clausewitz’s friction and the inherent unpredictability of warfare 
captured in the term ‘the fog of war.’ Although I could understand that states would want 
to minimize that uncertainty as much as possible, presuming ‘superiority’ could lead to 
hubris and miscalculations. The conference was about reducing this uncertainty through 
new information technologies.
A video showed the Dutch military launching missiles from airborne platforms to 
support land forces on the ground. An example of seamless combined and joint opera-
tions. New technologies were leading to the ‘networking’ of an Army battalion, increasing 
the speed of information exchange from operational to the tactical level and increasing 
overall effectiveness on the battlefield. The presentation by the impressive 6-foot four 
officer was an obvious attempt to show to NATO colleagues that the Netherlands’ armed 
forces were high-tech and well ahead of the curve. Or better still, that the Dutch military 
was ‘transformed’. The week-long course was saturated with presentations about that 
word, transformation. As it happens, the term had for several years been the buzzword 
humming around NATO corridors. Reflecting on its meaning, transformation sounded 
like a metaphysical process of self-reinvention, an inward-looking existentialist journey 
defining one’s own purpose of being. Rather than being abstract, transformation was just 
as real as the missiles in the video. It was the overarching process giving shape to the West’s 
new defense policy and posture. In that regard transformation indeed had an existential 
dimension. For it was envisioned to change how Western militaries would operate and 
how they would be used by Western states. Since the use of the military is at the core of 
state behavior and a reflection of national character, any structural shift in the way a state 
wields military power has profound implications for international relations. It triggered 
my interest. Since transformation dominated the security discourse, I expected to find a 
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clear understanding among officers and officials NATO-wide what the term meant. That 
expectation soon evaporated. There is no collectively held understanding of transforma-
tion. Instead, the change strategies pursued by NATO member states differed substantially. 
While NATO member states had agreed to pursue transformation, these initiatives in 
defense reform were shaped by the interplay between changes in threat-perceptions in the 
security environment and national strategic cultures.
Transformation is the principle vehicle through which the Alliance has aspired to 
maintain cohesion and develop collective capabilities to address common security threats. 
Tancredi Falconieri, the forward-looking nephew in Giuseppe di Lampedusa’s novel Il 
Gattopardo, says to his aging aristocrat uncle that the changing political environment 
requires him to adapt as well, that “if you want everything to stay the same, everything 
must change.”1 So too, NATO member states in 2002 committed to transformation with the 
intent to maintain the viability of the fifty-something alliance in a changing security envi-
ronment. As individual member states pursued defense transformation, it was supposed 
to offer a new common basis for the alliance in the 21st century. Instead, the diversity of 
the trajectories of transformation has become an expression of the fundamental difficul-
ties NATO confronts to maintain alliance solidarity, particularly in an era when security 
threats are met abroad rather than close to home, and irregular warfare has replaced tradi-
tional defense. What does this mean for the future of transatlantic security policy? What 
has transformation meant to different NATO member states and why have the trajectories 
of transformation differed? This is the puzzle of this research and the topic of this book. 
1 Translated from Italian, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, De Tijkgerkat [Il Gattopardo], (Van 
Loghum Slaterus: Arnhem, 1960), p.24.
Introduction
“Every nation is caught in the moral paradox of refusing to go to war unless 
it can be proved that the national interest is imperiled, and of continuing in 
the war only by proving that something much more than national interest 
is at stake.”
 – Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Irony of American History”2
1 Introduction
1.1 What is Transformation?
What factors shaped defense transformation among NATO member states and what does 
it mean for the future of NATO?3 Defense transformation is a concept pertaining to a 
particular instance of defense reform which may describe military innovation – which 
emphasizes changes in the military organization, technologies or doctrine – as well as 
strategic-level shifts in the orientation of defense policy. In the United States, the semantic 
use of the term transformation has been closely associated with the Revolution in Mili-
tary Affairs, as well as with the agenda of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. However, 
these represent but single expressions of deliberately pursued, discontinuous changes in 
defense policy. Neither does this negate the possibility of a similar instance of discon-
tinuous change to also be considered transformation, even if it was described under a 
different name.4 In order to enable a comparison, a common definition of transformation 
must be provided. Prominent works on transformation have favored a US-centered defini-
2 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), p. 36.
3 Unless otherwise indicated I use the terms ‘transformation,’ ‘defense transformation’ and 
‘military transformation’ interchangeably.
4 Robert G. Bell writes for instance that “Although the word “transformation” has been in 
vogue only in recent years, NATO has effectively faced a “transformational” imperative 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union a decade and a half ago.” See Robert G. Bell, “NATO’s 
Transformation Scorecard,” NATO Review, Spring 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/
review/2005/issue1/english/art3.html (accessed January 29, 2011).
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tion attributing prevalence to the American expression of transformation, viewing it as a 
US-led process aimed at exploiting information technologies in the military realm and a 
process which European states have been able to emulate to differing degrees.5 This study 
takes a different approach. Rather than viewing transformation as a US-driven process to 
be emulated by others, transformation is considered a concept of discontinuous change in 
defense policy that is not confined to a specific time period or set of technologies. Instead 
it is a concept describing far-reaching change in a state’s defense policy and approach to 
the military. In this study transformation is defined as the process of pursuing deliberate 
discontinuous change in a state’s military policy, the purpose of which is to increase the 
compatibility and relevance of the military instrument to a state’s foreign and security 
policy objectives, in response to major shifts in the international security environment. 
Here, the focus lies on transformation pursued by three states in the period subsequent to 
the end of the Cold War. The central elements of this definition are elaborated upon below. 
Not all instances of military change can be considered transformation; instead trans-
formation is a particular appearance of military change. According to a major study on the 
topic, military change is a policy to promote “change in the goals, actual strategies, and/
or structure of a military organization.”6 This however includes both incremental modifi-
cations as well as major shifts. The discontinuous change associated with transformation 
invariably refers to the latter type. According to the dictionary transformation is “an act, 
process or instance of change in character or condition.”7 It underlines the fundamental 
character of the change being pursued. Transformation is a policy of discontinuous, rather 
than incremental, sometimes referred to as evolutionary, change of the military. A scholar 
of transformation writes that “unlike military adaptation, which conveys the refinement 
of traditional routines or the grafting of new missions, technologies or tactics onto the 
old, transformation represents major changes in what military organizations do, how they 
do it, and who does it. Transformation does not merely encompass the development and 
use of new technologies, but constitutes qualitative changes in organizational strategies, 
procedures, and measures of effectiveness for performing critical tasks.”8 Along these lines, 
defense transformation represents fundamental and far-reaching change in military policy 
and the military organization. This far-reaching change can occur along two dimensions.
5 See for instance Terry Terrif, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell (eds.), A Transformation Gap? 
American Innovations and European Military Change, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010), p.1; David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, Mind the Gap: 
Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1999).
6 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, 
(Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO, 2002), p. 5.
7 Merriam-Webster, The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Merriam Webster, 2004). Entry for 
“Transformation”.
8 Adam N. Stulberg, Michael D. Salomone, & Austin G. Long, Managing Defense 
Transformation: Agency, Culture and Service Change, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), p. 15.
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1.2 Transformation and Revolutions in Military 
Affairs
Transformation may be the result of military innovation that produces order of magni-
tude changes in military competitive advantage. Andrew Krepinevich has for instance 
described the product of transformation as a dramatic increase in combat potential when 
new technologies combine with new doctrine.9 A sizeable body of research has focused on 
how different military organizations have evolved over time emphasizing the impact of 
technological innovation on the application of military power, describing cross-national 
differences in military organizations, and detailing how technological change produced 
doctrinal innovation to yield battlefield advantages.10 They focus on specific military 
services or inter-service distinctions and take the military service, whether Navy, Air 
Force or Army, as the core unit of analysis.11 These studies demonstrate for instance how 
technological advances such as the introduction of the tank or the aircraft carrier led to 
new sources of military advantage for the Army and Navy in the guise of blitzkrieg and 
carrier aviation. Such changes produced discontinuities in defense policy since they made 
previous ways of operating obsolete and could rightly be seen as instances of discontin-
uous change in ways of warfare.12 A common conclusion drawn from these studies is that 
those that adopted these innovations stand to gain, while those that do not fall behind, 
thus impacting the course of history. The Maginot line was outdated in light of Germany’s 
9 Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” The 
National Interest (Fall 1994), pp. 30-42.
10 See Theo Farrell & Terry Terriff, Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics and Technology 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Stephen P. Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India 
and its Armies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Stephen D. Biddle, Military 
Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004); Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Williamson R. Murray & Alan R. Millett, 
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (New York: Cambridge University Press 1998); 
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between 
the World Wars, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1984); Barry R. Posen, “Nationalism, 
the Mass, and Military Power,” International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 80-124; Deborah 
D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons From Peripheral Wars, (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 
BC to the Present, (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Max Boot, War Made New: Weapons, 
Warriors and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Gotham, 2007); Joris van Bladel, 
The All Volunteer Force in the Russian Mirror: Transformation without Change, Proefschrift, 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, June 7, 2004; Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: 
France between the Wars,” International Security, vol. 19, no. 14, pp. 65-94.
11 For instance Stulberg et al. (2007) compare German Army Blitzkrieg, military change in the 
US Navy, British Armored forces and US Army counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Adam N. 
Stulberg, Michael D. Salomone, & Austin G. Long, Managing Defense Transformation: Agency, 
Culture and Service Change, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007).
12 Jeffrey Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs” in John Arquilla & David 
Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp, MR-880-OSD/RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 
p.118.
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rapid mechanized assault and the battleship no longer formed the core of a maritime strike 
force as carrier aviation increased the range, concentration and precision of naval strike 
power. 
In the 1990’s, scholars studying these phenomena described such technological 
and doctrinal upheavals as revolutions in military affairs.13 In these years scholars, poli-
cymakers, tech-watchers and futurologists alike similarly thought that a revolution in 
military affairs, now capitalized and abbreviated as the RMA, was at hand resulting from 
innovations in the field of information and communication technologies. Like the tele-
graph and the railway before, these new technologies were thought to revolutionize how 
militaries fought in battle, creating dramatic improvements in the speed of operation and 
increased precision of targeting. Proponents - mainly in the United States where these 
debates precipitated - argued that by integrating information technologies throughout 
the military, mass could be substituted by information, enabling a whole new, more effi-
cient and effective, way of operating characterized by a more nimble and adaptive mili-
tary.14 They concluded that it would revolutionize warfare. Undoubtedly these technolo-
gies produced substantial changes in the US military. Yet since the appearance of an RMA 
was declared without the virtue of historic hindsight and was primarily based on events 
taking place inside the United States the validity of its revolutionary nature has been ques-
tioned.15 Nevertheless in the United States a policy of military change based on the RMA 
was pursued under the assumption that it would be a source of vastly increased military 
power and a new model of warfare.16 In the mid-1990’s this process was dubbed transfor-
mation.17 It emerged as a replacement for RMA. The shift was apparently deliberate. In 
this period Andrew Marshall, director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, sent 
a memo to his staff saying that the term RMA was no longer of interest because it had 
become too value-laden. Rather than discussing the merits of the technological improve-
ments and its implications for doctrine, debates erupted over the proper definition of the 
13 See for instance Andrew Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: the pattern of military 
revolutions,” National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994). A synonym sometimes used is ‘military 
revolution’. This term is avoided as it is confusing in relation to distinguishing between 
military coups d’etat, or political change precipitated by the military and changes in the future 
of warfare.
14 Stulberg et al. (2007), p. 1, 14-15.
15 For a critique see John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: the Reluctant Transformation of the American 
Military, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008).
16 According to the US Pentagon’s definition transformation is, “a process that shapes the 
changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of 
concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and 
protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps 
underpin peace and stability in the world.” Department of Defense, Transformation Planning 
Guidance 2003, p. 3.
17 See Andrew Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: the pattern of military revolutions,” National 
Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 30-42; Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future 
of Warfare, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
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term ‘revolution’.18 To avoid further confusion transformation was deemed a suitable 
substitute. Initially use of the term transformation to denote discontinuous organiza-
tional change had emerged from the business community. In the corporate world, trans-
formation was the antithesis to making incremental adjustments to the organization.19 It 
described fundamental, comprehensive change in an organization’s objectives, structure 
or market-orientation in response to changes in the business landscape, precipitated by 
the impact of information technologies and globalization. New organizational structures 
were developed - networked and less hierarchical - and new strategies were developed to 
increase efficiency or improve competitiveness. Similar thinking was adopted with respect 
to defense policy and the military. 
1.3 Transformation and Change in the Function of the 
Military
Transformation and the RMA however are not synonyms, especially when we turn to the 
other side of the Atlantic. In 2002, NATO member states adopted the term following the 
NATO Prague Summit - later referred to as the Transformation Summit - to describe their 
individual policies of military change.20 The label was used by NATO’s European member 
states to describe all or parts of their change strategies after the end of the Cold War. The 
attacks of September 11 and the demands of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan further 
shaped, changed or reinforced these strategies, which presented no less a discontinuity 
from previous policy than the adoption of a Revolution in Military Affairs. It was however 
18 Interview with Thomas Ehrhard, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
Washington DC, January 22, 2008. The academic debate over the accurate description 
of “revolutionary change” would continue throughout the decade. See for instance Thierry 
Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff, “Introduction: Sizing up the Revolution in Military Affairs,” 
in Th. Gongora & H. Von Riekhoff (ed.), Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?: Defense and 
Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, (Greenwood, 2000), pp. 1-21.
19 See for instance David A. Nadler, Robert B. Shaw, A. Elise Walton et al, Discontinuous 
Change: Leading Organizational Transformation, (Jossey-Bass, 1994); Thomas E. Vollman, The 
Transformation Imperative: Achieving Market Dominance through Radical Change, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business Press, 1996); Howard Thomas, Don O’Neal & James Kelly, Strategic 
Renaissance and Business Transformation, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 1995); Michael S. Morton, 
The Corporation of the 1990’s: Information Technology and Organizational Transformation, 
(New York: Oxford University Press 1991); Beverly R. Fletcher, Organization Transformation 
Theorists and Practitioners, (Praeger: Westport CT, 1990); Oron South, Organization 
Development: Change, Reform or Transformation?, (Action Research Group 1976); Michael 
Bresnen, Challenge of Change: Theory and Practice of Organizational Transformations, (Pluto 
Press, 1992); Christopher Sauer & Philip W. Yetton, Steps to the Future: Fresh Thinking on the 
Management of IT-based Organizational Transformation, (Jossey-Bass 1997); Robert H. Miles, 
Leading Corporate Transformation: A Blueprint for Business Renewal, (Jossey-Bass, 1997); 
Mike Davidson, The Transformation of Management, (New York: Palgrave, 1995); Jeffrey 
Amos, Transformation to Agility: Manufacturing in the Market Place of Unanticipated Change, 
(New York: Routledge, 1998); Eric A. Marks, Business Darwinism, Evolve or Dissolve: Adaptive 
Strategies for the Information Age, (New York: Wiley, 2002).
20 See North Council Atlanti,c, Prague Summit Declaration, Press Release (2002) 127, Prague, 
November 21, 2002 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm).
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profoundly different from the American experience with transformation. In a nutshell, it 
was less technology-driven and more functional in nature, yet no less deliberate.
Although, as mentioned above, a substantial amount of literature associated with 
defense transformation has emphasized military innovation, research into geopolitical 
change and major shifts in the strategic orientation of states reveal discontinuities in 
military policy.21 Fundamental change in military policy which creates changes in the 
“goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization,” is not exclusively the 
result of technological developments. A state may not only engage in discontinuous mili-
tary change as a result of technology-driven innovations in the field of warfighting, but 
also through changes in how the state understands the role of its military and its defense 
policy in the context of a changing international environment. While the Revolution in 
Military Affairs is crucial to understand US transformation, other NATO member-states 
pursued a policy of discontinuous change in their military policy largely independent of 
these technological developments. As the case studies make clear, to the Netherlands and 
Germany transformation was a process of military change to develop an expeditionary 
force in response to the end of the Cold War. This process is less focused on nuts-and-bolts 
and is more cerebral but is as profound in its implications, or perhaps even more so, than 
harnessing military innovations to produce a shift in the military organization. 
There are several interesting historical examples of such far-reaching shifts. A key 
consideration is that such change may be precipitated by changing appreciations of the 
strategic circumstances confronting the state. Both the Greeks and the Romans deliber-
ately chose a strategy of developing a Navy to protect and advance their interests without 
having one in the first place. The Greek politician-general Themistocles argued for building 
a Navy since he believed only this could avoid Greece from being invaded in the future by 
the massive Persian land army. The Romans by contrast shifted to sea power to counter 
Carthage in the Punic Wars. These were profound adaptations to the prevalent military 
structures at the time. A similar strategic choice lay at the root of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s 
argument to build a “great white fleet.”22 Without a strong Navy, the United States could not 
become a great power in the early twentieth century and his thinking turned the United 
States into a major naval power. Such shifts may be connected to the rise of an expansionary 
power. The reverse however is also true. In the early 15th century, the Chinese emperor 
Hongxi, in stark contrast to his father’s policies, abruptly forbade all maritime expeditions 
and refocused China’s attention inward. It precipitated a decline in China’s naval capaci-
ties and outward-looking foreign policy. Similarly, the Japanese defeat in World War II led 
to a transformation of Japan’s military, its military culture and its defense policy.23 A further 
21 Historic examples are German and Japanese military and social change following defeat in the 
Second World War, but also current research interest in the change in strategic orientation of 
emerging countries such as India and China.
22 John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: the Reluctant Transformation of the American Military, (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2008), p.12.
23 See also Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).
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example can be found in the way decolonization impacted the defense policies of erstwhile 
colonial powers. These shifts in defense policy occur due to changes in the international 
environment. In Europe, following the end of the Cold War, militaries slowly reoriented 
away from focusing on territorial defense and towards expeditionary operations outside 
their borders. This change from a defensive posture towards a more proactive orientation 
signaled profound changes in European strategic thinking. By the early 2000’s the label 
transformation was used to describe this process that produced a wholesale revision and 
discontinuity in defense policy. It became the expression of a changing European strategic 
calculus regarding how the military could be relevant to advance security interests. 
1.4 Two Types of Transformation
In the Western world transformation, thus understood as the process of pursuing delib-
erate discontinuous change in the military, has taken place at two distinctly different, 
although related levels, both of which triggered fundamental organizational redesign 
of the armed forces and a rethinking of military policy. The locus of transformation can 
reside at the military or the political level, where the former focuses on improving the 
operational effectiveness of the military and the latter addresses the overarching orienta-
tion and the purpose for which the military is used. It leads to two types of transformation 
that both reflect elements of strategy; namely to what end the military is used, and how 
best to realize that end. 
Borrowing from the business management literature on strategy-making, a typology 
of transformation is proposed that reflects the distinction between defense transforma-
tion at the military and the political level. This distinction follows from the discontinuous 
nature of both instances of change and the different objectives they hope to attain. Trans-
formation can have two strategic objectives. It can lead the military to perform completely 
different functions, such as the shift from a defensive posture to one of expeditionary 
operations, or performing the same functions, but doing it fundamentally differently, such 
as the introduction of technologies and doctrines which revolutionize warfare. In the 
business management literature discontinuous change to leverage sustainable competi-
tive advantage can be derived in two ways: “doing things differently” or “doing different 
things.”24 This seemingly simple dichotomy has significant strategic repercussions. While 
the former describes radical ways to improve competitiveness through operational effec-
tiveness measures, the latter refers to purposeful differentiation or organizational reinven-
tion. Western states have similarly engaged in both types of transformation and are termed 
here “operational effectiveness transformation (Type I)” and “strategic transformation 
(Type II)”. Another way of looking at this is that operational effectiveness transformation 
refers to the nature of warfare in general, while strategic transformation refers to radical 
change in the defense policy of a state.25
24 Michael E. Porter, “What is Strategy?,” Harvard Business Review (November-December 1996), 
p. 61- 78.; Hema Prem & George Eby Mathew, “How Does Business Transformation Happen?,” 
Cutting Edge (Infosys: June 2006).
25 Tom Dyson comes to a similar categorization of types of defense reform. Borrowing from 
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Type 1, or operational effectiveness transformation focuses on improving the existing 
orientation of the military but doing it in a revolutionary new way. It is a form of organiza-
tional change meant to increase the overall operational effectiveness of the military. “Doing 
things differently” refers to changing doctrine, technology or organizational procedures 
in order to provide a better existing product. According to the US Pentagon such change 
is “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation 
through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations […].”26 An 
earlier example is Blitzkrieg which revolutionized land warfare, relegating the advantage 
to offensive powers. In the United States the maturing of information technologies was 
considered instrumental to produce a disruptive improvement in conventional operations, 
offering tremendously increased military power to the United States. In addition it would 
spell significant changes how the military fought, heralding a period of rapid, decisive 
and “clean” wars. In light of changes in the international security environment that led to a 
unipolar system with the United States as only remaining superpower, it was believed that 
these information technologies provided the means to sustain its hegemonic position. It is 
important to note that at the technological or organizational level these changes promised 
to be highly innovative but were intent to improve an activity the United States was already 
superior in, namely conventional, military-to-military high-intensity warfare.
Type II, or strategic, transformation by contrast concerns a discontinuous change in 
the orientation and function of the military. For European states in the 1990’s it repre-
sented a shift towards expeditionary operations. Previously focused on territorial defense 
and unable to sustain military operations far away from home, this shift amounted to stra-
tegic change. 
This typology is critical to understanding the policies of military change pursued 
within NATO. To suggest that only one of these apparitions can truly be considered trans-
formational, perhaps arguing that Type I transformation based on changing the character 
of war through new doctrine-technology linkages amounts to incremental rather than 
discontinuous change, denies the historical precedents of such change efforts. Type I 
transformation has tended to shape the course of history providing critical advantages to 
those that were quick to enact new policies and technologies, and lethal disadvantages to 
those that did not. Disregarding Type II transformation however, leads to underrating the 
Peter Hall’s work on policy-making and the process of policy change, Dyson makes a 
distinction between ‘second-order change’ and ‘third-order change’ in the manner in which 
defense reform was pursued among Western states. The United States’ post-Cold War defense 
reforms, Dyson writes, were an instance of ‘second-order change’; instruments and settings of 
policy changed, but the overall policy goals – high-intensity expeditionary warfighting - did 
not. This resonates the concept of ‘operational effectiveness transformation’ used in this study. 
‘Third-order change’, by contrast, entails change in the instruments, settings of policy, as well 
as the overall policy goals. It corresponds to ‘strategic transformation’ in this study. See Tom 
Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe, (London: Palgrave, 
2010), p. 12-13. See also Peter A Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The 
Case of Economic Policy-Making in Britain,” Comparative Politics, vol. 25, no. 4 (1993), p. 
278-279.
26 United States Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance 2003, p. 3.
21Introduction
strategic change initiatives undertaken by European states which enable a more balanced 
understanding of NATO’s attempt to adapt to the new security environment. Defense 
transformation and military change is a constituent component of a state’s broader secu-
rity policy. How a state views the place of the military instrument in its broader security 
agenda is crucial to understanding how and for what objective the state pursues military 
change. It means that amongst others the military’s political masters also have a strong role 
to play in shaping a transformation strategy. Recent research efforts have given renewed 
attention to the study of the interplay between domestic factors, technological innovation 
and shifts in the international security environment.27 Furthermore, a lack of typology 
disregards the discontinuous nature of both types of change and risks considering irrel-
evant the fundamental questions each state has had to grapple with regarding the military 
change program they pursued. It is precisely these dynamics, and the comparison thereof, 
which makes it possible to assess the future of the transatlantic alliance on the basis of vari-
ance in transformation. 
1.5 The Contemporary Period of Transformation
Transformation is not a specific event such as a Revolution in Military Affairs. Instead it is 
a process states have engaged in subsequent to perceived shifts in the international security 
environment. Such shifts may be the result of major improvements or deteriorations in 
the level of external vulnerability of the state. The path of transformation illustrates how 
states rationalized the role of their military in light of perceived changes in the interna-
tional security environment. This research focuses on the period 1991 to 2008, from the 
end of the Cold War to the end of the second administration of US president George W. 
Bush. This period witnessed several system-level events, some more profound than others, 
that shaped a period of transition in the global distribution of power warranting reassess-
ments of defense policy. The end of the Cold War, the attacks of September 11, the Iraq 
War but also the promise of information technology in the realm of warfare shaped the 
context in which transformation was discussed and change strategies took shape. While 
the neologism was primarily associated with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld – 
who made it a mainstay of his administration while in office between 2001 and 2006 - the 
term appears in official US strategy documents from as early as 1995.28 To NATO, the term 
transformation became a mainstay in policy discussions from 2002 onwards. However, 
for European states, transformation had been going on in different guises since the years 
subsequent to the fall of the Berlin Wall. This research seeks to understand why transfor-
27 See Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the 
Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US and Israel, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security 
Studies 2010); Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff & Frans Osinga (eds.), A Transformation Gap?: 
American Innovations and European Military Change, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 
2010); Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, 
the State and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
28 See John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010 (Department of Defense, 1995). Joint Vision 2010 
became the basis for the military transformation proposed in William S. Cohen, Report of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review, (Department of Defense, May 1997).
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mation took shape the way it did within NATO, and what this means for the future of 
NATO. As such this study into the trajectories of transformation is as much a historical 
study of the evolution of how a state views its use of the military under a changing security 
environment, as it is a research into the drivers of military change.29
2 Transformation in NATO
Different trajectories of transformation illustrate the diversity within the NATO alliance.30 
This has not been straightforward since NATO is often considered to be a homogenous 
entity made up of same-minded states, the West, with a similar appreciation of the security 
environment due to a commonality of values “founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law.”31 How did this diversity come about?
The end of the Cold War had serious ramifications for the security policy of Western 
states.32 For NATO it meant that its primary raison d’être dissolved. Founded in 1949 
as a collective defense organization to counter Soviet expansionism and the Warsaw 
pact, NATO was considered victorious when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. With 
its purpose met, what remained to avoid NATO’s slow and silent decline?33 The alliance 
however, proved resilient in subsequent years as European and North American states 
underscored an interest to maintain the institution and use it to further their security inter-
ests; at first by enlarging the circle of democratic states with former Warsaw pact countries 
and later by embracing out-of-area crisis-management operations outside NATO’s alli-
ance territory. NATO became an instrument of stabilization in Europe’s immediate neigh-
borhood.34 By 2006 NATO counted 26 member countries, up from sixteen a decade and a 
half earlier. More importantly NATO’s strategic and operational focus changed as the alli-
ance undertook operations in former Yugoslavia and an air campaign in Kosovo in 1999. 
29 For clarifying purposes and to underline the different expressions of transformation, this 
study will also use the term ‘transformation strategy’ to denote the specific apparition of 
‘transformation’ in a state.
30 Interview with Brigadier General Antonello Vitale, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic 
Concept, Policy and Interoperability, Norfolk VA, January 25, 2007; See also Timo Noetzel 
and Benjamin Schreer, “Does a Multitier NATO matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the process 
of strategic change,” International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2 (2009) p. 211-226.
31 North Atlantic Council, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, April 4, 1949, p.1.
32 See David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace 1998); Lawrence Kaplan, NATO Divided: 
the evolution of an alliance, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s 
Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a new era, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004).
33 Peter van Ham & Richard L. Kugler, “Western Unity and the Transatlantic Security Challenge,” 
The Marshall Center Papers, No.4; Rob de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: 
The Battle For Consensus, (London: Brassey’s UK, 1997).
34 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Washington DC, April 24, 1999, 
(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm).
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The shift indicated an acceptance to perform military interventions outside the treaty area. 
Contrary to the Cold War when its primary intent was to avoid action, the alliance was now 
embracing it. That same year a Strategic Concept was adopted cementing the Alliance’s 
focus on crisis-management operations beyond the NATO treaty area, so-called “out-of-
area” operations. A popular slogan describing NATO’s change was “out of area, or out of 
business.” With this new strategic orientation questions arose regarding the appropriate 
mix of military capabilities, doctrine and organizational structure. The posture neces-
sary to fight the Soviet Union over the Fulda Gap would not likely be suitable for dealing 
with smaller, but more frequent crisis-management operations far away from home. The 
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in 1999 was a first step to adapt the alliance to an 
expeditionary world. Assessments were made of necessary capabilities and shortfalls. The 
list contained items required for expeditionary operations such as strategic lift aircraft, 
refueling capabilities, precision weapons, reconnaissance, surveillance and communica-
tions capabilities, and capabilities for the suppression of enemy air defense.35 Yet the Initia-
tive fizzled. In the words of US ambassador Alexander Vershbow, the alliance’s “rhetoric 
has far outpaced action when it comes to enhancing capabilities.”36 A sense of urgency 
seemed lacking as the security environment exhibited limited threats. The terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 gave renewed impetus to the argument that the world had changed 
and that the security environment was in a state of flux. On September 12, 2001 for the 
first time in its history NATO invoked Article V of the Washington treaty in solidarity with 
the United States. European allies offered their assistance to Washington. Yet European 
states had few relevant capabilities available as Washington set out to remove the Taliban 
from power in Afghanistan. It became apparent that changes were necessary. Not a state 
tied to a particular territory but rather an elusive group of individuals spread across the 
globe using terror as a weapon and concomitant state fragility were the alliance’s new foes. 
Security was no longer purely a function of territorial integrity and geographic distance 
to the threat. In 2002 the NATO alliance embarked on its first global, out-of-area mission, 
supporting the reconstruction and stabilization process in Afghanistan with the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Nevertheless it became clear that the world’s most 
powerful military alliance on paper lacked the capabilities and organizational structure to 
support a relatively small operation. And so, following DCI, in August 2002 the leaders 
of the NATO member states gathered in Prague to discuss how further to prepare the 
alliance for the new security environment. One capability shortfall in particular proved 
symptomatic throughout this period. With more than two million men under arms and 
several thousand helicopters among member states, NATO was not able to provide suffi-
35 See Gordon Adams, et al., Bridging the Gap: European C4ISR and Transatlantic Interoperability, 
George Washington University, October 2004; David G. Gompert & Uwe Nerlich, Shoulder 
to Shoulder, The Road to US-European Military Cooperability: A German-American Analysis, 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).
36 Ambassador A. Vershbow, Remarks on Euro-Atlantic Security and Defense, Barcelona, May 
10, 2001. See also Carl Ek, NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment, Congressional Research 
Service, RS21659, January 18, 2006.
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cient helicopters, crucial to tactical transport in Afghanistan. Instead, NATO turned to 
commercially leasing the helicopters.37 
At the 2002 Prague Summit the heads of state committed “to transforming NATO 
with new members, new capabilities and new relationships with our partners.”38 The 
emphasis lay on creating capable expeditionary forces, able to operate under challenging 
circumstances, able to go “quickly to wherever they are needed... to sustain operations over 
distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, 
biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.”39 In terms of capability 
development, the transformation plan was three-tiered. Firstly, it called for the creation 
of a NATO Response Force (NRF), a 20,000-strong crisis-management force that would 
be able to deploy to any theatre of choice within days. Secondly, the strategic commands 
were rearranged, from a geographic to a functional orientation. The European strategic 
command in Mons was renamed Allied Command Operations and would coordinate and 
plan the alliance’s ongoing operations. Atlantic Command in Norfolk was renamed Allied 
Command Transformation. Its mission was to provide overarching guidance to trans-
forming the alliance’s capabilities and doctrine and to oversee the transformation initia-
tives of the various states. The third component was to address the capability requirements 
mentioned in the Prague Capabilities Commitment; a list of capability shortfalls to enable 
the creation of the NRF. Distilled from DCI, the list included capabilities for detection and 
prevention against chemical, biological and nuclear attacks, advanced communications 
systems (C4ISR40), strategic lift assets, precision-guided munitions and air-to-air refueling. 
The Prague Summit was a milestone and transformation became part of NATO vocabu-
lary and policy. 
The Summit however failed to lead to a common transformation strategy. The reason 
was that the Summit was never the starting point of transformation within the alliance. 
Although it marked the first time the term was used in an alliance-wide context, several 
Western states were in the process of pursuing military change echoing many of the Prague 
initiatives, and had been doing so since the early 1990’s or even before.41 In official docu-
37 James G. Neuger, “NATO to lease 20 Helicopters to fill Afghan Shortfall,” Bloomberg News, 
October 22, 2007. See also Joris Janssen Lok, “NATO Accelerates Search for More Helicopters 
for Afghanistan Operations,” Aviation Week, November 25, 2007; Thomas Withington, 
Helicopter: Operational Mobility, ISN Security Watch, May 5, 2008 (http://www.isn.ethz.
ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-
E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=88742); EDA, “Declaration of Ministerial support for the 
European Defence Agency’s work on improving helicopter availability,” EDA Note for the 
Steering Board No.2008/ 21, Brussels May 19, 2008.
38 North Atlantic Council, Prague Summit Declaration, Press Release (2002) 127, Prague, 
November 21, 2002 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm), accessed August 8, 
2007.
39 Ibid.
40 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance are a family of capabilities that rely on advanced information technologies to 
collect and disseminate information through the military organization.
41 Besides the United States, other member states such as the United Kingdom and France had 
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mentation in the United States the term was already in widespread use. Furthermore, as 
the case studies will make clear, much of the American transformation strategy had been 
developed irrespective of NATO and the principal technologies were derived from innova-
tions dating to the latter stages of the Cold War or pioneered during the 1991 Gulf War. For 
the Netherlands transformation was an extension of policies initiated by its shift towards 
expeditionary operations in 1993. In Germany transformation had its roots in the integra-
tion of the former GDR’s military into the Bundeswehr, which later changed to reforming 
for expeditionary operations. 
Since states have different international vantage points, cultures, histories and narra-
tives, the interpretation of developments in the external security environment does not 
translate equally into policy. To some, mostly European states, transformation meant a 
fundamental reorientation of what the military is for, to others – like the United States - 
it was an organizational concept making the military more effective. General Antonello 
Vitale, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Concepts, Policy and Interoperability 
at Allied Command Transformation when I interviewed him in early 2007 acknowledged 
that there were different appreciations of transformation throughout NATO.42 This diver-
gence increases the risk of strategic dissonance within the alliance. While the term is used 
on both sides of the Atlantic, the concept of transformation is understood differently and 
discussions among NATO member states resemble a Babylonian confusion of tongues. 
Explaining variance in transformation strategies is necessary to understand how foreign 
and defense policies take shape, how states respond to transitions in the external security 
environment and to understand the root causes of divergence in the transatlantic security 
relationship. It also offers an additional instrument with which to make assessments about 
the future of the Alliance. One of the central elements to explore in this study is there-
fore why the United States and European states differ in their appreciation of the military 
instrument.
3  Between Mars and Venus
In recent years an impressive volume of books and articles has been produced discussing 
differences in security policies among the states of the transatlantic community. These 
focused mainly on a distinction between European states and the United States, and many 
were published in the wake of the Iraq War.43 Driven by the crisis in the run-up to the Iraq 
already initiated military change programs towards expeditionary forces.
42 Interview with Brigadier General Antonello Vitale, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic 
Concept, Policy and Interoperability, Norfolk VA, January 25, 2007.
43 See for instance Stephen F. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Peter van Ham, “America’s Rising 
anti-Europeanism” in Europe’s World, Spring 2006, p. 30-35; Christopher J. Makins, “Power 
and Weakness or Challenge and Response: Reflections on the Kagan Thesis,” August 1, 2003 
; Madeleine K. Albright & Kurt M. Campbell (eds.), Crossing the Atlantic, A report from 
the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003 Workshops, (The Aspen Institute, 2004); Ronald Asmus et 
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War in 2003, and subsequent torture and maltreatment scandals in the Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo Bay detention centers, observers focused on transatlantic alienation. Anti-
Americanism among European publics was at a peak. In a 2003 Eurobarometer survey, 
53% of Europeans felt that the United States was a threat to world peace, second only to 
Israel (59%) and on par with Iran and North Korea.44 Similarly, European approval ratings 
of US leadership in international affairs dropped to 38% in 2002 and 37% in 2007, with 
European approval ratings of US President George W. Bush hitting a low of 17% that year.45 
Whether it was a rift, a divergence, a crisis or a gap, articles and books were addressing 
differences in European and US foreign and security policy. Most of the criticism focused 
on the role played by the military instrument in American and European policies. Perhaps 
the most important argument came from Robert Kagan, an American neoconserva-
tive commentator living in Brussels. In a widely-read essay published in 2002 he argued 
that transatlantic dissent over issues such as the Global War on Terror and responses to 
terrorism was not an incident but rather symptomatic of a strategic disconnect informed 
by the military weakness of Europe and the military strength of the US.46 Because Europe 
is militarily weak, European states necessarily opted for multilateral solutions and ‘soft 
power’ instruments in their foreign policy. Kagan argued that this also enabled Europe 
to selectively choose which threats to focus on. However, because the United States is a 
military hegemon, it has a different strategic perspective. The United States’ strength 
preordains an active role in the field of security, Kagan argued. The capability gap between 
Europe and the US thus precipitated a strategic gap. Europeans were from Venus and 
Americans from Mars. 
Indeed, the European response to 9/11, the War on Terrorism and concerns over 
homeland security, or appreciations of the Iraq-threat prior to the war in 2003, was different 
from Washington’s. And there was regular friction among transatlantic partners over the 
use of the military. A clear example was the criticism expressed by European troop-contrib-
al., “One Year On: Lessons from Iraq,” Chaillot Paper, no. 68, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, March 2004; Phillip Gordon & Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, 
Europe and the Crisis over Iraq, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004); Peter van Ham & Richard 
L. Kugler, “Western Unity and the Transatlantic Security Challenge,” The Marshall Center 
Papers, No.4; Steven Everts & Gary Schmitt, “Is Military Power still the Key to International 
Security?” in NATO Review, Winter 2002; Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and 
Chaos in the 21st Century, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004); Charles Kupchan, The 
End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and Geopolitics in the 21st Century (New York: 
Knopf 2002); Parag Khanna, “The Metrosexual Superpower” in Foreign Policy, July/August 
2004, p. 66-68. Sebastian Reyn, Allies or Aliens: George W. Bush and the Transatlantic Crisis 
in Historical Perspective, (Zoetermeer, NL: Atlantische Commissie 2004); Maarten Brands et 
al., Transatlantic Relations at a Crossroads: Current Challenges in US-European Relations (The 
Hague: Atlantische Commissie, 2004).
44 Eurobarometer, Iraq and Peace in the World, Flash Eurobarometer 151, Directorate General 
Press and Communication, November 2003, p. 78.
45 German Marshall Fund & Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Worldviews 2002; and 
German Marshall Fund & Compagnia di San Paolo, Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2007.
46 Robert Kagan, On Power and Weakness, Policy Review, no. 113 (June-July 2002).
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uting nations regarding the tactics used by American colleagues in Afghanistan in 2007.47 
European states complained that the United States was overemphasizing force protection 
and using the military bluntly in an area where European allies were desperately trying to 
engage the local population by avoiding excessive use of military force. European allies 
denounced what they perceived as US overreliance on the military to solve foreign policy 
problems, while officials in Washington criticized European states for not pulling their 
weight in crisis-management operations. In late 2006, to America’s annoyance, NATO’s 
Secretary-General was going around European capitals pleading for additional troops for 
operations in Afghanistan, while in the eyes of Europeans the United States was losing 
credibility in Iraq as a result of a heavy-handed approach disrespecting local sensitivities. 
European states accused the United States for not understanding the delicate dynamics 
of complex emergencies which necessitated greater attention to ‘soft power.’ The United 
States in turn was infuriated by the resistance of several European states to commit forces 
to Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, the parts where the heaviest combat was taking 
place. Practitioners in Europe were also underwriting parts of Kagan’s thesis. In 2006 at 
an international conference, a senior official at NATO’s Allied Command Transforma-
tion remarked that there was a divergence in transatlantic “perception of challenges” and 
that the “real separation [between the US and Europe] is one of mind-set.” Europeans, he 
said “view threats differently” than the United States. The remark echoed Kagan’s conclu-
sion that “when it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining chal-
lenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States 
and Europe have parted ways.”48 Transatlantic differences were also brought to the fore 
in public opinion surveys. According to the Transatlantic Trends survey of the German 
Marshall Fund, there was a systemic gap between European and American appreciations 
of the use of force and for what force is considered justified (see figure 1). At the same time, 
it also showed ample differences between European states. 
Kagan’s essay begged further clarification, nuance and context. He wrote that Euro-
pean weakness was caused by a lack of military capabilities yet he failed to answer the ques-
tion why Europeans - as structural realists would predict - had not emulated the United 
States and developed similar military capabilities. He bypassed the underlying question of 
what drives states to develop high-intensity military capabilities in the first place. Defense 
budgets were an obvious place to look. The United States militarily outspends the rest of 
the world. In absolute figures, while only at 3.3% of GDP, in 2002 the amount is almost 
twice as large as the combined budgets of the rest of its NATO allies. Including the emer-
gency funds made available for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States spends 
an equivalent amount on defense as the rest of the world combined. Its defense budget 
47 See for instance, “British Criticize US Air Attacks in Afghan Region” New York Times, August 
9, 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/world/asia/09casualties.html). For an excellent 
assessment of differences in national perspective regarding the value of force in the Iraq 
post-conflict stabilization environment see Aylwin-Foster, Bg Nigel, “Changing the Army for 
Counterinsurgency Operations” Military Review, November –December 2005, pp. 2-15.
48 Kagan (2002), p. 4.
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exceeds spending on international aid and the State Department more than 17 times, 
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“Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice”
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Figure 1:   Comparison of German, Dutch and American Attitudes to War 
(Source: German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends, 2009, Topline Data, 
http://www.gmfus.org/trends/2009/docs/2009_English_Top.pdf)
Figure 2:   Table of Costs Appropriated to Defense and Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands, 
Germany and the United States, including Ratio-Curve.
(Source: Author’s analysis. Figures taken from United States Congress, Finanzamt, Auswaertiges Amt, Ministerie van 











































































49 In Europe, there are differences nonetheless as Germany spends five times more on Defense 
than on Foreign aid, and the Netherlands spends roughly an equivalent amount with the 





















































With such figures it is not surprising that the United States has an inclination to focus more 
on the military than Europeans. Underlying these figures is a fundamental distinction that 
pertains to how Europeans and Americans perceive their role in the world and the role 
played by the military in their security policy.
Furthermore, Kagan states that Europe “is moving beyond power into a self-contained 
world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation.”50 This observation 
is only tenable when looking at intra-European affairs in which Europeans have aban-
doned the use of force as an instrument of their foreign policy. However, it does not hold 
when considering the high-intensity combat states such as the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Great Britain have engaged in during recent interventions like Afghanistan. Referring to 
military power, he asserted that one of the principal distinctions between Europe and the 
US is that “those with a greater capacity to fix problems are more likely to fix them.” Yet 
this assumes that there is a causal relationship between superior conventional military 
power and success in complex emergencies. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan demonstrated that this is not the case and that certain elements of the United 
States’ conventional military power have been offset by innovation in the field of asym-
metric strategies.51 This trend heralds a major system-level event with the potential over 
time to change the distribution of power and - as the case study on the United States makes 
clear - Washington is encountering substantial difficulties to adapt to it. The campaigns in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the once unquestioned superpower is not 
50 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p. 3.
51 See Rob de Wijk, The Art of Military Coercion, Why the West’s military superiority scarcely 
matters, (Leiden: Mets & Schilt, 2005).
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invulnerable. Not only does it provide possible adversaries with a practical manual on how 
to effectively confront the United States, as long as the US military remains embroiled in 
these theatres it provides an opportunity for others to expand their influence elsewhere.
Nevertheless Kagan’s article triggered renewed attention to the dynamics inside 
a security community that was presumed to have a common appreciation of the threat 
environment. The belief that the West is a homogenous entity responding to the interna-
tional security environment in similar ways was shattered. This impacts the trajectory of 
transformation as well. From an academic and policy-analytical perspective it is of interest 
to look at transformation strategies when NATO member states, commonly perceived as 
having similar security interests; historically constituting ‘the West;’ having commonly 
agreed to transform their military; and subjected to similar system-level parameters; in 
fact lack commonality in that approach. Understanding the factors that shaped the indi-
vidual transformation strategies yields insights into how these states respond to changes in 
the security environment as well as how they perceive the role of the military instrument 
in it. This helps to understand variance in responses to security challenges such as irreg-
ular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan or dealing with international terrorism, and it allows 
assessing the future of the Atlantic alliance in an expeditionary environment. Analyzing 
the variables shaping a state’s transformation strategy enables a better understanding of 
the behavior of individual actors in the realm of international security. It also gives greater 
substance to the discussion over European and American differences in security policy. 
For what purpose a state transforms its military is as important as how it does so.
From the moment that transformation was adopted throughout NATO, it was antici-
pated that a commonly pursued transformation strategy could bridge a capability gap with 
the United States and give new energy and cohesion to the NATO alliance.52 In spite of 
common values and an international system that was relatively risk-free and favorable to 
Western states, transformation has not been pursued similarly by NATO member states.53 
There are fundamental differences between the United States and its European allies, as 
well as among European states, and these differences impact NATO’s ability to formulate a 
common response to security challenges. It can thereby be hypothesized that transforma-
tion strategies aside from the relative distribution of power are also shaped by domestic 
considerations. This lends credence to supplementing an interest-based analysis with 
elements derived from the school of international relations that emphasizes the role of 
domestic and ideational variables. While the international environment offers the frame-
work within which a state pursues its security interests, a state’s policies are given shape 
once filtered through the lens of a state’s strategic culture. The theoretical basis for this 
hypothesis is elaborated upon in Chapter 5.
52 See David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, Mind the Gap: Promoting 
a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington DC: National Defense University 
Press, 1999).
53 See Terry Terrif, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell (eds.), A Transformation Gap? American 
Innovations and European Military Change, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
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4 Problem Statement
The focus of this research rests on explaining how discontinuous military change was given 
shape from 1991 onwards by three NATO member states. So doing the research will assess 
which factors were crucial to give shape to transformation in these states and how this 
impacts cohesion within NATO. Why was transformation pursued the way it was? The 
principle research interest thereby rests on explaining variation in Western transforma-
tion strategies. It is the thesis of this research that the interaction between system-level 
dynamics and a state’s strategic culture combined are the main factors that shape a state’s 
policy of defense transformation.54 Three states are considered, all members of the NATO 
alliance; the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. The reason for their selection is 
offered in chapter 7. 
Through a structured focused comparison of the transformation strategies of three 
Western states in the period 1991-2008 this research studies how NATO member states 
have interpreted and responded to periods of transition in the international security envi-
ronment. On the basis of a theoretical framework derived from neoclassical realism I 
argue that the choice for, and outcome of a particular transformation strategy is a product 
of both the system-level position of a state in a given international distribution of power 
and a state’s strategic culture. The research question is How has the interaction between 
system-level factors and domestic strategic cultures influenced the trajectory of defense 
transformation of NATO member states and how does it shape future transatlantic 
security relations and the future of NATO? 
In the next part the theoretical framework will be presented. The theoretical basis is 
offered by the international relations theory of neoclassical realism. It fuses system-level 
and domestic-level variables to explain state behavior. In this conceptual framework stra-
tegic culture is considered the central domestic-level variable intervening in translating the 
external system-level environment and relative power differentials into transformation 
strategies. Following a discussion of strategic culture, subsequently the research design and 
methodology are presented, including the subquestions to be addressed. 
54 This is based on the theory of neoclassical realism. For an overview see Gideon Rose, 
“Neoclassical Realism and theories of foreign policy,” World Politics, vol. 51, no.1, (October 
1998), pp. 144-172.
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5 Theoretical Framework
There is, upon the whole, nothing more important in life than to find out 
the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged 
of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend the mass of 
events in their unity from one standpoint; and it is only the keeping to one 
point of view that guards us from inconsistency.
 – Carl von Clausewitz, “On War”55
The definition of transformation used in this research implies that variations in transfor-
mation strategies are principally the result of divergent interpretations of changes in the 
security environment. This underlines the importance of domestic variables to explain 
state behavior. From a neoclassical realist perspective, transformation strategies take shape 
in response to perceived major shifts in the international security environment, as filtered 
through domestic-level variables. For instance, the French levée-en-masse was a means to 
increase the power of Napoleon and so doing to extract greater resources from the French 
nation. It originated in the inculcation of nationalism in response to perceived external 
threats.56 Yet this could only have taken place following major changes in French society 
subsequent to the French Revolution. The theoretical basis for understanding the drivers 
of transformation needs to take both system- and domestic-level factors into account. In 
this chapter a model for explaining transformation strategies is developed on the basis of 
the theory of neoclassical realism. Furthermore, the variable strategic culture is introduced 
as a crucial domestic-level factor shaping a state’s disposition towards the use of the mili-
tary instrument. Sources of strategic culture are similarly presented. Finally, this part closes 
by elaborating on the case studies and the research design.
A theory is a logically coherent ‘bias’ in an attempt to foster greater understanding 
of a complex subject. Just as the economist focuses on economic trends and the spread of 
means of production and treats other aspects of social interaction as secondary, the theo-
retical underpinnings of this research act as a filter and a lens. The theoretical framework 
attempts to rationalize the inevitably subjective nature of some of the choices made in this 
research. Does this make the research in itself weaker or stronger? The choice of theory is 
that part of a social scientific research that makes it strong and vulnerable at the same time. 
The use of a theory may antagonize those that disagree with it in principle, perhaps for no 
other reason than not being their favored theory, yet it may also stimulate an academic 
debate about the ontology and epistemology of a subject, or which spectacles most sharply 
focus the topic. My intent is to offer a logical, internally coherent argumentation on this 
topic pertaining to foreign and defense policy.
55 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin, 1982), p.404.
56 Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security, vol. 
18, no 2. (Autumn 1993), pp. 80-124.
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5.1 System and Domestic–Level Theories of 
International Relations
Neoclassical realism is a relatively new field of international relations scholarship. It 
attempts to equip the school of Realism with greater depth and richness and explain 
foreign policy by bridging the gap between neorealist theories that rely on the explana-
tory power of international power distributions and material interests, and theories of 
Innenpolitik that emphasize the role of ideas, perceptions, culture and norms to shape 
decisionmakers’ preferences. It has emerged as an attempt to refocus realist scholarship 
away from the structural analyses that were dominant in the past half century and towards 
foreign policy analysis, reminiscent of the focus of traditional realist scholars of the early 
20th century.57 Hence the attribution neoclassical. This has led neoclassical realists to carve 
out a space for their work in the turbulent theoretical waters where realism and construc-
tivism meet. It has led to academic clashes with both neorealism, or structural realism, 
as well as with theories of constructivism that perceive interests, alliances, and power as 
social constructs. In the following chapter a neoclassical realist approach is put forward by 
discussing the shortcomings of both neorealism and constructivism to study transforma-
tion. Yet it is precisely the synergistic interaction between the two schools which offers a 
promising way forward. Subsequently strategic culture is presented as the domestic vari-
able to complement a system-level analysis within the contours of neoclassical realism.
5.1.1 Neorealism’s Shortcomings
Arguably the theory most often referred to in contemporary international relations schol-
arship, whether favorably or not, is Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism.58 His balance of power 
theory is one of the benchmark studies against which various alternative theories are 
generally tested. Neorealism is interested in systemic outcomes of state behavior over a 
longer period of time, and says little about the individual foreign policies of states.59 Waltz’s 
theory does not deal with the question why particular states pursue particular strategies. 
This makes its system-level assumptions relevant but not sufficient for the present study of 
transformation. 
Neorealism remains the dominant theory to explain the behavior of the Soviet 
Union and the United States during the Cold War. The Cold War was the product of a 
dangerous although inherently straightforward strategic threat environment. The number 
of important actors was limited, it was a bipolar system, and the nature of competition was 
predominantly military and military-industrial. It favored a systemic explanation which 
was provided by neorealism. The Cold War could be understood by knowing the distribu-
tion of material capabilities and the dominant impact the existential, nuclear threat had on 
the system as a whole. International politics was captured in a two-party game of mutually 
assured destruction (MAD). Not surprisingly, the allegory often used to describe the Cold 
57 Lobell et al (2009).
58 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
59 Waltz (1979), p. 71-72.
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War was the chessboard. As Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravscik argue, Waltz’s theory is 
primarily applicable under the specific circumstances present during the Cold War.60 They 
argue that the theory was of bounded validity, confined to a particular Zeitgeist. The end 
of the Cold War created new systemic dynamics and a different Zeitgeist, thereby spelling 
the end of the dominance, or perhaps even the relevance, of neorealism. 
New challenges arose in the form of non-state actors, destabilizing spill-over from 
regional conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore 
the absence of a peer competitor of the United States implied a shift to a unipolar system 
founded on US conventional military superiority. The new security paradigm that took 
shape, as James Gow points out, was one where “new threats and challenges are fuzzy and 
hard to perceive. They have no equivalent to the a priori status of structurally bound states 
in neorealism.”61 The strategic documents published by Western governments in the subse-
quent years similarly reflected uncertainty over the international system. Ethnic conflicts, 
intra-state conflicts, asymmetric conflicts, non-conventional conflicts, ‘military opera-
tions other than war’, non-military security threats, complex emergencies and terrorism 
formed the post-Cold War vocabulary used by international relations scholars trying to 
understand the behavior of greater and lesser powers, as well as a new type of actor in the 
international arena, the non-state actor. It tested the fundamentals of neorealist thinking, 
whose proponents nevertheless continued to promote the relevance of net assessments in 
support of their theory.62 A crucial problem is that neorealism avoids relying on domestic 
level variables for explanatory purposes, yet particularly in a unipolar system those factors 
that shaped foreign policy were becoming more important to understand state behavior. 
For instance in relation to understanding third-party interventions in ethnic conflicts. As 
Martha Finnemore points out, there was little structural realist rationale for Western inter-
vention in the crises in Somalia and Cambodia. Instead, she argued, it was the norm of safe-
guarding human rights that shaped the decision of states.63 Waltz later concurred that the 
United States intervened in several ethnic conflicts out of national ambition and domestic 
pressure, rather than systemic motives and external security interests. Neorealism, he clari-
fied, describes systemic dynamics over the longer term, not the short-term when relative 
distributions of power are in transit.64 Yet the short-term is precisely the period in which 
transformation policies take shape. This complicates making use of neorealism for this 
study. 
60 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravscik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist,” International Security, 
vol. 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), p. 49.
61 James Gow, Defending the West, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) p. 34.
62 See for instance Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War” in International 
Security, Vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.
63 M. Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Katzenstein, P.J. (ed.), 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996).
64 Waltz (2000), p.27.
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Neorealism’s sub-varieties are similarly problematic to explain the specific foreign 
policy behavior of transformation. Offensive and defensive Realism both focus on the role 
of relative power distributions yet they both explain state behavior differently. The offen-
sive variant assumes that states are power-maximizers and that in an anarchic world the 
desire for scarce security is the dominant driver of state behavior. This persistently drives 
states to identify avenues to increase their power.65 Offensive realists thereby equate anoth-
er’s greater military power to greater anticipated aggressive behavior, breeding the risk of 
confrontation. That states always and only seek to expand their power however is a simpli-
fication.66 Defensive realism assumes instead that on the basis of the power distribution 
states are security-maximizers and thereby have the choice to ‘balance’ or ‘bandwagon’ 
against threats.67 While states essentially want to avoid confrontation, they become victim 
of security dilemmas. This is a conclusion that is hard to falsify in general yet becomes 
problematic when applied in more detail. Although the security dilemma is a central 
aspect of interstate dynamics (and remains so in this neoclassical realist study), defensive 
Realism offers an incomplete theoretical understanding of how threat perceptions are 
formed. They are as much formed by domestic considerations as in response to the real 
military capabilities of others. 
The foremost objection to both variants as well as neorealism in general is the assump-
tion that actors first of all have an accurate understanding of the objective distribution of 
power in the international system and secondly, that this is translated friction-free into 
state behavior. This is a serious shortfall as international politics is not a chess-game where 
everyone knows the amount, type, function and position of all the pieces on the board. 
Instead, international relations are governed by imperfect information. States take deci-
sions based on their own unique interpretation of that imperfect information.68 Robert 
Bathurst offered the example of US reliance on technology-heavy solutions to security 
issues and how this skewed its estimations of relative power. Even when attempting to 
make objective estimates of relative power, such as through net assessments of Soviet 
military capabilities, perception and subjectivity came into play. Bathurst notes that the 
seemingly straight-forward and objectively verifiable act of counting military hardware 
as a measure of estimation was perception-driven and value-laden leading to misper-
ceptions.69 The United States assumed mistakenly that its use and application of military 
hardware was comparable to the Soviet’s. Bathurst concluded that “only after long, usually 
65 See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
2001).
66 See Randall Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” in Security 
Studies, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996) pp. 90-121.
67 See Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1999).
68 Robert Jervis, Perception & Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976).
69 Robert B. Bathurst, Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy (London: SAGE, 1993), 
p. 115.
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costly mistakes do we learn that a tank in a Soviet context was not the same as a tank in 
NATO.”70 Domestic factors influenced perceptions of external threats. In other research, 
Jack Snyder in 1977 argued that differences in nuclear strategy between the Soviet Union 
and the United States were due to domestic variables rather than anything else.71 
Neorealism does not focus on explaining foreign policy. Rather it contents itself to 
taking a longer-term perspective and addressing longer-term system trends. This makes 
it inadequate for explaining why a particular state may be slow or fail to pursue a change 
in its strategy or why some states are able to adapt and others are not when facing similar 
threats or opportunities in the international system. This is relevant for the current study 
to understand why and how a state has pursued its path of transformation. As Jeffrey Talia-
ferro argues, unit-level variables instead determine whether and when a state pursues an 
adaptive strategy.72 These variables constrain or enable key decisionmakers to respond in 
the short to medium term to system-level events. With regards to this present study of 
transformation, perhaps the most explicit criticism has been articulated by Stephen Rosen. 
He argued that neorealists believe to have found a “universal science that explains the 
generation of military power in all countries, without regard to their internal societies.”73 
This can hardly explain the divergence in transformation strategies that are witnessed. 
While neorealist assumptions on the balance of power shape the confines within which 
state behavior takes shape, to explain a state’s foreign policy it needs to be augmented with 
an appreciation of domestic variables.
5.1.2 The Need to Augment Theory with Domestic Level Variables
Theories that focus exclusively on domestic level factors are known under the category 
Innenpolitik. They stress the role of domestic variables such as political ideology, culture 
and societal composition and reject the role of international systemics to explain state 
behavior. State structures and the belief systems prevalent among the governing elite 
are considered independent variables.74 The democratic peace theorem, which holds 
that democracies do not go to war with each other, is perhaps its most important exam-
ple.75 It asserts that domestic structures and regimes define state behavior. Such theories 
focus on domestic-level factors yet they fail to explain variance in state behavior under 
70 Ibid.
71 Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, R-2154-AF, 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1977).
72 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource 
Extractive State,” Security Studies, vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006), pp. 465-469.
73 Stephen P. Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” International Security, vol. 19, 
no. 4 (Spring 1995), p. 5.
74 This applies to social constructivism but also some liberal theories of international relations. 
See Alexander Wendt, ”Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization, vol. 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.
75 See Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 1,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, vol. 12, no. 3 (1983), pp. 205-235.
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differing system-level contexts. For instance, although Saddam Hussein was a critical 
factor in shaping Iraqi policy, his foreign policy would have been very different if he was 
the president of the Solomon Islands instead of Iraq. The regional distribution of power in 
the Middle East cannot be ignored, nor can Iraq’s geopolitical setting in the 1990’s. The 
chief problem with theories that focus solely on domestic characteristics is that they fail 
to explain why the same state may pursue different strategies under different international 
distributions of power, or its inverse, why similar foreign policies can be produced by 
states with substantially differing domestic systems.76 A purely constructivist interpreta-
tion of transformation would disregard the constraints offered by system-level dynamics 
in shaping threats and discount interests as dependent variables subject to intersubjective 
construction rather than the material requirements of state security. While anarchy to a 
certain degree indeed is what states make of it, within the confines of a relative distribu-
tion of power states are constrained in the options they can pursue as states at a minimum 
pursue their survival and at maximum pursue global domination. 
Instead I have found it useful to look at the interaction between both system and 
domestic level variables. Waltz concedes that “the causes of war lie not simply in states 
or the state system; they are found in both.”77 In fact, in his 2000 article in International 
Security the neorealist infers both domestic and system-level elements to explain state 
behavior. “Structures shape and shove; they do not determine the actions of states,” he 
wrote.78 Neoclassical realism combines both system and domestic-level variables to 
explain state behavior. 
5.2  Neoclassical Realism
Both domestic and system-level factors are constraints within which a state’s security 
policy takes shape. Neoclassical Realism has emerged over the past fifteen years in inter-
national relations scholarship as a deductive theory that combines both variables. Rather 
than being an additive theory, neoclassical realism underscores that domestic and system-
level factors interact to produce foreign and defense policy outcomes. 
Neorealism and neoclassical realism are closely related. Waltz’s neorealism focuses 
on the long-term outcome of a system, not on the shorter-term transition periods in 
between different constellations of the relative power distribution. The neoclassical real-
ists Jeffrey Taliaferro, Steven Lobell and Norrin Ripsman write in their study that “over 
the long term, international political outcomes generally mirror the actual distribution 
of power among states. In the shorter term however, the policies states pursue are rarely 
objectively efficient or predictable based upon a purely systemic analysis.”79 At the end of 
76 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” World Politics, vol. 51 (October 1998).
77 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, no. 1, 
(Summer 2000), p. 13.
78 Ibid, p. 24.
79 Steven E. Lobell, et al., Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.4.
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the Cold War, neorealism predicted the United States would pursue a policy that sustains 
its position as a hegemon.80 Yet, neorealism had little to offer in order to understand how 
the United States would pursue this position. It does not deal with the complex issue of 
how states interpret and respond to transitions in the distribution of power. It does not 
answer the question how governments assessed likely threats, and why they did so, and 
translated it into foreign and security policy. Particularly during these transition periods 
domestic variables are central.81 One of the crucial moments in the international system is 
when there is ambiguity over the distribution of power, or a period in which the distribu-
tion of power changes, or is expected to change. This is precisely where neoclassical realism 
has added value. In these transition periods information about the international system 
is opaque, and states are even more dependent on their interpretations of these shifts.82 
Instead system-level distributions of power set the broad parameters of foreign policy yet 
domestic-level variables inform how those parameters are translated into policy. 
Neoclassical realism has several core characteristics. Conform neorealism, neoclas-
sical realism takes the international system and the relative distribution of power as a 
starting point. Gideon Rose, one of the principal students of the theory, writes that “the 
scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place 
in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities.”83 
Likewise, Fareed Zakaria, another prominent neoclassical realist, argues that any theory 
of foreign policy “should first ask what effects the international system has on national 
behavior.”84 Neoclassical realism is explicitly realist in its assumptions regarding the role of 
the relative distribution of material capabilities, the focus on power and the impact it has 
on interest formation.85 Yet contrary to neorealism, it focuses on explaining foreign policy. 
A second core characteristic is that neoclassical realism assumes there is an “imper-
fect transmission belt” between a state’s relative position in the system and its foreign 
policy. Contrary to neorealism, there is no direct, unfettered and undiluted linkage 
between relative power capabilities and state behavior. Instead, the impact of “power 
capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must 
80 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 25, no. 1, 
(Summer 2000), p. 5-41.
81 See Tobias M. Wilke, German Strategic Culture Revisited: Linking the past to contemporary 
German strategic choice, (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007).
82 Steven E. Lobell, et al. (2009), p.41.
83 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, vol. 51 
(October 1998), p. 146.
84 Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics” in Michael E. Brown et al (eds.), The Perils of 
Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), p. 
482.
85 Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism” in Colin Elman and 
Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
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be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.”86 Since policy is shaped by 
officials, national interests and threats to these interests follow from their reading of the 
international environment. Responses to threats are similarly constrained by unit-level 
variables, including ideology or state institutions. As Rose elaborates, “one must analyze 
how systemic pressures are translated through domestic-level intervening variables such 
as decisions-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structure.”87 Neoclassical realism 
takes account of the possibility that state-actors misinterpret, misunderstand, or misread 
the international structure, which in turn can produce foreign policy responses that are 
not congruent with neorealist expectations. 
A third assumption in neoclassical realism is that as perceived power increases states 
expand the scope of their political agenda abroad.88 When relative power increases, so too 
does the ambition to influence international affairs. The more perceived power an actor 
has, the more it will attempt to advance its normative view of the international environ-
ment. Robert Gilpin wrote in the 1980’s that increased power breeds a greater appetite 
for influencing the international arena.89 Conversely, when relative power declines, these 
ambitions are scaled back. Power is an enabler for the spread of ideas, but ideas influence 
how power is used. An example is the increase in expeditionary peace operations after 
the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War signaled a benevolent environment 
to the ‘victorious’ West. It enabled these states to expand their domestic liberal agendas 
abroad. Not only did these states take a peace dividend but they also pursued liberal-inter-
ventionist agendas, promoting the advance of Western liberal values through peace opera-
tions, many far away from home. The new international constellation offered a US-led 
Security Council new opportunities to advance its global role. In these days, President 
George H. W. Bush spoke of creating a ‘new world order’. It marked an embrace of liberal 
interventionism. 
While neoclassical realism does not explain systemic shifts, it accords weight to how 
the perceived distribution of power influences the opportunities a state has to advance its 
security interests. “Power in short, determines the options that preferences select.”90 The 
systemic and unit level variables are thus mutually connected rather than one having 
precedence over the other. The neoclassical realist Jeffrey Taliaferro writes that “systemic 
forces shape domestic process within states, which in turn constrain states’ ability to 
respond to systemic imperatives.”91 Different system-level distributions of power thus 
produce different constraints within which domestic variables shape policy.
86 Rose (1998), p. 146.
87 Ibid, p. 152.
88 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p.33-42.
89 A pessimist’s equivalent of this would be to say ‘power corrupts’. See Robert Gilpin, War and 
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
90 G. Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration, 
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 96.
91 J.W. Taliaferro in Lobell et al. (2009), p. 210-211.
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The interplay between domestic and systemic factors is relevant to understand how 
the United States coped with the changed post-Cold War security environment. The United 
States did not develop a military empire based on repression; instead it strengthened a 
set of international institutions and intervened on a limited scale in places like Somalia, 
Haiti and Bosnia, amongst others to promote liberal norms. Instead, it was a combina-
tion of a benevolent security environment, in which no peer competitors appeared on 
the horizon, and domestic factors which shaped US policy.92 For smaller powers, from a 
neorealist perspective, the major changes in the international security environment after 
the end of the Cold War heralded a strategy of bandwagoning with, or counterbalancing 
the United States. Rather than respond in a similar fashion, a set of domestic constraints 
and different threat appreciations, along with institutional considerations, influenced the 
policies of European medium and smaller powers. International imperatives were filtered 
by domestic considerations to affect how officials conceptualized and responded to the 
new distribution of power and threats to national interests. 
Turning to the relation between neoclassical realism and transformation, Samuel 
Huntington observed in the 1960’s already hat “Major changes in military policy reflect 
changes in the relations of the government to its domestic and foreign environment.” 
Huntington continues:
If the external balance of power changes and the government sees 
opportunities to expand its territory and power abroad, these changes in 
its external environment will be reflected in its military policy. The changes 
in military policy, in turn, may require changes in aspects of domestic 
policy. Similarly, changes in the domestic environment – such as rapid 
industrialization of the country, or a change in its form of government 
– may lead to alterations in its military policy and its foreign policy […]. 
At any given time, military policy thus reflects the interactions between 
the external environment and goals of the government and its domestic 
environment and goals.93
Huntington’s comments correspond to the principles of neoclassical realism outlined 
above. For transformation it means that discontinuous change in a state’s defense affairs 
can be derived from the interplay between domestic and system-level variables. The inde-
pendent variable in neoclassical realism is the relative power distribution, while domestic-
level variables intervene, to produce foreign policy. As such, neoclassical realism provides 
an appropriate theoretical framework within which to study how different Western states 
respond to periods of upheaval and change in the international system and to under-
stand how states individually cope with the process of change and what this has implied 
92 Lobell et al (2009), p.3.
93 Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 
482.
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for the role of the military instrument.94 James Gow, professor at King’s College, makes a 
similar point when he states that “Necessity lies at the core of the social construction of 
Realist understanding.”95 What one state feels necessary, the other does not. All changes 
in strategic policy pursued by a state – formulated in response to the perceived distribu-
tion of power - is governed by the notion that it is necessary due to an appreciation of 
the external environment. This opens the door to emphasizing the role of perceptions in 
understanding foreign policy. 
Hans Morgenthau, the intellectual father of classical political realism, acknowl-
edged the role that perceptions play and the influence of domestic level factors on interest 
formation. National character, Morgenthau argues, affects the development of interests as 
it “cannot fail to influence national power; for those who act for the nation in peace and 
war, formulate, execute and support its policies, elect and are elected, mold public opinion, 
produce and consume – all bear to a greater or lesser degree the imprint of those intellec-
tual and moral qualities which make up the national character.”96 Von Clausewitz, a clas-
sical realist, stated that “one and the same political object may produce totally different 
effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times […].”97 In 
these statements, neoclassical realism finds its classical roots. Differences between actors 
may depend on varying perceptions or variance in the external environment. Robert 
Jervis made this point clearly in Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 
arguing that even if different states acknowledge that a particular threat has arisen it does 
not imply these states will respond in a similar way.98 Given the central role that percep-
tions play as a domestic variable, let us take a closer look.
5.2.1 The Role of Perceptions
The nature of regimes matters to explain state behavior. As Walter Russell Mead demon-
strated in his treatise on US foreign policy schools, a Jacksonian or Wilsonian president 
will pursue foreign policy objectives differently, independent of a given system-level 
distribution of power.99 Elites view the world through their ideological and philosophical 
prisms, whether it is isolationist or liberal internationalist. It impacts how the objective 
reality of the international system is viewed. An analogous dynamic can be seen in particle 
physics. The Heisenberg principle asserts that phenomena are distorted by the act of 
observation. It means that reality is a product of its interaction with the perceiving entity. 
Similarly, neoclassical realism advocates that events within the relative distribution of 
94 Ibid, p. 21.
95 Gow (2004), p.35.
96 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace (New York: A.A. 
Knopf, 1985, 6th ed.) p. 151.
97 Von Clausewitz, p. 109.
98 Jervis (1976), p. 13-31.
99 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the 
World (New York: Routledge, 2002).
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power are filtered through domestic level factors such as the perceptions of policymakers 
and governing elites. In short, context, shaped by the external environment and domestic 
factors, matters.100 Officials filter information about the external security environment 
through their ideologies, histories and political philosophies. For instance, under the bipo-
larity of the Cold War, the behavior of the United States fluctuated from containment to 
détente to roll-back on the basis of differing assessments of Soviet behavior by different 
administrations. William Wohlforth asserted that the end of the Cold War was driven by 
perceived shifts in power rather than objective changes therein.101 Conservative national-
ists and neoconservatives in the US have different interpretations of the intentions of other 
actors in the international system. They ‘read’ international affairs differently. Domestic-
level determinants that shape perceptions are thus an essential element for sense-making 
and interpretation of the international security environment within the relative distribu-
tion of power. Robert Jervis is pessimistic about the effect of perception on decisionmakers 
and contends that state behavior is almost always based on faulty assumptions of the other. 
The security dilemma is the most obvious and most dangerous example: 
Actors frequently assume that their intentions, especially peaceful ones, are 
clear to others. Failing to realize that others may see the actor as a threat 
to their security, the actor concludes that others’ arms increases can only 
indicate unprovoked aggressiveness.102
An emphasis on intersubjective interpretations of reality opens the field of international 
relations to psychological analysis, as exemplified by the work of strategist Alexander 
George who contends that individuals simplify the world on the basis of “a set of beliefs 
and personal constructs about the physical and social world”.103 Perceptions are inter-
vening variables to give meaning to the system-level distribution of power. Robert Bathurst 
argued that “we classify what we experience to what we know.”104 In his discussion of 
neoclassical realism Gideon Rose writes that due to the role of elite perceptions “the world 
100 See also Colin S. Gray, Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: the 
Sovereignty of context, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, February 2006.
101 William Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) as quoted in Legro and Moravscik (1999), p. 39.
102 Jervis (1976), p. 410.
103 “In order to function, every individual acquires during the course of his development a 
set of beliefs and personal constructs about the physical and social environment. These 
beliefs provide him with a relatively coherent way of organizing and making sense of what 
would otherwise be a confusing and overwhelming array of signals and cues picked up 
from the environment by his senses […] These beliefs and constructs necessarily simplify 
the external world […] Much of an individual’s behaviour is shaped by the particular ways 
in which he perceives, evaluates, and interprets incoming information about events in his 
environment.”Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective 
Use of Information and Advice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 57.
104 Robert Bathurst¸ Intelligence and the Mirror, (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 
1993), p.3.
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states end up inhabiting is indeed partly of their own making.”105 This deliberate reference 
to Alexander Wendt’s social-constructivist work Anarchy is what states make of it is an 
expression of neoclassical realism’s acknowledgement of the central role of domestic-level 
factors and that it aspires to a form of theory-synthesis between neorealism and Innenpoli-
tik.106 Neoclassical realism, so doing, allows a measure of ‘securitization’ or construction of 
security threats.107 In fact, if the system-level variables sketch the broad contours in which 
policy can take shape, neoclassical realism relies for its specific explanatory power on the 
constructivist elements that were already underlined in Morgenthau’s classical work.108 
The role of perceptions and national ideology are currently considered to be the exclusive 
realm of the constructivist school. Yet an interest-based analysis of state behavior, which 
rests at the foundation of realist thinking, can only but benefit from taking into account 
the role that perceptions play in shaping how elites understand what the national interest is.
A manifest example of the role of perceptions in international relations was formed 
by the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003. For several years Saddam Hussein obstructed a 
UN-imposed weapons inspections regime. Blocking or delaying access to sites and failing 
to provide transparent accounts of stockpiles of weapons. The United States had become 
convinced that Iraq possessed and continued to have the capability to produce weapons 
of mass destruction. As such, Washington reasoned that Saddam had every reason to 
obstruct UN weapons inspections. Assuming that Saddam had such weapons, they 
were seen to pose a direct threat to the regional distribution of power and US national 
security. Iraq had a history of belligerence and these weapons could be used against 
105 Rose (1998), p. 153.
106 See Alexander Wendt, ”Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization, vol. 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. For a broad overview 
of Constructivist literature on international security see Katzenstein, Peter (ed.), The Culture 
of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996). There is a trend of theory-synthesis among IR scholars. In their article Is 
Anybody still a Realist Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravscik have advocated theory-synthesis 
as a means to deal with the problems offered by the traditionally divided areas of international 
relations and foreign policy. They refer to a ‘two-step’ method whereby “the domestic and 
transnational state-society relations of preference and belief formation can be analytically 
separated from the strategic logic of interstate interaction […].” Neoclassical Realism is a 
concise effort to conceptualize this theoretical ‘two-step’. On the one hand it has a profound 
Realist base, emphasizing relative material power. On the other hand there is a consideration 
of unit-level variables and a focus on the role of perceptions which may be considered 
Constructivist. While Constructivism is not Innenpolitik per se, it contends that state behavior 
– and the definition of interests - is determined on the basis of beliefs and norms of the actor, 
elements that are partial to neoclassical Realism’s reliance on the perceptions of governing 
elites. Although it seems a contradiction-in-terms to coalesce these two separate schools 
of thought that are contradictory at first sight (Wendt 1987 & Barkin 2003), as Legro and 
Moravscik point out, “is it realistic to maintain that patterns of important, complex events in 
world politics are the result of a single factor?” Andrew Moravcsik and Jeffrey W. Legro, “Is 
Anybody Still a Realist?”, International Security, vol. 23, no. 2, (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55.
107 See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, & Jaap de Wilde, Security: A new framework for analysis, 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
108 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Neoclassical Realism and identity: peril despite profit across the 
Taiwan Strait,” in Lobell et al. (2009), p.111.
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Israel, enable him to blackmail states in the oil-rich region or – in the limelight of the 
9/11 attacks - be supplied to terrorist groups. On February 5, 2003 US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell briefed the United Nations Security Council with “convincing and conclu-
sive” evidence about Saddam’s weapons programs and it formed the primary justification 
to go to war. After the war, it turned out Saddam in fact did not possess such weapons. 
How could such a dramatic misperception have taken shape? For one, Washington relied 
heavily on intelligence from its array of satellites. These revealed suspicious movements 
at suspected weapons-sites. Iraqi military officials had also been eavesdropped. Yet this 
circumstantial information was interpreted through a filter shaped by years of Iraqi decep-
tion and animosity. On the basis of interviews with Iraqi officials in the aftermath of the 
war researchers concluded that by 2002 Saddam had been trying to persuade the inter-
national community that – contrary to his reputation - he was in fact cooperating with 
the United Nations. Iraqi officials said that orders had been given to remove all traces of 
WMD-related material, which might serve as a pretext for an attack. Ironically, the activi-
ties related to ensuring the removal of all liable material were interpreted as a cover-up 
instead of a clean-up. Iraqi trucks caught on satellite photographs rushing from a site 
about to be inspected were viewed as attempts to hide weapons. Conversations between 
military officers discussing that the term ‘nerve agent’ not be used over the airwaves were 
interpreted as steps to conceal forbidden programs. The authors of the Iraqi Perspectives 
report concluded that “US analysts viewed this information through the prism of a decade 
of prior deceit. They had no way of knowing that this time the information reflected the 
regime’s attempt to ensure it was in compliance with UN resolutions. What was meant 
to prevent suspicion thus ended up heightening it.”109 Perception, misperception and the 
security dilemma played a pivotal role. The idea that Saddam had WMD and especially 
that he was deceiving the international community was more powerful than any alterna-
tive explanation. As the CIA director at the time, George Tenet, recalls in his memoirs: 
“we had no previous experience with a country that did not possess [WMD] weapons but 
pretended that it did… Before the war, we didn’t understand that he was bluffing, and he 
didn’t understand that we were not,[emphasis in original].”110 The idea that Saddam still 
possessed weapons and could not be trusted was the dominant perception shaping the 
lens through which information was interpreted. In fact, Iraq had long led its neighbors 
and the wider world to believe it had weapons of mass destruction rightly to avoid inter-
vention. A security dilemma ensued that brought the two states to war. 
Perceptions regarding the international security environment lie entrenched in 
ideational and normative variables that are referred to under the concept of strategic 
culture. This is the topic we turn to next. 
109 K. Woods, J. Lacey & W. Murray, “ Saddam’s Delusions: the view from the inside,” in Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 85, no. 3, (May/June) 2006. For the full report see Kevin M. Woods et al., “Iraqi 
Perspectives Project: A view of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership,” 
Joint Center for Operational Analysis, US Joint Forces Command, 2006.
110 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, (New York: Harper Collins, 
2007), p. 332-333.
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5.3 Strategic Culture: National Character of States 
in Security 
Neoclassical realist thinking stresses that the national character of states has a strong role 
to play in explaining state behavior. It thereby contributes to a rich body of literature that 
has addressed the role of cultural and ideational factors in shaping strategic behavior. This 
research applies the insights from the study of strategic culture to understand the pursuit 
of transformation strategies. 
As Jeffrey Taliaferro and Steven Lobell indicate, neoclassical realists can relevantly 
draw on strategic culture to explain foreign policy outcomes in conjunction with a 
system-level analysis.111 An example is the work by Randall Schweller, who asserts that 
states may be either revisionist or status quo powers, depending on domestic character-
istics. Schweller studied the period of the run-up to World War II and concluded that 
state behavior and international outcomes vary as a result of state power, but also state 
preferences.112 He defined status-quo states as those that “value what they possess more 
than what they covet, they maximize security not power.” This of course is reminiscent of 
defensive realist theory, although Schweller supplemented it with a cultural analysis. Revi-
sionist states however are power-maximizers which tempt to shift the status-quo in their 
favor. This produces behavior corresponding with offensive realist theory. The difference 
however is that it is not exclusively the system-level constraints that define the strategy of 
the state, as is the case with defensive or offensive realism, but domestic variables as well. 
By drawing up a bestiary, Schweller categorized states by supplementing their position 
in the system of international politics; great power, medium power etc. with their ambi-
tion within the system; status-quo, limited revisionist, strongly revisionist etc. As such he 
argued that the US in the run-up to World War II acted as an Ostrich, Germany as a Wolf, 
Russia as a Fox and France as an Owl.113 A colorful exposé but Schweller’s bestiary is also 
useful for underlining the importance of the national characters of states in security affairs.
Central to the domestic intervening variables explaining patterns in foreign policy is 
the tenet of political culture. Political culture is the set of assumptions, habits and values 
unique to a state regarding the political process and its pursuit of political objectives.114 In 
the realm of foreign and security policy, this translates to the concept of strategic culture. 
As Barry Rosen writes, strategic culture is an “analogous concept [to political culture] 
applied not to the political class of a nation, but to the sub-set of political-military deci-
111 J.W. Taliaferro in Lobell et al. (2009), p. 295.
112 Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
113 Ibid, pp. 59-93.
114 See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy 
in Five Nations, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 11-14; Jeffrey Lantis, 
“Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” International Studies Review, vol.4, no.3 
(Autumn 2002), pp. 90-93.
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sions makers.”115 Strategic culture involves traditions and preferred methods of operation 
regarding the use of the military.116 Generically, it encapsulates the popular notion of a 
“way of war”.117 
Three waves of scholarship on strategic culture can be identified.118 The term was 
pioneered by Jack Snyder and Ken Booth in the late 1970’s whose research focused on 
Soviet-US relations and their nuclear doctrines.119 These scholars argued that national 
belief systems and historical experiences produced a distinct attitude towards strategic 
matters. It introduced the idea that different security communities could think differently 
about the same security issue. The second wave followed the end of the Cold War and 
gave rise to seeing strategic culture as an independent variable. The third wave was associ-
ated with a constructivist shift in international relations research and increased scholarly 
interest in the role of cultural variables to explain state behavior.120 This increased schol-
arly attention produced studies examining how cultural factors shape military doctrine 
and defense strategies.121 Neoclassical realism adds to this the notion that domestic-level 
factors impact the ability of governments to extract resources from the nation, in order to 
increase its relative power.122 
Within this increasingly rich body of research on strategic culture two methodolog-
ical issues stand out that make the use of strategic culture as a variable intellectually chal-
lenging and the object of academic scrutiny.123 Invariably this has to do with the abstract 
and elusive nature of ‘culture’ as a concept. These difficulties are also the result of the 
constructivist turn in international relations scholarship, which leads to new questions 
being asked, the interdisciplinary approach applied and the increased influence of other 
115 Rosen (1995), p.12.
116 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 28.
117 See Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War since 1945, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008).
118 See Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the 
Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010), p. 6-7.
119 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981).
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121 See Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” International 
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123 For three discussions of the use of strategic culture see Christopher P. Twomey, “Lacunae 
in the Study of Culture in International Security,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 29, 
no. 2 (2008), p. 338-357; Jeffrey Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” 
International Studies Review, vol.4, no.3 (Autumn 2002), p. 90-93.; Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture 
Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, International Security, Vol. 23, 
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disciplines on international relations studies aside from political science, such as sociology, 
historical research, psychology and anthropology. The first difficulty is methodological 
and relates to the task to narrow the range of variables that can be considered “cultural.” 
This pertains to a question of definition and identifying the factors that “own” culture. The 
second difficulty lies in strategic culture’s predictive qualities, and whether strategic culture 
is either an intervening or an independent variable. Both issues are addressed briefly below.
Strategic culture is a concept used by many scholars of security studies. Stephen 
Rosen defines strategic culture as “beliefs and assumptions that frame…choices about 
international military behavior, particularly those concerning decisions to go to war, pref-
erences for offensive, expansionist or defensive models of warfare, and levels of wartime 
casualties that would be acceptable.”124 Colin Gray includes in his definition the notion of 
identity. He sees it as a set of behavioral patterns derived from “national historic experience, 
aspiration for self-characterization…, of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, 
and ‘way of life” which coalesces to “modes of thought and action with respect to force.”125 
As such it reflects how society views the military role of the state. In this manner it is also 
related to Charles Kupchan’s definition that strategic culture “refers to images that shape 
how the nation as a collective entity defines its well-being and conceives of its security.”126 
A conference on the topic in 2006 produced a consensus definition that strategic culture 
consists of “shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common 
experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity 
and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for 
achieving security objectives.”127 These definitions have in common that they all identify 
ideational elements as the cornerstone of strategic culture. Yet ‘shared beliefs’ and ‘images 
regarding how a state conceives its security’ are rather amorphous sources. It leads to an 
ontological question; where can strategic culture be found? B.H. Liddell Hart has written 
that strategic culture flows from a state’s geography and resources, history and experience, 
society and political structure.128 This is amply broad to include nearly all domestic vari-
ables that could shape domestic perceptions, as long as they are of semi-permanent status. 
It offers researchers a certain amount of freedom to build a narrative regarding the consti-
tution of strategic culture. As Ken Booth writes, the use of strategic culture is a demanding 
124 Rosen (1995), p. 12.
125 Colin S. Gray, “ National Style in Strategy; The American Example,” International Security, vol. 
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126 Charles Kupchan, The Case for Collective Security, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994), p. 21.
127 Darryl Howlett, “The Future of Strategic Culture,” paper presented at Comparative Strategic 
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task and “will also remain an art rather than a science.”129 Booth describes the use of stra-
tegic culture as a form of “strategic anthropology” which can supplement the more scien-
tific approach of neorealism. Such an understanding does not appeal to scholars looking 
for methodological rigor.130 This leads to the second difficulty, namely the predictive quali-
ties of strategic culture. Jeffrey Lantis has pointed out that one of the problems associated 
with using strategic culture as a variable is its lack of a commonly accepted methodological 
design and its ability to produce replicable results.131 Various studies however have been 
able to convincingly argue how cultural factors influenced security policy. Thomas Berger 
for instance demonstrated how cultural factors rather than economic or technological 
power shaped German and Japanese security policies.132 Nevertheless, Lantis argues, stra-
tegic culture has not become accepted as an independent variable in its own right.133 Colin 
Gray and Alastair Ian Johnston have battled over this topic in academic journals with the 
former ascribing to the view that strategic culture primarily offers context to explain stra-
tegic behavior and the latter complaining about the lack of causality others have attrib-
uted to the concept.134 While Gray sees strategic culture as a supplementary factor to better 
understand a state’s strategic behavior, Johnston holds strategic culture to be a separate 
causal variable to explain such behavior. Gray’s argument contends that strategic culture is 
a “context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behavior.” The strategic 
culture of a state thereby represents a set of patterns of strategic thought and behavior. Ken 
Booth sides with Gray, and understands strategic culture as describing “a set of patterns of 
and for behavior on war and peace issues. It helps shape but does not determine how an 
actor interacts with others in the security field.”135 This makes strategic culture an inter-
vening, rather than an independent variable. Indeed if strategic culture is used as a lens 
that allows “discerning tendencies, not rigid determinants, then the end result should be 
richer theory and more effective practice.”136 It is not the intent of this research to settle this 
debate, suffice to say that this latter interpretation makes strategic culture conducive to be 
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operationalized within a neoclassical realist framework. Although identity is important, 
strategic culture is an intervening variable, along the lines of Colin Dueck’s argument that 
“Culture is best understood as a supplement to and not a substitute for, realist theories of 
strategic choice.” Dueck underlines that system-level factors rank higher in the hierarchy 
of variables than strategic culture: “Strategic culture can certainly help to explain ‘devia-
tions’ from balancing behavior, but since the very concept of such deviations presumes 
some sort of appropriate or expected response to international conditions, it is only within 
a realist framework that such explanations make sense…when political-military cultures 
come under intense international pressure, they adjust and adapt in the end.”137 
Strategic culture gives shape and substance to the identity of the state.138 It defines 
constraints of strategic behavior in relation to what system-level theories of international 
relations would expect. This does not make strategic culture immune to system-level 
dynamics but it does provide depth and understanding to why a state responds to system-
level dynamics in a particular way. Strategic culture in itself is insufficient to explain vari-
ance in transformation strategies, since the relative distribution of power preordains the 
overarching choices a state has. Yet strategic culture – as an intervening variable – is able to 
offer greater understanding why a state for instance was less than successful in pursuing a 
strategy a neorealist understanding would predict. 
To understand how transformation strategies took shape, neoclassical realism 
supplements a system-level analysis with the added depth and richness provided by under-
standing the role behavioral patterns and shared beliefs played in order to bring greater 
understanding how security policies changed. NATO member states pursued transforma-
tion with the intent to increase the relevance of their military instrument to their foreign 
policy objectives as a result of shifts in the security environment. Strategic culture can 
contribute to explain how system-level dynamics impacted the choice and execution of a 
transformation strategy.139 
An additional important characteristic of strategic culture is that it has semi-perma-
nent status. Dima Adamsky points out that “features of culture, norms, and ideas that tran-
scend generations and impact continuously upon a state’s strategic behavior are chosen 
as the parameters of the strategic culture.”140 It means there must be an element of ‘lasting 
nature’ to the identified vehicle of strategic culture. Christopher Meyer similarly ascribes 
a sense of semi-permanence to strategic culture as it is vested in norms.141 However this 
137 Colin Dueck, Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton 
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139 John Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?”, 
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140 Adamsky (2010), p. 12.
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does not mean it is unchangeable. Strategic culture is “persistent over time, but neither 
particular elements nor a culture as a whole are immutable.”142 As the international secu-
rity environment evolves new developments are assessed “through the perceptual lenses 
provided by strategic culture.”143 Thomas Berger likewise argues that strategic culture is 
semi-permanent since its major principles are widely shared among the political class and 
society, and since it is the result of cognitive dynamics which tend to affirm existing ideas 
and beliefs and discounts alternatives as anomalies.144 In other words, strategic culture is 
self-sustaining as developments are interpreted to confirm earlier interpretations. As such 
a process of institutionalization takes place. Just as it takes time to institutionalize stra-
tegic culture as a new pattern of strategic behavior is grown, change is a slow process in 
which internal reflection and resocialization play a large role.145 Meyer argues similarly that 
change may gradually take place “through a constant stream of similar, or a repetition of 
the same kind of discrepant information” that deviates from the status quo.146
This is closely related to the role of the principal ‘owners’ of ‘entrepreneurs’ of stra-
tegic culture, namely the foreign, security and military policy elite and, to a lesser extent, 
the institutions they run. They define security and military policy goals and the manner 
in which the state responds to new challenges. As they have a tendency to promote the 
status quo, change occurs slowly. However, as the principal ‘cultural actors,’ any sustained 
change in their behavior will amount to a change in strategic culture. Therefore, as Lantis 
points out, they might better be understood as “users of culture who redefine the limits of 
the possible.” 
However, in exceptional cases change can come abruptly as a result of an external 
shock in the form of specific events in the international security environment, particularly 
if this is associated with a radical change in the foreign policy elite and its institutions. Mili-
tary defeat, occupation or revolution can change the character of the state. It can also be the 
result of protracted incompatibilities of strategic cultural traits with the external security 
environment.147 Change could come in the form of an experience which due to its impact 
leads to discontinuity over previous policy. Strategic cultural dilemmas thereby “define 
new directions for foreign policy and demand the reconstruction of historical narratives.”148 
As societies change, so can their perception regarding the use of force. Martha 
Finnemore’s research elaborated on this with respect to norms governing the use of force. 
The dismissal of forcible debt collection as a casus belli in the early 20th century and the 
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advent of humanitarian intervention principles for non-white, non-Christian populations 
are two examples of shifts in grand-strategic behavior. Furthermore, there is interaction 
between system- and domestic-level factors. The end of the Second World War led to a 
shift in the balance of power, and it led to a change in the nature of the German and the 
Japanese state. Defeat constituted an external shock that turned two of the most aggres-
sive states at the outset of the 20th century into states that abhorred the use of force in the 
second half of the century. Similarly, the French Revolution brought a paradigm shift in 
France as the appeal of freedom and equality changed for which objectives and by whom 
war was waged.
5.3.1  Sources of Strategic Culture
What then are the sources of strategic culture? Which beliefs and attitudes are central to 
describe it? In a nutshell, there is no single explanatory variable that constitutes strategic 
culture; instead it must be developed indirectly, on the basis of a narrative vested in the 
state’s historical experience with the use of the military. Ken Booth writes that “strategic 
culture is derived from history, geography and political culture, and it represents the aggre-
gation of the attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential voices; these may 
be, depending on the entity, the political elite, the military establishment and/or public 
opinion.”149 This research includes the following sources of strategic culture: preferences in 
ways of using the military, the approach to justifying the use of the military, elite ideology, 
historical experiences with the military and military doctrine. These are elaborated upon 
below according to a distinction of the military and national-political levels.
5.3.1.1 How the Military Should Be Used
Strategic culture resonates at various levels.150 Firstly, at the military level, strategic culture 
reflects norms of warfare regarding how the armed forces should be applied. In 15th century 
France, knights had a code of chivalry. It represented their idea of what war was and how it 
was to be fought; mounted and man-to-man. When confronted with a British adversary at 
Agincourt that did not abide by these perceived rules, it was denounced as amoral, unjust, 
and altogether not war. The French were defeated by a much smaller group of forces that 
operated differently. The British longbowmen were instrumental to heavy French losses. 
In the 20th century, in Vietnam, the struggle against the Vietcong was regarded by some 
as not being war because it failed to match a preconceived idea of conventional maneuver 
war. Colin Gray argues, “Social and cultural contexts differ among societies. It is not safe to 
assume that strategic behavior deemed morally unacceptable by our society would meet 
with identical prohibition abroad.”151 In other words, that which Western states consider 
149 Booth (2005), p. 25.
150 See for instance Thomas Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture,” paper prepared for 
Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced 
Systems and Concepts Office, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, November 13, 2006.
151 Colin S. Gray, Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: the 
Sovereignty of context, February 2006, p. 33.
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just in war may not be reciprocated by the adversary. This has obvious consequences for 
the manner in which force is used. An example is the comment from a US soldier regarding 
the way insurgents in the Iraqi town of Ramadi confronted him in April 2006: “They fight 
us hard, the soldier said. “But there is no morality there. They hide among the population, 
among families, women and children. That’s how they fight. That’s how they do what they 
do.”152 The soldier did not feel that the way in which the insurgents fought was just or fair, 
not according to his idea of what war is or is supposed to be. The insurgent in turn may feel 
that dropping bombs from high altitude neither is a just way to fight. 
These examples are illustrations of norms of warfare. Norms are institutionalized 
ideas about social interaction and “are collective expectations about proper behavior for a 
given identity … Norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular 
environment and about how these particular actors will behave.”153 They are “cognitive 
blinders” or filters of information.154 They justify certain forms of policy while denouncing 
other types of behavior. Not only are they an expression of how the state should act, but 
are similarly an expression of how others are expected to act. Deviation from the norm 
can then lead to the use of force being justified, just as the violation of international law 
can justify an intervention.155 Norms unmistakably can have a relation with elements of 
Realpolitik, as they often express behavior that best contributes to the security of the state. 
For instance, strengthening the norm-based international rule of law by smaller powers is 
a means to counterbalance major powers. According to Lawrence Freedman, “All societies 
expect to fight their wars according to the core values upon which they are based.”156 To 
Western liberal democracies this corresponds to a set of liberal values and ‘just war’ prin-
ciples. It can also produce difficulties when different norms of warfare clash, as was the case 
at Agincourt or in Ramadi. 
Furthermore, at the military level strategic culture can be found in military policy, 
doctrine, technology and procurement policy, illustrating how the military and individual 
military services want to operate.
152 T. Pitman, “Ramadi Insurgents Develop Clever Tactics,” Washington Post, April 9, 2006.
153 R.L. Jepperson, A. Wendt, P. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security” 
in P.J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.54.
154 P. Trubowitz, & E. Rhodes, “Explaining American Strategic Adjustment,” in P. Trubowitz et 
al., The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), chapter 1. As Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane detail, “ideas help 
to order the world. By ordering the world, ideas may shape agendas, which can profoundly 
shape outcomes.” Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, 
Institutions and Political Change, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.12.
155 See also Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the use of 
force, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
156 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 35.
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5.3.1.2 Why the Military Should Be Used
A further source of strategic culture which resides at the national level is the body of 
declaratory policy and political justifications regarding the use of the military instrument. 
Following Meyer’s reasoning, the acceptable goals for the use of the military – whether 
for war, humanitarian intervention or reconstruction missions – goes to the heart of the 
national identity of a given political community and goes a long way to determine the 
composition and capabilities of a country’s armed forces.157 In liberal democratic states, 
the decision to prepare, organize, equip and use the military is accompanied by public 
debate among the different elements of the “foreign policy executive,” generally between 
the government and congress or parliament. As former Dutch Minister of Defense Joris 
Voorhoeve made clear, it is nearly untenable for Government to agree on an operation 
without seeking implicit parliamentary support.158 The perceived necessity to use the mili-
tary corresponds to the perceived justness and legitimacy of the act and yields important 
insights into how a state – defined for the purposes of this research as the “top officials 
and central institutions of government charged with external defense.”159 - understands the 
security environment and its role in it. Declaratory doctrine, policy and political justifica-
tions regarding the preparation and use of the military are important as they are the public 
expression of how the state creates security for itself. Appeals to core principles, ideas or 
norms are tools which are used by the state to extract resources from the nation as well as 
to gain public support for the use of the military. These tools differ for each state dependent 
on its strategic culture. Here the role of the Parliament is crucial as it creates the opportu-
nity to debate this declaratory policy in public. 
Political justifications in specific necessarily appeal to common-held perceptions of 
grand-strategy, the external environment, the role of the state, collective histories about 
domestic society and those of others, and collective norms, values and beliefs. Particularly 
in coalition operations, different states may appeal to different ideas to justify participation 
in the same operation. This yields insights into different patterns of strategic behavior. For 
one state a military intervention against a WMD-producing state is justified in terms of a 
clash between good and evil, while for another state the same intervention may be justi-
fied in the name of supporting the United Nations and upholding the international rule of 
law. Other sources of declaratory policy are strategic policy documents, military doctrine, 
procurement policy and civil-military relations.160 Building a historic overview of such 
justifications enables identifying semi-permanent structures.
157 Meyer (2010), p. 22.
158 “Het is buitengewoon moeilijk voor een regering om een uitzending te baseren op een klein 
draagvalk en het is al helemaal buitengewoon moeilijk om een uitzending door te drukken 
als de Kamer duidelijk laat merken dit niet verstandig te vinden .” Remarks by J. Voorhoeve to 
the Parliamentary Working Group Nato Response Force, quoted in Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal, Onderzoek NATO Response Force, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 30 162, 
nrs. 2-3, p.18.
159 Taliaferro (2006), p. 470.
160 “The military doctrine and its associated documents – threat assessments, intelligence plans, 
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5.3.1.3 Philosophical Worldview
A related source of strategic culture is the dominant political-philosophical or ideological 
outlook of the state and its foreign policy elite. This represents seepage from political 
culture in shaping a state’s foreign policy outlook. The first generation of strategic cultural-
ists for instance examined how Soviet strategic thinking was influenced by specific Soviet 
historical experiences.161 A contemporary example is the measure to which European states 
have developed a pattern of strategic thought influenced by the conditioning experience of 
the European integration process.162 Borrowing from sociological studies and philosophy, 
an expression of such political-philosophical distinctions is the contrast between ‘struc-
ture’ and ‘agency’ as the central driving force of history. For instance, Marxists and other 
economic determinists have a profound economically-driven understanding of societal 
progress, and understand conflict in terms of class-struggles rather than the neorealist 
reading of conflict being between states due to competing interests. In sociological litera-
ture, the debate between structure and agency is still ongoing.163 It is a dilemma which 
deals with the question what are the defining motives for human action. Agency refers to 
the capacity of individuals to act independently, to make their own choices and to have 
responsibility over their lives and destiny. Structure refers to those factors such as social 
and political institutions, economic configurations, elements of governances and insti-
tutions which act as a set of variables shaping the opportunities that individuals have. It 
impacts and shapes the interrelationships between individuals that make up a society. A 
structure-based understanding of history holds that social structures are the dominant 
factor in shaping social behavior among individuals. Individual action is seen as the 
product of social structures. It is also reflected in the political systems of states. 
The structure- and agency-focused approach to interventions are two exponents of 
liberal thought and makes its way into Western security policy through the vehicle of elite 
ideologies. While the latter is based on the principle that particular regimes and leaders 
stand in the way of liberal norms and values taking root and to that end the use of force 
may be justified, the former holds that the basis of international peace lies in a system of 
collective security and adherence to international law.164 They translate into two different 
military estimates and contingency plans – tell us very much about what is perceived, the 
order in which it is understood and what is not perceived.” Bathurst (1993), p.124. See also 
Lantis & Howlett (2010), p. 89-91.
161 Snyder (1977).
162 See Asle Toje, America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Strategic Bargain, 
(Routledge, 2008); Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, (New York: Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 2003; Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms 
on Security and Defence in the European Union, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).
163 See for instance Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Social Construction of Reality 
(Garden City, NJ: Anchor Books 1966); Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press 1984); John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: 
Penguin, 1996).
164 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2008), p. 79-80 & 97.
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strategic cultural orientations. One is based on stability projection, the other on power 
projection. In this research I use the term stability projection to describe an interventionist 
approach with the intent to promote stability and the international rule of law by addressing 
structuralist causes of conflicts. It is juxtaposed to power projection. While power projec-
tion concerns the use of force to coerce and shape the behavior of actors, stability projec-
tion consists of the use of the military in order to set conditions for the development of 
liberal institutions conducive to the stability of a state. It shuns using the military to create 
instability in the international system. Stability projection thereby emphasizes multilateral 
action, and exhibits a disinclination to use the military for the purposes of regime change. 
Having discussed the core concepts underlying this study, it must now be brought 
together in a research design. 
6 Research Design: Transformation and 
Neoclassical Realism
This study employs a neoclassical realist model in its attempt to explain variance in the 
transformation strategies pursued by NATO member states. As detailed above, transfor-
mation is the process of pursuing deliberate discontinuous change in a state’s military 
policy, the purpose of which is to increase the compatibility and relevance of the military 
instrument to a state’s foreign and security policy objectives, in response to major shifts in 
the international security environment. Two types of transformation strategy have been 
identified that have been pursued, although with varied success. These are operational 
effectiveness (Type I) transformation and strategic (Type II) transformation. Neoclassical 
realism is a theory of international relations that supplements a realist analysis based on 
the relative distribution of power with constructivist domestic-level elements to explain 
state behavior. While other domestic-level variables are imaginable, this study focuses 
on strategic culture. Strategic culture reflects a state’s shared historical patterns and atti-
tudes towards the use of the military. It thereby acts as a set of constraints on the strategic 
behavior of the states, formulating a bandwidth within which security policy can take 
shape, given a particular system-level distribution of power. This may then account for 
a deviation or lag in policy-outcome otherwise expected from using a neorealist model. 
A neorealist understanding of transformation would imply that European states would 
emulate US transformation strategies. This did not occur across the board.
The neoclassical realist model assumes that although the necessity to pursue a trans-
formation strategy is triggered in response to transitions in the international security 
environment that significantly shift the (perceived) level of vulnerability, the shape of the 
transformation strategy is the product of the filter provided by the domestic-level variable 
of strategic culture. It is the combination of the system-level transition and the strategic 
cultural filter which results in the pursuit of a particular transformation strategy. 
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The major shift in the level of external vulnerability (or opportunity) forms the inde-
pendent variable.165 It is derived from the relative distribution of power, developments in 
military technology and geographic proximity of a threat. Major increases or decreases in 
opportunity or threat thereby form the initial trigger for transformation. Transformation 
may result from a Revolution in Military Affairs, such as France’s development of the levée 
en masse, which presented an opportunity to France and increased the extractive capacity 
of the state. The greater available military manpower and heightened morale to fight for 
the French state increased the power of the state and subsequently turned it into a threat 
to neighboring states.166 
For smaller powers, system-level considerations such as NATO alliance dynamics 
or an institutional framework such as the European Union impact the perception of the 
distribution of power and external vulnerability. The international institutional envi-
ronment, formed by organizations such as NATO, the European Union and the United 
Nations, receives attention as a contextual element influencing strategic behavior. Small 
and medium powers are generally unable to singlehandedly emulate or innovate to offset 
a great power. Instead they can balance within an alliance. They are also able to emulate 
useful military capabilities or innovate to provide relevance to an alliance. Alliance politics 
thus play a role in the process of transformation. This further makes the interplay between 
domestic and system-level variables apparent. As Taliaferro contends, “Systemic forces 
shape domestic processes within states, which in turn constrain states’ ability to respond 
to systemic imperatives.”167
Subsequent to the identification of a major shift in external vulnerability or opportu-
nity, strategic culture then intervenes to shape a state’s ability to adapt (see figure 4). States 
have three broad ways through which they can adapt: emulation by imitating the military 
policies and technologies of another state in an effort at bandwagoning, innovation in an 
attempt to offset the relative power advantage of another, or escalating current strategies by 
further developing “existing politico-military strategic and technological practices”.168 At 
the level of defense policy, a state’s transformation strategy is the overarching expression 
of this adaptation. 
As an intervening variable strategic culture then impacts how the transformation 
strategy is pursued, for instance whether there is a lag or not. 
Jeffrey Talliaferro has defined resource extraction as the ability of a state to mobilize 
domestic resources to promote its security.169 Transformation is a form of resource extrac-
tion to increase the relevance of the military to a state’s foreign and security policy, and 
so increase the ability of the state to promote its security. Strategic culture determines the 
165 Taliaferro (2006), p. 486.
166 Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power,” International Security, vol. 18, 
no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124.
167 J.W. Taliaferro in Lobell et al. (2009), p. 211.
168 Taliaferro (2006), p.471.
169 J.W. Taliaferro in Lobell et al. (2009), p. 195.
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extractive capacity of a state in the context of changed international settings. Phrased differ-
ently, the ability of a state to pursue a transformation strategy is dependent on whether the 
bandwidth shaped by a state’s strategic culture corresponds to the changed material reality.
(Source: Based on Taliaferro, 2009)
Figure 4:   Model of Transformation
Independent Variable
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7 The Organization of this Study
7.1 Case studies
This study focuses on differences in European and American approaches to the military 
instrument. As such this study is organized in one part on the United State and a second 
part including the European case studies. Three states figure center stage in this structured, 
focused comparison: the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. They offer a good 
starting point to analyze the trajectories of the transformation strategies within NATO. 
These states were chosen as all three are first-generation members of the NATO alliance. 
The United States is NATO’s primary member and by military standards in the period 
1991-2008 it was the West’s and the world’s most powerful state. Given that the term 
transformation originated in the United States, any study of transformation excluding the 
United States would be considered incomplete. The Netherlands is a medium-sized NATO 
member state that has been an alliance member since its inception. A former colonial 
power with a rich maritime history, it has participated in all NATO operations and several 
UN interventions since 1991 including ISAF operations in Afghanistan, SFIR in Iraq and 
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. The Netherlands is exemplar for a smaller Western 
European state with an active security policy. Germany is the most populous state in the 
European Union; it is Europe’s largest economy and has one of Europe’s largest militaries 
in size. This gives it a leadership role in European foreign policy. Its geographical position 
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at the heart of Europe as well as the principal role Germany has played in 20th century 
security issues make it an indispensable voice in European security. Given its size, histor-
ical weight and place within both NATO and the European Union, Germany continues to 
influence the European security debate. If NATO was created from the outset, as former 
NATO Secretary-General Lord Ismay had it, to “keep the Americans in, the Soviets out 
and the Germans down,” the future of European security hinges substantially on German 
policy. Simultaneously, over the past years Germany and the United States have criticized 
each other over their security policies, particularly regarding the Iraq War but also in light 
of operations in Afghanistan.170 
The sheer size and sophistication of the American defense architecture, the immense 
volume of the American defense budget, and Washington’s prolific use of the military have 
implied that there is a continuous and high-level strategic debate in the United States over 
the direction of defense policy. To this research it has meant that there is ample material 
available on which to base the analysis. For the European states, given their status as smaller 
powers, their smaller militaries, and a generally less militaristic approach to foreign policy, 
there has been less material available. Particularly in Germany, the strategic debate over the 
future of the armed forces has been meager at best. This has produced a smaller - although 
no less important – amount of relevant material. However, consequentially the German 
case study is thereby significantly the smaller of the three case studies. Since this research 
relies for a large part on the comparison between the United States and Europe, I have 
strived to balance both parts.
In order to make a structured, focused comparison possible and to address the 
research question, this study focuses on how the transformation strategy developed at the 
level of the foreign and security policy elite and the “owners” of strategic culture. To the 
extent that bureaucratic, academic or organizational discussions have been relevant to the 
overall trajectory of transformation, rather than to study the details of how these debates 
emerged and developed - a topic on which much relevant research has been done - this 
study focuses on the outcomes of these debates and how they impacted the level of the 
senior-level policymaker and political decision-maker.
Related to this is the observation that the group of relevant actors within each state 
shaping the actual transformation strategy is of limited size. There is much, often intensive, 
debate over the future of security policy, the impact of technologies and future security 
threats, within military bureaucracies, academic communities and political action groups 
and think-tanks. Yet, only a handful of actors are involved in setting the national guide-
lines which determine the direction of a state’s security and defense policy.
170 See Stephen F. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
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7.2 Methodology
In his analysis of American democracy promotion, Jonathan Monten summarized the 
basis for neoclassical realism as follows: “Power and ideas are not mutually exclusive 
explanations, but interact to produce foreign policy outcomes of interest.”171 In order to 
explain transformation strategies it is necessary to build a narrative taking both power 
and ideas, system and domestic-level factors into account. Neoclassical realism provides 
the theoretical tools to achieve this. The method follows Alexander George’s proposi-
tions and is a structured, focused comparison of the transformation strategies pursued 
by three Western states.172 This study is based on data obtained from historical analysis, 
extensive literature research, an analysis of political speeches, ministerial minutes, policy 
documents available in the public domain and in several archives, government budgets, 
and elite interviews. Many of the individuals central to the development and execution of 
the transformation strategies in the respective states are still available for interviews. This 
has allowed the research to benefit from nearly seventy interviews with key players, mili-
tary officers, politicians, policy-makers, members of congressional staff, professors and 
researchers at think-tanks to offer greater understanding of the drivers of military change. 
They consisted of face-to-face, semi-structured interviews that served to give context and 
support the overall analysis. Archival research was used in order to study the historical 
consistency of the tenets of strategic culture influencing transformation. In particular, this 
relates to the manner in which states have justified the use of the military and domestic-
level normative concepts underlying security policy decisions. Justification regimes are a 
crucial domestic variable that act as a constraint on, or stimulus for the extractive capacity 
of the state. Furthermore, strategic policy and military strategy documents are essential 
sources to understand how transformation developed. 
From a strategic perspective transformation is composed of two analytical dimen-
sions. On the one hand there are the actual capabilities that are developed and secondly 
there is the operational component, or the use of ‘transformed’ capabilities, including 
for what purposes and how they are used. Together these are the two main products of 
a state’s transformation strategy and also figure prominently in the analysis. Rather than 
to trace in detail the breadth of the transformation strategy as it played out in different 
levels of bureaucracies, military services, and policy communities this research looks at 
the political-strategic outcomes of those processes and emphasizes the foremost strategic-
level policy documents, decisions, speeches, events in the international environment and 
use of the military that shaped the transformation strategy.
The key questions, which are derived from the theoretical model as well as the 
research question, along which the case studies are structured are the following: 
171 Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” International Security, vol.29, no.4 
(Spring 2005), p.116.
172 Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, 
Focused Comparison” in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, 
Theory and Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68.
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What type of transformation strategy was pursued by the state?
Did it amount to operational effectiveness or strategic transformation? This is the point 
of departure for the case study. As will be made clear, to the United States transforma-
tion was focused on pursuing vast improvements in warfare, increasing the ability of the 
United States to sustain its position of strategic dominance by developing military capa-
bilities second to none. For Germany and the Netherlands, transformation was strategic 
in nature and revolved around shifting the military from territorial defense to perform 
high-intensity expeditionary missions. 
What change in the level of external vulnerability or 
opportunity, forming the transition in the international security 
environment, triggered transformation? 
This study makes use of a new theoretical framework offered by neoclassical realism. The 
starting point for explaining strategic behavior is material interests and the relative distri-
bution of power. In relation to transformation the locus becomes substantial changes 
herein. For the United States, the advent of information technologies yielded a necessity 
and an opportunity to protect its position as unipolar hegemon. To the Netherlands, the 
end of the Cold War triggered a reassessment towards promoting the international rule of 
law and sustaining relevance to the Alliance and the United States. For Germany, the end 
of the Cold War similarly produced a reassessment of its military policy based on main-
taining allegiance to NATO.
What are the characteristics of the strategic cultural factors 
that shaped the transformation strategy? 
A historical narrative is created from the strategic cultural factors that contributed to 
shaping the state’s pursuit of discontinuous military change. It yields insights into how a 
society views the use of the military, and how states responded to events that affected its 
perception of the system-level distribution of power. To the United States, its domestic 
values including Liberty and Democracy promotion, and political exceptionalism played 
an important role in framing its role in the world. Dutch strategic culture was based on a 
structure-focused approach to the use of force in which the international rule of law was 
seen as an end in itself. For Germany, solidarity with the alliance was a central driver to 
pursue transformation. However, it did so while lugging its strategic culture, defined by 
Zivilmacht and the historical and political institutional remnants of the twentieth century 
along. 
61Introduction
What did the interaction between the level of external 
vulnerability and strategic culture mean in terms of capabilities? 
Having identified the drivers of transformation how did these produce policy outcomes 
in terms of capabilities, doctrine and approaches to the use of the military? In other words, 
what was the outcome of the transformation strategy?173 
How did further events in the security environment impact the 
transformation strategy?
The transformation strategies were put to the test during military operations and in 
response to the rise of new threats. For European states, missions such as Operation Allied 
Force in Kosovo tested the ability of domestic strategic cultures to acquiesce in the trajec-
tory of transformation, or whether it resulted in limited extractive capacity. To the United 
States missions in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed it to irregular warfare and the demands of 
complex emergencies, leading to a strategic debate over the future direction of the military. 
Each state encountered events that triggered a reevaluation of the transformation strategy. 
How they coped with it yields insights into the importance of strategic culture in shaping 
a states’ military policy.
This allows answering the final question at the end of the research: 
How do the different trajectories of transformation shape future 
transatlantic security relations and the future of NATO? 
Understanding the fundamental drivers of the transformation strategies of Western states 
explains the trends that determine the future of NATO. As members of the same military 
alliance and with many security challenges addressed within that alliance, the transforma-
tion strategies pursued by these states have ramifications for the Alliance’s future and its 
ability to maintain cohesion and solidarity. Explaining variance in transformation strate-
gies offers insights into the reasons why European states and the United States have often-
times been at loggerheads in recent years over security policy, and why it will remain for as 
long as transformation strategies are not in sync. It thereby sheds light on Robert Kagan’s 
insightful, but unpolished, assessment of the different national characters that produce the 
divergent Atlantic perspectives of creating security. 
I argue that differences in transformation paths are on the one hand due to different 
appreciations of the international system, material interests and changes in the relative 
distribution of power, but on the other hand that emulation failed because of differences in 
strategic cultures. While the major variance is apparent between larger and smaller powers, 
between the United States and Europe; there are similarly differing domestic constraints 
between the Netherlands and Germany which leads to different extractive capacities to 
pursue transformation.
173 In order to facilitate a comparison, the emphasis rests on elaborating on policy outcomes 
rather than on the full breadth of discussions, dissenting views or alternative opinions within 
defense bureaucracies and services.
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The subsequent chapters are dedicated to the three case studies; the United States, 
and the two European states, the Netherlands and Germany. Each case study addresses the 
same questions, tracing the path of transformation pursued by the state. The final chapter 
offers a conclusion to the problem statement and provides an assessment of the impact of 
defense transformation for the future of the NATO alliance.
7.3 A Word on Notes
Since this research relies on official documents and texts in other languages than English, 
and for purposes of heuristic clarity, the following general rule applies to the use of quotes. 
In the event that a non-English text or remark is quoted, I have taken the liberty to translate 
the quote to the best of my ability. The quote is then supported by the excerpt in its original 
language form in the footnote.
Part 1: 
Transformation in the United States

Climbing the Ladder of 
Primacy
“…the best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.”
 – Presidential Candidate George W. Bush, Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999174
8 Introduction
The following part traces the origin of the US government’s policy of defense transfor-
mation from 1991 to the end of the second Bush administration in late 2008. The term 
transformation came into use in the late 1990’s and evolved into the dominant paradigm 
along which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pursued change in the military orga-
nization. It fostered the promise that transformation could make warfare obsolete and 
yield a perpetuation of US military and strategic dominance.175 Challenges associated with 
sustained irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan led to discord within the US govern-
ment and military regarding the pursuit of transformation. To cope with the operational 
duress, the US Army alone revised its transformation strategy to adapt to the irregular 
challenge. American strategic culture influenced the pursuit of strategic transformation. 
Initially the extractive capacity was limited as the Army struggled to develop the capa-
bility to perform sustained stabilization missions. This improved when it evolved into an 
approach to irregular warfare in line with US strategic cultural tenets. 
The case-study is divided into five segments each pertaining to a sub-question of 
the structured-focused comparison. The first part introduces the US interpretation of 
transformation as understood in US official policy. Subsequently two parts address the 
question what system-level shifts shaped the US approach to transformation. Two major 
changes in the realm of technology and military innovation heralded a transition in the 
external level of opportunity for the United States; the increase in precision and guided 
munitions and the rise of the Information Age. It amounted to a strategy of escalating 
America’s focus on conventional operations through a policy of operational effectiveness 
174 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.
175 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/ June 
2002) p. 27.
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(Type I) transformation. Transformation evolved from the concept of the Revolution in 
Military Affairs, and came to denote an emphasis on harnessing information technolo-
gies to make the military instrument smaller, lighter, quicker and more lethal meant to 
improve the overall operational effectiveness of the US military to perform conventional 
combat operations.176 Network-centric warfare became the dominant doctrinal paradigm 
intent on revolutionizing the face of the US military instrument. In the following part, the 
role of domestic factors in shaping US transformation policy and the dominant tenets of 
US strategic culture are presented. The notion of exceptionalism in US political culture 
has a strong influence over US foreign and security policy and secures an orientation to 
promote democracy as well as a quest for attaining absolute security. An agency-focused 
perspective on international relations produces an inclination to accept the use of the 
military as a political instrument in general and high-intensity operations in particular. 
The system-level variables and US strategic culture were initially aligned, producing the 
perfect conditions to drive this operational effectiveness transformation. The fourth part 
discusses what transformation meant for the development of strategies, capabilities and 
policy, culminating in the doctrine of preventive warfare and the invasion in Iraq. By 2004 
the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan triggered a shift in the system-level distribution 
of power posing a challenge to the US strategy of transformation. The fourth question to 
be addressed is how US transformation responded to the changes in the security environ-
ment and how strategic culture led to responses to these changes.
9 US Transformation Defined
The Pentagon’s 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance is the primary policy docu-
ment outlining the central idea and objectives of transformation in the United States. It 
offers a clear expression of what operational effectiveness (Type I) transformation is and 
what its objectives are for the United States. It defines transformation as:
a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and 
cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people 
and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against 
our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which 
helps underpin peace and stability in the world.177 
This definition provides a clear objective for transformation, namely the continuation of 
American strategic dominance. Rather than a military-operational objective, it was grand-
176 See for instance Joint Vision 2010 which introduced the concept of “full-spectrum dominance” 
and “dominant battlespace awareness” and detailed how new technologies and operational 
concepts could increase the speed and lethality of conventional operations and “greatly 
enhance our capability in high intensity conventional military operations.” General John M. 
Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC, 1996.
177 United States Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance 2003, p. 3.
67Transformation in the United States
strategic. The definition writes that transformation’s goal is to “sustain our strategic posi-
tion.” In 2003, this position was the sole remaining military superpower. Sustaining that 
position meant prolonging the unipolar system. It resonated President George W. Bush’s 
declaration at the outset of the 2002 National Security Strategy that: 
The United States possesses unprecedented— and unequaled—strength and 
influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the 
value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, 
obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used 
to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.178
The Transformation Planning Guidance specified that rather than responding to changes 
in the external security environment, the United States itself could shape the nature of 
military competition.179 This would provide the basis for sustaining its strategic position 
and the US would do so by “redefining standards for military success by accomplishing 
missions that were previously unimaginable or impossible except at prohibitive risk and 
cost.”180 Key to this was harnessing the Information Revolution.181 The Guidance declared 
that “the United States is transitioning from an Industrial Age to an Information Age 
military.”182 In doing so it could stay several steps ahead of possible peer competitors and 
“ensure US forces continue to operate from a position of overwhelming military advan-
tage in support of strategic objectives [emphasis added].”183 Thus while the US had a mili-
tary hegemony, this could only be guaranteed for the future by adopting these technologies. 
Transformation thereby represented an opportunity for the United States to persist in its 
unipolar status and extend its influence over the international system. The focus of which 
was to perform conventional military operations with greater speed and precision.184
The term transformation was not first mentioned in the 2003 Transformation Plan-
ning Guidance. Rather it evolved from defense policy discussions in Washington during 
the early 1990’s. The Gulf War, in which precision munitions, stealth technologies and 
cruise missiles played a large role, had demonstrated the military technological superi-
ority of US armed forces and it fed the discussion that the United States was pioneering 
a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). RMA’s are a generic concept. The central idea is 
178 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington 
DC, September 2002, (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf), 
p. 1.
179 United States Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance 2003, p. 3.
180 Ibid.
181 For a description of the impact of the Information Age on military affairs see Alvin Toffler, 
The Third Wave, (New York: Pan, 1981).
182 United States Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance 2003, p.3.
183 Ibid, p. 4.
184 Ibid, p. 10-11.
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that as a result of new technologies, or organizational concepts, a discontinuous increase 
in military power can be achieved. Such improvements in warfighting capabilities impact 
the balance of power benefiting those that harness the improved effectiveness or combat 
potential.185 
The advent of these new technologies and operational concepts amounts to a discon-
tinuous change as it revolutionizes the way in which wars are fought. Since the Middle Ages, 
Andrew Krepinevich identified ten such instances that produced significant changes in the 
way military operations were waged. Guided munitions warfare leading up to network-
centric warfare was the eleventh.186 Soviet scientists in the 1960’s had predicted that “stra-
tegic reconnaissance complexes” fusing distributed weapons and sensor-systems together 
amounted to a “military-technical revolution”. This emboldened proponents to argue that 
indeed a revolution was occurring. Following Operation Desert Storm the Revolution in 
Military Affairs came to describe revolutionary advances in the field of guided munitions 
warfare.187 Advances in missile guidance systems and command and control were making 
it possible to hit targets over greater distances with greater accuracy and speed. 
The definition of transformation above contains both realist and normative elements. 
It is realist by its emphasis on the system-level implications of change and its emphasis 
on military power. Focusing on military capabilities, transformation is meant to increase 
US strength, producing “overwhelming military advantage” to sustain US superiority. It 
presents a clear relation to a distribution of power and an ambition to maintain a position 
of military hegemony. Transformation is believed to make the military more usable as an 
instrument for the foreign policy executive. By pursuing a set of changes, the state would 
extract greater resources to enhance its power. The Guidance claims that “such efforts will 
185 Andrew Krepinevich, former director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, defined 
the Revolution in Military Affairs as a situation that occurs: “...when the application of 
new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative 
operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the 
character and conduct of conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic increase – often an 
order of magnitude or greater – in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed 
forces.”Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” 
The National Interest (Fall 1994), pp. 30-42.
186 Andrew Krepinevich, “From Cavalry to Computer”. The ten revolutions are the Infantry 
revolution, coupling the strength of the longbow to dismounted men-at-arms (improved 
range and strength) beginning 14th century; Artillery revolution, cannon used against fortified 
defenses, late 14th century; Sail-and-Shot; naval warfare; 16th century; Fortress Revolution; 
trace italienne, return of static defense, 16th century; Gunpowder Revolution, more powerful 
gunpowder allows the musket-carrying infantrymen to outshoot archers, late 16th century; 
Levee-en-masse, greatly increases manpower on the battlefield, also through standardization 
of equipment and spare parts, late 18th century; Land Warfare Revolution, telegraph and 
railroads, machine guns, primacy to defensive, trench warfare, beginning 19th century; Naval 
revolution; dreadnoughts, submarines, torpedos, half 19th century; Interwar Revolutions, 
mechanization (internal combustion engine), aviation and information (radio and radar), led 
to carrier aviation, Blitzkrieg, strategic aerial bombardment, post WWI; Nuclear revolution, 
post-1944.
187 Interview with Robert Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2008, 
Washington DC, January 21, 2008.
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render previous ways of warfighting obsolete and change the measures of success in mili-
tary operations in our favor.”188 The definition thereby provides a clear reference to opera-
tional effectiveness.
The normative element of the definition is based on the inferred assumption that US 
unipolarity, prolonged through successful transformation, is beneficial to international 
peace and stability. The Guidance writes that “over the long term, our security and the 
prospects for peace and stability for much of the rest of the world depend upon the success 
of transformation....If the United States fails to transform, then our current military supe-
riority and the relative peace, prosperity and stability it underwrites will erode. We will 
see the rapid emergence of regional competitors and a world prone to major conflict.”189 
It provided the normative basis for pursuing change. Pax Americana, an international 
system based around US military power, was considered a strategic necessity to prolong 
US power, but also to promote global stability. Successful defense transformation thereby 
could enable the United States to shape the international environment.190 And the military 
was critical to this. Pursuing that strategy required building and maintaining “defences 
beyond challenge.”191 Military innovation was central to the belief that the United States 
could sustain its strategic dominance. The promise of transformation was that it could 
reduce the costs of interventions significantly, it could enable the United States to pursue 
high-intensity conflicts faster, cheaper and cleaner and that this would produce the basis 
for persistence of America as the world’s global superpower.
In 1999 Presidential candidate George W. Bush embraced transformation. Speaking 
at the Citadel in South Carolina, he outlined his defense agenda. “We are witnessing a revo-
lution in the technology of war,” he said. “Power is increasingly defined not by size but by 
mobility and swiftness. Influence is measured in information; safety is gained in stealth; 
and forces are projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons.”192 Bush underlined 
that he would sustain US strategic dominance by pursuing a strategy based on harnessing 
these technological changes for the purpose of fighting high-intensity conventional wars. 
In the following pages it will be explored how this understanding of transformation was 
specific for the United States. In order to understand transformation from 1991 onwards 
it is necessary to trace the continuity of the American military focus on high-intensity 
combat. The end of the Vietnam War led the military to draw lessons that framed its 
outlook.
188 United States Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance 2003, p. 3-4.
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10 System Level Factors that Triggered US 
Transformation
10.1 Collapse of the Soviet Union
 “These congressional deliberations come amidst an historic transformation of the global 
security environment,” Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said as he and the military lead-
ership testified on the Department’s budget request for the period 1991-1995.193 Some 
four months earlier the Berlin Wall had collapsed and all present at the testimony realized 
that a new global distribution of power beckoned. As the chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee Sam Nunn stressed, “these changes have altered many of the basic 
assumptions on which our national security policy, military strategic and defense budget 
have been based for the last 40 years. The military balance had been altered as one end of 
the scale – the Warsaw Pact – seemed to be broken.” 
Uncertainty, complexity, uncharted terrain, these were qualifications used by Admin-
istration officials to describe the new security environment. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Colin Powell mentioned that an “enduring reality is the uncertain nature of world 
events.” The world became less dangerous but more opaque and complex as a result of the 
shifts in the Soviet Union. “A varied and complex security environment like never before,” 
according to the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the Air Force echoed this while 
showing a slide depicting the globe with instability written in bold lettering across it. Other 
challenges were also identified alongside the shifts in Europe, including the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction to “potentially hostile states,” the presence of anti-American 
regimes and non-state threats such as drug-trafficking, anti-American insurgencies and 
terrorism. It promoted a need to develop capabilities for power projection. 
It also gave new impetus to focus on technological improvements. Following the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall the US government proposed a peace dividend. Secretary of 
Defense Cheney presented a defense budget with a 2 percent per annum real decline in 
the budget for the period FY1991 to 1995. This peace dividend was deemed acceptable 
on the assumption that the security environment would retain its benevolent momentum 
and the Soviet Union remained weak. On top of post-Cold War relaxation, an economic 
downturn implied that the defense budget would be further reduced. For fiscal year (FY) 
1991 overall defense budget authority dropped by 11.3% as opposed to FY1990; a five-fold 
increase from what Cheney had initially envisaged. By 1993 active duty strength decreased 
with 91,400 forces. “We must preserve the high quality of our forces, even if that means 
major reductions in our manpower and active force structure. High quality derives mostly 
from our military people, but it also requires that our weapons and systems be technologi-
cally superior,” Cheney said in 1991. Technology came to figure centrally in the American 
mind.
On August 2, 1990 as Iraqi tanks were crossing the border with Kuwait, US President 
193 Richard Cheney, “Prepared Statement of the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee,” Washington DC, February 1, 1990, p. 1.
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George H.W. Bush was in Aspen, Colorado. Present to celebrate the founding of the Aspen 
Institute, Bush spoke about changes in the military structure.194 In the five-year plan that 
Bush presented active forces would be reduced with 25% by 1995. However, Bush warned 
against prorate defense cuts. “What we need are not merely reductions but restructuring” 
and declared that the military was to focus on expeditionary operations. Bush said at 
Aspen: “In an era when threats may emerge with little or no warning, our ability to defend 
our interests will depend on our speed and our agility. And we will need forces that give 
us a global reach.” Speed, agility, flexibility, mobility, global reach would become domi-
nant concepts for military change during the next two decades. The US would operate 
anywhere at any time. As the world’s remaining superpower, the United States needed to 
be able to defend its interests everywhere. By 2004, this had become engrained in mili-
tary thinking, as the US national military strategy declared that the objective was to have 
military forces that were “rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable throughout the 
global battlespace.”195
The uncertainty of the global environment, the anticipated manpower reductions 
and the ambition to maintain a position of strength, placed the focus on mobility, rapid 
response and power projection. Technology could serve this purpose. Precision weapons 
could substitute for lack of manpower, while advances in mobility could give the US global 
reach. Cheney outlined his intention to develop multifunctional, deployable, logistically 
independent and highly mobile conventional forces in what would become a precursor for 
the transformation rhetoric of the late 1990’s. Unable to define where a crisis would erupt, 
flexibility and power projection became a central mission. Cheney wanted the ability to 
deploy “six additional Army divisions, 60 additional tactical fighter squadrons, one Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade, and associated elements” within 10 days anywhere across the globe. 
The US was securely positioning itself in the role of a global military hegemon. The Gulf 
War strengthened this position further.
To understand why the Gulf War was crucial to shaping thinking about transforma-
tion, we must retrace the development of the US military’s focus and doctrinal emphasis 
on high-intensity conventional operations from the end of the Vietnam War.
10.2 Guided Munitions Warfare: From Vietnam to 
Desert Storm
The aftermath of the Vietnam War proved a pivotal moment for the reorientation of 
American defense policy, cementing a focus towards conventional maneuver warfare. It 
provides the genesis of what later became US operational effectiveness transformation.196 
It cemented a focus on conventional high-intensity operations. 
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It was not preordained that the Vietnam War would make the United States allergic 
to counterinsurgency operations. But defeat in Vietnam had profound domestic conse-
quences. Politicians and the military services turned their back towards the conflicts they 
had just fought. Central in the shaping experience of the defeat was that the US military 
felt it had fought the wrong type of war. The diffuse nature of the conflict had negated 
US technical superiority, strained the civil-military relationship and fractured public 
support for the military. The officer corps felt it had been unable to fight the war it wanted 
to, nor fight the war in the way it wanted to due to political interference.197 The dominant 
reading was that Vietnam had escalated slowly – along President Lyndon Johnson’s “slow 
squeeze” – rather than overwhelming the adversary with military force. This led to a half-
hearted employment of US military strength that demanded ever greater sacrifices and 
resources while the political elite fell victim to strategic entrapment until finally the mili-
tary was bogged down. The operational challenges of confronting an adversary that fought 
contrary to what Americans believed war to be like proved frustrating. The adversary hid 
among the local population, maneuvered stealthily through the countryside and avoided 
force-on-force confrontations. Doing so, it was able to bring the American military to a 
grinding halt. Famously, General William Westmoreland would recall that the US military 
never lost a single battle, to which his North-Vietnamese counterpart General Vo Nguyen 
Giap responded that it was true but also irrelevant. The war was a conflict in a gray zone 
neither constituting peace, nor war as Americans imagined it. Then already, failure was 
also attributed to the military’s one-dimensional focus on major theatre conflict.198 Brian 
Jenkins asked the rhetorical question in 1970 why are “US government institutions…. 
unable to adapt to the kind of war we ought to have been fighting?” Jenkins’ response was 
that the United States was domestically disposed to fighting major conventional wars. He 
outlined that “as a result of technological advances we have more firepower and mobility in 
Vietnam now than we had four years ago, and theoretically we have always had more fire-
power and mobility than the Viet Cong. Considering our apparent lack of success, however, 
the case can be made that superior firepower and mobility have been perhaps irrelevant in 
this war.”199 With nostalgia the officer corps remembered the Second World War, a war 
of liberation fought by generals not politicians, with a decisive end and an unconditional 
surrender of the enemy. That conflict echoed American perceptions of war. It was also 
a war where military power and superior technology did matter and progress could be 
measured in terms of an adversary’s casualties. Jenkins argued that “war is regarded as a 
series of conventional battles between two armies in which one side will lose and, accepting 
197 For a critique on the role of the political leadership during the Vietnam War see H.R. 
McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that 
they told that led to Vietnam, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998) and Lewis Sorley, A Better 
War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New 
York: Harvest, 2008).
198 Brian M. Jenkins, The Unchangeable War, RM-6278-ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 1970).
199 Ibid, p. 3-4.
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this loss as decisive, will sue for peace…Our army remains enemy-oriented and casualty-
oriented. War, then is assumed to be a battlefield where tactics rather than strategy are 
important.”200 The Second World War put the United States military in a favored role as 
liberators, and its ultimate success had branded American soldiers as heroes. The Vietnam 
War was its antithesis.201 Rather than the Vietnam War leading to a reassessment of the 
distribution of power and refocusing its attention towards asymmetric conflict, the United 
States disregarded Vietnam-style operations and focused on conventional warfare instead. 
There was little attempt to innovate or balance the threat posed by irregular war. 
Factors both at the domestic and system-level played a role in the subsequent 
changes. At the domestic level post-Vietnam reform was driven by a military organiza-
tion that wanted to regain its stature in society. As Andrew Bacevich recounts, “successful 
reform…required two things: first, restoring the bonds between American soldiers and 
the American people, torn asunder by Vietnam; second, shifting the balance of civil-
military authority on decisions relating to war and its conduct.”202 Army Chief of Staff 
Creighton Abrams worried about the public ostracization of the military and the prolific 
micro-management of the war’s conduct by President Johnson and Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara.203 To address both concerns Abrams took several measures. Princi-
pally he gave shape to the Total Force policy. Abrams restructured Army force components, 
making operational divisions dependent on the mobilization of critical components in the 
reserve. The result was that if politicians wanted to wage a large-scale campaign, a substan-
tial amount of the total armed forces needed to be mobilized from the beginning. This had 
two effects. Because of the numbers involved, it would guarantee that any war would sit at 
the top of the political agenda and command the attention of the public and policymakers. 
It would also ensure that the military had sufficient forces to fight, since a substantial part of 
the total force would be mobilized in the event of a conflict. Furthermore, Abrams wanted 
to give full control of warfare to the generals.204 Since the nature of counterinsurgency in 
Vietnam had not been purely military, politicians had interfered throughout its prosecu-
tion. Abrams was appalled by the way the White House had micro-managed the war, at 
times with such mundane acts as target selection. That sentiment was further strengthened 
when following the war politicians, due to the public disapproval of the war, distanced 
themselves from military officers. Abrams’ idea was that the Army would become a profes-
sion focused on an exclusive core business. The reasoning was that if the US military could 
become a professional niche and excels in it, the public would regain trust in the institu-
tion. The move to an All Volunteer Force was a necessary step in this direction. The niche 
200 Idem.
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to occupy became high-intensity conventional maneuver warfare. An added benefit was 
that conventional warfare was clearly a military affair, the realm of generals rather than 
politicians. It represented a return to a clear domain within the Clausewitzian trinity 
where government offers the political direction, the military commands the operation and 
delegates the care for warfare to the military, while the people - both at home and in the 
battlefield – are left by the side.205 
There was also a system-level motivation to reorient the military away from irregular 
warfare. Besides the considerations of the military establishment, the United States govern-
ment believed the greater threat came from the Soviet Union. Proxy conflicts such as in 
Vietnam detracted from preparations for the important challenge, which was maneuver 
warfare with the Soviet Union. The real battle was anticipated in Northern Germany over 
the Fulda Gap. Soviet numerical advantage was assumed, justifying a shift towards conven-
tional warfare. This remained throughout the Cold War. Even in May 1989, as the Cold 
War was coming to an end, Soviet numerical advantages still troubled the Pentagon: “Even 
after the reductions announced by the Soviets occur,” Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 
said, “the Warsaw pact will still have more than a two to one advantage in tanks and artil-
lery over existing NATO forces.”206
Professionalizing into the niche of high-intensity operations further rested on 
military-bureaucratic logic. It had no comparative advantage for other types.207 “Between 
nuclear annihilation on the one hand and the exhaustion of guerrilla warfare without 
end on the other: this was the space in which they intended to find a renewed sense of 
purpose.”208 The US military would prepare for and fight “clean wars,” with clear begin-
nings and ends. In these “clean wars” the cleanliness was provided by technology. Preci-
sion munitions, stealth, and advanced communications would contribute to effective 
maneuver warfare. Conventional war favored the advances in guided weapons technology. 
The smaller All Volunteer Force similarly benefited from the advantages offered by the new 
technologies, which functioned as a force multiplier.
10.2.1 Airland Battle and Systems Warfare
Airland Battle became the US Army’s doctrinal framework following the post-Vietnam 
shift towards conventional maneuver warfare. It was the precursor to network-centric 
warfare that came to define US transformation in the early 2000’s. Published in 1981, 
AirLand Battle was a doctrine that combined land and airpower. It explicitly addressed 
what was perceived to be the Army’s failure in Vietnam, which let military strategy 
become the premise of politics. The doctrine affirmed that the objective of the military 
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instrument was crystal-clear, namely to win wars. On the second page of the doctrine it 
stated “once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, mili-
tary forces must win something –else there will be no basis from which political authori-
ties can bargain to win politically. Therefore, the purpose of military operations cannot be 
simply to avert defeat- - but rather it must be to win.”209 AirLand Battle relied on distant 
firepower, artillery and close-air support and the use of overwhelming force. It was based 
on presumed US technological superiority to counter greater Soviet numbers of armored 
and mechanized vehicles. It rested on the principle of disrupting a Soviet assault by simul-
taneously attacking Soviet forward deployed and second echelon follow-on forces through 
a combination of artillery, mechanized and armored formations as well as air power and 
army aviation. These latter units would engage in “deep attack” missions, targeting follow-
on forces deep behind enemy lines. It would reshape military confrontations. Using 
words resembling those used two decades later in the context of network-centric warfare, 
AirLand Battle, “draws adroitly on advanced technology, concentrates force from unprec-
edented distances with overwhelming suddenness and violence, and blinds and bewilders 
the foe.”210 Two decades later this evolved into the concept of rapid, decisive operations 
which envisaged military power applied with overwhelming force to achieve rapid and 
decisive victory.211
The objectives of AirLand Battle were comparable to the objectives envisaged for the 
Future Combat Systems, the dominant Army transformation program in the early 2000’s 
which will be discussed in more detail later. The latter’s conceptual basis was to enable 
“operational maneuver over strategic distances” intent on performing concurrent opera-
tions to shock the adversary into submission. Furthermore, the same principle to “blind 
and bewilder the foe” - as referred to in AirLand Battle - was echoed in the doctrine of 
‘Shock and Awe’ in 1996.212 It envisioned victory in warfare by applying overwhelming 
force nearly instantaneously so that the adversary’s will to fight evaporates. The authors 
believed that the technologies of the guided munitions revolution and network-centric 
warfare offered the ability to achieve such quick victory. It was the logical end-point and 
pinnacle of achieving dominance through power projection, but pioneered in AirLand 
Battle. 
AirLand Battle offered the conceptual foundation on which transformation’s 
network-centric warfare would later be developed. It also provided doctrinal momentum 
for the development of technologies associated with the guided munitions revolution. 
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‘Deep attack’ required advanced reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities (the adver-
sary’s follow-on forces need to be identified), improved command and control (the follow-
on forces need to be engaged by the appropriate capabilities), precision munitions (the 
follow-on forces need to be engaged effectively with as few US capabilities as possible) 
and stealth platforms capable of penetrating deep into adversarial terrain. This created 
the demand for connecting various reconnaissance sensors in a network to get actionable 
intelligence on the adversary’s follow-on echelons, to be able to transmit that informa-
tion to the forces in the field, and to have precision engagement. ‘Deep attack’ anticipated 
finding weak points and centers of gravity in the adversary’s advance, whether physical or 
moral, and to target these. This would become central to network-centric warfare. 
Around the same time, in the mid-1980’s, the Air Force developed a doctrine known 
as System Warfare. Developed by Colonel John Warden III, it was a theory of airpower 
focused on targeting an adversary’s strategic pressure points and centers of gravity.213 It 
was the Air Force’s precursor to network-centric warfare and its focus on so-called “effects-
based operations,” in which the military aspires to produce certain effects to achieve 
victory rather than emphasize purely the physical destruction of an adversary.214 It was 
a direct product of the systems-thinking developed with System Warfare since it relied 
on information about an adversary’s strategic pressure points and a system of airborne 
and space platforms, sensors and precision munitions to target them. It made use of the 
new advances in technology which yielded the possibility to target an adversary’s center 
of gravity, for example specific communication nodes or headquarters, in order to inca-
pacitate a military. System Warfare relied on the ability to apply “overwhelming complexity” 
on the opponent by using multiple layers of attack, bomb and support aircraft in order to 
achieve “air superiority”. Moreover these aircraft were fitted with new types of precision 
munitions including heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, radar-homing SEAD missiles and 
laser-guided precision bombs which greatly improved accuracy. The Vietnam War had 
questioned the role of airpower in achieving strategic victory. But advances in precision, 
which theoretically enabled those distinct pressure points to be hit, implied that strategic 
bombing campaigns were reconsidered. In addition, these multiple layers of aircraft and 
sophisticated munitions created the demand to link these platforms together in a network. 
System Warfare was in effect a strategic bombing plan. It viewed the opponent as a system, 
rather than purely a military force, and airpower was applied to crumble that system. 
Operation Desert Storm would provide its testing ground. 
10.2.2 The Precision Revolution & Operation Desert Storm
Precision and stealth were central to the RMA and the evolution towards network-centric 
warfare. Precision meant that fewer forces needed to be put in harm’s way. Due to the 
technological increases fewer forces were needed to achieve the same effect. It produced 
213 John Warden, “The Air Campaign,” National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1988.
214 For a discussion of the difficulties associated with “effects-based operations” see Zoltan 
Jobbagy, “Effects-based operations and the Problem of Causality,” Joint Forces Quarterly, iss. 
46 (3rd quarter 2007), pp. 90-95.
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the dictum to “substitute mass for information.” It created less risk to American forces, 
increased the speed of operations and greater cost efficiency. It also meant that there would 
be less collateral damage and that objectives could be met sooner, promising to make 
warfare quicker, cheaper and less bloody. Advances in precision could realize the vision of 
“clean wars.” It was also a quantifiable metric to measure the superiority of US conventional 
forces. Operation Desert Storm advanced this principle which was central to thinking on 
transformation in the US.
Militarily, the Gulf War was a vindication for the changes pursued during the past 
decade and a half. The ground campaign drew on elements of AirLand Battle while the 
month-long air campaign put System Warfare into practice, although now in the desert 
instead of the West-German hills. The ground war saw the Army and Marine Corps 
dispose of the Iraqi military in one hundred hours. This was the major theatre war that 
the Army had planned for since Vietnam and vindicated its niche of conventional warfare. 
The spirit of Vietnam had loomed large over the White House as well. As President George 
H.W. Bush later recalled in his diary during Operation Desert Storm, “…Vietnam will 
soon be behind us…It’s surprising how much I dwell on the end of the Vietnam syndrome. 
I felt the division in the country in the 60s and 70s…I remember the agony and the ugli-
ness, and now it’s together.”215 
In every confrontation during the ground campaign in Iraq American forces domi-
nated.216 The United States deployed 795,000 forces and suffered 240 casualties. With 
unprecedented low loss-rates, the US military was able to achieve its military objective 
of removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, liberating the small oil-state.217 The Gulf War 
demonstrated the value of the guided munitions revolution. The use of precision muni-
tions by the air force created vast increases in effectiveness.218 The massive air campaign 
- well over 100,000 sorties in 43 days - was based on Warden’s concept of system warfare. 
Iraqi air defenses were crippled, key centers of command and control were destroyed and 
aircraft were able to strike targets as far North as Baghdad. Both in the ground and air 
campaigns, the opponent had been struck far behind the frontlines. While only a frac-
tion of the bombs dropped were guided, the general public remembers the images from 
cameras mounted on missiles striking bridges and buildings. According to the authors of 
the Gulf War Air Power Survey, stealth and precision munitions greatly contributed to 
215 George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, (New York: Vintage, 1998), 
p.484.
216 This is not intended to mean that there were no tough battles during the Gulf War, as the 
Battle of 73 Easting clearly demonstrated. Rather, that even when confronting a numerically 
superior Iraqi military, the United States proved dominant.
217 As Stephen Biddle points out, “This loss rate of fewer than one fatality per 3,000 soldiers was 
less than one tenth of the Israelis’ loss rate in either the 1967 Six-Day War or the Bekaa Valley 
campaign in 1982, less than one twentieth of the Germans’ in their Blitzkriegs against Poland 
or France in 1939-40, and about one one-thousandth of the U.S. Marines’ in the invasion of 
Tarawa in 1943.” Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern 
Battle, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.133.
218 See Thomas Keaney & Eliot Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, (Washington, DC: 1993).
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success of the air campaign.219 
To measure advances in precision, an oft-used metric in the Pentagon is the target/
sortie ratio. During Desert Storm twelve sorties of aircraft with precision-guided muni-
tions (PGMs) targeted 26 targets using 28 bombs. With unguided munitions, it took 
the same twelve sorties 168 bombs to destroy two targets.220 PGMs were two orders of 
magnitude more effective than unguided weapons in terms of target per sortie ratios. The 
Air Force fully embraced them in the years ahead. While less than 10% of all munitions 
used during Desert Storm were precision-guided, that number rose to 60% in Operation 
Enduring Freedom and 68% of all munitions dropped in Operation Iraqi Freedom. As 
sensor technology progressed during the decade and laser-guided was replaced by GPS-
based guidance systems, disturbing factors such as weather or smoke could be removed 
further improving accuracies. Such GPS-guided JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) 
were emblematic of the revolutionary nature of precision. They decreased the circular 
error probability at close-to-zero risk to the pilots and limited cost, consisting of a $28,000 
GPS-kit mounted on a dumb bomb. During the combat-phase of Iraqi Freedom more 
than 6500 JDAMs were dropped with an average miss of less than 12 feet.221 This spurred 
the faith that guided munitions could improve System Warfare and realize ‘Effects-based 
Operations’.222 
(Source: US Ofce of Force Transformation, 2007)


























219 Stephan Biddle later nuanced this, saying that it was superior technology that allowed better-
trained American forces to exploit Iraqi mistakes to advantage. Stephen Biddle, “Victory 
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Figure 5 was amongst others used by the director of the Pentagon’s Office of Force Trans-
formation, Terry Pudas, to illustrate the increased potential offered by the guided muni-
tions revolution. Showing that through the increased precision, the Air Force could plan 
for targets per sortie instead of sorties per target. Associated with the advances in preci-
sion was the ability of US forces to penetrate deep in enemy territory. Stealth technologies 
were central. The authors of the Gulf War Air Power Survey write: “The F-117, which flew 
only two percent of total attack sorties, struck nearly forty percent of the strategic targets 
and remained the centerpiece of the strategic air campaign for the entire war.”223 Another 
precision capability was the cruise missile. 64% of the 288 cruise missiles were launched 
in the first two days of Operation Desert Storm to strike Iraqi centers of gravity. Preci-
sion and stealth gave the US air force the ability to attain access to a part of the airspace 
that had been denied to it through sophisticated air defense systems, and hit targets that 
otherwise could not have been. Furthermore, a strong argument based on force protec-
tion promoted the use of precision, stealth, cruise missiles and other stand-off weaponry. 
These capabilities provided an unprecedented measure of safety to airmen and ground 
troops which satisfied concern for American lives. Similarly, precision munitions held the 
promise that fewer sorties were required for particular missions, keeping more Americans 
out of unfriendly skies. It quite literally reduced the human and financial cost of major 
theatre war.
10.2.3 Powell-Weinberger Doctrine
At the military-strategic level the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine cemented the Pentagon’s 
mindset that the United States focuses on major conventional warfare in its defense 
strategy. The doctrine was initially formulated in response to the 1983 terrorist attack on 
the Marine barracks in Lebanon, killing 241 Marines. The attack prompted the withdrawal 
of US forces. In response Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated six criteria which 
served as conditions to be met before the United States committed combat forces abroad. 
They were constraints not to commit forces to missions where limited interests were at 
stake or where insufficient forces were available. The Weinberger Doctrine meant to avoid 
Vietnam- and Lebanon-like deployments.224 The six questions to be answered in the affir-
mative were:
ӺӺ Is a vital national interest at stake?
ӺӺ Will we commit enough forces to win?
ӺӺ Do we have clearly defined political and military objectives?
ӺӺ Will we reassess and adjust our forces as necessary?
ӺӺ Will Congress and the American people support the action?
ӺӺ Is the use of force our last resort?
223 Keaney & Cohen (1993), p. 224.
224 Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and 
Irregular War, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 117.
80 The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally
Following the Gulf War Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell augmented 
the Doctrine with several military-strategic tenets. Together it would become known as 
the Powell-Weinberger doctrine. Powell underlined the necessity of using overwhelming 
force to achieve limited and well-defined political objectives. “We must not, Powell wrote, 
“send military forces into a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish.”225 He 
inferred the hypothetical of pushing on to Baghdad in 1991 which he said would have 
created an uncertain situation with “major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and 
a very expensive and complex American proconsulship.”226 Instead the Allied coalition 
had stopped short of going to Baghdad, a position strongly supported by President George 
H.W. Bush.227 Powell’s observation proved a prescient, but unheeded warning when he 
was Secretary of State in the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003. Powell was keen to point 
out that when the decision to use force was taken, it should be applied overwhelmingly 
and decisively: “When we do use it, we should not be equivocal: we should win and win 
decisively. If our objective is something short of winning ... we should see our objective 
clearly then achieve it swiftly and efficiently.” Powell advanced the principle of decisive 
force as criteria for deploying military forces abroad. It meant overwhelming the adversary 
to achieve swift defeat with a minimum number of casualties.228 The doctrine was captured 
in the Army’s Field manual, the principle doctrinal document of the US Army. It noted: 
The people of the United States… expect the military to accomplish its 
missions in compliance with national values. The American people expect 
decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties. They prefer quick 
resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support 
should any of these conditions not be met.229
The Powell-Weinberger doctrine was premised on realist considerations. It tempered 
decision-making regarding the use of the military for idealist purposes by making its use 
contingent on threats to vital security interests. It also reinforced the demand for military 
superiority and high-end, high-intensity capabilities making use of advanced technolo-
gies. It supported the tenets of AirLand Battle and System Warfare. It also confirmed high-
intensity conventional warfare as the organizing principle for the military. The Doctrine 
was as much a capstone of the post-Vietnam reforms, as it was an implication derived from 
the Gulf War where overwhelming force had been applied with a definite exit-strategy in 
225 For a concise articulation of Powell’s addendum to the Weinberger Doctrine see Colin Powell, 
“US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992/93).
226 Colin Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992/93).
227 Bush, Scowcroft (1998), p.464.
228 Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and 
Irregular War, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 118.
229 US Army Doctrine, Field Manual 100-5: Operations, (June 1993), p. 1-2/3.
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response to a threat to vital security interests. For all its unique characteristics the Gulf War 
became the archetypical operation for the US pursuit of transformation.230 
10.3 Pax Americana
Critical to the development of US transformation was the belief that its successful pursuit 
would mean a comparative advantage for the US military allowing Washington to sustain 
its strategic position as unipolar global superpower after the end of the Cold War and 
Desert Storm. The Gulf War gave rise to three ideas. Firstly, technology had been essential 
to US victory. Secondly, the United States had the most technologically capable military on 
the planet. Thirdly, Operation Desert Storm heralded a new era of warfare based around 
US military dominance and its ability to project power and to wage major regional warfare 
at limited costs. It made clear that a unipolar system had been born.231 The lack of a peer 
competitor on the horizon spelled a strategic pause to some, and a window of opportu-
nity to others. Inside Washington, its political-strategic consequences were formulated 
in the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Paul 
Wolfowitz drafted the Guidance as an internal report outlining the grand strategic impli-
cations of the post-Cold War environment. It developed the idea of a Pax Americana, an 
international system based around American hegemonic military power. The document 
advanced two premises; maintaining a position of global dominance by preventing the 
rise of a peer-competitor and to that end dealing effectively with regional conflicts and 
other sources of instability that might give rise to great power aspirations: “Our strategy 
must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor,” 
Wolfowitz wrote. It formed the basis for a strategic focus on power projection and major 
theatre warfare.232 The document embraced a policy of interventionism to protect vital 
interests abroad:
While the US cannot become the world’s policeman, by assuming 
responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent 
responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not 
only our interest, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously 
unsettle international relations.233
230 For an analysis of the unique characteristics working in the US military’s favor during 
operation Desert Storm, see Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood,” International Security, 
vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 139-179.
231 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs: America and the World 
(Winter 1990/91).
232 “Excerpts from the Pentagon’s Plans: ‘Prevent the Re-emergence of a new rival,” The New York 
Times, March 8, 1992.
233 Ibid.
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The document advocated a policy of shaping the security environment from a position 
of strategic primacy. It was an assessment on the basis of the distribution of power in the 
international system. 
Unipolarity based on US military power was confirmed in subsequent strategy 
documents.234 In 1997 Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen wrote that “America begins the 
new millennium as the sole superpower, the indispensable nation …This report sets forth 
the Department of Defense’s vision of what lies ahead as our nation embarks upon a 
new American century ….”235 Strategic dominance was the status quo, and preserving it 
the objective of defense policy. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated 
that the “US defense strategy for the near and long term must continue to shape the stra-
tegic environment to advance US interests... [emphasis in original]”236 Joint Vision 2010 
begins with proclaiming that it focuses “on achieving dominance across the range of 
military operations…” The 1997 National Defense Panel report stated that it contained 
recommendations for a policy “that molds the international environment rather than 
merely responds to it.”237 As presidential candidate, George W. Bush explicitly adopted this 
perspective when advocating in 1999 that the United States “must master the new tech-
nology of war – to extend our peaceful influence, not just across the world, but across the 
years.”238 After the attacks of September 11, President Bush asserted the status of unipo-
larity based on strategic dominance: “America has and intends to keep, military strengths 
beyond challenges – thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, 
and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”239 The United States was the 
Leviathan in the international system.
Both the Powell-Weinberger doctrine and the Defense Planning Guidance 
were based on sustaining unipolarity through conventional military strength. It meant 
extending US military hegemony and it promoted the view that doing so required further 
improving on existing capacity to wage high-intensity warfare. 
234 Major security strategy documents such as the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, Joint 
Vision 2010 and the 2002 National security strategy formulated US military and strategic 
dominance as central assumptions.
235 William Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense, 
Washington DC, May 1997, p. x.
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10.3.1  MOOTW & The Emphasis on Major Theatre War
Following Operation Desert Storm US defense strategy came to rely on high-intensity 
conventional operations. The international environment had taken a turn for the better 
and the post-Cold War, post-Desert Storm environment saw the United States as the 
unequivocal remaining superpower. According to realism, it implied that the US would 
aspire to expand its influence. Yet military-strategically this period of nascent unipolarity 
produced a hegemonic mindset whereby the United States focused on potential peer 
competitors. Regional hegemons, such as Saddam Husseins’ regime, were Soviet Union 
‘mini-me’s’. They were evil and had to be confronted by the threat of overwhelming 
military strength. Every other operation was of secondary concern and euphemistically 
became known as a Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW). The 1993 Bottom 
Up Review – the first strategic policy review following the Cold War – was drafted in the 
spirit of Powell-Weinberger and emphasized high-intensity conventional operations. Not 
only was there no real change in the AirLand Battle-oriented force structure, Powell-Wein-
berger’s criteria were explicitly reaffirmed in the document.240 
Most importantly, the Bottom Up Review set Operation Desert Storm and the 
Saddam Hussein regime as the benchmark for future conflicts. Defending against rogue 
regimes that could threaten regional stability became the principal issue of concern and 
the document articulated a force planning construct that remained constant throughout 
the 1990’s. The US should be “capable of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts 
nearly simultaneously.” The construct was explicitly geared to address the threat of a 
resurgent Iraq and to defend South Korea against a rogue North, both at the same time if 
necessary. The Review even specified an Iraq-size military to be planned against.241 The US 
military received a strategic guideline to repeat the intervention of 1991. The two Major 
Regional Contingency (MRC) construct ensured America’s strategic focus on large-scale 
wars. The 1997 QDR – the follow-up to the Bottom Up Review - stated that the two-
war-construct was “the sine qua non of a superpower” and in 2000 Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen again reaffirmed this.242 Key to fighting two major regional wars was the 
240 The Bottom Up Review enunciated four tenets which needed to be weighed before using 
military force; an assessment whether military action advances US national interests; whether 
objectives are clear and attainable; how an intervention will impact America’s strategic 
posture; and finally, whether the military is up to par and has the right capabilities. See Les 
Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, chapter 2.
241 The Review articulated combating a force of 400,000-750,000 personnel, 2,000-4,000 tanks, 
3,000-5,000 armored fighting vehicles, 2,000-3,000 artillery pieces, 500-1,000 combat air craft, 
100-200 naval platforms, 50 submarines and 100-1,000 Scud missiles. See Les Aspin, Report 
on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, chapter 3.
242 “The most demanding military requirement on US forces is the capability to fight and win 
two major theatre wars in overlapping time frames. This requires that US forces have a full 
spectrum of military capabilities in quantities sufficient to defeat any two regional adversaries 
in full-scale warfare involving land, sea and aerospace forces in two separate and distant 
theatres of conflict, with only a short period of time separating the beginnings of the two 
conflicts.” W.Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Department of Defense 
2000, p.18.
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ability to project conventional military power. While the United States had always been an 
expeditionary country, an island nation, the National Defense Strategy of 2005 explicitly 
stated that “the United States cannot influence that which it cannot reach.”243 
Paradoxically, contrary to the focus on rogue regimes, the two MRC planning 
construct and the use of the diminutive MOOTW, the 1990’s were characterized by US 
military deployments to deal with less-than-vital security issues such as Somalia in 1993, 
Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, the cruise-missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, 
persistent enforcement of the no-fly zones over Iraq throughout the decade, and the oper-
ation in Kosovo in 1999.244 The US military became the fire-extinguisher of choice of both 
the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations. Throughout the nineties the White 
House also came to rely more and more on the military to perform non-war tasks.245 It 
resulted in a strategic dichotomy. For planning purposes US armed forces were focusing on 
the two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC), yet MOOTW was the dominant form of inter-
vention. Critics pointed out that MOOTW missions were a distraction since deployments 
for peacekeeping missions or humanitarian operations meant readiness requirements for 
the two MRC’s could not be met. It was assumed that preparing for an MRC meant that all 
“lesser included contingencies” could be performed successfully as well.246 Because of the 
dominance of the two MRC construct, the US military spent little time training and equip-
ping for Operations Other Than War. The military’s focus on high-intensity conventional 
operations remained even though it was engaged in these ‘lesser’ operations at a greater 
frequency.247 Most of the MOOTW missions had limited interests at stake and thus had 
only limited impact on America’s perception of the distribution of power. 
10.3.2 Captivated by Unipolarity
Performing these limited interventions is conform to neoclassical realism. The Amer-
ican position as a hegemon led to an expansion of its domestic agenda, in which limited, 
primarily morally-driven actions now had a place. It was reflected in the statement in 1993 
by the Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright directed at Colin Powell: 
“What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use 
it.”248
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Because the United States had power, in the form of a peerless military, it could 
undertake missions even if vital interests were not at stake. Instead, the US could now do 
‘good.’ It produced a greater willingness to use the military to correct perceived wrongs in 
the international system. While the military focused on conventional warfare, the foreign 
policy executive emphasized limited interventions as a consequence of unipolarity. 
The unipolar moment meant that the United States could be unchecked in advancing 
its interests as well as its values. The Gulf War had demonstrated that the United States was 
capable of using force to adjudicate in the international system and the United States could 
shape its environment. Even Colin Powell, who had erstwhile promoted pragmatic realism 
with respect to the use of force, now seemed enthused by the opportunities presented by 
military hegemony. Powell expressed that the post-Cold War period was a “fourth rendez-
vous with destiny” in line with the American Revolution, the Civil War, US participation 
in World War II and the subsequent Cold War.249 The United States, wrote Powell, had a 
window “to lead the world at a time of immense opportunity – an opportunity never seen 
in the world before.” That opportunity meant advancing the ideals of a new world order on 
the basis of American values: “We can have peace. We can continue moving toward greater 
prosperity for all. We can strive for justice in the world. We can seek to limit the destruction 
and the casualties of war. We can help enslaved people find their freedom.” The unipolar 
moment brought an ideological policy to bear. The Defense Planning Guidance had also 
outlined the option to use military force for limited purposes rightly because there was no 
peer competitor to worry about:
…because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic 
power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity 
to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs -- as long as we are prepared 
to reconstitute additional forces should the need to counter a global threat 
re-emerge.250 
Limited interventions however did not mean peacekeeping operations. The United States 
remained focused on seeing the military as a specific niche. Small wars were considered 
acceptable, complex peace missions were out of the question. The transition at the end of 
the Cold War shaped a strategy to optimize its capabilities for conventional high-intensity 
warfare and rapid, decisive operations. The subsequent administration underlined this. In 
2001, prior to entering office national security advisor Condoleeza Rice reaffirmed the 
military’s orientation to conventional warfare. She told President George W. Bush: “The 
use of the military is only used for warfighting …The president must remember that the 
military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police 
force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian 
249 Colin Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/93).
250 “Excerpts from the Pentagon’s Plans: ‘Prevent the Re-emergence of a new rival,” The New York 
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society.”251 George Bush corroborated this when he said that: “… we will not be permanent 
peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our strength or our calling.”252 It proved 
to be a prophetic statement since a few years after Rice’s comment the United States would 
confront irregular warfare and pursue counterinsurgency, a military-operation-other-
than-war that was strategically important. But more on this later.
10.3.3 Anti-access and Area-denial threats
Following Desert Storm Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell defined the 
requirement of the new geopolitical context as follows: “We have to make sure that as we 
build our new force structure in this new environment, we have the ability to respond to 
the crisis nobody expected, nobody told us about, a contingency that suddenly pops up at 
2 in the morning. […] Our national strategy is founded on the premise that America will 
continue to provide the leadership needed to preserve global peace and security.”253 Secre-
tary of Defense Cheney had earlier argued in favor of being able to deploy several divi-
sions within days. President Clinton also adhered to the tenets of power projection based 
on a mobile force.254 The embrace of power projection produced a consistent emphasis 
on multifunctional, deployable, logistically independent and highly mobile conventional 
forces. Its keywords were best described by President Clinton in February 1993: 
Our military will be mobile (with the sealift and airlift it requires), agile 
(with new technologies and integrated doctrine which allows it to dominate 
by maneuver, speed and technological superiority), precise (to reduce the 
loss of life in combat), flexible (to operate with diverse partners in diverse 
regions), smart (with the intelligence and communications it needs for the 
diverse threats it will face), and, especially, ready (given the unpredictability 
of new threats) [emphasis in original]. 255 
The logical conclusion of the emphasis on power projection was the necessity to have 
global access. Following Desert Storm, although the United States believed it could claim 
superiority at the outset of any military confrontation, the operation had demonstrated 
that getting to the theatre timely had become a bottleneck and that theatre and strategic 
251 Condoleeza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no.1 (January/ 
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ballistic missiles – possibly even containing chemical, biological or nuclear warheads 
- could influence the strategic equation of an intervention by tempering an advance, 
stalling an operation or even preventing a deployment. Saddam Hussein fired forty Scud 
missiles at Israel and forty-three against Saudi Arabia. They had almost broken the coali-
tion. The Scud attack on February 25, 1991 on an Army compound in Saudi Arabia killing 
twenty-eight and wounding 97 American soldiers– almost 20% of all US casualties in the 
war - demonstrated the vulnerability of large concentrations of military forces at points 
of disembarkation and vulnerable sites. The campaign plan of Desert Storm had called 
for 830,000 US forces to be deployed. Such a large amount required a momentous effort 
both in time and capital. The United States had used a five-month period to build up and 
accustom its forces to the desert surroundings.256 Future adversaries would not likely be 
as tolerant. Advances in missile technology and proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion could plausibly exploit these vulnerabilities. Known to possess medium-range 
ballistic missiles and chemical warheads, what would have happened had Saddam pre-
empted the military build-up by making vulnerable points of disembarkation unusable? 
Or had successfully targeted large concentrations of troops? If the United States wanted 
to perform expeditionary operations, prevent the rise of regional hegemons and project 
power to wage major regional war, it needed to be nimbler; quicker in theatre and more 
dispersed. Defense analysts in Washington were pondering this question and it would 
become a main driver for operational effectiveness transformation, particularly among 
the ground forces, throughout the 1990’s. 
US power projection rested on superiority over the commons – space, air and 
sea – yielding unfettered access to many parts of the globe.257 It maximized freedom of 
action and thereby was considered central to sustaining strategic dominance. Command 
of the commons is an essential characteristic of US strategic policy. Already in the 1997 
Quadrennial Defense Review the Command of the Commons philosophy was present. 
“Control of the seas and airspace” was mentioned as a critical enabler for US power projec-
tion. Some months later the National Defense Panel noted that:
The cornerstone of America’s continued military pre-eminence is our 
ability to project power rapidly and virtually unimpeded to widespread 
areas of the globe. Much of our power projection capability depends on 
sustained access to regions of concern.258 
256 One of the reasons being that 95% of material had to be shipped by slow sealift. See Keaney & 
Cohen (1993), p.4.
257 Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons,” International Security, Vol. 28, no.1 (Summer 
2003), pp.5-46.
258 National Defense Panel Report (1997), p. 12.
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This global access also included space.259 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in 
2005 that:“Key goals... are to ensure our access to and use of space, and to deny hostile 
exploitation of space to adversaries.[emphasis added]”260 When an adversary has the 
intention to “exploit space in the same way the United States and its allies can,” denying 
that ability was believed necessary. Space superiority was “the American way of fighting” 
said General Lance Lord, commander of the US Air Force Space Command, “… it is our 
vision for the future.”261 
AirLand Battle and System Warfare had been developed taking these concerns into 
account. Both doctrines required the US military to gain access far beyond traditional 
frontlines. A successful execution of the doctrine relied on establishing air superiority by 
defeating sophisticated air defenses. The SCUD-scare of the Gulf War made it clear that 
American reliance on single points of entry and large concentrations of forces presented 
significant vulnerabilities able to be exploited by adversaries armed with anti-access or 
area-denial weapons such as mines, cruise missiles, or ballistic missiles. The ability to 
project power quicker was key. In 1999 George W. Bush echoed the desire to project power 
“over long distances, in days or weeks rather than months.”262 Five years after Bush’s speech 
the National Military Strategy stated that adversaries “will avoid US strengths like preci-
sion strike and seek to counter US power projection capabilities by creating anti-access 
environments.”263 Since US military dominance relied on power projection, the future 
operational environment was believed to be one where large concentrations of forces 
would be challenged. Conversely, the strategic bombing campaign during Desert Storm, 
which targeted the Iraqi infrastructure far from Kuwait, demonstrated the value of having 
freedom of action across the battlespace. ‘Getting access’ became an element of critical 
importance to sustain US military hegemony and military technology was considered 
crucial to achieving it.
Since the end of the Cold War this strategic orientation sparked an emphasis on 
dealing with anti-access and area-denial threats which deny US power projection capa-
bilities and threatened its command of the commons. While command of the commons 
enables power projection, anti-access and area-denial threats deny it: “If anti-access (A2) 
strategies aim to prevent US forces entry into a theater of operations, then area-denial 
(AD) operations aim to prevent their freedom of action in the more narrow confines of 
259 United States Department of the Air Force, The US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 
Washington DC, November 2003, p. 45.
260 Donald Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department 
of Defense, Washington DC, March 2005, p.16.
261 Tim Weiner, “Air Force Seeks Bush’s Approval for Space Weapons Programs” New York Times, 
May 18, 2005.
262 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.
263 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of 
America : a strategy for today, a vision for tomorrow, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 
2004.
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the area under an enemy’s direct control.”264 Adversarial capabilities that fall within the 
A2/AD category are amongst others ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, CBRN weaponry, 
sophisticated mines, air defense systems, anti-ship weaponry and submarines. This tech-
nology could “diminish [the United states’] ability to apply military power, reducing [its] 
military and political influence in key regions of the world.”265 
Thus following the end of the Cold War and underlined by Operation Desert Storm, 
the United States emerged as the dominant power in the international system. The US 
interpretation of this distribution of power inclined it to pursue a policy to sustain its posi-
tion at the top of the unipolar system and prevent the rise of peer competitors. On the 
basis of its appreciation that the post-Cold War environment presented limited threats and 
driven by domestic factors - most importantly the inclination of the military to emphasize 
a focus on conventional wars and avoid Vietnam-like repeats - the United States pursued 
a strategy based on the model that was designed to fight the Soviet Union and had led to 
success in Desert Storm. AirLand Battle and System Warfare relied on the technological 
advances of the guided munitions revolution. Improving these capabilities would be the 
recipe to sustain its hegemonic position. Doing so required dealing with anti-access and 
area-denial threats that could negate the United States’ ability to deploy military force 
where it wanted. It became the basis for its view on transformation. 
10.4  Making War Obsolete
Aside from the rise of unipolarity and the sustained focus on major theatre warfare, the 
second element that drove US transformation and represented both an opportunity as 
well as an increased external vulnerability was the advent of the Information Age. Lacking 
a peer competitor while focused on preventing its rise, US policymakers in the 1990’s 
quickly became seduced by the concept of the strategic pause. The unipolar environment 
offered a unique opportunity to advance US interests abroad, but also a window to sustain 
US unipolarity. By the early 2000’s it was thought that given its military superiority the 
United States could even make military competition all but obsolete. In 2002 Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went so far to state that the objective of transformation 
was to “develop new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from 
competing.”266 A military-strategy document two years earlier had envisaged successful 
transformation to allow the United States to defeat an enemy by simply being present, or 
even threatening to be there.267 If successful transformation would allow the United States 
264 Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial 
Challenge, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC, 2003, p. ii.
265 Idem.
266 Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/ June 2002) 
p. 27.
267 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, Joint Vision 2020, 
Washington DC, June 2000, p. 21.
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to stay so far ahead of potential competitors that it could make military conflict futile. The 
reason for the optimism was the advent of, and America’s pole position in, the Informa-
tion Age. 
10.4.1  Faith in Technology
Throughout its modern history, the United States has emphasized superior technology to 
provide it with victory in battle. Reliance on technology has been driven by a positivist 
philosophy that science can be applied to engineer society and solve social problems.268 
The positivist view was that “as human knowledge advanced, human conflict would wither 
away.”269 The technologies associated with the Information Age formed the next incarna-
tion of security policy based on faith in superior military technology.
In the 1950’s President Dwight D. Eisenhower realized that the United States 
confronted a Soviet adversary that was numerically superior. Eisenhower embraced 
technology and turned to the recently developed atomic bomb, pushing the Pentagon 
to make it suitable for maneuver warfare. The Pentomic division was a flirt with nuclear 
artillery intent on putting the science of nuclear physics to political-military advantage. 
Throughout the Cold War Washington believed that technology could tip the strategic 
balance in its favor. Forsaking the possibility of spending as much on defense as the Soviet 
Union - which was running in the ranges of one-third of its GDP- the US emphasized tech-
nological prowess. The historian Russell Weigley argued in 1973 that it was quintessen-
tially American: “To seek refuge in technology from hard problems of strategy and policy 
was already another dangerous American tendency, fostered by the pragmatic qualities of 
the American character and by the complexity of nuclear-age technology.”270 The principle 
described by Weigley remained applicable following the end of the Cold War. Secretary 
of Defense Dick Cheney believed that the Cold War had been won on the basis of tech-
nological competition and that among US core strengths was its level of “technological 
innovation” adding that “one of the key strategic assets the United states has enjoyed now 
all these years has been our ability to do a better job of applying modern technology to 
military requirements than the Soviets have been able to do.”271 President George H.W. 
Bush similarly said in 1990 that:
268 Positivism originated during the Enlightenment as a reaction to metaphysics and theological 
explanations for social behavior. One of the first Positivists was Auguste Comte who looked 
towards a society based on science, rather than theology. See Comte, The Course in Positivist 
Philosophy, 1830. Other important positivists or influences on Positivism include Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Immanuel Kant, and Bertrand Russell. For a critique of logical Positivism see 
Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, (Beacon, 1972).
269 John Gray, Black Mass, (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2007) p. 59.
270 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 416.
271 Richard Cheney, “Transcript of the testimony of the Secretary of Defense,” Hearings at United 
States Senate Armed Services Committee for FY1991, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 
February 1, 1990, p. 10.
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The US has always relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to 
match potential adversaries’ strength in numbers –cruise missiles, Stealth 
fighters and bombers, today’s “smart weapons” with the state-of-the-art 
guidance systems, and tomorrow’s “brilliant” ones. The men and women 
in our Armed Forces deserve the best technology America has to offer.
While Operation Desert Storm demonstrated US conventional superiority, Cheney 
emphasized the importance to sustain that superiority. Eyeing the relevance of technology 
in 1991, he said, “staying ahead in this technological revolution will help shape the future 
security environment in ways favorable to the United States and will help give us capa-
bilities that we are comfortable employing for defense or deterrence against tomorrow’s 
regional aggressors.”272 Technological superiority was widely felt to be the basis for victory 
in the Gulf War. An exuberant Senator John Warner (ranking member of the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services) exclaimed in February 1991:
The technology is awesome! […] Having heard directly from the American 
soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines whose lives are at stake about how our 
modern weapons systems save lives, I must say that I am more convinced 
than ever that we must continue to invest in modern technology weapons.… 
Defending freedom is not cheap. Modern technologically advanced systems 
are expensive – but they avoid needless loss of life, the lives of American 
service personnel, the lives of innocent civilians, and yes, if able to bring 
about an earlier end of war, the lives of the opposing military personnel … 
Defending freedom is worth these costs.273 
In the 1990’s technology was turned to for a variety of reasons; it could lead to cost-savings 
and it could take Americans out of harm’s way to participate in non-vital conflicts. At a 
time of shrinking budgets, technology was a natural solution. Colin Powell, then retired 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in 1992 that technology could offset the loss 
of military power following the post-Cold War peace dividend: “A downsized force and 
a shrinking defense budget result in an increased reliance on technology, which must 
provide the force multiplier required to ensure a viable military deterrent.”274 While the 
substitution of humans for technology had been necessary during the Cold War to face 
Soviet numerical superiority, in the 1990’s it was necessary as a result of the post-Cold 
War strategic pause. Technology would allow the size of forces to be decreased or to avoid 
the use of troops altogether. Technology was preferred in order to remove US forces from 
the battlefield. It coincided with a period in which the United States undertook mainly 
272 Ibid.
273 John Warner, “Transcript of Hearing before the United States Congress Senate Committee on 
Armed Services,” Library of Congress, Washington DC, February 21, 1991.
274 Colin Powell, “Information-Age Warriors,” Byte, (July 1992), p. 370.
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non-vital interventions. The military strategist Edward Luttwak wrote that the conflicts 
in the 1990’s did not impact the vital interests of Western states, and therefore were not 
worth dying for.275 He concluded therefore that Western states should invest in those 
technologies that reduced the risk to Western forces. The military and politicians wanted 
to perform these missions risk-free. Amongst others for fear of losing the support of the 
American people.276 With limited interests at stake, only limited resources were willing to 
be spent. The operation in Somalia had made clear that 18 dead Americans could lead 
to a withdrawal of US forces with the political objectives unattained, a damaged interna-
tional image and emboldened adversaries. Technology offered the way out. The guided 
munitions revolution made the military an increasingly useful instrument at a time of 
limited domestic support for sending military forces into harm’s way. It served the Clinton 
administration well throughout its limited interventions, relying on cruise missiles and 
airpower.277 The guided munitions revolution allowed reducing the size of a deployed 
force. For instance, close air support could substitute Army artillery. In the event that land 
forces were deployed, airpower would take on a supporting role, leading to a lower require-
ment of ground forces, thereby increasing the deployability of the force. With less forces 
deployed, the reasoning went, less Americans would be at risk. The technology of the 
guided munitions revolution was key to addressing political concerns over the missions in 
the 1990’s; keeping the number of US deployed forces down, the government had a highly 
usable military instrument. Aside from the non-vital operations, it also increased the effec-
tiveness of US military forces in those high-intensity operations its strategic documents 
called for. Network-centric warfare was the next step in a history of relying on technology 
to increase the extractive capacity of the state and the usability of the military, with the 
systems now being not tanks but bytes. It offered a further reason for a technology-centric 
approach, namely the belief that it would revolutionize the face of war.
10.4.2 The Fog of war disappears in a cloud of electrons
Joint Vision 2010, the military’s strategy document published in 1996 by the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili was the first to present network-centric 
warfare as the basis for US transformation. While the United States had demonstrated 
its capabilities in the realm of precision and stealth, a new set of technologies was prom-
ising to place those systems in a different context. With no peer competitor threats on the 
275 Edward Luttwak, “A Post-Heroic Military Policy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 75. no. 4 (July/ August 
1996), p.33-44.
276 See the study by Peter Feaver & Christopher Gelpi, “A Look at …Casualty Aversion,” 
Washington Post, November 7, 1999. On the basis of extensive surveys Feaver and Gelpi 
showed that contrary to the sentiment in Washington, the political leadership is more 
casualty-averse than the general public as long as the latter feels that the war can be won. See 
also Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion, & U.S. Military Intervention, MR-
431-A/AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), p. 1–27; Lt.Col. Richard A. Lacquement Jr., “The 
Casualty-Aversion Myth,” Naval War College Review, (Winter 2004), p 39-57.
277 See Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 148.
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horizon, Joint Vision 2010 argued that the strategic pause warranted a rush forward into 
the Information Age. 
The document argued that technological change yielded a unique opportunity for 
new advantages in warfare. The combination of enhanced sensors and information 
processing capabilities was leading to greater information about the adversary. Joint 
Vision 2010 argued that the adversary could be identified, targeted and destroyed earlier, 
quicker and with greater precision. It was based on a network of ‘sensors’ and ‘shooters’ 
that the US would roll over a battlefield like a blanket. It promised to lead to dominant 
battlespace awareness reducing the fog of war; the term Clausewitz used to describe 
uncertainty and friction in warfare. The overarching concept was network-centric warfare. 
Rather than firepower or maneuver, it is based on the idea that superior information on 
the adversary leads to quicker and better decision making. Information superiority was 
defined as the “capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.” This was the 
key enabler that would “transform the traditional functions of maneuver, strike, protection 
and logistics.”278 It would change all elements of major theatre warfare and thereby present 
a discontinuous change to the US military. Transformation was based on the belief that 
through networking sensor-systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites or Special 
Operations Forces with platforms such as fighter aircraft, cruise missiles or Special Forces 
on the ground, “technology trends will provide an order of magnitude improvement of 
lethality.” This opened a window to a whole new way of waging war characterized by speed 
and precision. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review provided the Pentagon’s interpre-
tation of Joint Vision 2010. Referring to the Revolution in Military Affairs it stated that 
the information revolution was the principle source of the RMA and that it would “funda-
mentally change the way US forces fight. We must exploit these and other technologies to 
dominate in battle.”279 The document deliberately shifted the focus towards future tech-
nologies and developing future capabilities, in line with the belief in a strategic pause and 
the opportunity it offered. Once successful it would lead to US forces that were “different 
in character” and give America an asymmetric advantage over its competitors. “The key to 
success is an integrated ‘system of systems’ that will give [US forces] superior battlespace 
awareness, permitting them to dramatically reduce the fog of war.” In June 2000 the new 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton published Joint Vision 2020. Three 
years its junior this strategy document reiterated much of Joint Vision 2010 although with 
a ten-year extension of the deadline. The document introduced the principle of full-spec-
trum dominance as the final objective of transformation.280 ‘Full spectrum dominance’ 
278 Joint Vision 2010, p.19.
279 William Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense, 
Washington DC, May 1997, p. iv.
280 “The transformation of the joint force to reach full spectrum dominance rests upon 
information superiority as a key enabler and our capacity for innovation.”Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, Joint Vision 2020, Washington DC, June 2000, 
p. 7.
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implied the ability to win conflicts at all junctions of the conflict spectrum and was “the 
ability to sense, understand, decide and act faster than an adversary in any situation.”281 It 
would bring military superiority. As Eliot Cohen formulated it in 1996: “what can be seen 
on the modern battlefield can be hit, and what can be hit will be destroyed.”282
Technologically, network-centric warfare is made possible by advances in the guided 
munitions revolution combined with the critical enabler offered by information technol-
ogies. The central driver behind the Information Age, according to proponents such as 
David Alberts, was that the economics of information had changed as a result of satellite 
communications, fiber-optic cables and the internet.283 These and other information tech-
nologies had made gathering and transmitting large amounts of information cost-effective. 
Greater richness and reach of information was making “the ROI [return on investment] for 
a dollar spent on information greater than it was before.” In network centric warfare the 
value of individual platforms increases exponentially as a result of being integrated into 
a network. Network externalities make a coherent system-of-systems approach possible, 
changing the way in which militaries operate in order to increase the speed of operations, 
and the locus of value, or power, shifts from platforms to the network.284 
The basis of the two Joint Vision documents and the 1997 QDR, namely improve-
ments in operational effectiveness as a result of new technologies, was similar. It sought 
to establish a favorable “frictional imbalance” by reducing Clausewitz’s fog of war for the 
US military through advanced sensor systems. The goal of transformation was to develop, 
grow and harness that imbalance. By having superior information gathering, informa-
tion processing and information dispersal, it would lead to decision superiority: “better 
decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an opponent can react.”285 Operational 
effectiveness would be achieved by having a quicker and better decision cycle than the 
adversary or enable the manipulation of the adversary’s OODA-loop.286 Being quicker and 
smarter than the adversary provided the basis for new military competitive advantage and 
sustaining US dominance. 
At the tactical level, network-centric warfare was developed to reduce the fog of war, 
making the battlefield transparent, removing uncertainty and permitting increased speed 
of operations and hitting targets quicker. The operational advantage was that all friendly 
281 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations Concepts, November 2003, p.8.
282 Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), p. 
44.
283 David S. Alberts, Information Age transformation: getting to a 21st century military, DOD 
Command and Control Research Program, 2002.
284 These ideas are derived from Geoffrey A. Moore, Dealing with Darwin, (New York: Portfolio, 
2005).
285 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, Joint Vision 2020, 
Washington DC, June 2000, p. 8.
286 For a full explanation of the intellectual origins of the OODA loop and John Boyd see Frans 
Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, (London: Routledge, 
2006).
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forces had the same operational picture (called situational awareness) and could self-
synchronize.287 It would allow dispersed operations, reducing massed – and thus vulner-
able – friendly concentrations of forces and enable synchronous instead of sequential 
action across the battlespace. The overall strategic effect would be quicker achievement 
of military objectives with fewer forces. It would reduce the military footprint, or number 
of forces on the ground, to the same effect. This improved the expeditionary nature of the 
deployed forces and the ability to project power. Admiral Owens, vice-chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1994 to 1996, wrote after reiterating that technology would be 
able to ‘pierce the fog of war’ creating a force:
designed to exploit our lead in computer, sensing and communications 
technologies...It would be a force capable of achieving dominant battlespace 
knowledge and using it not only for general war but for maintaining peace. 
It would be a military that could, for the first time in history, pierce the fog 
of war, both minimizing American casualties, and winning the conflicts at 
hand. And waging war would be done for a cost of 20 percent less.288
Joint Vision 2020 underlined the deterrent effect of such a transformed force and acknowl-
edged that merely the anticipated presence of such a force could overwhelm the adversary 
into submission.289 Given the increased speed and distribution of operations, with multiple 
layers of systems, the opponent would face an overwhelming degree of complexity and 
possibly avoid confrontation altogether. As will be discussed later on, amongst others the 
Army’s Future Combat Systems arose from this concept. The power of the information 
revolution became critical to transformation.
10.4.3 Toffler & Cebrowski
Network-centric warfare was made possible by innovations in civilian information and 
communication technologies. Technologies originating from the civilian realm had 
historically led to shifts in warfare. Such was the case with the introduction of the telegraph, 
the radio and the railways. These technologies improved communications or mobility and 
created efficiencies in warfare and gave rise to new doctrine. They became a multiplier for 
the capabilities of the state. Changes in society similarly led to changes in warfare. The 
German Marshall Von Clausewitz alluded to this when he described how shifts in French 
287 The central application of network-centric warfare in the battlefield is the principle of 
situational awareness; knowing where you, friendly forces and enemy forces are. The 
technology enabling it for the US Army is FBCB2 -Field Battle Command Brigade and 
Below - and Blue Force Tracker. This created a Common Operational Picture. Aside from 
this an integral part of network-centric warfare is the Global Information Grid. This is 
an information network which all US military systems, warfighters and policymakers use, 
modeled after the internet. See Government Accountability Office,“The Global Information 
Grid and Challenges facing its implementation,” GAO 04-858, July 2004.
288 William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 2000), p. 202.
289 Joint Vision 2020, p.21.
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political thinking enabled the levée-en-masse, the mass conscription, and increased the 
extractive capacity of the state.290 Von Clausewitz believed that this policy enabled the 
French army to fight with a higher “degree of energy.” The revolution had brought forth a 
shift in ideas which translated into the ability to mobilize vast resources of manpower for 
war. 
In 1980 Alvin Toffler wrote a book about the linkages between societal progress and 
warfare, arguing that states wage war in the same way they create wealth.291 He wrote that 
the extractive capacity of the state is influenced by the ‘age’ in which a society is; Agricul-
tural, Industrial or Information. Preceding ages are trumped and rendered irrelevant in 
light of the next wave of warfare, Toffler argued. Just as the industrial era produced warf-
ighting capabilities superior to those of the agricultural era, the Information Age would 
overpower Industrial Age capabilities. More important, Toffler argued that Western soci-
eties were on the brink of moving from the Industrial age to the Information Age and 
warfare too was entering the Information Age, with the United States in the lead. His logic 
held that first-movers had a distinct advantage.
Particularly in the United States Toffler’s book had impact. Not surprisingly since it 
was American business that pioneered the Information Age. The World Wide Web – based 
on American innovations in the computing sector - led to a drastic remodeling of the busi-
ness landscape and became an important engine of the American economy. It proved to be 
a new source of wealth, both for IT companies, as well as for traditional corporations that 
changed their business processes and organizational structures to take advantage of infor-
mation technologies. As the dotcom-boom took off in the early 1990’s, Toffler’s argument 
captured the minds of Pentagon officials. The Pentagon also wanted part of it. 
The person who was instrumental to promote this thinking was Admiral Arthur 
Cebrowski, former President of the Naval War College and the first director of the Office 
of Force Transformation, the Pentagon’s in-house think tank on transformation. “We 
live between two great chapters of human history, in the messy interspaces between the 
Industrial Age we are leaving and the Information Age we are entering,” Cebrowski wrote 
alluding to Toffler.292 By making the change to an Information Age military the Pentagon 
could emulate the advances in competitive power in the business sector. According to 
Cebrowski: “Network-centric operations deliver to the US military the same powerful 
290 “It is true that War itself underwent important alterations both in its nature and forms, which 
brought it nearer to its absolute form; but these changes were not brought about because 
the French Government had, to a certain extent, delivered itself from the leading-strings 
of policy; they arose from an altered policy, produced by the French Revolution, not only 
in France, but over the rest of Europe as well. This policy had called forth other means and 
other powers, by which it became possible to conduct War with a degree of energy which 
could not have been thought of otherwise. Therefore the actual changes in the Art of War are 
a consequence of alterations of policy; and, so far from being an argument for the possible 
separation of the two, they are, on the contrary, very strong evidence of the intimacy of their 
connexion.” Von Clausewitz, Anatol Rappaport, On War (New York: Penguin, 1968), p. 409.
291 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, (New York: Pan, 1981).
292 Quoted in William A. Arkin, “Spiraling Ahead,” Armed Forces Journal, Commentary, February 
2006. Available at http://www.afji.com/2006/02/1813685.
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dynamics as they produced in American business.”293 He later testified to Congress that the 
transformation from the Industrial Age to the Information Age was the central element 
of military reform and creating an Information Age military was a sine qua non for other 
efforts of military change.294
10.4.4 Emulation from the Corporate Sector
While AirLand Battle and System Warfare were conceptually its precursors, network-
centric warfare was thrust forward by developments in the corporate sector. The central 
concept behind network-centrism is that digitizing information and making that infor-
mation accessible in an organization that is structured as a network rather than a rigid 
hierarchy will create operational efficiencies. Transaction costs to distribute information 
fall drastically and the flow of information becomes a source of competitive advantage. 
This makes the computer and their cumulative network connections central to business. 
The technologies could not only reduce business operating costs through digitization, but 
more so enable businesses to be more responsive to the demands of the market or open up 
new ones. As companies transformed their operational structures to harness the increased 
competitiveness associated with internet-based technologies and instant communications, 
vast changes – or transformations - in the nature and shape of organizations occurred. 
Non-essential activities were outsourced, companies set up operations in different parts 
of the world where conditions were more favorable to their value-chain and new business 
models were pioneered, such as just-in-time supply. At the same time, networking tech-
nologies were leveling the playing field by decreasing barriers to entry and allowing new 
competitors to enter the market. 295 Thus an internet start-up called Napster in 1999 could 
become a threat to major multinational entertainment industries. New markets were devel-
oped, such as online travel agents and bookstores, increasing customer value. Information 
technologies could reduce costs, provide new or more convenient services and improve 
customer intimacy while being more responsive to consumer demands. Computing 
and internet technologies became a source of economic wealth. If there was any doubt, 
by the mid-1990’s the world’s richest man had earned his fortune selling electronic ‘1’s’ 
and ‘0’s’. Enthusiasts saw an information revolution that would change the shape of busi-
ness competition. The lesson was that those that failed to harness this revolution would 
be out-competed by those that did: “Firms that invest in IT as a strategic resource for the 
future will survive. Those that do not will perish. Executives who invest in IT as one of their 
293 Arthur K. Cebrowski & John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its origin and 
Future,”Proceedings, January 1998.
294 “If this transformation does not succeed all of our other efforts in transformation will not 
likely bear fruit.” Arthur K. Cebrowski, Testimony on Military Transformation, transcript of 
testimony delivered to Congress, Washington DC, April 9, 2002. Available at www.defenselink.
mil.
295 See also Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: a Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, 
(New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 2005).
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primary strategic levers will thrive. Those who do not will be deselected.”296 Central to the 
Information Age is that it cuts both ways. It constituted an opportunity for those that were 
first-movers, yet it posed a strategic risk to those that did not. 
Such thinking would spill over into the Pentagon, particularly with the Pentagon 
leadership. In the corporate realm the transformation to the Information Age had created 
operational efficiencies, increases in profits, and market leadership. In the military sector 
network-centric warfare would give the United States unparalleled competitive advan-
tage.297 It could be a tool to increase state power. The 1997 QDR first outlined the need to 
incorporate the developments of the civilian IT sector into the military: 
We also need to take advantage of business process improvements being 
pioneered in the private sector. Over the past decade, the American 
commercial sector has reorganized, restructured, and adopted revolutionary 
new business and management practices in order to ensure its competitive 
edge in the rapidly changing global marketplace. It has worked. Now the 
Department [of Defense] must adopt and adapt the lessons of the private 
sector if our armed forces are to maintain their competitive edge in the 
rapidly changing global security arena.298
The 1997 QDR drew explicit parallels between the corporate and the security environ-
ment. A RAND report in 2000 also advocated learning from the corporate sphere; “The 
breathtaking productivity gains that the information revolution is now yielding in the 
‘new’ US economy cannot be dismissed as irrelevant by analysts and stewards of national 
defense.”299 The lessons the authors identified were output-focused processes such as the 
broad dissemination of information throughout the organization and non-hierarchical 
leadership, both improving flexibility within the organization. Robert Zoellick, former 
aide to Secretary of State Jim Baker and deputy Secretary of State in 2005 who would 
become the president of the World Bank in 2007, similarly understood transformation as 
the necessity to emulate the business community: “US companies that have not incorpo-
rated the revolutionary advances in information and communications technologies have 
been swept away by their competition with surprising rapidity. The Pentagon cannot afford 
to run a similar risk.”300 Like others, Zoellick understood Information Age transformation 
296 Eric A. Marks, Business Darwinism: Evolve or Dissolve, adaptive strategic for the information 
age, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), p.8.
297 Hema Prem & George Eby Mathew, “How Does Business Transformation Happen?,” Cutting 
Edge (Infosys, June 2006).
298 William Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense, 
Washington DC, May 1997, p. ix.
299 David C. Gompert & Irving Lachow, Transforming US Forces: Lessons from the Wider 
Revolution, RAND Issue Paper, National Defense Research Institute 2000, p.12.
300 Robert Zoellick, “A Republican Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 1 (January/
February 2000), p. 77.
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as critical to maintaining American military dominance, not only out of opportunity but 
also out of necessity. The advent of the Information Age, although pioneered in the United 
States, would shift the balance of power in the international system.
(Source: US Ofce of Force Transformation, 2007)














Many of the leading advocates of network-centric warfare collaborated in a series of publi-
cations sponsored by the Pentagon’s Command and Control Research Program. In the 
late 1990’s this program commissioned work to explore network-centric concepts, explic-
itly drawing on experiences from the civilian sector. One of its landmark publications was 
Network-centric Warfare. “War is a product of its age,” the authors begin in reference to 
Toffler’s concept of warfare in the Information Age. “In the commercial sector, dominant 
competitors have developed information superiority and translated it into a competitive 
advantage by making the shift to network-centric operations.”301 The US military should 
become an Information Age organization because, “organizations that have been able to 
fully leverage the power of information and information technologies…have dominated 
their competitive domains.” It revealed the thinking in US military circles that network-
centric warfare could be a holy grail. If the US military could harness the power of infor-
mation technology it could “lock out” competitors and allow it to dominate warfare.302 A 
period of endless American power dawned.
301 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Frederick P. Stein., Network-centric Warfare: Developing 
and Leveraging Information Superiority, (Washington DC: DOD Command and Control 
Research Program, 1999), p.1.
302 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Network-centric Warfare: Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage, 
Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Department 
of Defense, Washington DC, Winter 2003, p. 1.
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Network-centric warfare increased operational effectiveness by creating a new source 
of military competitive advantage. Simply put, the dictum was that networked forces 
outfight non-networked forces.303 It resonated Toffler’s concept that newer, Information 
Age warfare trumped older Industrial Age concepts. The principle is demonstrated in 
figure 6. It has two consequences. On the one hand, with the same amount of forces greater 
effects can be achieved than a traditional platform-centric force. On the other, fewer forces 
are required to achieve the same effects as a traditional force. It promised the possibility 
of substituting mass for information with greater cost efficiencies. It led Admiral Owens 
to embrace the bureaucratically powerful argument that network-centric warfare saves 
money.304
The principle of network-centric warfare is similar to its workings in the corporate 
sphere. Network-centric operations allow the dispersion of troops to create an operational 
advantage, just as companies have spread their operations or business-units to different 
countries around the globe to maximize the advantage of location. “Instead of concen-
trating forces to gain advantage, data sharing allows them to be scattered for advantage,” 
Gompert and Lachow write.305 It makes the force more responsive to opportunities as they 
emerge. At the tactical level, forces are able to operate in a higher tempo. At the strategic 
level it allows objectives to be reached quicker and cheaper. 
As a first-mover, it fostered the belief that the United States could dictate the terms 
of military competition. The rhetoric of dominance and the drive for market leadership 
infused the American transformation debate. This argument was particularly manifest at 
the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation (OFT). Its documents rationalized transfor-
mation as creating “overwhelming military advantage in support of strategic objectives.”306 
John Garstka, one of the conceptual pioneers of network-centric warfare, described trans-
formation as being either necessity-driven through a “rapid deterioration in an organiza-
tion’s competitive position” unable to respond to the competitive environment, or oppor-
tunity driven intent on shaping the market by developing new sources of competitive 
advantage.307 The latter was applicable to the United States. OFT defined transformation 
303 Cebrowski (2003), p. 2.
304 Besides operational efficiencies in deployments, network-centric concepts would allow 
cost reductions for the military organisation through reducing overhead, streamlining 
infrastructure through base closure or realignments, reforming the acquisition process and 
outsourcing and privatizing support activities. The 1997 National Defense Panel report for 
instance stressed the necessity of changing the DOD acquisition process noting that system 
lead times must be reduced through greater use of commercial-off-the-shelf capabilities. See 
Owens (2000).
305 David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, Transforming US Forces, lessons from the Wider Revolution, 
RAND Issue Paper, National Defense Research Institute 2000.
306 Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance 2003, Washington DC, p. 4.
307 John Garstka defined transformation as “sustained, purposeful change, often on a large scale, 
undertaken with the strategic objective of creating or maintaining competitive advantage, or 
of countering an advantage put in place by an existing or a new competitor.” John J. Garstka, 
“The Transformation Challenge” Draft paper, provided to author.
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foremost as a process to sustain strategic primacy by fighting wars differently, thus giving 
it unparalleled military advantage. Cebrowski said, “Transformation is meant to create 
new competitive areas and new competencies. ... Transformation is meant to identify and 
leverage new sources of power. The overall objective of these changes is simply—sustained 
American competitive advantage in warfare.”308 Testifying to Congress, he outlined that 
“the President and the Secretary have elevated transformation to the level of strategy, and 
that probably is the most important lens through which we should look at transforma-
tion. Strategy is about how one selects a competitive space and determines the attributes 
within that space which will lead to advantage. Strategy answers the fundamental question 
of how one controls the scope, pace and intensity of a competition.”309 Transformation thus 
touched the fundamental question of how the United States viewed the military instru-
ment, how the United States could get the most value from its military forces and could 
remain dominant.
Controlling the ‘scope, pace and intensity of a competition’ reflected terminology 
used in the business management literature. This was echoed by Cebrowski’s successor, 
Terry Pudas, when he spoke of “developing and owning new competitive areas” by having 
“upstream influence” with the primary objective to “shape the future market.”310 Cebrowski 
had also applied this thinking to explain the rationale for transformation advocating the 
“selection of a competitive space” in response to “falling barriers to competition” which were 
changing the terms of warfare.311 It meant looking ahead at what new sources of power may 
appear and to invest in those with the intent of leveraging their potential. The belief was 
prevalent that the United States, given its position as military hegemon based on high-tech 
capabilities, was able to define the terms on which military competition would be waged. 
The Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation saw the goal of transformation as creating 
an “agile, network-centric, knowledge-based force capable of...military operations against 
all potential future adversaries.”312 The Information Age force would sustain US primacy 
and transformation became an argument for increasing the operational effectiveness of 
the military.
308 Arthur K. Cebrowski, What is Force Transformation, Office of Force Transformation, 
Department of Defense at http://www.oft.osd.mil/what_is_transformation.cfm. (accessed July 
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10.4.5  A Business Mindset
The American strategy of transformation has much in common with a business-mindset, 
being intent to out-compete competitors in the field. US officials not only referred to busi-
ness practices but also liked to quote business leaders when rationalizing transformation. 
Aside from the fact that many of the processes associated with defense transformation reso-
nated tenets of the change programs that large corporations had gone through as a result 
of the introduction of information technology, American society looks up to successful 
CEOs. Speaking to Francis Fukuyama, professor at Johns Hopkins University, he said that 
much more than in Europe, US society looks advantageously at successful businesses. The 
cause, he said, lies in the role private entrepreneurship played in the development of the 
United States. Business made the US, while governments made Europe, Fukuyama said.313 
Thus Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric (GE) and best-selling author on changing 
a large traditional-era firm into a profit-making corporation, was regularly quoted during 
briefings from the Office of Force Transformation. Welch proved himself a strong propo-
nent of developing learning organizations, developing a culture of continuously curious 
employees looking for best practices and opportunities to improve efficiencies. One of the 
central concepts Terry Pudas promoted was to provide richer information to more people 
on the battlefield to create an agile organization, able to respond quickly to opportuni-
ties and changing circumstances on the battlefield. Quoting Welch, Pudas said “ultimate 
competitive advantage lies in an organization’s ability to learn and rapidly transform that 
learning into action.” Similarly, forces in the field, needed to be ‘agile’ to respond to new 
threats and asymmetries. Welch further saw as the key to his success his strategy to sell all 
businesses in which GE was unable to become first or second in its market. According to 
Welch: “A company has only so much money and managerial time. Winning leaders invest 
where the payback is the highest. They cut their losses everywhere else.”314 Other business 
management literature resonated this principle.315 By translating Welch’s thinking to the 
military domain and using it to support the argument in favor of transformation neatly 
fit the US military’s focus on its primary competitive advantage, namely high-tech, high-
intensity warfare. The market it would be number one in.
The business management literature conceptualizes three ways of coping with change: 
reacting to it, anticipating it and leading it.316 As the world’s remaining superpower, the 
United States embraced a policy of the latter. In 1999, as a presidential candidate, George 
W. Bush said that “This [Information Age] revolution perfectly matches the strengths of 
313 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, Washington DC, October 24, 2006.
314 Jack Welch, Winning, (New York: Collins Business 2005) p. 38.
315 The 2001 bestseller Good to Great similarly advanced the argument that great companies 
focus on what they know they can be best at and drop everything else. See Jim Collins, Good 
to Great: why some companies make the leap…and others don’t, (New York: HarperBusiness, 
2001).
316 Shona L. Brown & Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured 
Chaos, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998) p. 6.
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our country – the skill of our people and the superiority of our technology. The best way to 
keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.”317
Reliance on these business concepts was of course met with skepticism by some 
commentators. Frederick Kagan warned that the emphasis on operational effectiveness 
reflected a one-dimensional focus. Kagan wrote that the focus on efficiency would enable 
the US military to do one thing only, “even if they do it superbly well.” He continued:
They will be able to identify, track and destroy enemy targets from thousands 
of miles away and at little or no risk to themselves. … The business model 
that brought success to many companies in the 1990s will be adopted as the 
basis for this transformation, and all of America’s future success will rest 
upon this one capability and the applicability of this single model.318
From 2004 onwards operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would demonstrate the validity of 
this claim and demonstrate how the United States had primarily based its faith on war that 
could be won through superior technology.
10.5 Technological War
The belief that information technology could shape the nature of military competition 
has intellectual roots in the concept of ‘technological war’. It rests on the assumption that 
superior technology translates into superior state power and that remaining a step ahead 
in technological competition is sufficient to remain militarily dominant. 
In 1968 the military strategist Stefan Possony – who contributed to the development 
of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative during his work at the Hoover Institu-
tion319 - and science-fiction writer Jerry Pournelle captured the principle of focusing on 
technological innovation as the basis of national power. Entitled The Strategy of Tech-
nology the authors presented an argument of technological war, or military competition 
driven by technological innovation. It relies on the fundamental assumption that mili-
tary technology can be translated into military power. This thinking resonated President 
Ronald Reagan’s strategy in the early 1980’s to ‘outspend’ and more importantly ‘out-
innovate’ the Soviet Union. 
A central concept of Possony and Pournelle is that superior technology deters mili-
tary competition: “Military power may be…necessary to consolidate the victory, Possony 
and Pournelle write, “but the true aim of the Technological War is the denial, paralysis, 
and negation of all forms of hostile military power…Superiority must be constantly main-
tained and modernization must be continuous by a power that is determined not to end 
317 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.
318 Frederick W. Kagan, “A Dangerous Transformation,” The Wall Street Journal, November 12, 
2003.
319 “Stefan Possony; Pioneered Air War Strategy in WW II,” LA Times, May 3, 1995. http://articles.
latimes.com/1995-05-03/news/mn-61669_1_stefan-possony, accessed February 5, 2011.
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the Technological War by destroying the enemy.”320 Technological superiority was believed 
to deter conflict. An anecdotal example appears in reference to the B-2. Air force colonel 
Robert Wheeler mentioned of the aircraft: 
Merely by having the B-2, we can better influence the decision-making 
process in rogue nations and encourage any other countries to perhaps go 
another route in their national defense. The stealth bomber is a diplomatic 
instrument as much as it is a military instrument.321 
Many intellectual components of the ‘strategy of technology’ reappear in the operational 
effectiveness transformation of the late 1990’s. Network centric warfare was meant to give 
the US leverage over potential adversaries, shaping the future of military competition. In 
a landmark speech at the Citadel before his election George W. Bush said the source of 
the United States’ power was fleeting and technological innovation should be aggressively 
pursued. The strategic pause presented a window of opportunity. “[O]ur relative peace 
allows us to do this selectively. The real goal is to move beyond marginal improvements – 
to replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies. To use this window of 
opportunity to skip a generation of technology.”322 In 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld went one step further to state that the objective of transformation was to “develop 
new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from competing.”323 It 
was an expression of achieving lock-out and resonated the thinking by Possony and Pour-
nelle to sustain dominance through superior technology.
10.5.1 The continuous threat of emulation
However, Possony and Pournelle were not exclusively optimistic. Technological innova-
tion has a self-sustaining momentum to persistently continue to pursue change. They 
assumed that once technological innovation has occurred it is only a matter of time before 
it is emulated or offset by others: “Technology flows on without regard for human inten-
tions, and each technological breakthrough offers the possibility for decisive advantages to 
the side that first exploits it. Such advantages will be fleeting, for although the weaker side 
does not have weapons based on the new technology yet, it is certain that it will have them 
in the near future. Under such circumstances, failure to exploit the capability advantage 
is treason […].”324 It creates a perpetual cycle of innovation and at the same time demon-
strates the fallacy in Rumsfeld’s thinking in the quote above. There is no finality in tech-
320 Stefan Possony & J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War 
(Amherst: University Press of Massachusetts, 1970) p.6.
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Atlantic Monthly, September 2007.
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nological change and it is fundamentally uncertain how long a particular advantage will 
last. Thus it is not possible to develop technologies that stop political-military competition.
Possony and Pournelle concluded that it is tantamount to ‘treason’ not to exploit 
capability advantages. This reveals a serious concern. Technological war’s stated objec-
tive is to “deny, paralyze and negate all forms of hostile military power” yet this remains 
elusive because emulation will always occur. While technological war is intent on avoiding 
military conflict, since the moment of technological superiority is by definition fleeting 
technological competition in fact increases the risk of conflict as the state is expected to 
take advantage of its technological superiority while it lasts. Only when there is parity are 
both sides mutually deterred. In other words, technological superiority in fact increases 
the likelihood that the military is used. This observation underlined US assumptions that 
transformation is pursued to make the military more usable for its defense policy. It is also 
observed in the fact that the United States has used the military persistently throughout 
the 1990’s rightly because of its technological edge.
The perpetual cycle of technological change reveals the logic for “skipping” a genera-
tion of technology, as Bush said in 1999. It is meant to retard the process of emulation by 
being several steps ahead of the competition in terms of technology. The goal, according 
to OFT’s director Terry Pudas, being to create overwhelming complexity through increas-
ingly sophisticated military systems that would make resistance futile. Or phrased differ-
ently, to scale the ladder of technological innovation so high that the adversary becomes 
afraid of heights.
Two separate reports published in 1997 warned that US power projection capabili-
ties based on the guided munitions revolution were in fact being compromised by tech-
nological innovations among adversaries. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile 
Threat to the United States addressed the rising threat of ballistic missiles with possible 
payloads of weapons of mass destruction. The report focused on Russian, Chinese, North 
Korean, Iranian and Iraqi missile capabilities. The commission argued that “for those 
seeking to thwart the projection of US power, the capability to combine ballistic missiles 
with weapons of mass destruction provides a strategic counter to US conventional and 
information-based military superiority.”325 The authors of the report – under chairman-
ship of Donald Rumsfeld and co-authored by Paul Wolfowitz - concluded that the United 
States was vulnerable to the emulation of this element of guided munitions. The National 
Defense Panel report similarly concluded that the guided munitions revolution not only 
favored the United States but potential adversaries as well. “Precision strikes, weapons of 
mass destruction, and cruise and ballistic missiles all present threats to our forward pres-
ence, particularly as stand-off ranges increase.”326 The report concluded the US should 
transform to cope with the consequences of other states catching up. The Report stated that 
325 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the 
United States, Executive Summary, July 15, 1998.
326 Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st 
Century, Washington DC, December 1997, p.13.
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“if we do not lead the technological revolution we will be vulnerable to it.”327 In other words, 
if the current opportunity was led to pass, others would adopt it first. Precisely those tech-
nologies which had been central to forming America’s ability to project power were now 
- coupled to weapons of mass destruction – creating anti-access and area-denial threats, 
jeopardizing US strategic freedom of action and its ability to project power. According to 
this logic, the post-Cold War window to shift to the Information Age was not a window 
of opportunity as much as it was as a necessity in response to shifts in the international 
distribution of power. 
Even in a unipolar system, the ‘strategy of technology’ rationalized a self-perpetu-
ating dynamic of technological innovation. Paradoxically, having developed particular 
technologies meant that it would only be a matter of time before a potential adversary 
emulates it. Steps should be taken to further improve the capability. It explains why there is 
persistent momentum to focus on next-generation platforms. For if the United States does 
not build them, a possible adversary may. The ‘strategy of technology’ similarly promotes 
a sizeable budget for research and development, as investments must be made in all areas 
of military competition. It produced an inward-looking dynamic. As Colin Gray critically 
comments; “It is difficult to resist the conclusion that in the minds of many the quest for 
revolutionary change, RMA, now transformation, comes perilously close to being an end 
in itself.”328 It serves to demonstrate that US operational effectiveness transformation had 
its own, self-sustaining dynamic.
10.5.2 Linear Thinking
Cebrowksi’s right-hand man, John Garstka was among those that recognized the Informa-
tion Age would in time be adopted by others.329 Only because the US corporate sector had 
pioneered the widespread introduction of information technologies was the United States 
military at an initial advantage. However if it would let this opportunity pass, others would 
grab it. The pace of change, Garstka writes, “demands that we change while we are still at 
the top of our game in order to survive the next wave.”330 Likewise, Terry Pudas reasoned 
that given American unipolarity, “ours is the team against which everyone measures them-
selves, and to the extent we do not transform we provide would-be adversaries a fixed 
target.”331 Competitive advantage is fleeting. As Shona Brown and Kathleen Eisenhardt 
write, “Treat any strategy as temporary”.332 A US Army video about the Future Combat 
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System quoted Admiral Cebrowski outlining the thrust of this thinking: “Either you create 
your future, or you become the victim of the future someone creates for you.”333 Network-
centric warfare was considered to be the emerging way of war and something to which 
other adversaries would also resort. It demonstrated linear thinking in US operational 
effectiveness transformation. The key idea was that the US, given its hegemonic position, 
was ahead of other potential adversaries and that they had to pursue a path of emulation to 
balance US military power. Admiral Cebrowski wrote in the fall of 2003 that if the United 
States failed to transform, its strategic dominance was at risk: “They are watching…We 
stand still at our peril…if we do not transform our enemies will surely find new ways to 
attack us.”334 Transformation was a must in order to stay ahead.
This thinking illustrates the fallacy associated with US operational effectiveness 
transformation. It was pursued according to the logic that the United States was – almost 
literally – in front of possible competitors on a ladder of technological innovation. The 
metaphor of the ladder is relevant since it captures this linear understanding. That ladder 
was held to be high-intensity warfare. It promoted the logic to “skip” a generation of tech-
nology and a belief that dominance would be sustained. It was a line of reasoning based on 
the notion that the United States had led military competition from the end of the Cold 
War onwards, because it led the military-technological competition. Warfare was under-
stood to be major combat operations. The United States could thus focus on making high-
intensity operations more complex and rapid, able to overwhelm any adversary. It was 
not anticipated that American military strength could be negated by shifting the realm of 
warfare away from force-on-force high-tech military confrontations as happened in the 
context of the Iraq insurgency. For it would mean that there were different ladders to scale.
10.5.3  Van Riper’s war-game
One of the clearest expressions of the linear thinking of operational effectiveness transfor-
mation became apparent during a war-game held in 2002. Millennium Challenge 2002 was 
a $250 million simulation involving 13,500 people organized by Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM) in Norfolk.335 The war-game was presented as the “largest, most complex mili-
tary experiment” that had ever been conducted. General Kernan, commander of JFCOM, 
said the war-game had as objective, “to determine the extent to which our forces are able 
to establish and maintain knowledge superiority, assure access into and throughout the 
battle space, leverage all national elements of power, and sustain ourselves as we conduct 
operations against adversaries that may come at us very differently than we have experi-
Chaos, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998).
333 Admiral A. Cebrowksi (rtd) quoted in US Army video, Future Combat Systems – North Korea 
2014, posted at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YjsychklJBg (accessed May 15, 2008).
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enced in the past.”336 The assumptions underlying the exercise were based on the promise 
of network-centric warfare. The General said:
the bottom line upfront is we want to know as much about our adversary 
as possible, more than he knows about himself, whoever that adversary 
may be, that we can shut them down very quickly and very effectively, with 
the least amount of damage and loss of life…337
The war-game was designed to test the principles of Joint Vision 2020 including informa-
tion and decision superiority. General James Smith, JFCOM’s deputy commander, said 
“[Millennium Challenge 2002] will look at leveraging the information revolution to change 
the way we fight.”338 To Secretary Rumsfeld, the exercise was a test of the concepts under-
lying transformation: “This exercise will … not only test the effectiveness of the force, but 
also the progress we have made thus far in transforming to produce the combat capability 
necessary to meet the threats and the challenges of the 21st century.”339 
Held from July 24 to August 15 2002, the scenario was set in 2007 where a rogue 
general in a Middle-Eastern country – a mix between Iraq and Iran – threatens US inter-
ests, leading to war. Retired Lieutenant-General Paul van Riper was asked to command the 
Red Force, simulating the opponent. Van Riper was an avid opponent of the concept of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs. In 1999 Van Riper had said the military had “oversold unre-
alistic promises” with respect to operational effectiveness transformation.340 Nor did he 
believe in the concept of ‘clean wars’ which transformation-enthusiasts had alluded to.341
During the war-game Van Riper summarily defeated the US naval force by using 
asymmetric tactics. He for instance used salvoes of cruise missiles to saturate US defensive 
capabilities. He also deployed a flotilla of small, high-speed boats – some of them filled 
with explosives – swarming around the naval vessels to confuse and overwhelm the US 
336 General William F. Kernan, “General Kernan Briefs on Millennium Challenge 2002,” July 18, 
2002. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/07/mil-020718-
dod02.htm.
337 Ibid.
338 Maryann Lawlor, “Facing the Challenges of the New Millennium: Tactics, Strategy change 
to meet today’s threats,”Signal Magazine, July 2002. Available athttp://www.afcea.org/signal/
articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=99&zoneid=6.
339 Donald Rumsfeld, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Media Availability 
With Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Norwegian MoD,” July 29, 2002. Available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3621).
340 Lt. General Paul Van Riper, “Remarks on United States and NATO Military Operations 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” United States House of Representatives, 
Committee on Armed Services, April 28, 1999.
341 “‘War means fighting and fighting means killing.’ What we are seeing is what people wish war 
was, not what it is in reality. It is a terrible, bloody, dangerous business…” General Van Riper, 
“Remarks on United States and NATO Military Operations Against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia,” United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 
Washington DC, April 28, 1999.
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Navy. He relayed the message to attack through minarets at the time of prayer, rather than 
electronic command and control signals. Sixteen ships were sunk, including an aircraft 
carrier. Several tens of thousands of fictitious marines were dead.
The results were so devastating that the war-game was stopped and the US fleet was 
refloated. In response to the explanation he received from JFCOM Van Riper said: “A 
phrase I heard over and over was: ‘That would never have happened,’” … and I said: nobody 
would have thought that anyone would fly an airliner into the World Trade Centre....but 
nobody seemed interested.”342 It went from bad to worse. As the game got underway 
again, Van Riper wanted to use chemical agents to prevent an amphibious landing of US 
forces, but was prohibited from doing so because it would restrict US operational freedom. 
Furthermore, Van Riper was only allowed to use electronic communications and satellite 
phones, rather than his method of broadcasting through minarets or messengers, so the 
US could eavesdrop on his communications. Finally, at times his air defense systems were 
shut down to enable US forces to operate. Van Riper quit the war-game in frustration. He 
complained that it was a scripted exercise in which he had no chance of winning. As Van 
Riper recalled later on: 
Unfortunately, in my opinion, neither the construct nor the conduct of the 
exercise allowed for the concepts of rapid decisive operations, effects-based 
operations, or operational net assessment to be properly assessed…[I]t was 
in actuality an exercise that was almost entirely scripted to ensure a Blue 
‘win.’… You don’t come to a conclusion beforehand and then work your 
way to that conclusion. You see how the thing plays out.343
Furthermore, the events of the war-game were downplayed by US military officials. 
The results of the simulation should have sent the message that “dominant battlespace 
awareness” and “information superiority” had their limits in practice, that asymmetric 
tactics could deny transformed US forces their strengths and have tempered the cabal 
surrounding presumed superiority resulting from transformation. Instead, senior military 
officials, among them the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to great lengths 
to illustrate why the real war would not have happened the way it did in the simulation. 
They argued that the Blue Force had unrealistic vulnerabilities and that the vulnerabilities 
exploited by Van Riper could never have occurred in a real-life situation given the game’s 
constraints.344 They also engaged in a semantic explanation noting the differences between 
342 Lt. General Paul Van Riper, quoted in Julian Borger, “Wake-Up Call,” The Guardian, 
September 6, 2002.
343 Sean Naylor, “War Games Rigged?” Army Times, August 16, 2002. See also James Meek, “All at 
Sea,” The Guardian, January 21, 2004.
344 “In Millennium Challenge, you had several cases of experimentation going on at the same 
time you had exercises going on…. if what the opposition force commander wanted to do at 
a particular time in the experiment was going to change the experiment to the point where 
the data being collected was no longer going to be valid as an experiment, then he was asked 
not to do that” Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace, “DoD News Briefing - 
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exercises and experiments, and how this meant different things for the Red Force.345 What 
remains however is that General Kernan said prior to the war-game: “...this is free play. The 
OPFOR [opposing forces] has the ability to win here.”346
There was of course much riding on this largest, most expensive war-game held to 
date. A “win” was necessary to validate the US concept of transformation. Van Riper’s 
experiences however suggest that JFCOM had fallen victim to groupthink. “Nothing 
was learned from this,” Van Riper later said. “A culture not willing to think hard and test 
itself does not augur well for the future.”347 It strengthened opponents that said network-
centric warfare was an untested idea. Colonel Douglas Macgregor, for instance testified 
to Congress in 2004 that Army experimentation was reminiscent of the queen in Alice in 
Wonderland: “first the verdict, then the trial!”348 Already in 1997 Van Riper had mentioned 
the risk of linear thinking with respect to transformation. Testifying to Congress he had 
said: “To decide now that we know and understand the coming revolution (or revolutions) 
in military affairs will more than likely close down a number of potentially significant 
options.”349 After the Millennium Challenge 02 war-game Van Riper said about transfor-
mation: “I have no truck with those who talk about terms like transformation. It clearly 
indicates they don’t know what they’re doing. All it is a slogan rather than getting to the 
hard problems. ... These ideas have never truly been vetted, and yet they’re being sold to 
our headquarters, our services, as the way we want to fight in the future. …Rather than 
trying to think our way through the problem, we’re trying to buy our way. So we had to buy 
our way in terms of technology; we buy our way in terms of some of these ideas without 
the underpinnings of real bases that you can fight on.”350
Transformation was triggered by the end of the Cold War which spelled a moment 
of unipolarity for the United States. The United States was geared to prevent the rise of a 
peer competitor and sustain its position of strategic dominance. Network-centric warfare 
Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace,” August 20, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3595.
345 US Department of Defense,“Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium 
Challenge’s Lessons Learned”, September 17, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3653.
346 General Kernan, “General Kernan Briefs on Millennium Challenge 2002,” July 18, 2002. 
Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/07/mil-020718-dod02.
htm.
347 Julian Borger, “Wake-Up Call,” The Guardian, September 6, 2002.
348 Quote taken from Douglas Macgregor, “Army transformation: Implications for the Future,” 
testimony before the United States House Armed Services committee, Washington DC, July 
15, 2004.
349 Lt. General P. van Riper, “Information Superiority,” Testimony before the Procurement 
Subcommittee and Research and Development Subcommittee of the House National Security 
Committee, US Congress, March 20, 1997.
350 Lt. General P. van Riper, “Interview with PBS: Frontline,” October 26, 2004. Available athttp://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews/vanriper.html. Accessed 
April 23, 2008.
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evolved as crucial elements in a strategy to wage conventional wars with ever more effi-
ciency. The way US transformation was given shape could not have occurred during 
another distribution of power than the unipolar moment of the 1990’s. The window of 
opportunity to invest in the Information Age coincided with a window of opportunity 
based on the strategic pause to further unipolarity. Neoclassical realism suggests that 
mobilizing Information Age capabilities was a means to improve resource extraction to 
sustain the American position of power. The technological innovations associated with 
network-centric warfare improved the military’s relevance. As will be made apparent later 
on, events in the security environment, exemplified by counterinsurgency and stability 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, would test these assumptions underlying transforma-
tion. 
However, before we move on to that period, we must identify the domestic factors 
that shaped US operational effectiveness transformation. It is not possible to explain US 
transformation and its normative elements purely through this system-level dynamic. 
Strategic culture intervened to provide the context for the US pursuit of interventionism 
and its reliance on high-intensity combat. Unipolarity meant that these intervening vari-
ables figured much stronger, as an unchallenged military power could expand its moralist 
agenda with impunity. It implied that the United States pursued a policy to promote the 
values of the American Revolution with greater resolve than before. This gave increased 
momentum to push forward with transformation.
11 Strategic Culture and US 
Transformation
“Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no 
recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment.”
 – George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796
11.1 A Symbol of Strategic Culture
Atop the United States Capitol in Washington DC sits the statue Freedom. The white-
marble building - itself an expression of American nationalism and political power – is 
adorned with a bronze allegorical figure attesting to US national identity. Cast in bronze by 
the sculptor Thomas Crawford Freedom was placed atop the dome in 1863, to celebrate 
the Union victory. The female figure holds a sheathed sword loosely in one hand and a 
laurel in the other. Prepared to defend freedom yet trusting in victory the statue stands as a 
reference to Freedom at arms. The relation between freedom and the use of force is closer 
still when looking at Freedom’s headdress, a helmet. The original design by Crawford was 
to have her wear a Phrygian cap, the cap adorned by Roman slaves liberated from servi-
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tude. However, its reference to slavery was considered too delicate at the time.351 Instead, 
she wears a helmet featuring an eagle’s head, feathers and the thirteen stars representing 
the states united. It was a reflection of America’s ideological roots. 
The American self-perceived role in the world is shaped by a belief that it can bring 
freedom across the globe and that this constitutes an American calling. Central is a civic 
religion based on liberty, and the idea that to protect or advance it the use of force is - at 
times - justified. It is an ideology based on a liberating tradition, which goes back to the 
Revolutionary war, and now serves as a moral compass for its foreign and security policy 
and a justification for the use of force. This is the necessary paradigm to understand, as 
freedom and the liberating power of warfare have shaped the American strategic outlook. 
They are the concepts through which American statesmen have framed the world and the 
role of the United States in it.
11.2 Watchmen of Freedom
The Information Age promised a system-wide shift in military capability. Innovations in 
civilian technology were interpreted as opportunities to advance US military power and 
sustain the American position of primacy as the strategically dominant power in the 
system. The shift in external opportunity gave rise to a revamped foreign policy, in which 
conventional warfare and the use of force became an accepted instrument of foreign policy. 
Unipolarity offered the conditions for America’s strategic culture to flourish and express 
itself more clearly, unconstrained by the limitations of a more restrictive international 
environment. Since its founding days the United States considers itself a liberating power 
and a defender of Freedom. Exceptionalism, vindicationism, and an emphasis on human 
agency in shaping history together produce a tendency in foreign policy towards unilater-
alism and interventionism in order to promote democracy and advance US values abroad. 
Even when vital interests are pursued the political justification relies on these tenets. 
Recall that the United States’ official definition for transformation contains a normative 
element, namely that American strength underpins global peace and stability. The use of 
the military is considered amenable to America’s overall normative objective “to promote 
a balance of power that favors freedom.”352 These normative components are reaffirmed 
by US exceptionalist thinking and are principles that have remained constant throughout 
American history. 
351 David Hackett Fischer, Liberty and Freedom, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p.299.
352 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington 
DC, September 2002, p. 1. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf.
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(Source: Architect of the Capitol, Washington DC, http://www.aoc.gov/cc/art/freedom.cfm) 
Figure 7:   The Statue “Freedom” Coronating the US Capitol and Symbol of American Strategic 
Culture. 
American exceptionalism refers to the notion that the United States is qualitatively different 
from all other countries.353 It is based on the concept of the American Creed.354 More specif-
ically, in the realm of foreign policy it refers to the widespread belief that the United States 
is unique and has a specific role to play in the world. Derived from its founding principles 
and reaffirmed by subsequent administrations, exceptionalism is the overarching notion, 
comparable to a national cultural myth, that the American Revolution has endowed it 
with certain characteristics that make it exceptional. It produces a moralist undertone 
in US foreign policy, a belief in the benevolent nature of its actions, but also drives the 
pursuit of absolute security, befitting of an exceptional country.  If exceptionalism is the 
engine of US strategic culture, vindicationism is its fuel. It entails the belief that the United 
States has a mission to promote the values of the American Revolution beyond its borders, 
353 Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996) p. 18.
354 See Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy, 
(New York: Harper, 1944).
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primarily those of Freedom and Democracy, and by force if necessary.355 It rests on the 
belief that absolute security can be attained through the export of the US political system. 
It has endowed it with innate momentum to pursue great power status. The third element 
is an agency-focused perspective on social and political affairs. In social-economic policy 
it is expressed through distinct individualism and entrepreneurship. In strategic culture 
it portrays the understanding that security threats are actor-related rather than based on 
structures and institutions. This has created an emphasis on adversarial approaches to 
security threats and has strengthened a force-on-force understanding of warfare. It has 
led the United States to follow a security policy singling out specific actors as threats, and 
seeking their removal. This has developed a focus on high-intensity combat operations to 
deal with security threats. Along with vindicationism, and exceptionalism it has promoted 
the perspective that wars are at times necessary. Military interventions are conceptualized 
as chapters in the liberating mission started by the American Revolution and military tech-
nology is viewed as making their removal more efficient. Historically the United States has 
cultivated these elements. They have remained constant in spite of changes in the interna-
tional distribution of power, or the political color of the White House and interact with 
the system-level factors to give shape to US transformation. Neoconservatism for instance, 
rather than being an anomaly of US political culture, is one particular, yet extreme, appari-
tion of these elements of US political and strategic culture.356
In US strategic culture exceptionalism reflects a belief in an American Sonderweg 
in security policy. “America’s security role in the world is unique,” the Quadrennial 
Defense Review in 2001 stated.357 But rather than be a product of a unipolar system, the 
United States has always seen itself as different from other countries. It has produced both 
isolationism and international interventionism. Before the US became a superpower it 
promoted exemplarism and isolationism. As the United States grew stronger exception-
alism translated into interventionist behavior, not shying away from the military instru-
ment.358
Following the end of the Cold War, unipolarity allowed these domestic tenets to 
be expressed with greater verve. It added to the momentum to develop a military that 
was able to rapidly and decisively defeat possible adversaries, climaxing in the principle 
of preventive warfare. Andrew Bacevich writes: “The RMA was peculiarly suited to the 
outlook, interpretation of history, and expectations of the future then au courant among 
American elites.”359 
355 For a description of vindicationism in relation to US foreign policy see Jonathan Monten, 
“The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” International Security, vol.29, nr. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 112 – 
156.
356 For a review of the different foreign policy schools and their relation to US political culture 
see Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002).
357 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Washington DC, 
September 30, 2001, p. 1.
358 See Monten (2005).
359 Bacevich (2005), p. 169.
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11.2.1 US Exceptionalism
American exceptionalism encompasses the belief that the United States is further ahead 
on a universal path of history and that it has a mission to guide other people along its way. 
The ideology posits the US in a natural leadership role. Exceptionalism is premised on the 
American Creed as the basis of American political culture.360 The Creed reflects the tenets 
of the American Revolution: liberty, equality of opportunity, individualism, populism 
and laissez-faire.361 While other states have a common language, ethnicity or geography 
to serve as the basis of national identity, to Americans a unifying force lies in the appeal of 
these ideals and the political system it brought forth. More than any other state in the West, 
national identity has been connected to its political traditions and institutions. As Samuel 
Huntington writes: “the United States has no meaning, no identity, no political culture or 
even history apart from its ideals of liberty and democracy and the continuing efforts of 
Americans to realize those ideals.”362 He further elaborated that, “the nature of the United 
States has left it little or no choice but to stand out among nations as the proponent of 
liberty and democracy.”363 The historian Richard Hofstadter observed that “it has been our 
[American] fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.”364 Francis Fukuyama, 
professor of international political economy at John Hopkins University, noted that being 
American is intimately connected to the nature of the American political system. The 
US national identity cannot be disconnected from its founding principles of democracy 
and liberty, since the American Revolution as such has never been overturned. While the 
United States is not unique for using its founding values as the basis for its international 
policy, it is unique because the American political system continues nearly unchanged 
since its creation to this day.365 American political institutions were the product of the 
revolutionary spirit of 1776 and have not changed substantially over the past 250 years. 
The persistence of these institutions reaffirms the belief in American exceptionalism and 
explains why Americans continue to invoke the Founding Fathers in official rhetoric. 
American exceptionalism is thus based on the continued connection of today’s challenges 
to the ideals of 1776. Something that comes across as anachronistic to outsiders, yet which 
is of importance to this study as it relays a consistency in how the United States views itself 
and the world. 
The persistence of the political-philosophical link to the Founding Fathers also 
360 See G. K. Chesterton, What I Saw in America (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.,1922) and 
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy, (New 
York: Harper, 1944). The term “American Creed” was originally coined by Chesterton.
361 Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, (Cambridge, MA: 
Bellknap Press, 1983), p.14. Huntingon substitutes the last two tenets for “democracy and the 
rule of law under a constitution.”
362 Ibid, p.36.
363 Ibid, p. 255.
364 Quoted in Michael Kazin, “The Right’s Unsung Prophet,” The Nation, 248 (February 20, 1989), 
p. 242.
365 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, Washington DC, October 24, 2006.
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explains why the histories of the Founding generation still inspire vast volumes of books 
published yearly. Quotes by Founding Fathers are omnipresent in political speeches and 
strategy documents. For instance, the introduction to the 1997 National Defense Panel 
report ends with a quote by Thomas Paine.366 Even a doctrinal document such as the 
Army’s Field Manual ends a chapter with a reference to the Declaration of Independence 
and General Washington’s “moral courage,” “selfless leadership” and “personal sacrifice 
for the greater common good,” noting that “today’s Soldiers continue [Washington’s] 
legacy of sacrifice and selfless service.” 367 Belief in American exceptionalism is widespread, 
including among those at the highest levels of the political system. Madeleine Albright, 
former US Secretary of State writes:
My own inclination is to say ‘Bunk’ to those who argue that America is 
not an exceptional country. I can point to the Declaration of Independence, 
the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Gettysburg Address, the role of the 
United States in two World Wars, and the example of America’s multiracial, 
multiethnic democracy and ask: what country can compare? A few are as 
big, some are as free, many have admirable qualities, but none has had 
the same overall positive influence on world history and none has been as 
clearly associated with opportunity and freedom.368 
Belief in America’s exceptional role in the world remains very much alive.
11.2.2 The Civic Religion of Freedom
The ideals of the American Revolution enunciated in 1776 persist to this day as a primary 
public reference for the conduct of government in internal and external affairs. Thirty-three 
years before Freedom found her place on top of the Capitol the French political commen-
tator Alexis de Tocqueville travelled through the United States observing a “holy worship 
of freedom.”369 The cult-like promotion of freedom he encountered was the product of the 
exuberance over the successful struggle against the British. Then, influenced by enlighten-
ment ideals, most notably Locke’s political philosophy espousing that legitimate govern-
ment be stooled upon the ‘consent of the governed,’ and fed by continuous discord over 
366 The quote reads: “Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must undergo the fatigue 
of supporting it.”
367 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 1, Chapter 4 (2005). http://www.army.
mil/fm1/chapter4.html. The full paragraph reads: “George Washington’s moral courage and 
selfless leadership preserved the ideal of civilian control of the military. Washington’s actions 
at Newburgh show what selfless service to the Nation means-enduring personal sacrifice for 
the greater common good and rejecting personal gain that comes at the Nation’s expense. 
Today’s Soldiers continue his legacy of sacrifice and selfless service.”
368 Madeleine Albright, Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God and World Affairs, 
(New York: HarperCollins, 2006), p. 31.
369 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, and Two Essays on America, (London: Penguin, 
2003) p. 22.
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‘taxation without representation’ the American colonies drifted on a course towards Revo-
lution against King George III and the British Parliament. It culminated in 1776 when 
Thomas Paine, a virulent anti-colonial and one of the later Founding Fathers, advocated in 
his essay Common Sense that freedom be taken by force and the United States be founded 
as a refuge for the oppressed: 
Freedom hath been hunted around the globe. Asia and Africa have long 
expelled her. Europe regards her as a stranger and England hath given her 
warning to depart. O! Receive the fugitive and prepare in time an asylum 
for all mankind.370 
Based on 18th century liberal rationalism and Protestant sectarianism, it evolved in to a 
concept known as the American Creed. The Creed promotes a sense of optimism and 
entrepreneurial spirit to engineer the unknown world as a haven for free man. Since at the 
time these tenets were unique to the American experiment – Europe was mostly a collec-
tion of monarchies, despotic regimes and fiefdoms - the American Creed gave rise to an 
idea of exceptionalism. The philosopher John Gray argues that American exceptionalism 
has its roots in Christianity and Enlightenment thinking.371 The Creed indeed has a provi-
dential lining as it is infused with the history of the religious beginnings of the American 
colonies, founded as a safe haven for the religiously oppressed. It turned into a civic reli-
gion based on, “the sacred origin of individual rights …and the American sense of duty 
to defend freedom at home and, at times, abroad.”372 And as religions do, it contained an 
element of conversion.373
11.2.3 The City on a Hill
Fleeing religious oppression in the 17th century, pilgrims left the European continent in 
search of a better life. For those that did, parallels with the biblical exodus from Egypt were 
straightforward. Aboard the Arbella that would take him to New England, John Winthrop 
the soon-to-be governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony spoke in 1630 of the New World 
in these terms, 
For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all 
people are upon us; so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work 
we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from 
us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world.374
370 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 33.
371 See John Gray, Al Qaeda and What it means to be modern, (New York: the New Press, 2003).
372 John Meacham, American Gospel, (New York: Random House, 2006) p. 27.
373 John Gray has argued that the American Revolution was a form of religion pursued by other 
means. John Gray, Black Mass (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 2007), p.2.
374 John Winthrop, quoted in Meacham (2006), p. 46-47.
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The allusion to the city on a hill was taken from Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount, and became 
an icon of American political rhetoric.375 Winthrop’s sermon was interpreted to forebode 
America’s missionary character as a force to promote freedom in the world. Three and a 
half centuries later, President Ronald Reagan among others, alluded to it when underlining 
his vision that America was an exceptional country with an agenda to further freedom. 
Adding an optimistic adjective, he described America as ‘a shining city upon a hill’ and 
promised that the United States was “the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for 
those who do not now have freedom.”376 
The belief that the United States was at the vanguard of history can be traced to the 
early Pilgrims, but has been reinforced ever since. Thomas Paine wrote that: “we have 
it in our power to begin the world over again. A situation similar to the present has not 
happened since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand, and 
a race of men, perhaps as numerous as all Europe contains, are to receive their portion of 
freedom from the event of a few months.”377 This thinking was reflected in the founding 
documents of the young republic. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution 
both contain references to the providential nature of the political freedoms they are meant 
to protect.378 
Religious connotations can be found everywhere in American political symbols, 
such as the Liberty Bell which holds an inscription from the book of Leviticus.379 The 
Liberty Bell was rung on June 6, 1944, D-Day, its tolling broadcast over radio, intent on 
reminding people around the world that the liberation of Europe had begun. Later, Ronald 
Reagan would say that such religious motives were key to the American identity. “If you 
take away the belief in a greater future, Reagan said “you cannot explain America – that 
we’re a people who believed there was a promised land; we were a people who believed we 
were chosen by God to create a greater world.”380
Throughout forty-three presidencies, all important political speeches have included 
a confirmation of the civic religion of freedom.381 It remains a constant factor in political 
375 Matthew 5: 14-16 “You are the light of the world. A city on a hill cannot be hidden. Neither do 
people light a lamp and put it under a bowl. Instead they put it on its stand, and it gives light 
to everyone in the house. In the same way, let your light shine before men, that they may see 
your good deeds and praise your Father in heaven.”
376 Ronald Reagan, “Inaugural Address,” Washington DC, January 20, 1981.
377 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, (New York: Random House, 2003) p. 49.
378 The Declaration of Independence states: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The opening lines of 
the Constitution read: “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union...and secure the Blessings of Liberty...establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America.”
379 The inscription reads: “Proclaim liberty throughout all the land, and unto all the inhabitants 
Thereof.”
380 Ronald Reagan, cited in Albright (2006), p. 28.
381 See John Meacham, American Gospel, (New York: Random House, 2006).
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rhetoric and contemporary presidents and politicians keep this ideology alive. It became a 
justification for policy. The author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, 
declared that: “[t]he God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time.”382 In the 21st 
century President George W. Bush’s rhetoric was eerily reminiscent when during his third 
State of the Union Address in the run-up to the Iraq War he said that: “the liberty we prize 
is not America’s gift to the world; it is God’s gift to humanity.”383 
11.2.4 Freedom and John Locke 
It is difficult to overestimate the measure to which the concept of Freedom is central to 
American political identity. The historian Eric Foner writes that, “devotion to freedom 
formed the essence of American nationalism.”384 Freedom constituted the grand idea that 
mobilized support for the Revolutionary war and ownership of Freedom is claimed by all 
domestic political schools of thought. From those that believe in the right to bear arms 
and are “protecting freedom” to the pro-choice advocates that believe they have the liberty 
to decide over their own body in relation to abortion, freedom is the dominant cognitive 
concept through which the American political experience is framed.385 The term has been 
employed by activists and politicians on all sides of the political spectrum and on a multi-
tude - if not all – topics of political relevance.386 Not egalitarianism, but economic freedom 
dictates the objectives of US government in social-economic policy, while conservatives 
argue that individuals should be free to go about their business without external interfer-
ence from the state. Intimately linked to Freedom is democracy since it reflects political 
freedom. 
The political philosophy of the 17th century English philosopher and physician John 
Locke provides the intellectual basis for the prominence of political freedom in the United 
States.387 Locke’s argument, based on Enlightenment thinking and its emphasis on human 
reason, defended natural rights of life, liberty and property and promoted the view that the 
legitimacy and authority of a government is vested in the “consent of the governed”. The 
principle is echoed in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and in Wash-
382 Thomas Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America,” July 1774.
383 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, January 28, 2003.
384 Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New York: Norton & Co., 1998), p. 16.
385 Ibid., p.299, 328.
386 “Industrial freedom”, “economic freedom”, “wage slavery”, “civil liberties”, even the movement 
to institute women’s suffrage argued that it was essentially an act of liberation rather than a 
measure of equality. In the 1920s new kitchen appliances were introduced under the heading 
that “cooking slavery” had come to an end. Left-wing politicians framed social welfare 
provided by the state in terms of liberating citizens from social burdens such as healthcare 
and unemployment. See Foner (1998), p.163-218.
387 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. ed. Peter Laslett. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, (London: 
William Tegg & Co., 1849).
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ington’s Farewell Address in 1796.388 Central to Locke’s thesis is the principle of Tabula 
Rasa. It means that man is a blank slate (tabula rasa in Latin) and that man is essentially 
free of a pre-ordained position in society and his future is his for the making. At the time, 
it presented a radical departure from the structuralist thinking dominant in Europe, 
with its feudal, aristocratic and rigid, if not hereditary, social structures. Locke however 
embraced the concept of individual responsibility, and marked the path for the principle 
of social mobility which would be central to the American belief in equal opportunity and 
the pursuit of happiness. It was inherently optimistic as it affirmed the ability of man to 
improve society rather than see this as static, as was the case in the monarchies of Britain 
and France at the time. Conversely, it bred an individualistic agency-focused perspective 
on history, and saw structures as subordinate to individual action in determining human 
behavior. 
Locke’s individualism was reinforced by the dominance of a wide variety of religious 
Protestant congregations in the United States, instead of a single state-church. Protes-
tantism also stressed the centrality of the individual as opposed to the hierarchical insti-
tutions prevalent in Catholicism. While religious tolerance had led the United States to 
open its arms to a wide range of denominations, it also served a different purpose. The 
Founding Fathers, intent on avoiding the creation of a state-church that had caused war 
and repression in the Old World, openly embraced the sects which, given their multitude, 
minimized the risk of one achieving dominance. Likewise it meant a strong role for reli-
gion and moralism in public life, including in foreign policy.
The appeal of Locke’s thinking, and the level to which his individualism was institu-
tionalized in the US political system also helps explain why the growth of socialist move-
ments, which thrived in the rigid class-based societal structures found in Europe, was 
marginal in the United States. Influenced by Locke’s Libertarian principles American 
politics focused on individuals and local communities rather than socio-economic struc-
tures.389 As Seymour Martin Lipset writes, the lack of a socialist movement became one 
of the defining elements of US exceptionalism.390 A foreign policy based on an agency-
focused approach evolved from it.
388 In the Farewell Address, George Washington said: “...The basis of our political systems 
is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government. But the 
Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the 
whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of 
the people to establish government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the 
established government...”.
389 While the Democratic party has focused more on socio-economic, structuralist policy than 
the Republicans, this remains less so than European social-democratic parties. I extend 
thanks to Professor F. Fukuyama for addressing this point.
390 Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: a Double-Edged Sword, (W.W. Norton: New 
York, 1996), p. 23.
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11.3 Expressions of US Strategic Culture
11.3.1 George Washington’s Exceptionalism
US exceptionalist thinking is rooted in both ideology as well as practical realist consider-
ations. After its founding the United States distanced itself from the machinations of power 
politics in Europe which had led to multiple wars. Exceptionalism implied a belief that the 
dynamics of international politics that affected European states did not hold for the US. It 
was apparent in George Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address: 
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very 
remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the 
causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it 
must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary 
vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions 
of her friendships or enmities… Our detached and distant [geographic] 
situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course...when we may 
choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.391 
Exceptionalism was reinforced by geography. Cushioned by the Atlantic Ocean, the 
United States could sail the seas of an independent foreign policy. Washington called for 
maximizing American freedom of action and isolating the US from the toils of European 
realpolitik. Washington asked: “Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why 
quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that 
of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambi-
tion, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?” Washington was however not an idealist, but a 
staunch realist intent on maximizing American freedom of action cloaked in the rhetoric 
of idealism.392 For his Farewell Address was an appeal for self-reliance that would also be 
resonated by subsequent presidents.393 Joseph Ellis, a historian of the Founding Fathers, 
attributes the following words to George Washington in relation to the Proclamation of 
Neutrality in 1793. They shed light on Washington’s longer-term horizons. “Twenty years 
peace with such an increase of population and resources as we have a right to expect: 
added to our remote situation from the jarring powers, will in all probability enable us in a 
391 George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 19, 1796.
392 Washington’s premise that the United States should remain at a distance from the dealings of 
the major powers in Europe was based on a realist understanding of the weak position of the 
young republic. Washington was keenly aware of the critical role played by France in enabling 
the American military victory, amongst others in his close friendship with the Marquis de 
la Fayette. France’s participation was based on realpolitik, in the form of an interest-based 
calculation by Paris to oppose King George. European powers continued to interfere with 
American affairs, such as during the quasi-war at the turn of the 19th Century and the British-
American wars in 1812 which led to the burning of the US Capitol.
393 See also Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” Washington DC, March 1, 1801.
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just cause to bid defiance to any power on earth.”394 In this light, Washington’s isolationism 
was deliberate, avoiding entangling alliances as a result of perceived weakness. Washington 
was buck-passing until the state became more powerful. US exceptionalism implied opting 
out of global politics. Washington had however grasped that the US had a role to play in 
the world. He said, “It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great 
nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always 
guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.”395 The Address was meant to strengthen 
American independence and so the basis of freedom of action in the international arena 
was laid. For it was not isolationism that the Address meant to convey, but a keen appre-
ciation of the international system instead, mixed with the founding ideals of the Revolu-
tion. Washington’s Address thereby belies great ambition, rather than isolationism. Eric 
Foner writes: “Americans have sometimes believed they enjoy the greatest freedom of all 
– freedom from history.”396 American exceptionalism in its strategic culture came to denote 
a policy of maximizing freedom of action. Achieving such strategic freedom either placed 
the United States outside of history, or stimulated a drive to define history by advancing 
American values abroad. Both can be found in the Address.
US exceptionalism in the international realm has also been expressed as a tendency 
towards exemptionalism, the belief that the United States is not bound by international 
agreements.397 International norms tend to be applied with double standards as a result 
of its exceptional nature. Disregard for international legal frameworks such as the Kyoto 
Protocol on Climate Change and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
form contemporary examples, as are US policies regarding the treatment of detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay and the pseudo-applicability of the Geneva Conventions to try unlawful 
non-combatants. Under President Clinton the Landmine Treaty and the refusal to ratify 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty come to mind. While the resistance to being bound by 
international legal frameworks is symptomatic for the behavior of a hegemon in a system, 
it is reinforced by such domestic variables that claim American uniqueness, an exemp-
tionalist impulse which is exhibited stronger in Congress than in the White House. Since 
President F.D. Roosevelt, the United States had been an avid institution-builder, shaping 
organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank and IMF. Yet it has also always 
claimed a controlling share in these organizations, through veto-powers or a majority vote. 
Particularly at the inception of these institutions, the United States was either the official or 
non-official primus inter pares. In addition, many international agreements encountered 
non- or late ratification by Congress.398 For instance, the UN Convention against Torture 
394 Ellis (2000), p. 135.
395 George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 19, 1796.
396 Foner (1998), p. 332.
397 Michael Ignatieff, “Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights,” (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005) p.4.
398 John Gerard Ruggie, “American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism and Global Governance,” in 
Michael Ignatieff (ed.), American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), p. 322-324.
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was adopted in 1984 but was ratified in the US Senate only a decade later. An ILO conven-
tion banning forced labor stalled in Congress for thirty-four years. The importance is not 
that the United States did not comply with the spirit of these conventions while stalling 
ratification – it did – but rather that distrust of big government, which international gover-
nance is in particular, has been an undercurrent of US exceptionalism.
11.3.2 Absolute Security & the End of History
Exceptionalism is intimately connected to the pursuit of absolute security. From the 
Pilgrims who fled from religious persecution, to Thomas Paine’s belief that the United 
States could be a refuge for Freedom, and centuries later to the notion that defense trans-
formation could nullify military competition, there has been a persistent ideological 
momentum to attain a strategic position in which US security would be uncontested. At 
first by distance through the virtue of geographic isolation, and later through military 
strength and the promotion of its values abroad. Democracy promotion thereby becomes 
a policy to make the world more in its own image and contributing to absolute security. 
Once its security perimeter had been established through the expansion of the Fron-
tier, the Monroe Doctrine and regional hegemony, the United States could advance its 
values and interests in the major events of the 20th century with the luxury of not risking 
being invaded. By the start of the Cold War military technology had given the United States 
unprecedented power but had paradoxically also made it increasingly vulnerable. The 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction nullified the protection offered by distance 
or military strength. Weapons of mass destruction, even in the hands of weak adversaries, 
could level the strategic playing field and their spread undermined the promise of absolute 
security. The Cuban Missile Crisis made the direct threat of ballistic missiles all too clear. It 
made the United States simply a country like any other, subject to the same Damocletian 
sword of insecurity as any other state. It spurred a drive to annul this vulnerability through 
ballistic missile defense. Although the strategic covenant of mutually assured destruction 
(MAD) between Washington and Moscow had made its deployment impossible, Amer-
ican leaders strongly favored developing ballistic missile defense throughout the Cold War. 
The acceptance of MAD had always been reluctant. It was an inherently instable and for 
Washington unsatisfying equilibrium. Alfred Wohlstetter’s work on the missile gap, the 
move to develop conventional military superiority and the doctrine of flexible response 
were all meant to avoid being captured in the prism of mutual nuclear vulnerability.399 If 
not, the United States would be constrained in pursuing its agenda abroad. The presence 
of such a strategic threat ran counter to America’s position as a global superpower and 
clashed with the assertion of the US as an exceptional nation. How could it claim to be 
exceptional if its actions were threatened by weapons of mass destruction? The result has 
been a persistent quest for returning to a mythical period where the US is cushioned from 
the rest of the world. The two alternatives have been isolationism or interventionism. 
399 Albert Wohlstetter, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” Foreign Policy, No. 15 (Summer 1974), 
pp. 3-20.
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Isolationism has never been absent from the American strategic debate as it is the 
logical theoretical alternative for attaining absolute security. Isolationism is the mirror 
companion of an American assertive internationalist foreign policy. Both strive to reach 
the same strategic end-state of a United States that is unaffected by the dynamic of inter-
national security. Technology offered another route to isolationism. For instance, in the 
1980s the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was advanced by President Reagan as a means 
to make the US invulnerable to nuclear attack. If successful it would reaffirm America’s 
exceptionality. In order to develop absolute security the United States pursued a policy to 
place itself outside the dynamic of international affairs. Achieving unquestioned military 
dominance would also serve the purpose, as would using that power to advance the prin-
ciples of the American Revolution. The appeal of the guided munitions revolution and 
network-centric warfare and the pursuit to sustain US strategic dominance should be seen 
in a similar light.
The pursuit of absolute security also explains the appeal of the ‘end of history’ thesis 
in the 1990s which supported a policy of US interventionism and making the world in 
the American image. As the Cold War neared its end, a belief had taken root that liberal 
capitalism would become the dominant model and American values would spread. This 
thinking climaxed in the book The End of History in which Francis Fukuyama wrote that:
What we are witnessing is not just the end of the Cold war, or a passing of a 
particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is 
the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization 
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.400 
President George H.W. Bush professed support to the universal appeal of liberty in a 1990 
speech summoning the end of the Cold War:
At long last we are writing the final chapter of the 20th century’s third great 
conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a close, and after four decades 
of division and discord, our challenge today is to fulfill the great dream 
of all democracies: a true commonwealth of free nations. To marshal the 
growing forces of the free world, to work together, to bring within reach for 
all men and nations the liberty that belongs by right to all.401
The wave of democratization in the 1990’s confirmed that regime change throughout the 
former Warsaw Pact was taking place at unprecedented rates and regimes were reverting 
to a Western model based on American values.402 Infatuated by the moment, Colin Powell 
400 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, no. 16. (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.
401 George H.W. Bush, “Speech at Aspen Institute,” August 2, 1990.
402 Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative 
Legacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp 53-55.
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explained these developments in reference to the American Revolution. “The march 
toward democracy and freedom seems inexorable,” he said. “Our founding fathers would 
find no mystery in this, merely the confirmation of their fondest hopes and their firmest 
beliefs.”403 In the domestic political spectrum, neoconservative thinkers saw these develop-
ments as nothing short of revolutionary and believed that what could happen with Soviet 
communism in Eastern Europe could also apply elsewhere, for instance in the Middle East. 
If an end to history could be achieved it would spell that American absolute security was 
within reach. ‘End of history’-thinking persevered throughout the decade, particularly in 
neoconservative circles.404 Richard Perle and David Frum, both prominent strategists in 
the first George W. Bush administration, wrote in 2003 that, “now that the United States 
has become the greatest of all great powers in world history, its triumph has shown that 
freedom is irresistible.”405 It reflected faith in the ultimate success of the American Revolu-
tion and the spread of its values across the globe. 
Advancing US values abroad as the basis for security policy is a reflection of the 
democratic peace theorem. This liberal theory, based on the thinking in Immanuel Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace, holds that democracies do not go to war with each other. Its conse-
quence for policy is that promoting liberal democracies is the best guarantee for security. 
In 1999 presidential candidate George W. Bush argued, “America, by decision and destiny, 
promotes political freedom – and gains the most when democracy advances.”406 He stated 
later unequivocally, “because free nations tend toward peace, the advance of liberty will 
make America more secure.”407 His statement would penetrate into other high-level docu-
ments. The National Security Strategy similarly declared active support for the theorem: 
“The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that 
can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the interna-
tional system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.”408 
Bush appealed to the pursuit of absolute security since only in the event that states have 
benevolent, democratic regimes the possibility existed for uncontested security. 
The democratic peace theorem contrasts with supporting multilateral institution-
alism. While the United States is member of international institutions, they are consid-
ered an instrument rather than an objective. In the eyes of many neoconservatives, the 
403 Colin Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee,” Washington DC, February 1, 1990, p. 144-5.
404 Francis Fukuyama, who pioneered the End of History-thesis, for instance was one of the 
signees to a neoconservative “Statement of Principles” on the future of US foreign and 
security policy. See Project for the New American Century, “Statement of Principles,” June 3, 
1997, http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm.
405 David Frum & Richard Perle, An End to Evil, (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 275.
406 George W. Bush, “Address at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library,” November 19, 1999.
407 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, 
Washington DC, March 2006.
408 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, 
Washington DC, March 2006, p.1.
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United Nations had lost credibility because it offers equal membership to dictatorial and 
democratic regimes alike. In the 1990’s neoconservatives denounced President Clinton’s 
preference to work with international institutions as impediments to US freedom of action 
that disenfranchised American exceptionalism.409 This skepticism towards international 
institutions however is not exclusive to neoconservatism and can be found throughout 
American political culture. It is based on the Lockean principle that international insti-
tutions do not have legitimacy of themselves but derive if it from the character of their 
members. The realist logic that superpowers view international institutions instrumentally 
to avoid normative constraints further amplified this. Likewise it has led to calls in the 
United States to set up a League of Democracies as an alternative legitimate international 
decision-making body.410
11.3.3 Universalism
Belief in American exceptionalism led policymakers to take an uncritical approach to the 
American role in the world, viewing it as exclusively benevolent and in pursuit of universal 
causes. After all, if American values are not better than any other, than the United States 
could not be exceptional. In fact, US interventionism was considered critical to interna-
tional stability and improving global security. In 1991 Colin Powell invoked the tradi-
tion of American exceptionalism following the Gulf war saying that the United States is a 
“remarkable nation” and the “last best hope of earth.”411 This notion specifically resonated 
among the neoconservative movement. William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan wrote in 
2003 that “the alternative to American leadership is a chaotic, Hobbesian world”.412 The 
United States was the “custodian of the international system” according to Charles Krau-
thammer413, or the “global cop” according to Thomas Barnett. Edward Luttwak strongly 
believed in the power of American military strength, saying that: “if US military power 
is withheld in one crisis after another, it is bound to stimulate the growth of other mili-
409 Richard Perle said of the period: “The Clinton administration went so overboard with 
multilateralism that they created the impression that the United States was just another 
country, that we would be bound in the way every little dictatorship in Africa would be 
bound. We would all sign agreements together. We’d get as many signatures as possible. And, 
we would behave the way everyone else would behave. I think that’s a complete abdication of 
American leadership and responsibility. We’re not just another country. And if we are ever led 
by people who regard us as just another country, the whole world is going to be in trouble.” 
Interview with Richard Perle. Frontline: the war behind closed doors, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/interviews/perle.html. Accessed February 12, 2010.
410 See G. John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: 
US National Security in the 21st Century,” Final Report of the Princeton Project on National 
Security, The Princeton Project Papers (Princeton 2006); Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, 
“Democracies of the World, Unite,” The American Interest, (January-February 2007), pp.5-15.
411 Colin Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93), 
pp. 36-41.
412 William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan, The War over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s 
Mission (Encounter: San Francisco, 2003), p. 121.
413  As quoted in Francis Fukuyama, “The Neoconservative Moment,” The National Interest, vol. 
76 (Summer 2004), p. 59.
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tary powers…A policy of non-intervention would yield a world not only less stable, but 
also more militarized.”414 Among neoconservatives the US was the only vehicle to correct 
moral wrongs in the world.415 It favored a view that the US should advance its own values 
based not out of self-interest, but because in doing so it was promoting universal values 
that it held would benefit the greater common good. As David Frum and Richard Perle 
wrote: “To say that we are engaged in ‘imposing American values’ when we liberate people 
is to imply that there are peoples on this earth who value their own subjugation. … Much 
more often than not, democracy will not have a chance unless it is aided from outside – 
and by force if necessary [emphasis in original].”416 This thinking resonated with elements 
inside the Bush White House. National Security Advisor to the first G.W. Bush administra-
tion, Condoleeza Rice declared simplistically that: “American values are universal. People 
want to say what they think, worship as they wish, and elect those who govern them ….”417 
President George W. Bush echoed it on multiple occasions. In 1999 he declared, “the most 
powerful force in the world is not a weapon or a nation but a truth: that we are spiritual 
beings and that freedom is the soul’s right to breathe.”418 He reminded the world that “I 
believe every person has the ability and the right to be free … and we believe that freedom, 
the freedom we prize, is not for us alone. It is the right and the capacity of all mankind.”419 
He appealed to the teleological principles of universalism and the unequivocal belief in 
the righteousness of American policy derived from its founding principles. The belief was 
widely held among US policymakers and commentators that because of its Revolutionary 
values, its behavior was always just. As Fukuyama wrote in 2004 in reference to US hege-
mony: “we have in effect said to the rest of the world. ‘look, trust us,… we are not just any 
run-of-the-mill hyperpower. We are, after all, the United States.”420 Robert Kagan wrote 
an article in the summer of 1998 entitled The Benevolent Empire. In it he argued that 
America’s military hegemony was the best the world could ask for: “If there is to be a sole 
superpower, the world is better off if that power is the United States,” Kagan wrote.421 He 
414 Edward Luttwak, “A Post-Heroic Military Policy,: the new seasons of bellicosity,” Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 75, nr. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44.
415 “A world at peace; a world governed by law; a world in which all peoples are free to find their 
own destinies: that dream has not yet come true, it will not come true soon but if it ever does 
come true, it will be brought into being by American armed might and defended by American 
might, too. America’s vocation is not an imperial vocation. Our vocation is to support justice 
with power. It is a vocation that has earned us terrible enemies. It is a vocation that has made 
us, at our best moments, the hope of the world.” Frum & Perle (2003), p. 279.
416 Ibid, p. 276-78.
417 Condoleeza Rice, Promoting the National Interest,” in Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 1. (January-
February 2000), pp. 45-62.
418 George W. Bush, “Address at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library,” November 19, 1999.
419 George W. Bush, “Address at the National Endowment for Democracy,” November 6, 2003.
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later drew this argument to its logical extension and promoted moral interventionism: “if 
the United States is founded on universal principles, how can Americans practice amoral 
indifference when those principles are under siege around the world.”422 Even the eminent 
scholar Samuel Huntington believed in the exceptional nature of the US, writing that: 
“The impact of no other country in world affairs has been as heavily weighted in favor of 
liberty and democracy as has that of the United States…American power is far less likely 
to be misused or corrupted than the power of any other major government…If the United 
States plays a strong, confident, pre-eminent role on the world stage, other nations will be 
impressed by its power and will attempt to emulate its liberty in the belief that liberty may 
be the source of power…The future of liberty in the world is thus intimately linked to the 
future of American power.”423 
The premise of US exceptionalism is rooted in Lockean Enlightenment that society 
can progress through the human capacity to improve his condition. This perspective 
reflects a linear, agency-focused teleological view of history. In this thinking the use of 
force is not condemned but is at times viewed as an instrument to advance a people, civi-
lization or the world in total toward a particular end-state. American strategic culture 
reflected similar teleological thinking.424 
11.3.4 Democracy Promotion and Liberation
Democracy promotion became the key policy to pursue absolute security and has been 
a fundamental element of US foreign policy, and very explicitly so since the 9/11 attacks. 
Jonathan Monten has argued that: “democracy promotion is not just another foreign policy 
instrument or idealist diversion; it is central to US political identity and sense of national 
purpose.”425 The presidency of George W. Bush offers some of the most pronounced exam-
ples of this thinking. Although President Bush’s Axis of Evil speech in 2002 was profoundly 
realist in its assertion that “the United States of America will not permit the world’s most 
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons,” Bush never-
theless framed it through the prism of advancing US values and democracy promotion.426 
cfm?fa=view&id=275.
422 Robert Kagan, “The return of cheap pessimism: Inside the Limo,” The New Republic Online, 
vol. 4, no. 227, October 4, 2000.
423 Huntington (1983), p. 255-257.
424 The neoconservative movement reflects an extreme variant of this thinking, as it openly 
linked US exceptionalism and the pursuit of absolute security to the willingness to use force. 
John Gray has made the following comparison between Trotskyism and neoconservatism: 
“Trotsky’s delusion that the European working class longed for socialist revolution in the 
interwar years is matched by the neo-conservative fantasy that the Arab world yearns for 
American-style democracy. [Trotsky’s] contempt for the ‘Quaker-vegetarian chatter’ of 
those who condemned Bolshevik methods such as hostage taking in the Russian civil war is 
mirrored in neo-conservative scorn for those who condemn the use of torture in the ‘war on 
terror’.” John Gray (2007), p. 123.
425 Monten (2005), p. 113.
426 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002. Transcript available at http://
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Talking to journalist Bob Woodward, Bush explained that he had embraced the concept of 
liberation as the principle component of his presidency, a role that was thrust upon him by 
the attacks of 9/11: “Freedom is God’s gift to everybody in the world. I believe that….And 
it became part of the jargon. And I believe that. And I believe we have a duty to free people. 
I would hope we wouldn’t have to do it militarily, but we have a duty.”427 Bush announced 
before taking office that he would take advantage “of a tremendous opportunity – given 
few nations in history – to extend the current peace to the far realm of the future […] to 
project America’s peaceful influence, not just across the world, but across the years.”428 
The second half of 2003 saw the pinnacle of political change through military power. 
That November Bush spoke to the National Endowment for Democracy. Strengthened 
by the rapid demise of the Saddam regime, he outlined a domino theory for the Middle 
East based on democracy promotion: “Iraqi democracy will succeed -- and that success 
will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran -- that freedom can be the future 
of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a 
watershed event in the global democratic revolution.”429 A democratic and free Iraq would 
be an example to the rest of the Middle East and contribute to the fight against terrorism. 
It would be a place where individual hope and economic well-being would provide an 
alternative way of life than under the neighboring dictatorial regimes. Iraq would become 
a small “city on the hill” in the Arabian Desert. Bush’s argumentation relied on the perfect-
ibility of society, the universality of American ideals, the strength of individual aspira-
tions of freedom irrespective of culture and history, and the ability of the US to act as an 
external agent of change. By bringing democracy to one authoritarian country by force, 
other regimes like Syria, Iran and Libya would be scared into changing their international 
behavior. As the smoke settled over Baghdad, Libya renounced its WMD capability, the 
democratic process in Lebanon seemed to pick up speed and council elections were orga-
nized in Saudi Arabia.
In his 2005 second Inaugural Address, Bush declared a policy to promote freedom 
and remove tyrannies around the world. Bush’s threat perception portrayed a confluence 
of interests and values.430 Democracy promotion became the basis of his national security 
policy. The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 reiterated that “as freedom and democ-
archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/.
427 George W. Bush quoted in Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2004). p 89.
428 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.
429 George W. Bush, “Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the 
National Endowment for Democracy,” United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington DC, 
November 6, 2003.
430 “For as long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny prone 
to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder, violence will gather and multiply in 
destructive power, and cross the most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat….The 
survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands….
America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.” George W. Bush, “Inaugural 
Address,” as published in New York Times, January 20, 2005.
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racy take root in Iraq, it will provide an attractive alternative to the message of extrem-
ists for the people of the region.”431 It posited an inverse domino-theory. Published in the 
shade of the insurgency in Iraq, the National Security Strategy of 2006 remained highly 
idealistic about the project to advance democracy. It declared that “[i]t is the policy of the 
United States to seek and support democratic movement and institutions in every nation 
and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”432 It argued that tyran-
nical regimes which violate human rights and limit the freedom of citizens by their very 
existence threaten the United States. The relation between the domestic character of a 
regime and international security was made explicit. The 2006 National Security Strategy 
was a pamphlet for democratizing the world. It reasoned that if all states had a system like 
the United States, the United States would be secure and absolute security would be within 
reach.433 It professed that promoting the same model that had brought the United States 
security and prosperity would likewise extend security and prosperity around the world. 
It is crucial to underline that although neoconservatives were very explicit, this 
thinking was not only a product of theirs or a response to the 9/11 attacks, but was inte-
gral to US strategic culture. This argument is similarly made by the prominent scholar of 
strategic culture, Theo Farrell who argued that “neoconservative ideology – emphasizing 
moral certitude and military unilateralism – took root in American diplomacy with such 
ease because it found a fertile bed in US strategic culture.434 In the limelight of Operation 
Desert Storm in 1991, Senator John Warner, the ranking member on the Armed Services 
Committee, expressed the intimate connection between American security and the spread 
of freedom: “We in the United States will never fully attain the freedom to which we aspire, 
and for which we stand, if others in the world seeking that same freedom can be denied 
it by dictators like Saddam Hussein.”435 Similarly, in 1991 President Clinton declared that: 
“the defense of freedom and the promotion of democracy around the world aren’t merely a 
reflection of our deepest values; they are vital to our national interests…US foreign policy 
cannot be divorced from the moral principles most Americans share.”436
George W. Bush, as his speech at the National Endowment for Democracy quoted 
above makes clear, believed America’s fundamental security depended on the freedom of 
others. At its most profound he was perpetuating the ideology of the American Revolution. 
431 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington 
DC, March 2006, p.10.
432 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, 
Washington DC, March 2006, p.1.
433 Paradoxically it also meant, if successful, the United States would no longer be an exceptional 
country, but rather the norm.
434 Theo Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” SAIS Review, vol. 25, no.2 (Summer 
2005), p. 13.
435 Senator John Warner, Senate Committee on Armed Services, US Congress, Washington DC, 
February 21, 1991, p. 6.
436 William. J. Clinton, A new Covenant for American Security, Georgetown University, December 
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As one of the most extreme expressions of this Wilsonian tradition, President Bush said in 
late 2003:
 The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our 
country. From the Fourteen Points to the Four Freedoms, to the Speech at 
Westminster, America has put our power at the service of principle. We 
believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the 
direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence come 
in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom -- the 
freedom we prize -- is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all 
mankind.437
Bush translated this into an interventionist agenda. In the brief but important seventeen 
minute 2005 inaugural address President Bush referred to freedom or one of its derivatives, 
liberty and free, on fifty occasions, declaring that: 
It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of 
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with 
the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.438
It echoed Woodrow Wilson’s speech prior to the First World War in which he declared 
that it was necessary to establish “a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free 
peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.”439 
Central to this line of thought is the dichotomy between “the free” and “the unfree”.
11.3.5 Moralist Interventions
US strategic culture contains a measure of moralist naiveté, framing the world in simple 
dichotomies. By presenting security threats in dialectic, or even existentialist, terms, it 
makes the United States less reluctant to consider the use of the military. Central to Presi-
dent George W. Bush’s rhetoric is a construction of the world in these dialectics. Right 
versus Wrong. Good versus Evil. Black versus White. Freedom versus Tyranny. Following 
the 9/11 attacks Bush said, “freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, 
and we know that God is not neutral between them”440 While Bush is a strong exponent of 
this tradition, it is found among many earlier presidents and politicians. 
437 George W. Bush, “Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the 
National Endowment for Democracy,” United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington DC, 
November 6, 2003.
438 Idem.
439 Woodrow Wilson, “War Address,” cited in Albright (2006), p.29.
440 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 
Washington DC, September 20, 2001.
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The tendency to posit security threats in simple dichotomies falls within the rhetor-
ical lineage of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson placed his thinking in moral dichotomies, juxta-
posing free against unfree, right against wrong, and good against evil. In the 18th century, 
Jefferson’s biographer Joseph Ellis writes: “Jefferson’s mind consistently saw the world in 
terms of clashing dichotomies: Whigs versus Tories; moderns versus ancients; America 
versus Europe; rural conditions versus urban; whites versus blacks. The list could go on, 
but it always came down to the forces of light against the forces of darkness, with no room 
for anything in between.”441 Jefferson’s binary argumentation would leave its marks on US 
foreign policy thinking. The moralist dialectic was used to mobilize public support during 
the Cold war against the Soviet Union and it echoed in the Bush administration’s response 
to the 9/11 attacks. 
When the United States decides to use the military, it does so by appealing to moral 
justifications. As Seymour Martin Lipset writes, “support for a war is as moralistic as resis-
tance to it. To endorse a war and call on people to kill others and die for the country, Amer-
icans must define their role in a conflict as being on God’s side against Satan – for morality, 
against evil.”442 To mobilize support the adversary is demonized, quite literally framing 
him as the Devil or a materialization of Evil. Saddam Hussein was called the Butcher of 
Baghdad and compared to Adolf Hitler.443 Slobodan Milosevic and Osama bin Laden 
faced similar accusations. If a war is fought for moral purposes than nothing will be suffi-
cient except the destruction of the source of that immorality. For instance, when Saddam 
Hussein was not removed from power, and left in power in Iraq, it galvanized critiques 
– particularly neoconservatives- who felt that the persistence of the regime was a security 
threat in and of itself.444Anything less than absolute victory becomes morally suboptimal. 
Failing to deal decisively with a threat runs counter to the quest for absolute security as 
well as the exceptional nature of the US. At the level of military strategy it meshes with the 
Powell-Weinberger doctrine. The use of overwhelming force to reach a decisive victory, 
correlates with the political objective to achieve complete victory of a moral foe. This 
strategic cultural bias has at times led to operational difficulties. Once the United States 
declares that an intervention is part of a global struggle of liberation, it leads to strategic 
lock-in. The Vietnam War demonstrated this dilemma clearly. Escalation instead of with-
drawal becomes the logical course of action. To President John F. Kennedy, the Cold War 
was a test of character, and he said the US would “pay any price, bear any burden” to assure 
the “survival of liberty”. For President Lyndon Johnson similar rhetoric applied. It made it 
extremely difficult to change course when events did not proceed as anticipated. Having 
441 Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: the Revolutionary Generation, (New York: Vintage, 2000) 
p. 231.
442 Lipset (1996), p.20.
443 Nick B. Williams, “Hussein orders four ailing US Hostages freed,” LA Times, November 2, 
1990. See also Felicia Okeke-Ibezim, Saddam Hussein: A legendary dictator, (2006) p.8.
444 See for instance William Kristol, “The Imminent War,” The Weekly Standard, March 17, 2003; 
Project on the New American Century, “Letter to President Clinton,” January 26, 1998 http://
www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm.
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declared that they were engaged in a seminal struggle in South-east Asia, these Presidents 
could not easily withdraw from Vietnam since it would mean backing down on their 
commitment to “defend freedom” against “evil.” The Iraq War portrayed a similar dynamic. 
Having committed to the promotion of a democratic Middle East, the US could not walk 
away without reaching its objective. The use of values to support an interventionist policy 
thereby creates a self-sustaining dynamic to remain involved. 
11.3.6 An Adversarial approach to Security
American strategic culture further draws on the Lockean idea of the primacy of the 
individual. It holds that since behavior is not structurally-determined, individual action 
is able to shape the flow of history. It infuses American strategic culture with a focus on 
the role of agency as opposed to a focus on structures. Threats to the United States have 
persistently been configured in terms of specific actors, whether they are slavers of the 19th 
century, virulent European nationalists in the early 20th century, fascists, Nazis, commu-
nists, Islamic terrorists, or rogue leaders. A solution to these threats lies in the removal of 
these actors. It is closely connected with the perception that Good and Evil in fact exist. 
For instance, two leading neoconservative intellectuals wrote about terrorism that, “we do 
not believe that Americans are fighting this evil to minimize it or to manage it. We believe 
they are fighting to win- to end this evil before it kills again and on a genocidal scale.”445 
It inclines Americans to the belief that wars at times need to be fought, in order to deal 
with this evil. A consequence of the adversarial approach has been that the United States 
is perhaps the only Western state which fully accepts that it wages wars, not referring to 
euphemisms such as ‘peacekeeping’ or ‘stability operations’ to placate the domestic public. 
In fact, the American public is comfortable with the concept of ‘war’. It is embedded in the 
collective American psyche and discourse and appears when talking about such non-mili-
tary issues as the War on Drugs, the War on Poverty or dealing with economic recessions.446 
Targeting, killing or capturing adversaries means removing a threat. Washington empha-
sizes defeating an enemy, rather than taking a structuralist approach to focus on root 
causes. The US aspires to defeat terrorist networks, prevent actors from acquiring or using 
WMD, defend the homeland against terrorists and shape the strategic choices of states. The 
2006 US National Security Strategy presented a list of ‘root-causes’ for terrorism but all 
focused on the role of agency. They include political alienation, “grievances that can be 
blamed on others,” “sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation” and an ideology that 
“justifies murder”.447 The terrorist’s belief system is the problem, not his socio-economic 
surroundings or global inequalities that may influence it, as the EU has it. The only excep-
tion was a lack of political enfranchisement, for which the remedy is regime change or 
revolution. Obviously democracy is an agency-focused system primed on empowering 
445 Frum & Perle (2003), p.9.
446 George W. Bush said: “We will prevail in the war and we will defeat this recession.” “Bush 
vows to defeat terrorism, recession,” Reuters, January 30, 2002.
447 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, 
Washington DC, March 2006, p.10.
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the individual. From the US perspective, “promoting democracy” and “advancing freedom” 
requires tracking down, killing or capturing those that stand in its way. Additionally it 
favors an emphasis on body counts as a metric of success. One killed terrorist equals one 
less terrorist threat. It is a reflection of an adversarial approach to security. In the wake of 
the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush signed a presidential finding which 
authorized intelligence agencies to target and kill Bin Laden and his senior leadership.448 
Cofer Black, Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, testified to the 9/11 commis-
sion in 2002 that, “I know that we are on the right track today and as a result we are safer 
as a nation. [A] ‘no limits’ aggressive, relentless, worldwide pursuit of any terrorist who 
threatens us is the only way to go and is the bottom line.”449  The subsequent prolific use of 
armed unmanned aerial vehicles, known as drones, to target Taliban and Al Qaeda lead-
ership in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere is testament to the persistent adversarial 
focus among the US leadership.450 Official rhetoric also makes use of an agency-focused 
perspective to the Global War on Terror. President George W. Bush said in his 2003 State of 
the Union Address that “All told, more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested 
in many countries…And many others have met a different fate. Let’s put it this way: They 
are no longer a problem to the United States and our friends and allies.”451 President Barack 
Obama in his first State of the Union Address in January 2010 portrayed a similar inclina-
tion: “And in the last year, hundreds of al Qaeda’s fighters and affiliates, including many 
senior leaders, have been captured or killed -- far more than in 2008.”452 The revision of 
US strategic objectives in Afghanistan commissioned by President Barack Obama in early 
2009 also expressed a reaffirmation of an adversarial agency-focused approach in tune 
with US strategic culture. The strategy review for the Afghanistan war stated that “the core 
goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in 
Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”453
The agency-focused perspective is also reflected in the US Army’s focus on conven-
tional warfare. It is present in the Army’s dictum of See First, Understand First, Act First, 
448 Bob Woodward, “CIA told to do ‘whatever necessary’ to Kill Bin Laden,” Washington Post, 
October 21, 2001; Barton Gellman, “CIA Weighs ‘Targeted Killing’ Missions,” Washington Post, 
October 28, 2001.
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York Times, March 16, 2009; Peter Bergen, Katherine Tiedemann, “Revenge of the Drones,” 
New America Foundation, October 19, 2009. http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/
publications/policy/revenge_of_the_drones ; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, “Between the 
lines, an Expansion in Pakistan,” New York Times, December 1, 2009; Jeremy Scahill, “The 
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451 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, January 29, 2003.
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Finish Decisively and the “Army’s Warrior Culture” into which soldiers are immersed and 
are seen as the “ultimate combat system.”454 Defeating an enemy remains the principle 
objective of the Army. Witness also the Warrior Ethos, the US Army’s motto for each indi-
vidual soldier.455 
An agency-focused perspective to security threats dovetails with democracy promo-
tion and the US liberating tradition. By removing a physical threat, in the form of a terrorist 
or tyrant, liberation comes closer. At the strategic level, operational effectiveness transfor-
mation is similarly agency-focused. The envisioned product of network-centric warfare 
- full spectrum dominance - is configured as the ability to perform the OODA loop “faster 
than an adversary in any situation.”456 Through operational effectiveness transformation 
US defense policy and the US military prepares for force-on-force confrontations, not 
complex emergencies that lack a clear distinction between war and peace. An agency-
focused understanding of security creates an impulse to develop a superior military for 
high-intensity operations. In a world where threats are perceived to arise from actors, 
rather than for instance the complex interactions among political and socio-economic 
circumstances, maintaining the capability to defeat any such actor becomes essential to 
security. Pushed to the extreme, it also inclines states to pursue a strategy of regime change.
11.3.7 Changing Regimes
By the end of the 20th century the unipolar system created an opportunity for moving 
towards absolute security. Within US domestic politics it particularly appealed to the 
neoconservative movement that would come to intellectually shape the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s and played a prominent role in the administrations of George W. Bush.457 
From the neoconservative perspective, the end of the Cold war proved that the United 
States had “won” through military strength, rather than that the Soviet Union crumbled 
due to internal economic collapse. Neoconservatives embraced the theorem that mili-
tarily outspending Moscow and Reagan’s bold confrontation of the “evil empire” had led 
to success. It reinforced the belief that regimes could be forced to change through outside 
action, and military strength was key to it. In addition, the Cold War confirmed the impor-
tance of regimes and ideology in international relations. The Cold War was a battle of 
contrasting regimes and ideological oppositions. The Soviet Union and the United States 
were advancing Communist and liberal democratic models throughout their spheres of 
influence. Both systems believed they had found the keys to human progress and that their 
454 Department of the Army, Army Campaign Plan (Change 3), Washington DC, May 12, 2006, 
p. 6-7.
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456 Ibid, p. 6.
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models could be applied universally.458 Both states felt that their model was superior and 
would lead history to its final destination. It was “class equality versus individual liberty,” 
but also “control versus freedom”. Citizens had a different role in a democratic or a totali-
tarian regime and thus regime change from one to the other implied a total transformation 
of the state rather than a “simple change of government.”459 Because the Cold War was also 
framed as a philosophical struggle how to structure society and advance the human condi-
tion, it became a war of ideas, and similarly it enabled American political elites to frame 
the struggle in terms of good and evil. Both regimes also believed that the use of force was 
justified to oppose the other’s model.
When the Cold War ended, the US continued to expand its domestic model abroad 
under the nomer of democracy promotion. As mentioned above, the changing security 
environment offered a great opportunity to “affect the shape of the world to come.”460 The 
Cold War had proven the value of military competition to bring about regime change, now 
it would not involve staring an adversary down but rather actively removing tyrants. The 
use of force to impose the model of US success on others was justified in terms of liberating 
a country from an oppressive regime or advancing democracy. Following 9/11 neoconser-
vatives supported the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns in 2001 and 2003 in these terms.461 
Furthermore, a strong transformed military focused on high-intensity combat was a part 
of it.462 Colin Powell advocated in 1992 that US military primacy is “as critical to us as the 
freedom we so adore. Our arms must be second to none.”463 Only by being dominant is the 
US safe from the threats of the outside world. 
The drive for strategic primacy finds her ideological roots in the insular political 
culture which presumes that security is the norm, coupled to the ideal to advance the 
American Revolution.464 It breeds the perception that the United States will never be 
secure unless the world is made up of liberal democracies, while states that do not support 
American values constitute a threat. With a global mindset based on absolute security, 
tolerating different political-philosophical models of progress that are contradictory to 
458 Gray (2007), p. 30.
459 Nicholas Xenos, “Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of the War on Terror,” Logos 3.2, Spring 2004, 
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its own is difficult. This acknowledges the virtue Americans attributed to the democratic 
peace theorem, a policy of unilateralism as well as the eventual adoption of preventive war. 
Given its central position in providing context to US foreign policy, this raises the question 
whether expanding the ideals of the American Revolution was indeed historically consis-
tent. This next section briefly traces the historical trend for using the military as an instru-
ment of liberation and democracy promotion.
11.4 The Ball of Liberty
11.4.1 A Beacon to the East, a Bayonet for the West
Expansion of the ideals of the American Revolution beyond the thirteen states started 
almost immediately after Congress approved the Constitution in 1789. Democracy 
promotion was a central element of US foreign policy from that moment onwards.465 
The French Revolution was seen as an extension of the American Revolution. Thomas 
Jefferson said about the events in Paris: “This ball of Liberty, I believe most piously is now 
so well in motion that it will roll around the globe.”466 Jefferson believed that the American 
Revolution tipped the global scale in favor of liberation movements against feudalism 
and monarchy. While Jefferson deplored the violence in France during the Revolution, he 
considered it an acceptable and perhaps even necessary price to pay. The liberty of the 
whole earth, Jefferson said, 
[...] was depending on that contest [the French Revolution] and was ever 
such a prize won with so little blood? My own affections have been deeply 
wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it should 
have failed I would rather have seen half the earth desolated. Were there 
but an Adam and Eve left in every country, and left free, it would be better 
than it is now.467 
Thomas Jefferson emphatically accepted that violence was part of the process of spreading 
liberty: “What signify a few lives lost in a century or two, he wondered, “the tree of liberty 
must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural 
manure.”468 As his biographer, Joseph Ellis, summarized this revolutionary fervor was 
comparable to that espoused at a later stage by Lenin, Trotsky or Mao. When Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld on April 11, 2003 spoke in response to the widespread looting 
and chaos in Baghdad following the ousting of Saddam Hussein that “freedom is untidy” 
465 Anatol Lieven, “Wolfish Wilsonians: Existential Dilemmas of the Liberal Internationalists,” 
Orbis (Spring 2006), pp. 243-257; Monten (2005), p. 112 – 156.
466 Thomas Jefferson to Trench Coxe, June 1, 1795, quoted in Ellis (2000), p. 142.
467 Thomas Jefferson to William Short, January 3, 1793, quoted in Joseph J. Ellis, American 
Sphinx: the Character of Thomas Jefferson, (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 150.
468 Ibid, p. 118.
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it resonated this Jeffersonian logic. Jefferson was instrumental in making Freedom the 
defining construct around which domestic political battles devolved. Jefferson provided 
the ideas and words which allowed the end of the Cold War to be seen as the closing of 
a chapter in the advancement of the American Revolution. The same thinking appeared 
when the Bush administration promoted the belief it could change the Middle East by 
removing Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Defeating tyranny or Islamic terrorism was the 
modern-day equivalent of dealing with the feudalism Jefferson so despised.
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:American_progress.JPG) 
Figure 8:   John Gast, “American Progress,” 1872
Exceptionalism became an excuse for US expansionism. At first it became apparent 
through the expansion of the US frontier. To preserve the American experiment, and with 
it the Creed that differentiated American politics from European power politics, regional 
hegemony was required. In Federalist 24, on the basis of what we today would call realist 
considerations, Alexander Hamilton was hawkish and warned for the false security of 
having a nautical buffer across the Atlantic. He adamantly proclaimed that, “the savage 
tribes on our Western frontiers ought to be regarded as our national enemies, [and] natural 
allies [of the British and Spanish], because they have most to fear from us, and most to 
hope from them.” Hamilton stated that the security offered by distance was irrelevant. “The 
improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered 
distant nations, in a great measure, neighbours.” And neighbors, Hamilton had made clear 
in Federalist 6 were “naturally enemies of each other.” Not only was the young republic to 
have a standing military capability but Hamilton offered a rationale for pursuing domi-
nance over the continent. The roots for Manifest Destiny were born. It dovetailed with 
the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which demarcated the Western hemisphere as an American 
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sphere of influence. European meddling represented a danger to US interests and threat-
ened the security of the American experiment. The Continent would be American, if not 
the Republic would be insecure. Manifest Destiny combined power and ideas, drawing 
upon the providential mission of the American Revolution to assuage realist concerns.469 
Manifest Destiny was itself a reflection of the American Creed. It appealed to the 
entrepreneurial spirit and embodied the ‘pursuit of happiness’ as well as the economic 
liberty to do with the vast continent as pleased but advancing the ideals of democracy and 
Freedom in its wake. 
11.4.2 Right is more precious than Peace
Meanwhile, as the Frontier was closing, the Civil War erupted as the Confederacy chal-
lenged Unionist government in Washington over the most American of concepts; the 
interpretation of Freedom. To the Confederacy, it was the liberty of white landed Ameri-
cans to do with other man’s labor as they pleased whereas to the abolitionist Union 
freedom was meant for all those that inhabited the United States.470 By the turn of the 19th 
century the Western world was engaged in moralist politics and using the military as a tool 
in far-away places. It reflected the reasoning by the political philosopher John Stuart Mill 
that interventions were justified as long as they had a civilizing purpose.471 The British had 
their white man’s burden, the French had mission civilisatrice, the Dutch were engaged 
in an ethische politiek and in the United States President Theodore Roosevelt was one 
of the staunchest advocates for a vindicationist promotion of the American Revolution, 
a hawkish and morally infused imperialist foreign policy.472 He called his policy Ameri-
canism explicating that he was intent on advancing American ideals. Its realist dimension 
was based in the Monroe Doctrine. In 1898 the United States went to war with Spain over 
Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam and the Philippines. The Spanish-American war, a “splendid little 
war” according to President Roosevelt, evoked America’s belief to use military power to 
liberate. While the Spanish-American war is commonly considered the defining moment 
marking the United States’ arrival as a world power, it was pursuing a principle formulated 
469 The term ‘manifest destiny’ was first coined by the journalist John L. O’Sullivan in Democracy 
Review, July 1845. O’Sullivan supported America’s expansion into Oregon “by right of our 
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British Folkways in America, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
471 “But there assuredly are cases in which it is allowable to go to war, without having been 
ourselves attacked, or threatened with attack. … There is a great difference (for example) 
between the case in which the nations concerned are of the same, or something like the same, 
degree of civilisation, and that in which one of the parties to the situation is of a high, and 
the other of a very low, grade of social improvement.” John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on 
Non-intervention,” Foreign Policy Perspectives, no. 8, Libertarian Alliance, p.4. http://www.
libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/forep/forep008.pdf.
472 See Warren Zimmerman, “Jingoes, Goo-Goos and the Rise of America’s Empire,” in The 
Wilson Quarterly, vol. 22, no.2 (Spring 1998), pp. 42 – 65.
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at the signing of the Declaration of Independence.473 After Hamilton advocated belliger-
ence against colonial and tribal interests in North America, the United States had closed 
the Frontier, fulfilled its manifest destiny on the continent and liberated Southern slaves, 
now the time had come to push the perimeter of Freedom outward. 
An example of this thinking was a speech given by the Republic Senator from Indiana, 
Albert Beveridge, in 1898.. The speech, known as The March of the Flag, portrayed a 
missionary zeal and a keen fusion of ideological and realist considerations.474 Beveridge 
asked: “Have we no mission to perform, no duty to discharge to our fellow man? Has God 
endowed us with gifts beyond our deserts and marked us as the people of His peculiar 
favor, merely to rot in our own selfishness…?” Speaking to the background of the Spanish-
American war in 1898 Beveridge formulated America’s mission in the world as follows: 
“Would not the people of the Philippines prefer the just, humane, civilizing government 
of this Republic to the savage, bloody rule of pillage and extortion from which we have 
rescued them?...If England can govern foreign lands, so can America…The rule of liberty 
that all just government derives its authority from the consent of the governed, applies only 
to those who are capable of self -government.” 
President William McKinley retained the Philippines after the end of the war because, 
agreeing with Beveridge and John Stuart Mill: “they were unfit for self-government” and 
“there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and 
uplift and civilize and Christianize them…”475 
Two decades later, American participation in the First World War was also justi-
fied along the lines of Freedom. President Wilson’s “making the world safe for democ-
racy” was juxtaposed to a castigation of Germany as an authoritarian, backward state. By 
1917 German submarine warfare threatened American commercial shipping interests. 
Economic liberties were jeopardized yet Wilson found this basis to narrow for mobilizing 
American participation and enlarged it to encompass political freedoms as well. On the eve 
of American participation in the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson invoked 
American civil religion and the promise of Freedom:
But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things 
which we have always carried nearest our hearts… the day has come when 
America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles 
that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured.476
473 Monten (2005), p. 132.
474 Senator A.J. Beveridge, The March of the Flag, September 16, 1898, Indianapolis, http://www.
thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/readings/beveridge.html. Accessed January 22, 2007.
475 General J. Rusling, “Interview with President William McKinley,” The Christian Advocate, 
January 22, 1903, cited in Daniel Schirmer & Stephan Rosskamm Shalom, eds., The 
Philippines Reader, (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 22-23.
476 Woodrow Wilson, “Address to Congress,” Washington DC, April 2, 1917.
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While Woodrow Wilson has given his name to the foreign policy school that promotes 
American values abroad, his beliefs were integral to those of the American Revolution. As 
Jefferson had made clear, the ideas of the American Revolution were never supposed to 
end at the Appalachians. Once the frontier had been closed, the American model would 
expand by example and by active promotion. Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and in partic-
ular George W. Bush have similarly applied the rhetoric of Wilson to their day.
(Source: American Treasures at the Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm142.html) 
Figure 9:   Norman Rockwell, "The Four Freedoms". 
America’s participation in the Second World War juxtaposed freedom-loving nations 
against a tyranny once again. This time it was the slave-system of Fascism. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed the Four Freedoms as an ideal for a new world order 
and reflected US political culture and normative qualities of American society. With the 
four freedoms Roosevelt was declaring a policy of democracy promotion. In August 1941, 
before the Pearl Harbor attacks, Roosevelt argued that the United States should partici-
pate in the war to defend: “the great freedoms against encroachment and attack of the dark 
forces of despotism which would enslave the globe.” President George H. W. Bush would 
repeat the quest for such a new world order in 1991, as would his son a decade later. 
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The Cold War posited the United States in the role of protector of the ‘free world’ 
now encompassing the Western hemisphere and Western Europe. The divided Germany, 
Africa, Middle East and Asia were seen as contested areas where the US-dominated sphere 
met the communist realm. The Truman Doctrine in 1947, in conjunction with Paul Nitze’s 
National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) of 1950, delineated that the United 
States had a pivotal role in stopping and containing communist expansionism. NSC-68 
recognized that the United States confronted a power with an ideology antithetical to its 
own.477 On the day Kennedy was assassinated, he was poised to give a speech that held 
the following paragraph which outlined the United States as the primary guarantor of 
Freedom, appealing to religious motives: “We in this country, in this generation are – by 
destiny rather than choice – the watchmen on the walls of world freedom.”478 The Korean 
and Vietnam Wars were likewise initiated to stop communist ideology from spreading. 
President Ronald Reagan subsequently framed the Soviet Union as an evil empire with the 
United States engaged in a “crusade for freedom.” 
Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, this mindset persisted. In the unipolar 
world, the tendency to mesh the ideals of the American Revolution with a defense of realist 
interests remained. “Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq, it is the liberation of Kuwait,” 
President George H.W. Bush declared. In 1991 as the first aerial attacks on Iraq’s military 
infrastructure came under way Bush outlined that the unipolar world beckoned a period 
for advancing the ideals of the American Revolution:
We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future 
generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law 
of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. […] Listen to Hollywood 
Huddleston, Marine lance corporal. He says, “let’s free these people, so we 
can go home and be free again.” And he’s right.479
The realist threat amounted to Saddam Hussein shifting the balance of power in a strategi-
cally important region, yet the justification for the war rested on liberating a sovereign state 
in a new chapter in the liberating tradition of the US. Bush’s rhetoric invoked the memory 
of one of the founding fathers, Thomas Paine, appealing to the similarity of then and now. 
477 “Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historic distribution of power. 
First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have 
interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that 
power increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous 
aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, anti-thetical to our own, and seeks 
to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. ...any substantial further extension 
of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition 
adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled.” Paul Nitze, et al., 
“NSC 68: United States Programs and Objectives for National Security, April 14, 1950,” Naval 
War College Review, vol. 27 (May –June 1975), pp. 51-108.
478 Theodore Sorensen, Let the word go forth: the speech, statements and writing of John F. Kennedy 
1947 to 1963, (New York: Dell, 1988), p. 404-405.
479 George. H.W. Bush, “Address to the Nation,” Washington DC, January 16, 1991.
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He quoted a Marine that Freedom would be served through the war. Furthermore Opera-
tion Desert Storm would show that the United States had an opportunity to mould the 
international system into a new world order based on US power and the advance of US 
values.
George W. Bush made no illusion of his belief in the pursuit of freedom as a funda-
mental American objective: “Our advocacy of human freedom is not a formality of diplo-
macy; it is a fundamental commitment of our country. […]”480 He pledged his allegiance 
to the liberating spirit of the US. Infused by the military power of the United States, Bush 
argued for a stronger promotion of its ideals. In 1999 he said: “American foreign policy 
must be more than the management of crisis. It must have a great and guiding goal: to 
turn this time of American influence into generations of democratic peace.”481 Following 
the attacks of September 11, 2001 direct line was drawn between the struggle against 
terrorism and the major conflicts in history. Islamic terrorism was conceptualized to 
mirror the dominant violent ideologies of the 20th century. The Quadrennial Defense 
Review of 2006 posited that, “victory will come when the enemy’s extremist ideologies are 
discredited in the eyes of their host populations and tacit supporters, becoming unfash-
ionable, and following other discredited creeds, such as Communism and Nazism, into 
oblivion.”482 Islamic terrorism was similar to totalitarianism, Fascism, Nazism or commu-
nism. The National Security Strategy of 2006 declared that all those ideologies had as 
common features that they were characterized by “intolerance, murder, terror, enslave-
ment and repression,” and the United States was its antidote as a “force for good.”483 ‘Jerry’ 
Paul Bremer, the US administrator in Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004, also expressed the 
link between America’s mission in Iraq and these earlier struggles. Speaking at the first 
anniversary of the handover of Iraqi sovereignty, Bremer linked the American mission to 
extend Freedom and the Iraq war: 
When I go around the country I usually make the point that this is going 
to be a tough, long struggle. [But] we didn’t quit in the eighteenth century 
until we turned out the British. We didn’t quit in the nineteenth century 
until we had abolished slavery. We didn’t quit in the twentieth century 
until we chased totalitarianism off the face of Europe, and we’re not going 
to quit in the twenty-first century in the face of these terrorists.484
480 George W. Bush, “Address at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library,” November 19, 1999.
481 Idem.
482 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington 
DC, March 2006, p.21-22.
483 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, 
Washington DC, March 2006, p.3.
484 L. Paul Bremer, quoted in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2007) p. 298.
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President Clinton had similarly invoked the seminal struggle between Freedom and 
tyranny in relation to the embassy-bombings of 1998, “Our battle against terrorism did 
not begin with the bombing of our embassies in Africa nor will it end with today’s strike. 
… This will be a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism; between the rule 
of law and terrorism.”485 In 2007, in the run-up to the democratic primaries presiden-
tial candidate Barack Obama said, “the history of America is one of tragedy turned into 
triumph. And so a war over secession became an opportunity to set the captives free. An 
attack on Pearl Harbor led to a wave of freedom rolling across the Atlantic and Pacific. An 
Iron Curtain was punctured by democratic values, new institutions at home, and strong 
international partnerships abroad. After 9/11, our calling was to write a new chapter in 
the American story.”486 In 1969 Secretary of State Dean Acheson described that he felt 
“the threat to Western Europe [in the guise of expansionist communism] seemed to me 
singularly like that which Islam had posed several centuries before, with its combination of 
ideological zeal and fighting power.”487 With the rise of Islamic terrorism considered a new 
incarnation of the communist threat this statement was coming full circle. 
11.5 Strategic Culture and its impact on 
Transformation
Irrespective of the distribution of power in the international system, the idea of advancing 
Freedom through military power has been mortar and bricks to US strategic culture and 
how it justifies interventionism. The United States has not waged a war without doing so in 
the name of Freedom. US politicians observe and reinforce a historical trend in the moral 
justification of waging war for liberating purposes.488 The United States came into exis-
tence as a result of the American Revolutionary war, a military conflict to liberate British-
Americans from colonial rule. The Civil War and its hundreds of thousands of casualties 
were redeemed by the moral cause of liberating slaves and abolishing slavery. The Spanish-
American war was fought to liberate societies from barbarism. The First World War was 
fought to make Europe free and democratic, the Second World War for the Four Free-
doms. The Cold War was pursued to defend the ‘Free World’, the Gulf War to liberate 
Kuwait and Operation Allied Force to liberate Kosovar-Albanians from Serbian oppres-
sion. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) was declared to liberate the Middle East from 
islamo-facsism and the Iraq War specifically to liberate the Iraqi people and the world 
from Saddam’s tyranny. From 2006 onwards, use of the term ‘Long War’ to describe the 
GWOT framed the challenge against global terrorism as a twilight struggle against the 
forces of barbarism, just as the Second World War had been a “generation’s war.”489 While 
485 William J. Clinton, “Address of the President to the Nation,” Washington DC, August 20, 1998.
486 Barack Obama, “Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center,” Washington DC, August 1, 2007.
487 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 
1969), p. 376.
488 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, Washington DC, October 24, 2006.
489 US Army Chief of Staff Schoomaker said:“This is a fight for the very ideas at the foundation 
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realist concerns dominated to engage in Iraq and Afghanistan, strategic culture played an 
important role to predispose the US to particular routes of action and to mobilize support. 
As the overview above makes clear, all major conflicts in which the United States has been 
involved, it has done so in the name of liberating a group or community and conventional 
warfare was the preferred option. 
Strategic culture reflects the domestic drivers that give context to the objectives for 
which, and how, the military instrument is used. US strategic culture is based on pursuing 
the expansion of American Revolutionary values and is [rimed on the belief that the 
United States is exceptional and should not be subject to the same constraints or held to 
the same standards as other states. Simultaneously it nurtures the notion that the United 
States is capable of achieving absolute security. Doing so requires expanding its domestic 
model abroad, also known as democracy promotion. Exceptionalism has imbued the 
United States with a revolutionary verve. It manifests itself in the assumption that its excep-
tionalist values are universal, asserting that the United States is further ahead of other states 
on this teleological path of history and that it has a unique role to help others adopt these 
universal principles. Democracy promotion thereby becomes not only a way to expand 
the US sphere of influence, but is also an ideologically driven policy on the basis of its 
strategic culture.
Given the connection of US strategic culture to the ideals of the American Revolu-
tion, US interventions are framed as moralist undertakings. As conflicts between Good 
and Evil. Along with the Lockean individualism apparent in US political culture, it has 
contributed to an agency-focused approach to security. Regimes are held responsible for 
state behavior, and regimes can therefore also be held accountable. On the whole, the more 
a regime has an opposite system to the United States, the more it is likely to be considered a 
security threat. US exceptionalism produces the strategic perspective that the use of force 
is at times justified to address security threats and regime change can be realized through 
outside force. This is mirrored by societal acceptance to wage war for the purpose of 
liberation or defeating tyrannical regimes. In general US strategic culture inclines towards 
emphasizing high-intensity combat capabilities and a willingness to use them. Neocon-
servatism in the 1990’s and 2000’s was an extreme expression of this strategic culture. 
Adherents strongly and clearly expressed the tenets described above. However, in varying 
proportions they are consistent throughout US political history and in security policy.490 
of our society, the way of life those ideas enable, and the freedoms we enjoy,” Army Chief of 
Staff Peter Schoomaker & Secretary of the Army R.L. BrownLee, Serving A Nation at War: A 
Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities, 2004.
490 Walter Russell Mead has advanced four foreign policy schools as the framework through 
which to analyze US foreign policy. These four schools operate on regional, economic, social 
and class levels as well as foreign policy. The four schools resonate US strategic culture, as 
they individually reflect specific domestic understandings how to promote US interests. 
Combined they embody the spectrum of strategic culture. The Wilsonian school emphasizes 
the promotion of US values, Hamiltonians pursue a strong international position for the US 
which has led it to embrace its position as guardian of the global commons. The Jacksonian 
school is premised on a strong military to promote the United States and Jeffersonians 
emphasize safeguarding “American destiny and liberty” driven by exceptionalism. 
146 The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally
Under different distributions of power and different political constellation the liberating 
tradition of US power and the usefulness appropriated to military power, is a constant. 
In short, US strategic culture can be encapsulated as facilitating an acceptance of 
warfare to deal with specific actors and liberate a particular group as a means to overcome 
security threats. With regards to transformation, it provides an impetus to sustain military 
superiority in the field of high-intensity warfare. US strategic culture thereby created high-
extractive capacity for pursuing the American strategic objective of sustained dominance. 
What this meant in terms of capability and doctrinal development is the subject of the next 
chapter.
12 US expressions of transformation
The United States developed a transformation strategy in response to shifts in the external 
environment and a set of intervening domestic variables compromising US strategic 
culture. The question is how these system- and domestic-level elements produced the 
elements of US operational effectiveness transformation? 
Transformation in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s was the product of a perfect storm 
bringing together developments in military technology, America’s position as a unipolar 
hegemon and a strategic culture based on an agency-focused approach to security threats, 
belief in the usefulness of military power and its associated technology. The neoconserva-
tive wind that was blowing through Washington fused these elements together to produce 
an adaptive strategy based on sustaining its current dominance in high-intensity combat. 
By the mid-1990’s a central concern was the ability to project power and deal with 
anti-access and area-denial threats.491 Two reports in 1997 detailed how anti-access and 
area-denial threats could be addressed. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile 
Threat to the United States made clear in 1997 that ballistic missile technologies could be 
used as area denial capabilities, challenging America’s ability to project power. The threat 
of being precluded or deterred from reaching specific areas constituted a strategic threat 
to the Pax Americana. Ballistic missile defense was the proposed response. If a functional 
shield were developed, the United States would be less restrained in its foreign policy, able 
to deploy forces irrespective of the location and creating the strategic option to pursue 
foreign policy objectives with greater resolve. While the system was defensive it would 
make interventionism less risky. 
The same year that the ballistic missile report appeared, the report of the National 
Neoconservatives are referred to as a mixture between Wilsonians and Jacksonians. See 
Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and how it changed the 
World, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002), pp 86-98.
491 “To protect our vital national interests we will require strong armed forces, which are 
organized, trained and equipped to fight and win against any adversary at any level of conflict.
[…] To ensure we accomplish these tasks, power projection, enabled by overseas presence, 
will remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future force.” John M. Shalikashvili, Joint 
Vision 2010, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 1995, p. 4.
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Defense Panel Transforming National Defense was published.492 It was an advertisement 
for operational effectiveness transformation to project power focusing on anti-access 
and area-denial threats caused by the spread of advanced technologies. In order to avoid 
the vulnerabilities of a large military footprint, the report recommended the creation of 
“smaller forces with greater lethality supported by leaner logistics.” Forces should operate 
in a dispersed manner, relying on speed, networked and distributed operations, and preci-
sion systems. Power projection would be based around smaller units, a smaller logistics 
footprint and with greater lethality through the use of precision munitions. 493 It was a 
model emphasizing rapid, and decisive expeditionary operations based on smaller forces 
and distributed, network-centric operations.494 
These studies indicated the technology-minded focus of US transformation efforts to 
improve power projection. As the Information Age beckoned, each military service devel-
oped plans to improve the ability of the United States military to project power globally. As 
bureaucratic competition goes, each military service wanted to be most useful to the US 
government. The attacks of September 11 however gave practical momentum to develop 
a military that was able to operate anywhere with greater speed. An overarching model 
became a military that was flexible, surgical and quick, where information would substi-
tute mass and force-size could be reduced. Its hallmarks were speed, precision and light. It 
was a logical extension of rapid, decisive operations but now in the Information Age with 
the overarching strategic emphasis remaining on high-intensity warfighting.
As a generic category Special Operations Forces (SOF) are typically defined by their 
speed, stealth, self-sufficiency and versatility. Since these attributes became key character-
istics along which the US military transformed, and as will be argued in the next pages 
SOF became a distinct model to emulate, I have termed this process ‘SOF-ing’ the military. 
12.1 9/11 and Prevention
While transformation to an Information Age military had been a key concept in the 
late 1990’s the attacks of September 11, 2001 made transformation a central priority. At 
a doctrinal level it led to the adoption of preventive warfare and justified a nearly limit-
less use of the military. The doctrine is a product of a unipolar security environment in 
which the hegemon has a military geared towards rapid decisive expeditionary operations, 
is infused with belief a drive to attain absolute security and strategic dominance, and the 
primary security risk is catastrophic terrorism. Prevention was the pinnacle of strategic 
dominance thinking; no threat would be allowed to come to fruition.
Its roots can be found in the US response to earlier terrorist bombings. In August 
1998 President Clinton launched Operation Infinite Reach, a series of cruise missile 
492 Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st 
Century, Washington DC, December 1997.
493 Ibid, p.33.
494 Other capabilities included: Mine countermeasures, CBRN gear and ballistic missile defense. 
Short and vertical take-off aircraft were necessary as carrier-based power was likely to 
increase in importance due to the vulnerability of points of entry.
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strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in response to the twin-embassy bombings, intent 
on preventing Bin Laden from striking again: 
With compelling evidence that the bin Laden network of terrorist groups 
was planning to mount further attacks against Americans and other 
freedom-loving people, I decided America must act. And so [...] I ordered 
our Armed Forces to take action to counter an immediate threat from the 
bin Laden network.495
Although punishment and deterrence played a role, Clinton’s argumentation above illus-
trates that the motivation to launch Operation Infinite Reach was preventive in nature. It 
also played a central role in his considerations to strike the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant 
in Sudan. As the 9/11 committee details, the factory was targeted to prevent Bin Laden 
from using chemical weapons.496 Substantial effort went into assessing whether Bin Laden 
indeed possessed the deadly VX gas or any of its precursors. One of the opinions venti-
lated in the White House was later echoed by the Bush administration with respect to Iraq; 
striking the pharmaceutical plant in 1998 was deemed necessary to minimize the risk of 
nerve gas being used in New York in two weeks.497 Five years later the argument in favor of 
preventive war against Iraq was to avoid “a smoking gun in the form of a mushroom cloud.” 
Subsequent to Operation Infinite Reach, there was substantial debate over the course of 
action. Top White House counter-terrorism official Richard Clarke put forward an exten-
sive military plan to go after Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. In late 1998, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shelton even put the plan forward to use Special Operations 
Forces to capture Bin Laden. The episode offered the genesis for thinking about answering 
the threat of terrorist groups through preventive war.
Differences between Clinton’s second term policies and Bush’s first-term were 
not intellectual watersheds. Clinton had adopted preventive action against terrorism as 
well as embraced regime change as a policy. In 1998 he had passed the Iraq Liberation 
Act, making it the policy of the United States to “remove the regime of Saddam Hussein” 
and earmarking $99 million to that end. In practice there were significant differences. 
The limited cruise-missile strikes had not proved effective in preventing Al Qaeda from 
plotting further attacks. Instead the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that a terrorist group 
could strike at the financial and political heart of the world’s only superpower. The attacks 
changed the strategic calculus. From that moment, the possibility that a tyrannical regime 
could use a terrorist group as a proxy and strike the United States or hold it to ransom was 
considered unacceptable. What changed after 9/11 is that the two policies were brought 
495 William J. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in 
Afghanistan and Sudan,” August 20, 1998.
496 “The argument for hitting al Shifa [pharmaceutical plant] was that it would lessen the chance 
of Bin Ladin’s having nerve gas for a later attack.” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, (Washington DC, 2004), p.116.
497 Ibid, p. 117.
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together; preventive action became a doctrine to pursue regime change. In addition, while 
Clinton’s preventive action had been limited to risk-free cruise missile strikes, Bush was 
willing to use the full thrust of the US military with hundreds of billions of dollars to be 
spent. 
Following the attacks of September 11, President Bush asked states to make a choice, 
either for the United States or for the terrorists: “We will make no distinction between the 
terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them.” To Bush it was clear 
that a page had been turned, that the strategic context had shifted and the promise of abso-
lute security had receded: 
Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been 
wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have 
known the casualties of war – but not at the center of a great city on a 
peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks – but never 
before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single 
day – a night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under 
attack.498 
The comfort of pursuing a Sonderweg and interacting with the Hobbesian external envi-
ronment at will was shattered. President Bush alluded to this in the wake of the attacks 
stating that, “America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack 
only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.”499 At the 2002 West Point 
Graduation ceremony Bush stated that, “the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. 
We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats 
before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of 
action. And this nation will act.”500 Bush compared terrorism to weeds noting that, “the 
only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and 
destroy it where it grows.”501 It preordained a vigorous military response and agency-based 
focus of the US government.
The strategic impact terrorist proxy groups could have and the existence of anti-
American dictatorships became a threat of strategic import. Preventive warfare dovetailed 
with the quest for absolute security. Vice-President Dick Cheney formulated it as the “one 
percent doctrine.” It held that if there is a one percent chance that a threat will materialize, it 
must be treated as a one-hundred percent certainty. In the run-up to the Iraq War preven-
498 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 
Washington DC, September 20, 2001.
499 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address 2002,” US Capitol, Washington DC, January 29, 
2002. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html.
500 Ibid.
501 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 
September 20, 2001.
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tion was justified under the principle that “the risk of inaction is greater than the risk of 
action.”502 
International law justifies anticipatory self-defense and pre-emptive action in the 
event of an imminent threat.503 However, the United States adopted a policy of preventive 
warfare, whereby action is taken to preclude the materialization of a challenge.504 Because a 
materialized threat is considered so severe, it is considered unacceptable. The White House 
said that deterrence is therefore not an option against terrorists; “If we wait for threats to 
fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”505 
The attacks of 9/11 gave the White House far-reaching powers to wage military 
campaigns to prevent terrorism against the United States. Its legal basis was provided by 
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, John Yoo. Yoo reasoned that the Presi-
dent had constitutional powers “both to retaliate for those [9/11] attacks and to prevent 
and deter future assaults on the Nation.” The legal opinion stated that, “Military actions 
need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states that participated in the attacks 
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: the Constitution vests the President with 
502 In preparation to the Iraq War Vice-President Dick Cheney made the gravity of the Iraqi 
security threat clear as he perceived it :“Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein 
now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against 
our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive 
regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors …Ladies 
and gentlemen, there is no basis in Saddam Hussein’s conduct or history to discount any of 
the concerns that I am raising this morning. We are, after all, dealing with the same dictator 
who shoots at American and British pilots in the no-fly zone, on a regular basis, the same 
dictator who dispatched a team of assassins to murder former President Bush as he traveled 
abroad, the same dictator who invaded Iran and Kuwait, and has fired ballistic missiles at Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and Israel, the same dictator who has been on the State Department’s list of 
state sponsors of terrorism for the better part of two decades…Deliverable weapons of mass 
destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working 
together, constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined. The risks of inaction are far greater 
than the risk of action…Some concede that Saddam is evil, power-hungry, and a menace 
-- but that, until he crosses the threshold of actually possessing nuclear weapons, we should 
rule out any preemptive action. That logic seems to me to be deeply flawed.”Richard Cheney, 
“Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention,” 
Nashville, August 26, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.
html. Accessed April 30, 2008.
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Government Printing Office, 1934) available at The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp. For a discussion on the tradition of preemptive use of force 
and international law see Anthony Clark Arend, “International Law and the Preemptive Use 
of Force,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no.2 (Spring 2003) p. 89-103; Rachel Bzostek, 
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504 See also Francois Heisbourg, “A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences,” 
The Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no.2 (Spring 2003), pp. 75-88.
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the power to strike terrorist groups or organizations that cannot be demonstrably linked 
to the September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar threat to the security 
of the United States and the lives of its people, whether at home or overseas.”506 The legal 
opinion gave the Executive the right to intervene when and where it pleased on the basis of 
the possibility that a threat was gathering. 
The Iraq War was the first major expression of this policy. President Bush stated, 
“Prior to September 11 however, a president could see a threat and contain or deal with 
it in a variety of ways without fear of that threat materializing on our own soil.”507 After 
9/11 “Saddam’s capacity to create harm, all his terrible features became much more threat-
ening.” It was amplified by Colin Powell’s claim during his speech at the United Nations on 
February 5, 2003, that “leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruc-
tion for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.” 
That Iraq was a target made sense from the perspective that Iraq, as Bush recalled, “gathers 
the most serious dangers of our age in one place” and that “the danger is already signifi-
cant and it only grows worse over time.”508 The nature of the Iraqi threat had both realist 
and ideological grounds. Weapons of Mass Destruction, rogue states and terrorism, the 
three major threats identified in the 1993 Bottom Up Review had collected in the regime 
of Saddam Hussein. Policymakers justified the Iraq war on the basis of his possession of 
weapons of mass destruction: “It was the one reason everyone could agree on.”509 Yet, there 
was also a strong notion of democracy promotion and liberating Iraqis from an oppressive 
regime in the initial argument for war.510 In September 2002, making the case against Iraq 
to the UN General Assembly, Bush said that “the purposes of the United States should not 
be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced … And a regime that has 
lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.”511 The character of Saddam’s regime posed a 
threat. During his second inaugural commencement address in 2005 Bush extended the 
warning to other ‘rogue’ regimes:
506 John C. Yoo, “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations 
against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them,” Office of the Attorney General, Washington 
DC, September 25, 2001.
507 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 12.
508 George W. Bush, “Speaking in the Grand Rotunda,” Cincinnati, October 7, 2002.
509 Paul Wolfowitz in “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus,” Vanity Fair, 
May 9, 2003. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594.
510 When weapons of mass destruction were not found following the war the public justification 
almost entirely became focused on regime change and the promotion of freedom and 
democracy.
511 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” New York, September 
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The rulers of outlaw regimes can know that we still believe as Abraham 
Lincoln did: Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves; 
and, under the rule of a just God, cannot long retain it.512
The attacks did not change the content of transformation, it did make its program more 
urgent. In the following pages, it is described how this dynamic produced the transforma-
tion efforts of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
12.2 SOF-ing the Army
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was primarily concerned with changing the US 
Army. He challenged the Army’s emphasis on heavy mechanized maneuver units and its 
doctrinal focus on refighting Operation Desert Storm.513 Influenced by the promises of 
the Information Age, Rumsfeld did not deny that the Army should focus on high-intensity 
conventional war, but rather that it could do so more effectively by substituting mass for 
information. Smaller forces would improve deployability, reducing the vulnerability of 
large concentrations and decrease the overall risk of anti-access and area-denial threats. In 
short, it would enhance the Executive’s ability to wield the military instrument in a time 
when elements of the guided munitions revolution were being emulated by countries like 
Iran and North Korea. By decreasing the size of the force, it created cost-benefits as well. 
Added to this were the advances in precision. According to Rumsfeld, “the use of preci-
sion weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the opera-
tional footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.”514 It would turn 
the US into an expeditionary power able to confront both state and non-state actors. 
Neither was this thinking entirely new. Flexibility, mobility and speed have always 
been an objective of the US military and new technology was always introduced to push 
this further. With the first inklings of the guided munitions revolution apparent in the 
1950’s, General Westmoreland alluded to the ability of the new technology to produce 
a qualitatively different military. In a note of historical significance, the shift to a rapid, 
nimble, and mobile force has been at the basis of US Army’s change throughout contem-
porary history. In 1957 Westmoreland spoke of the necessity to develop lighter more agile 
forces to become more expeditionary in words that were eerily reminiscent of the debates 
in the 2000’s: 
Our Army is perhaps now in the most important period in its history. It is 
in a period of transition never before known in the history of arms. If the 
Army is to [continue to] play as important role in the service of our country 
as it has in the past, it is essential that we capitalize on technology and 
512 George W. Bush, “Inaugural Speech,” Washington DC, January 20, 2005 http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html. Accessed January 22, 2007.
513 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, (October 1993).
514 Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in R. Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: the untold story of America’s 
anti-terrorist commander, (Washington DC: Regnery, 2004), p. 164.
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scientific advances. We must exploit strategic mobility by emphasizing light 
and compact equipment that will be easily transportable. We must exploit 
Army aviation and battlefield mobility while at the same time ensuring the 
ability of our infantry to […] fight at the end of the trail. We must exploit 
electronic technology, capitalizing on better communications and the 
practical use of target acquisition devices. […] That is a big order. However, 
we should achieve a truly revolutionary type of Army – an Army that can 
gain and retain the initiative in any type of military situation.515
It underlined the continuous nature underlying America’s approach to transformation.
12.2.1 Go be more Like Them!
Deployability has been a key concern for the Army during the 1990’s. It was made partic-
ularly apparent through the experience with Task Force Hawk in 1999. The Task Force 
was the Army’s deployment of Apache helicopters in support of operations in Kosovo. 
Deemed necessary for dealing with Serbian armor, the helicopters were requested by 
General Wesley Clark forty-eight hours after the start of the operation in March 1999 yet 
it would take more than three weeks before they were deployed. Because Army planners 
were concerned with the risk to the pilots, the operational plan was based around using 
MLRS heavy artillery systems to ‘prepare’ the battlefield prior to deploying the Apaches 
while having several Abrams tanks as back-up. It meant that more than 5000 forces were 
required to support and protect a contingent of twenty-four Apache helicopters.516 The 
large footprint implied long deployment times and high costs. The total cost of the deploy-
ment amounted to roughly a quarter of the entire cost of the military operation. In the end 
the helicopters were never used in combat.517 The MLRS artillery systems could not be 
used because of their inaccuracy and the associated risk of substantial collateral damage. 
The Apaches could not be used because expected loss rates per sortie were 5% as a result 
of their vulnerability to small arms fire, opposed to the significantly lower risk estimate 
for fixed-wing aircraft dropping ordnance from 15,000 feet.518 Finally, neither could the 
tanks be used because Army engineers estimated that the muddy and mountainous terrain 
515 General William C. Westmoreland speaking at a conference of senior Army commanders in 
1957. Quoted in Benjamin Schreer (ed.), Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation, 
SWP Berlin, June 2005, p. 11.
516 See also Ivo Daalder & Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: Nato’s War to Save Kosovo, 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
517 John Gordon IV, et al., “The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk,” Joint Forces 
Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 2001-02), p. 55.
518 A further argument offered by Admiral Bill Owens is that there was substantial confusion 
in the planning cycle because the Apache had been developed as a complement to the 
deployment of ground troops in maneuver campaigns, not to operate without boots on the 
ground together with the force. As General Bob Gaskin said “No one has ever seriously 
envisioned including Army aviation in to a theatre strategic air campaign …Everybody trains, 
organizes, and equips to their service doctrine.” Owens (2000), p. 199.
154 The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally
would require extensive engineering to make bridges and roads accessible for the 68 ton 
tanks. The episode drew the usability of Army assets into question for rapid, power projec-
tion operations. 
Several months before 9/11 Secretary Rumsfeld proposed to decrease the size of 
the Army and substitute mass for information. The Army’s heavy but hard-to-deploy 
systems would have to go. Rumsfeld reasoned that the Army could compensate for the 
loss of armor by introducing network-centric systems, new weapons systems and oper-
ating jointly.519 Reluctant to give up the source of their bureaucratic power, the Army brass 
proved unwilling to move. Because Rumsfeld was not getting traction with the Army brass, 
by the summer of 2001 the media was reporting the failure of his transformation plans.520 
The attacks of 9/11 increased momentum to make the Army more nimble, flexible 
and rapidly deployable. Preventing catastrophic terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors 
required a military that could operate with speed, stealth and surgical precision with a 
strong emphasis on intelligence capabilities and Special Operations Forces. Small groups 
of terrorists could not be fought by large mechanized divisions, instead smaller units 
would be required that could operate quickly, silently and deadly. 
On September 12, 2001 the White House considered responses to the terrorist 
attacks. A discussion ensued whether the CIA or the armed forces would be the most suit-
able instrument to respond in Afghanistan.521 Rumsfeld tasked the Army’s leadership to 
provide options for rapid operations against Al Qaeda. Yet the Army’s war plans all relied 
on lengthy troop build-ups. The CIA by contrast had a plan lying on the shelf and with the 
help of several Special Operations Forces and Air Force capabilities they started Operation 
Enduring Freedom. During the first stage of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army was 
put on the sidelines. Rumsfeld’s concern was that without enhancing the Army’s power 
projection capabilities it would not be usable in the short-notice operations of the new 
security environment. Three weeks after the 9/11 attacks Rumsfeld sent one of his ubiqui-
tous short memos - quaintly called “snowflakes” - to his senior military leadership entitled 
What Will Be The Military Role in the War on Terrorism in which he stated that there 
was something “fundamentally wrong” with the Pentagon for not being able to produce 
a plan for the president.522 While Rumsfeld’s memo addressed the military at large, the 
focus was on ‘boots on the ground’, the Army. In the memo Rumsfeld hypothesized that 
the department had become risk-averse throughout the Clinton administration. He was 
determined to increase the extractive capacity of Army for the foreign policy executive. 
He elaborated his vision in a Foreign Affairs article published in response to the fall of the 
Taliban.523 The article reads as Rumsfeld’s blueprint for Army transformation. It detailed a 
519 Tom Bowman, “Pentagon to Consider Large-Scale Troop Cuts,” Baltimore Sun, July 10, 2001.
520 Thomas E. Ricks, “For Rumsfeld, Many Roadblocks,” Washington Post, August 7, 2001.
521 Bob Woodward, State of Denial, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 77 – 78. See also Bob 
Woodward, Plan of Attack, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 35.
522 Douglas Feith, War and Decision (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 112-113.
523 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/ June 
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greater reliance on SOF and the ability to connect different platforms together, citing the 
example of Special Forces being able to call in B-52 air-strikes to provide overwhelming 
force with a minimal footprint. “What won the battle for Mazar-i-Sharif, he wrote:
…and set in motion the Taliban’s fall from power -- was a combination of 
the ingenuity of U.S. Special Forces; the most advanced, precision-guided 
munitions in the US arsenal, delivered by US Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps crews; and the courage of valiant, one-legged Afghan fighters on 
horseback.524 
The service notably absent in this list was the US Army. The war in Afghanistan demon-
strated the value of SOF with precision air and naval support and proved to Rumsfeld 
the value of a smaller, leaner, and precise force. Five years later, Rumsfeld created Special 
Operations Command, a military command overseeing all SOF activities, tasked to plan 
and synchronize all operations of the Global War on Terrorism. It was the most explicit 
expression that SOF-ing had the future. The strategist Thomas Barnett wrote that: “Rums-
feld not only transformed the role of Special Operations Command, he designated it as an 
agent of change within the US military, saying to the rest of the armed forces: Go be more 
like them!”525 He furthermore substantially increased Special Operations Forces capabili-
ties.526 Special Operations Forces became the template of capabilities Rumsfeld wanted to 
grow in the Army: rapidly deployable small-sized units, able to operate anywhere under 
diverse circumstances, combining stealthiness with the ability to achieve precise results 
while operating as an integral element of the joint force. 
To accentuate his point, Rumsfeld decided to challenge the heaviest and least deploy-
able weapons program in the Army’s inventory. Referring to transformation imperatives, 
in the spring of 2002 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld cancelled the Crusader artillery tube. 
Explaining his decision in a newspaper op-ed, he said: 
2002), pp. 20-32.
524 Ibid, p. 21.
525 Thomas P.M. Barnett, “Old Man in a Hurry,” Esquire Magazine, July 1, 2005.
526 From 2001 to 2006, expenditures for Special Operations Command (SOCOM) soared. 
Excluding supplemental war-time funding, procurement funding nearly doubled (93% 
increase) and operations and maintenance costs increased with nearly 75%. The 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review stated that since 2001 Special Operations Forces had an 81% 
increase in the baseline budget. In FY2004, SOCOM received a 50% increase in funding and 
an increase in manpower with 1890 billets. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for 
a one-third increase in Special Forces battalions and a 15% increase of Special Operations 
Forces personnel expecting to grow with a total of 5575 billets by FY2008. Skills common 
among Special Operations Forces such as civil affairs and Psychological Operations would 
be expanded by a third. See also Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 
Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006.
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The decision to recommend its termination is based on our assessment that 
we must forgo a system originally designed for a different strategic context 
to make room for more promising technologies that can accelerate the 
transformation of future warfare on terms the United States must dictate.527 
Network-centric warfare did not mesh with the 110 ton artillery system. Even though 
the Crusader promised to shoot rounds faster, further and with greater accuracy than 
any system before, deployability gave the breakthrough. After all, precision could also be 
supplied by the joint alternative of close air support and the Air Force’s precision muni-
tions. Congress however was difficult to convince of the rationale of Rumsfeld’s decision. 
There were vested interests related to the Crusader, in particular among those congressmen 
representing Oklahoma where the $11 billion Crusader was to be assembled. A power 
struggle between the Pentagon and Congress ensued with Congress keeping parts of the 
program alive.528
That Donald Rumsfeld pushed SOF-ing in the Army also became apparent when he 
brought back General Peter Schoomaker from retirement to be the Army Chief of Staff in 
2003. Schoomaker had been a four-star general commanding the Army’s Special Opera-
tions Forces and shared Rumsfeld’s belief that the Army needed to change. Importantly, he 
was not from the current line of command. Rather he was an outsider with insider expe-
rience. According to Bob Woodward, Schoomaker wanted to recreate “the Army in the 
image of the Special Force – smaller, self-contained units that could deploy rapidly into 
any situation.”529
12.2.2 The Future Combat Systems: needing only one third
Referring to Operation Enduring Freedom Rumsfeld said in 2002: “the world has stood 
by in some amazement at the effectiveness of precision munitions in Afghanistan. There 
is no reason we cannot apply that technology to the Army’s land warfare capabilities.”530 
George W. Bush had outlined similar principles of US operational effectiveness trans-
formation in 1999: “On land, our heavy forces must be lighter, he said. “Our light forces 
must be more lethal. All must be easier to deploy. And these forces must be organized in 
smaller, more agile formations, rather than cumbersome divisions.”531 He was referring to 
527 Donald Rumsfeld, “A Choice to Transform the Military,” Washington Post, May 16, 2002, p. 
A25.
528 United States Congress, Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental, 2002,: “The Army’s 
deficiency in heavy artillery capability cannot continue to be deferred irrespective of the 
development of precision guided munitions. The gap left by the termination of the Crusader 
artillery system must be filled. The conferees believe it is imperative that the Army accelerate 
its plan to develop a next generation artillery cannon for the Objective Force to take full 
advantage of the $2 billion investment in state-of-the-art artillery technology developed 
under the Crusader program.”
529 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p. 124-125.
530 Donald Rumsfeld, “A Choice to the Transform the Military,” Washington Post, May 16, 2002.
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the Future Combat Systems (FCS). The defense analyst Michael O’Hanlon writes that with 
the FCS “the Army has come closest to following the rhetorical exhortations of George 
W. Bush… to ‘skip a generation’ of weaponry and hasten development of more futuristic 
technologies.”532 FCS is also the implementation of a transformation policy focused on 
rapid, decisive power projection in the Information Age. Derived from the Army After 
Next program in 1994, FCS was designed to meet anti-access and area-denial threats, and 
scale the strategy of technology ladder to “hedge against the possibility that a large, techno-
logically adept country may gain the ability to disrupt or negate US military advantages.”533 
FCS was pushing technology to the next level for fear that otherwise the adversary would 
achieve par by emulating US strengths. It thus reflected the ‘strategy of technology.’ FCS 
amounted to an entire force structure explicitly directed at waging high-intensity opera-
tions more rapid and more decisively by being built around Information Age technologies. 
In total it consisted of a completely new family of 14 individual platforms and sensors, 
from unmanned helicopters to non-line-of-sight precision artillery tubes to technologies 
for the individual soldier.
The Future Combat Systems was drawn up in the early 2000’s to create tactical, 
operational and strategic advantages for the Army. Operationally, FCS was designed to 
meet the anti-access and area-denial threats which could impede the slow and month-
long build-ups heavy divisions suffered from. The major maneuver units were developed 
with a weight limit in mind so that they could be transportable by C-130 tactical trans-
port aircraft. It meant making the main platform half as light as its predecessor, the 68-ton 
M1A2 main battle tank. It would enable the Army to achieve “operational maneuver over 
strategic distances.” This implied not being dependent on single, large and predictable 
points of disembarkation or on long and vulnerable logistics lines. Using multiple points 
of entry would avoid reliance on major ports, increase operational tempo as forces would 
deploy on arrival and avoid the threat of ballistic missile attacks such as occurred during 
the Gulf War. In order to be light, weight in terms of passive armor had to be sacrificed. 
Instead FCS would rely on speed and guile to avoid enemy fire rather than have the capa-
bility to sustain it passively, like the armor plating of the M1A2 tanks. Tactically, the back-
bone of the force was the information and decision superiority espoused in Joint Vision 
2010, substituting size and armor for information, outsmarting the enemy rather than 
outfighting it. O’Hanlon said FCS “will depend for its survival largely on not being shot 
at.”534 The ranking minority member in the Congressional committee responsible for polit-
ical oversight of the project said in 2003: 
The Army believes that non-traditional fighting tactics coupled with 
an extensive information network will compensate for the loss of size 
532 Michael O’Hanlon, Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era, (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2005), p. 88.
533 US Army Logistics Management College, Why Future Combat Systems, July 2006. http://www.
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534 O’Hanlon (2005), p. 89.
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and armor mass by utilizing information superiority and synchronized 
operations to see, engage, and destroy the enemy before the enemy detects 
the future forces.535 
As a standard it would increase fighting power by a factor of three. The Government 
Accountability Office observed that “each [FCS] unit is to be a rapidly deployable fighting 
organization about the size of a current Army brigade but with the combat power and 
lethality of the current larger division.”536 The FCS concept was infused with thinking in 
terms of the shift away from the Industrial age, which relied on quantity, rigidity and mass, 
to the Information Age, which would rely on speed, agility, and adaptivity. If successful, it 
would be a remarkable improvement since it would mean that either the Army could be 
one-third its current size, or with the same amount of forces but with the multiplier effect 
of technology, the United States Army would have three times the power. Brigades could 
offer the firepower of divisions, greatly increasing deployability.
On paper it would be a tremendous improvement in resource extraction and opera-
tional effectiveness. At the strategic level FCS meant that objectives could be reached in 
a shorter time span with fewer forces, or perhaps even overwhelm the enemy into not 
fighting at all. By not being dependent on specific points of entry it enhanced American 
strategic freedom. Relying on extensive diplomacy to get access to ports or staging bases 
would be unnecessary. Because the distance from which the US Army could deploy was so 
much larger, anti-access threats would also be negated. 
As a necessary step to pursue Army transformation, the QDR in 2006 also shifted 
the Army to a modular brigade-sized force. Rumsfeld initiated a change in the Army’s 
force structure from the division to the brigade. Army active force structure changed 
from ten divisions with three brigades to forty-three Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The 
modularization of the force also meant the Army could deploy smaller structures without 
compromising readiness, thereby tailoring size to the mission and offering flexibility in 
force planning since the brigade-sized building blocks could operate independently of 
one another.537 In fact, the Army’s Transformation Roadmap clarified: “the decisive effort 
of Army transformation is the creation of modular, combined arms maneuver brigade 
combat teams […].”538
FCS implemented the American belief that strategic dominance was pendant on 
power projection for rapid, decisive operations in high-intensity combat, especially major 
theatre war. Overwhelming the adversary through multiple entry points, dispersed and 
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537 Anne Plummer & John M. Donnely, “Shaping a Modern Fighting Force,” Congressional 
Quarterly, February 28, 2005.
538 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army Operations, Army Transformation Office, 
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concurrent operations, the enemy would be shocked and awed. The Future Combat 
Systems was the pinnacle of operational effectiveness transformation thinking. It also 
offered the logical next step over AirLand battle. While the latter had pioneered deep-
strike in order to make the battle non-linear, FCS was moving beyond the dependence 
on predictable points of entry FCS and would conduct concurrent distributed operations 
directed at the adversary’s center of gravity.
12.2.3 Critics of the FCS
The idea of FCS worked on paper but it still needed to be realized. In 2005 Army Chief of 
Staff Schoomaker assessed the program’s success at only 28%.539 Criticism was directed at 
its technical, tactical, operational, strategic and financial dimensions. Fourteen different 
next-generation platforms needed to be developed within a timeline of 9.5 years between 
concept development and production. It led to questions regarding its technical feasibility. 
A Government Accountability Office report observed that each individual system was 
as complex as fighter aircraft, and the standard for producing one single platform now 
applied to a complete family of platforms.540 As a consequence, in April 2005 the Congres-
sional Research Service stated that the FCS was both “at the heart of the Army’s trans-
formation efforts” but simultaneously “a high-risk venture.” At the tactical level, there was 
concern over its reliance on active defense; substituting speed and information for mass 
and armor. It risked producing a force too light for conflict against heavy forces but too 
slow to fight light infantry forces. Even in rapid, decisive operations the ability to maneuver 
around enemy fire and engage from distance was questioned. During the combat phase of 
Iraqi Freedom the maximum engagement range had usually been less than 200 meters, 
yielding preference to passive armor.541 As a remedy FCS assumed perfect situational 
awareness and “dominant battlespace awareness,” on both friendly and adversarial forces. 
This remained an unproven assumption. It also did not give the opponent a vote in the 
fight, a fallacy Millennium Challenge 2002 had made clear. Operationally, the principle 
of “operational maneuver over strategic distances” was doubted. Simply, the FCS vehicles 
were too big. The Stryker vehicle, the predecessor to the FCS vehicles, could not be trans-
ported fully outfitted in a C-130. The full configuration of the vehicle made it incapable 
of entering the aircraft.542 Using larger aircraft however, would undermine the cost- and 
time-efficiencies to negate A2/AD threats.543 Furthermore, a principle source of criticism 
539 Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Future Combat System: Background and Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, April 28, 2005, p.10.
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was related to the understanding of the strategic environment. Substituting armor and 
passive defense for superior information and speed was only suitable in a conventional 
high-intensity conflict. For instance in Mogadishu 1993, US forces had had no armor 
and suffered sufficient casualties when they were confronted with close quarters urban 
conflict, small-arms fire and RPGs. It led President Clinton to decide to withdraw. That 
type of conflict returned in Iraq, particularly during the 2004 Battle for Fallujah, where 
the heavy armored Abrams tanks proved useful.544 From its outset, FCS favored high-tech, 
high-speed war primarily applicable in the event of war with Iran, North Korea or a replay 
with Iraq.545 It was designed to skip a generation of technology to perform those operations 
better. It was developed on the assumption, prevalent in the 1990’s, that a major regional 
conflict formed the principle strategic challenge. FCS had been tailored to excel in opera-
tions at the high-end of the conflict spectrum, the question was whether those operations 
would still come to pass. Finally, the cost increases weighed heavily. FCS devoured most of 
the Army’s research budget: 16.5% in 2004; 27.1% in 2005; 28.5% in 2006; 31.5% in 2007 
and 28.5% of the Army’s research budget in 2008.546 The original plan was to realize FCS 
for the entire Army by 2014. Procuring FCS for one-third of the force was expected to cost 
as much as $157 billion, excluding roughly $25 billion for the networking infrastructure 
allowing the different elements to communicate.547 The question was whether the high 
claim the FCS put on the Army budget was justified in light of the concerns mentioned 
above. 
12.3 Air Force Transformation 
FCS had been the Army’s answer to achieve rapid dominance along network-centric prin-
ciples. It was similarly addressed by the Air Force. Operational effectiveness transformation 
emphasized precision and speed. In 2004, the US Air Force published its interpretation of 
transformation in the Transformation Flight Plan. “Before long,” its authors write, “Joint 
Force Commanders will be able to select the precise target necessary to achieve desired 
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545 Peter A. Wilson, John Gordon IV and David E Johnson, “An Alternative Future Force; 
Building a Better Army,” Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly (Winter 2003-2004), pp. 
19-39.
546 Another potential risk to cost has been the use of a lead systems integrator which has made 
oversight by the services difficult and increasing the likelihood of cost-growth. A similar 
situation occurred with the Coast Guard’s Deepwater and the Navy’s Littoral Combat 
Ship. See for instance, Ronald O’Rourke, “Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs: 
Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, Washington DC, updated June 5, 2008 and “Navy Littoral Combat Ship: 
Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, Washington DC, updated May 23, 2008.
547 For figures see Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Future Combat System: Background and Issues 
for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, April 
28, 2005.
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effects and focus on the quality, rather than the quantity, of targets attacked.”548 It was an 
extension of the guided munitions revolution and portrayed a complete reliance on supe-
rior military technology. Realizing information superiority through building a systems-
of-systems network of all aerial and space systems would lead to “predictive battlespace 
awareness,” not only discerning where the enemy is but also predicting his actions. This 
would allow optimized System Warfare and effects-based operations: 
[The Air Force] will be able to identify an adversary’s key centers of gravity 
and relay that information to combat forces in near real-time to attack and 
destroy the centers of gravity in the particular sequence that will be most 
devastating to the adversary.549
It echoed many of the concepts found with the Army’s Future Combat System illustrating 
the common understanding within US transformation policy. Technological improve-
ments in the US would make the enemy fight “blind, deaf and dumb” making them easy 
targets. Rather than overwhelming force, through ultimate precision it could produce 
overwhelming influence. The precision revolution would also lead to the development of 
a global precision strike capability, enabling the service to target anything on earth within 
45 minutes. According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review prompt global strike 
would form the basis for deterrence, help against homeland security threats and “shape the 
choices of states at strategic crossroads”.550 The Air Force had an adversarial, force-on-force 
perspective with a focus on using technology to achieve victory in high intensity opera-
tions. Emphasizing the superiority of airpower, the document exuded the impression that 
the Air Force was capable of fighting and winning any conflict by itself through superior 
technology and harnessing the information revolution. 
12.4  Naval Transformation
12.4.1 Sea-basing
Naval transformation was based on increasing the reach of the military and negating anti-
access and area-denial threats, much like the Army’s FCS program. The Naval Transfor-
mation Roadmap embraced the service’s desire to enhance power projection from sea, 
supporting ground forces by exploiting America’s Command of the Commons.551 It was 
captured in the concept of sea-basing which formed the core of the Navy’s interpretation 
of transformation. The Roadmap outlined:
548 United States Air Force, The US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, Washington DC, 
November 2003, p.51.
549 Idem.
550 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington 
DC, March 2006, p.46.
551 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: the military foundation of US Hegemony,” 
International Security, vol. 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46.
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While the Navy-Marine corps Team is expanding the entire array of naval 
capabilities we provide the Nation, our transformation is centered upon the 
development of Sea-basing: the concepts and capabilities that exploit our 
command of the sea to project, protect, and sustain integrated warfighting 
capabilities from the maritime domain.552 
The concept of sea-basing is based on increased strategic freedom of action for the United 
States, much like FCS and the Air Force’s global strike capability. Regardless of political 
constraints, it would enable the US to deploy power, negating A2/AD threats. It appealed 
to tenets of US strategic culture first formulated in Washington’s Farewell address and 
the desire to avoid entangling alliances, but nevertheless wanting to shape the security 
environment. “Command of the commons” created the opportunity to exploit strategic 
freedom of action from the sea and increase resource extraction of the Navy, making it 
more usable to sustain dominance. Key to sea-basing was removing strategic dependen-
cies to project military power and - as the 2007 Maritime Strategy outlined - to main-
tain “global freedom of action.”553 Sea-basing had a political, military and bureaucratic 
logic. From the Navy’s bureaucratic viewpoint, sea-basing would give the service a domi-
nant role in any expeditionary operation for it would be the central platform from which 
land operations would deploy and be commanded. From an operational perspective, it 
envisaged further exploiting one of America’s greatest asymmetric advantages, namely 
the control of the sea. Sea-basing was the next step in making the Navy’s carrier strike 
groups the central node of American power projection. Additionally it made sense from 
the perspective of force protection by minimizing the vulnerability to short-to-medium 
range missile attacks as opposed to a static base on land. Most importantly, at the level of 
grand strategy it would make the United States less dependent on diplomacy to project 
power. The National Defense Panel in 1997 had alluded to the possibility that crucial allies 
- on which US power projection depended - could be blackmailed precluding using access 
to a theatre.554 The US could avoid such strategic access-preclusion by extending security-
guarantees to these allies or developing an alternative for the deployment of forces. Sea-
basing provided such an alternative and would, “minimize limitations imposed by reliance 
on overseas shore-based support, and enable the transformed joint force to exploit our 
Nation’s asymmetric advantage in the seaspace.”555 
552 Gordon R. England, Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003, Department of the Navy, 2003, p.1. 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/transformation/trans-toc.html.
553 James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, Thad Allen, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, October 2007.
554 Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st 
Century, Washington DC, December 1997, p.13.
555 Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003, p. 2.
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12.4.2 The Marine Corps: More expeditionary than the Army
As the Navy’s infantry force, the Marine Corps similarly focused on anti-access 
and area-denial threats in its transformation policy, forming the ground component of 
the Navy’s sea-basing concept. In its principal strategic-level document Marine Corps 
Strategy 21, it stated categorically that the service was “less encumbered by the political 
constraints often encountered by forces tied to land-based infrastructure.”556 It did not 
suffer from the same constraints as the Army and instead, “the only invitation we [US 
Marine Corps] require to move to a crisis area is a request from the geographic combatant 
commander and an order from the National Command Authorities.” Three years later, in 
the run-up to the Iraq War, this issue would receive new urgency as the Turkish parliament 
denied the 4th Infantry Division access to its territory in order to open a Northern front 
in the war in 2003, highlighting the vulnerability of the US Army to political sways of key 
host nations. 
12.5 The Hey-Day of Transformation: Towards the QDR 
2006
Increasing power projection also required addressing the military’s focus on the two-war 
planning construct. Secretary Rumsfeld took this up in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review and revised the United States’ political-strategic ambition. It would at any one time 
defend the homeland, have a deterrent forward presence in four theatres (Europe, Taiwan 
straits, Korea and the Middle East), have the capability to swiftly defeat attacks in two 
theatres with overlapping time frames and defeat the adversary decisively in one of two.557 
The attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that homeland security had been grossly neglected 
throughout the 1990’s. US superiority in conventional warfare and emphasis on power 
projection had driven adversaries to seek out and exploit asymmetries amongst others by 
attacking the US homeland and its citizens directly.558 The rear had been left undefended. 
Most operational plans also relied on large concentrations of American forces and long 
build-ups. For instance the only Iraq war plan that existed in the mid-90’s was a replay 
of Desert Storm: Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait again, and after a build-up of several 
months 500,000 US forces are tasked to liberate the country. Rumsfeld had shouted: “that 
is insane, that is crazy, either it’s world peace or it’s World War III. Either the switch is on 
or off.”559 If the Army was to be more SOF-like, it would need to have a more flexible plan-
ning construct. 
That the overarching emphasis remained on high-intensity warfighting was apparent 
when in 2003, following the Quadrennial Defense Review, new Joint Swiftness Goals 
556 Headquarters of the United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Strategy 21, Department of 
the Navy, Washington DC, November 3, 2000, p.4.
557 “Swiftly defeat” implied countering attacks to re-establish the status quo whereas “defeat 
decisively” implied regime change.
558 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, p. 14.
559 Woodward (2004), p. 35.
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were formulated detailing the deployment guidelines for the Army. The Goals stipulated 
a “10-30-30” guideline outlining how the two overlapping “swiftly defeat” operations were 
phased. Army doctrine declared a “10 day goal to seize the initiative” and a “30 day goal 
to defeat the enemy and be prepared for redeployment to a near-simultaneous conflict 
(within the second 30 days).”560 It was a shift from Operation Desert Storm’s half-year 
build-up and it institutionalized rapid, decisive operations and ‘shock and awe’-thinking. 
It was also conform the adversarial-focused emphasis on fast-in, fast-out operations. The 
US military would dazzle an opponent, confirming American strategic dominance. The 
Goals offered proof of the drive to wage wars with greater efficiency and speed. They also 
show little consideration for the stabilization phase of an operation. The devotion to speed 
before, during and after an intervention conveyed faith in American military superiority 
and that such brief wars could achieve favorable political objectives by taking out the ‘bad 
guys.’ 
By mid-2003, statues of Saddam Hussein had been toppled and the US had 
conquered Baghdad in an armored assault that was smaller and faster than critics had 
considered possible. It was the heyday for Rumsfeld’s vision of smaller, lighter more agile 
forces. The war had vindicated his views on SOF-ing the military. Besides operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Global War on Terrorism involved operating around the world 
to perform pinprick counter-terrorism operations in places like the Horn of Africa, the 
Philippines and Yemen. It became known as ‘the Long War.’ Dealing with the threat of 
non-state actors also required more Special Operations Forces, able to pursue terrorists 
around the world. In 2006 the Pentagon published its new Quadrennial Defense Review. 
It breathed transformation. In the 113-page document transformation, or grammatical 
variants thereof, appeared in 79 instances. Rumsfeld wrote: “Technological advances, 
including dramatic improvements in information management and precisions weaponry, 
have allowed our military to generate considerably more combat capability with the same 
or, in some cases, fewer numbers of weapons platforms and with lower levels of manning.” 
The objective was to create forces that would “surge quickly to trouble spots across the 
globe.”561 It was the military-strategic culmination of operational effectiveness transforma-
tion. The QDR 2006 also removed planning further away from the two major regional 
wars and instead geared the military to performing continuous operations around the 
globe (see figure 10).
560 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The United States Army Functional 
Concept for MOVE 1015-2024 version 1.0, TRADOC pamphlet 525-36, Department of the 
Army, April 30, 2007, p.18  http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-3-6.doc.
561 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington 
DC, March 2006, p.v.




Strategic deterrence, North American air 
and maritime defense, missile defense
Consequence management of 
catastrophic event
War on Terror
Globally distributed irregular operations, 
long-duration counterinsurgency, forward 
presence 
One large-scale, potentially long 
duration irregular warfare operation 
with counterinsurgency and stabilization. 
Scale comparable to commitment to Iraq 
as well as Afghanistan.
Conventional Deterrence through forward presence
Two nearly concurrent conventional 
campaigns (or 1 if already in war on 
terror-surge). Regime change in one of 
two, destroy its military capacity and 
set conditions for the transition to, or 
restoration of, civil society.
(Source: Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, 2006, 
Washington DC, March 2006).
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There were two states the military planned for. “Surge” envisaged one long-term counterin-
surgency campaign (as in Iraq) or performing two nearly simultaneous conventional oper-
ations. “Steady-state” referred to a period of relative peace yet with a protracted campaign 
of small-scale surgical irregular operations as well as forward deterrence. It thus envisaged 
a period of continuous operations. From the two-war planning construct in the Bottom 
Up Review of 1993, to the 2006 “steady-state/ surge” distinction, the US military moved 
away from distinguishing between peace and war, and towards a period of continuous 
military action. While the Bottom Up Review had led to an emphasis on Desert Storm 
–type operations, the QDR 2006 focused on preventing another 9/11, and performing 
regime change campaigns if necessary. 
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was the latest document since the end of 
the Cold War reaffirming the principle of American primacy through military domi-
nance. In the 1990’s the belief was dominant that the United States could maintain stra-
tegic primacy by maintaining a focus on the two-war planning construct. Now, instead 
of being superior in “only” conventional maneuver warfare the United States adopted a 
strategic focus to meet irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges to its superiority. 
It meant that defeating terrorist networks, preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction and defending the homeland, became objectives of the US military. A holistic 
approach to maintaining strategic dominance was developed. In this new approach the 
US was affirming the principles first enunciated in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, 
namely that of unipolarity based on US power. The Leviathan spirit of the United States 
resonated in the belief that Russian and Chinese foreign policy choices could be shaped. 
Their “sophisticated military modernization” programs led to concern that they might 
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evolve into possible peer competitors.562 Regional hegemonies would not be tolerated, as 
the United States saw itself as a regional power everywhere and the US would “dissuade 
any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable 
regional hegemony.563 Operational effectiveness transformation would sustain this domi-
nance; however the security environment was shifting. The following chapter addresses the 
question how Washington’s adaptive strategy based on operational effectiveness transfor-
mation evolved in response to the challenges of sustained combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.
13 The Impact of Changes in the Security 
Environment 
The final question to be addressed in this case study is how the United States dealt with 
changes in the security environment which increased external vulnerabilities, most 
notably through difficulties encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how these affected 
US transformation. Given its strategic culture, which created an emphasis on high-
intensity operations fighting wars with succinct beginnings and ends, and a reliance on 
sophisticated technology to produce military superiority, there was inertia to change when 
confronted with irregular warfare, counterinsurgency and protracted stability operations. 
The security environment clashed with US strategic culture.
By 2005, while the United States Air Force and the Navy continued to pursue their 
transformation agenda’s, the Army and Marine Corps were engaged in irregular opera-
tions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ground forces were performing operations that would have 
been considered Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) a decade earlier. The mission in 
Iraq particularly was proving to be deadly and challenging. Crucial to the course of trans-
formation was that the political leadership decided that stabilizing Iraq was a strategic 
necessity of vital interest.564 Leaving Iraq a failed state would mean leaving behind a prey to 
be exploited by networked non-state adversaries intent on targeting the US. It would mean 
accepting that an American strategic weakness had been found, and thereby compromise 
US exceptionalism. The war in Iraq stood in stark contrast to the opening stages of Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom. Instead of rapid, decisive operations counterinsurgency operations 
562 Robert M. Gates, “Testimony of the Secretary of Defense,” Committee on Appropriations, 
United States Senate, Washington DC, February 27, 2007.
563 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington 
DC, March 2006 , p.30.
564 “[Iraq] is a vital front in the war on terror, which is why the terrorists have chosen to make 
a stand there. Our men and women in uniform are fighting terrorists in Iraq, so we do not 
have to face them here at home. And the victory of freedom in Iraq will strengthen a new ally 
in the war on terror, inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to Tehran, bring more 
hope and progress to a troubled region, and thereby lift a terrible threat from the lives of our 
children and grandchildren.” George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, 
February 3, 2005.
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were “a long, hard slog.”565 Rather than achieving a decisive victory in agreement with the 
Joint Swiftness Goals, the United States would remain in Afghanistan and Iraq for several 
years. Instead of waging war against a clear adversary, the US was confronted with an 
adversary that hid among the people. Operational effectiveness transformation had been 
geared at performing high-intensity operations with greater efficiency, greater speed, and 
greater lethality. Yet speed and lethality were not the primary characteristics to win a coun-
terinsurgency, nor did American superior military technology offer a panacea. The Army 
was facing substantial difficulties combating Iraqi insurgents, not because they were using 
advanced technology but rather because they denied the Army the effective use of theirs. 
In response to these changes in the security environment, the US Army adopted a different 
adaptive strategy pursuing a policy of strategic transformation towards performing 
sustained counterinsurgency operations. As a result of its incompatibility with US stra-
tegic culture, this subsequently evolved to an approach more reminiscent of the opera-
tional effectiveness transformation of the 1990’s, more in tune with US strategic-cultural 
constraints thereby increasing the resource extraction of the transformation strategy. 
13.1 A Struggle towards Strategic Transformation
In The Way Ahead: our Army at War, a 2004 document based on the Army Strategic 
Planning Guidance, the Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker initiated the shift of 
Army capability development to meet short-term requirements for ongoing operations. 
In harsh terms Schoomaker denounced the opportunity-argument of transformation, 
focusing on current operational necessities instead:
Some assumptions made and processes developed … for an Army with a 
“window of opportunity” to transform itself, while valid at the time, are no 
longer relevant to the current security environment.566
Transformation was reframed as the gargantuan task to create a military force capable of 
sustaining large-scale expeditionary operations in an environment where adversaries “will 
make every attempt to avoid our strengths”. It amounted to a strategic shift from the rapid, 
decisive campaigns that had been planned for before. Schoomaker said:
We must assume sustained operations will be the norm and not the 
exception… the Army must be prepared for operations of a type, tempo, 
pace and duration different from those we have structured our forces and 
systems to achieve.567
565 Donald Rumsfeld, “Memo,” October 16, 2003 reprinted in Airforce Magazine, December 
2003, p. 65. http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2003/ December%20
2003/1203keeper.aspx. Accessed February 17, 2010.
566 Schoomaker (2004), p.1.
567 Ibid, p. 2.
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Sounding the alarm bells to get the attention of the organization, Schoomaker said, “Our 
Nation, the Joint Force, and our Army are engaged in one of the most challenging periods 
in our history.”568 Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were redefining the Army’s transfor-
mation agenda towards strategic innovation as the security environment changed. 
Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq required stability forces to perform, long, 
continuous operations instead of rapid, decisive ones. This argument had also been made 
in 2004 by two prominent scholars on transformation at the National Defense Univer-
sity.569 In their publication, Binnendijk and Johnson argued for the creation of two perma-
nent brigade-size equivalents to focus on stabilization and reconstruction missions as well 
as a change of military ethos to embrace stabilization and reconstruction missions.
It was a task for which the Army had been ill-prepared. As the 10-30-30 Swiftness 
guideline demonstrated, stability operations were grossly underestimated in the US mili-
tary. A planning construct from the 1993 Bottom Up Review – which focused on a Desert 
Storm-type scenario – estimated that stability operations in Iraq would only require a 
“carrier battle group, one to two wings of fighters, a division or less [emphasis added] of 
ground forces, and special operations units.” This equated to approximately 20,000 boots 
on the ground, for the entirety of Iraq, a country the size of France. By 2005, there were 
more than 140,000 American forces in Iraq. As part of the strategic imperative to win the 
Iraqi peace and realize the strategic transformation initiated by Schoomaker, the Pentagon 
needed to refocus its attention to planning for stability operations. 
It was in late 2005, two years into the Iraq insurgency, that the Pentagon came to grips 
with the new reality in which stability operations had become a strategic interest. To that 
end Donald Rumsfeld in November 2005 approved Department of Defense Directive 
3000.05. The directive declared that stability operations “shall be given priority compa-
rable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD 
activities…”570 Thomas White, Secretary of the Army during the Iraq invasion, assessed 
the need for Directive 3000.05 as follows.
A) In the world that we face, the combat phase may be the easiest part; B) 
that what follows the combat phase is where most of the strategic objectives 
will be achieved or not achieved and, therefore, it deserves as much 
planning and attention as the combat phase does. Three, until you’ve done 
that, don’t start the operation in the first place. Fourth, it’s going to take 
you a long time and a great deal of effort if you get into anything the scale 
that we’ve gotten into in Iraq. So you’d better be ready for it.571 
568 Ibid, p.14.
569 Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson (eds.), Transforming for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Operations, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2004).
570 Department of Defense, “Military Support for Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction 
(SSTR) Operations, Directive 3000.05,” Washington DC, November 28, 2005.
571 Thomas White, “Interview with Frontline: the invasion of Iraq,” January 31, 2004. http://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/white.html, Accessed November 14 
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Some of the initiatives underlying the initial transformation strategy were put on loose 
screws. While Rumsfeld had wanted to cut Army personnel to substitute mass for infor-
mation, the stability component of counterinsurgency operations required boots on 
the ground. The size and duration of the deployments triggered organizational shifts in 
an Army institution that had been geared for rapid and decisive operations. More than 
140,000 troops had been deployed in Iraq continuously since March 2003. While Opera-
tion Desert Storm had demanded half a million troops, this had been for a six month 
period only. The Army was not organized to sustain such lengthy deployments and neither 
were the necessary capabilities in sufficient supply. Mentioned in the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, one of the first measures taken was the Active Component/ Reserve 
Component (AC/RC) rebalance. This encompassed increasing the pool of critical coun-
terinsurgency forces such as civil affairs and military police in the active component. These 
capabilities had been put in the Reserve since they were not critical to perform conven-
tional combat. The Army would reduce field artillery, air defense artillery, engineering and 
armor units and retrain or reassign many to transportation, civil affairs, military police, 
military intelligence, psychological operations, NBC-defense and combat support billets. 
It reshuffled approximately 100,000 forces.572 The Army called it the most significant army 
restructuring in the last 50 years saying that it was “divesting Cold War structure to better 
fight the war on terrorism.”573 The rebalance meant stepping away from the post-Vietnam 
total force concept of Creighton Abrams which had placed critical units in the reserve. It 
also implied letting go of the Powell-Weinberger doctrine of focusing on overwhelming 
use of force for rapid, decisive operations, focusing instead on longer-term stability opera-
tions which de-emphasized rapid, decisive use of force. The Secretary of the Army in 2005 
clarified that: “Our Army has passed from a time of contingency operations into an unde-
termined period of continuous operations.”574 Rebalancing went hand-in-hand with the 
objective, “to shift the center of gravity of [the Army’s] capabilities” to those required in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.575 The 2006 Army Field Manual 1.0 attested to the gravitas of the 
situation stating that the war in Iraq was:
...the first severe, long-term test for the All-Volunteer force. The need to 
conduct sustained operations over a number of years may be the most 
significant aspect of the early twenty-first century security environment.576 
2007.
572 O’Hanlon (2005), p.45.
573 See Department of the Army, “Army Transformation and Army Campaign Plan.”http://www.
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It was a complete turnaround from operational effectiveness transformation which had 
been pursued with the idea that the foremost challenge would come in the form of a 
possible peer competitor. It was a long stretch removed from rapid, decisive operations 
relying on overwhelming force with clear exit-strategies and decisive battles promoted at 
the beginning of the 1990’s. Different capabilities were required and the Army set out on a 
policy to adapt. After Directive 3000.05 strategic transformation started, yet only for the 
land forces.
13.1.1 Friction with Strategic Culture
The changes in the international security environment caused friction with US strategic 
culture and the US “way of war”. The need for change had been brought about by irregular 
warfare posing a strategic challenge to the US. Not because of its lethality but because it 
challenged core concepts of US strategic culture and the way in which the US wants to use 
the military. Some services – such as the Marines – were better equipped to deal with irreg-
ular warfare, however none of the services was organized for the long, protracted deploy-
ment that confronted them. The difficulties the United States experienced highlight the 
fallacy of pursuing operational effectiveness transformation on the presumption of mili-
tary superiority. Neoclassical realism predicts that a unipolar hegemon will overextend 
promoting its domestic agenda, thereby triggering counterbalancing behavior. The histo-
rian Adrian Goldsworthy, writing on the Punic Wars of the second century BC, made the 
point that “each society and culture tends to have a unique view of warfare which affects 
how they fight and as a result how they may be beaten.”577
Given US military hegemony, an adversary could logically be expected to search for 
US weaknesses. The United States had focused on perfecting conventional warfare in order 
to influence an adversary’s will, yet contemporary adversaries turned to targeting the polit-
ical will of the West through means which proved antithetical to the operational effective-
ness focus of US transformation. Frederick Kagan commented that “the danger does not 
come from the inevitability of an information revolution that will necessarily transform 
war in a certain way. It arises, rather, from the certainty that states contemplating war with 
the United States will work hard in the intervening years to find ways to counter American 
military predominance.”578 As adversaries become more capable through emulation and 
innovation and the US more at pains to deal with them, it contributes to a transition in the 
international distribution of power. 
Irregular warfare is able to challenge US power projection. In 2005 the Army Plan-
ning Guidance declared that “Irregular challenges are by-products of the current stra-
tegic environment and spring from an inability of our adversaries to confront U.S. power 
symmetrically.”579 This was phrased as a sign of weakness from adversaries – as though 
adversaries would prefer to confront the US conventionally– yet it offered a foreboding 
577 Quoted in Coker (2002), p. 41.
578 Kagan (2006), p. 390.
579 Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance (2005), p. 11.
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of events taking place in the security environment. Overwhelming technological advan-
tage had given the US unmatched power projection capabilities but “traditional means 
and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increas-
ingly obsolete.”580 Operational effectiveness transformation was driven by the US belief 
equating military success to political triumph. However, victory in the conventional mili-
tary domain no longer automatically translated to strategic success.
13.1.2 Area-denial in new terrain
As a result of US superiority in conventional warfare and US dominance over the global 
commons adversaries arose from two new dimensions. On the one hand they did not 
challenge US power in the ‘commons’ but rather did so in urban, or other closed terrain 
such as mountains and jungles (see figure 11). On the other hand, adversaries timed 
the main thrust of their actions either before or after the phase of conventional opera-
tions, or avoided outright confrontation altogether. Instead they challenged US military 
forces in the stabilization phase with insurgency tactics, remotely-detonated weapons and 
ambushes or targeted US citizens during ‘peace’ through terrorism. It represented a shift 
away from the locus of US operational effectiveness transformation. While the United 
States pursued a policy of operational effectiveness transformation intent on improving 
its capabilities for high-intensity conventional operations, adversaries were pursuing a 
balancing response to US dominance. Unipolarity ensured that the United States was the 
state against which other states developed war plans. Arthur Cebrowski acknowledged 
in 2002 that “ours is the team against which everyone measures themselves, and to the 
extent we do not transform we provide would-be adversaries a fixed target.”581 However, 
the United States, constrained by its strategic culture, was inadequately prepared for the 
path of military change pursued by others. 
As any strategically thinking actor would be expected to do, adversaries were looking 
at ways to avoid US strengths and exploit weaknesses. The Chinese, as reflected in the 
work Unrestricted Warfare, embraced this explicitly.582 Ralph Peters in 2006 articulated 
it as follows: “Why fight battles you’ll lose when you can wage war directly against the 
American population by attacking its digital and physical infrastructure, its confidence 
and morale?”583  Adversaries adopted a ‘center of gravity’ approach, conceptually compa-
rable to the doctrine of System Warfare, where the political will to fight is directly targeted 
through terrorism, targeting non-military elements of the state, and sapping the military’s 
580 Andrew Krepinevich, “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no.4 (July/
August 2009), p. 18.
581 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
“Statement before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee,” United States 
Congress, Washington DC, April 9, 2002.
582 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts 
Publishing House, February 1999).
583 Ralph Peters, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs,” Weekly Standard, vol. 11, no.10, 
(February 6, 2006).
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strength by denying it a clear military victory. The irregular challenge posed by insur-
gents in Iraq and Afghanistan negated the ability of American forces to apply their mili-
tary prowess in their preferred manner. It denied US forces obvious victory. By operating 
from urbanized surroundings, blending in with the local population and using concealed 
improvised explosives insurgents could deny the US military its use of its competitive 
advantages. The locus of the strategic challenge shifted to the phase of operations where 
the US military was at its most vulnerable. It was the realm of the ‘lesser included contin-
gency.’ Throughout the 1990’s the United States was concerned with anti-access threats 
that negated the ability of deploying American power for conventional power projec-
tion. Irregular warfare now presented similar challenges since in urban surroundings for 
instance US military technology was less effective.
(Source: Author’s Analysis)


































Major US adaptations to warfare have been based on technology; whether it was network-
centric warfare and the guided munitions revolution or the aircraft carrier and the nuclear 
weapon. In general these technologies have sought to increase the distance between US 
military forces and the opposing military. Precision munitions released from aircraft 
fifteen thousand feet in the sky or launched from vessels hundreds of miles off the coast, 
called in by small teams of nearly invisible Special Forces, the increased use of unmanned 
aerial vehicles commanded by pilots several thousand miles away, or developing a global 
strike missile that could hit any target anywhere within the hour, the vision of US transfor-
mation has put ever greater distance between opposing sides. It was founded on the vision 
of a “clean war” in which no American would be harmed and the subsequent ability to 
pursue absolute security. While the United States removed the American warrior further 
from the battlefield through ever more sophisticated technology, the counterrevolution of 
173Transformation in the United States
war in Afghanistan is in its ninth year. These dichotomies are exemplary for the strain 
being placed on US strategic culture.
13.1.4 Irregular Warfare as a means to counterbalance
Sir Lawrence Freedman, professor of War Studies at King’s College, argued that the 
major dilemma of warfare in this new security environment is internal to Western states. 
He referred to the difficulties facing liberal democratic societies to cope with the anti-
liberal challenges posed by irregular warfare.589 This ‘transformation of strategic affairs’ is 
composed of two elements; on the one hand the adversarial asymmetric responses to US 
military superiority in the form of targeting innocent civilians, on the other hand the illib-
eral responses by Western states constraining civil liberties, suspending respect for human 
rights or humanitarian law or accepting civilian casualties. Insurgents that are immersed 
in the local population present a major difficulty: “The more warfare becomes intermin-
gled with normal civilian activity, Freedman writes. “[…] the more difficult it is to respond 
by conventional military means.”590 Phrased differently, the problem lies in the incompat-
ibility of a state’s strategic culture with the response required by threats in the external 
environment. While Western states use the military in the name of grand liberal ideas such 
as promoting democracy or freedom, it is increasingly difficult to uphold these virtues 
when combatants shed uniforms or retreat into urban terrain. Persecuting the Global War 
on Terrorism, the Bush administration attracted much criticism for its dismissal of the 
Geneva Conventions for ‘unlawful combatants’, secret CIA prisons and the legal opacity 
at the Guantanamo Bay military base. 
Operational effectiveness transformation led to a less restrained approach to the 
use of force by the US under the assumption that it would reduce the cost of interven-
tions. It invariably triggered balancing reactions. The insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan 
is the product of innovation by non-state actors in response to the perceived conventional 
dominance of the United States. Dominant powers naturally trigger balancing reactions.591 
As Kenneth Waltz argues: “As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors 
unbalanced power.”592 The United States miscalculated the nonlinearity of military change 
due to the inherent non-linearity of warfare. Military overstretch, operational effective-
ness transformation and the rise of irregular warfare are thereby inherently linked.593 
Waltz concluded that, “the very effort to maintain a hegemonic position is the surest way 
to undermine it.”594 In hindsight, the Powell-Weinberger doctrine was at once the logical 
589 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, (London: Routledge, 2006), p.9.
590 Ibid, p.77.
591 See Colin S. Gray, The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order, (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 14-16.
592 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, 
(Summer 2000), p. 28.
593 Frederick Kagan, “A Dangerous Transformation,” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2003.
594 Waltz (2000), p. 36.
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irregular warfare has been notably non-technological. Those technologies that are used are 
everyday items such as cell-phones, video cameras and the internet that are accessible to 
most citizens around the world. Besides, the counterrevolution is ‘human’. It takes place 
in the ‘human terrain,’ in which humans are the network-nodes, and adversaries operate 
within, as well as explicitly target, the social space of non-combatants through terrorism 
and improvised explosives. Here humans themselves, as they steer car-bombs or strap 
explosives to their bodies, become the precision munitions and lend the counterrevolu-
tion its punch. In addition, the counterrevolution is put into practice, not by the actions of 
a security-maximizing anonymous state, but rather by a group of individuals motivated by 
human emotion and connected by the common conviction of religious ideology. Absent 
the high-tech industry base that has allowed the United States to remove the human 
further from the battlefield through technology, and the liberal culture that has imbued 
the US to see war as an activity engaged in by militaries at distance from civilians, adver-
saries have emulated the concept of network-centric warfare but have innovated it into the 
human terrain. While the digitization of warfare was pioneered by the United States, an 
alternative version of network-centric warfare took shape in the Hindu Kush.584 It is the 
same style of operations as was witnessed during the Vietnam War and the Soviet war in 
Afghanistan. Yet the United States, for the strategic-cultural reasons described in previous 
chapters, failed to develop an approach to embrace sustained stability operations.
13.1.3 Shifting Markets
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review states, “Transformation results from the exploi-
tation of new approaches […] that render previous methods of conducting war obsolete 
or subordinate.”585 Transformation was about being relevant but more so about making 
“previous methods of conducting war” obsolete. Using a parallel offered by the business 
management literature, operational effectiveness transformation strived to ‘differentiate’ 
by waging war differently than others, thereby giving the US ‘market leadership.’ However, 
operational effectiveness transformation led the US to excel in a market in which the 
US already enjoyed a monopoly. Instead, very few competitors were willing to enter the 
market with the US. The decline of this market has little to do with the professionalism 
or skill of the US military and its soldiers, sea- and airmen. Geoffrey Moore, a business 
researcher, writes regarding corporations that differentiate in the wrong market that, 
“Management must recognize that the problem is not one of company performance. [It is 
a result of changing market conditions]. This concept is often difficult to grasp for execu-
tion-oriented management teams who are used to succeeding through outperforming 
the competition.”586 From a business management perspective this quote is insightful to 
describe the problems the United States confronted with regards to insurgencies. Over 
584 Guerilla warfare and insurgencies have been around for decades if not centuries, however 
the nature of the counterrevolution is such that it has matured – due to the networking 
technologies adopted - that it is able to present a strategic threat.
585 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, p. 29.
586 Geoffrey A. Moore, Dealing with Darwin, (New York: Portfolio, 2005), p. 168.
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the past decades the United States conceptualized its defense policy as outperforming any 
military, particularly in high-intensity combat. Yet now the United States was finding it 
troublesome to translate that market leadership into political profit in the new security 
environment. 
The Iraq War and its aftermath demonstrated that a militarily weaker opponent 
could deny a superior military a clear political victory. It shattered the link between mili-
tary dominance and political dominance. Winning battles is not sufficient to achieve the 
desired political end-state. War returned to Clausewitzian roots, as not only an exten-
sion of politics – which had relegated it to a realm of its own – but becoming intimately 
connected to politics and political will. Transformation enthusiasts in the Pentagon did 
not adequately realize that since network technologies originated outside the military 
environment, responses to it would neither be focused on conventional warfare, nor be 
purely military. 9/11 was a clear challenge to US primacy, and rather than a military strike 
it was a terrorist attack targeting US society at large. 
As a result of American strategic culture, which preordained the US to emphasize 
high-intensity combat as the focus of its military policy, a form of groupthink occurred. 
This acted as a set of cognitive blinders. In the late 1990’s the US perception of the inter-
national distribution of power and its approach to warfare was in sync with its strategic 
culture. Together it created a focus on high-intensity operations and precluding the rise of 
peer competitors through military strength. This was the paradigm through which mili-
tary change had been viewed. Contrary to operational effectiveness transformation which 
focused on making war shorter, surgical and cleaner, adversaries engaged in insurgencies 
that make the confrontation longer, dirtier and more complex. In counterinsurgency the 
focus rests on winning the support of the local population, while in conventional war 
the focus is on destroying the adversary’s military. The United States military has been 
engaged in Afghanistan for nearly ten years, yet the 2003 Joint Swiftness Goals prepared 
the military to leave a theatre within a month. Operational effectiveness transformation 
made conventional war less deadly for the United States, while irregular warfare in the 
stabilization phase has become more lethal. In the five major confrontations in the past 
fifteen years US armed forces have lost no more than 400 friendly casualties.587 Five years 
of stabilization in Iraq led to close to 4000 casualties.588 According to the Powell-Wein-
berger doctrine, wars should have clear starts and endings and limited timelines, yet the 
587 Robert A. Pape, “The True Worth of Air Power,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 2 (March/April 
2004), p. 119.
588 A phenomenon that hit home hard after the combat phase of the Iraq War, yet which was 
already apparent throughout the nineties is that wars get cleaner but stabilization phases 
remain nasty, brutish and in particular, long. An order of magnitude more people have died 
in Phase IV in the midst of the Iraq civil war than the combat phase. During major combat 
operations 140 US servicemen lost their lives. During the stabilization phase as of May 1 2008, 
3937 Americans had been killed. This meant that on the combat phase is barely more lethal 
than the stabilization campaign: 3.2 forces killed per day opposed to 2.15. However, because 
of the stabilization campaign’s longevity – 1828 days opposed to 43 days for the combat phase 
- it has killed far more forces. This lethality has driven American emphasis on force protection.
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outcome of US strategic thinking but also its strategic flaw. The principle of overwhelming 
victory based on AirLand Battle, championed through the Gulf War, had as a logical 
downside that it would drive opponents away from these types of conventional confronta-
tions. The Powell-Weinberger doctrine became the victim of its own success and led adver-
saries to challenge the US in a way for which it was unprepared and for which the Powell-
Weinberger doctrine was wholly unsuited. Ironically, this had already been noted in 1989. 
Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to Congress that, “one of 
the reasons that low-intensity conflict has become so important is that we have done very 
well at the other end of the spectrum. The reason that this has become more important is 
because we have managed to tamp down the possibility of other kinds of conflict.”595 This 
warning went unheeded.
The realist assumption that other actors were intent on counterbalancing unipolarity 
by annulling American power was reaffirmed. The fallacy from the US perspective lay in 
the fact that they expected counterbalancing to occur as actors scaled the same transfor-
mational ladder as the US had. Rather than venture on an alternative path of innovation, 
adversaries were believed to have to go along the same path as the United States. Staying but 
one step ahead would be sufficient to maintain dominance. This proved short-sighted and 
dangerous, for it rested on a distinctly American perspective on war. “The principal danger 
in the years immediately ahead, Colin Gray wrote in 2006, “is that US Armed Forces will 
be so committed to their own network-centric transformation, that they fail to recognize 
the true character of potentially effective offsetting revolutionary change elsewhere.”596 It 
proved a true remark. Irregular challenges demonstrated that there were different ladders 
to climb. Due to the enhanced networking technologies available in the civilian world 
through communications and world-wide travel, irregular warfare has precision, stealth, 
advanced command and control. Combatants blur into civilian surroundings (stealth), 
they have the ability to target Western forces through suicide bombers (precision) while 
making use of internet technologies to broadcast their message or coordinate their attacks 
(Information Age command and control). One of the most powerful examples of how 
technologies were emulated in irregular warfare is the IED.
Military technological innovation is a process of continuous action and reaction. 
An iron law from Technological War is that the antidotes – in the form of innovation or 
emulation - will always succeed, giving rise to a new wave of innovation. Each revolu-
tion in military affairs has been matched by a balancing act of another; whether it was 
Blitzkrieg, levée-en-masse, the German railway system or the nuclear revolution. This is 
what might have dampened the expectations of the American transformation enthusiasts. 
Colin Gray wrote in 2006 that: 
595 William J. Crowe, “Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Library of Congress, 
Washington DC, 1989, p. 68.
596 Colin S. Gray, Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: the 
Sovereignty of context, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, February 2006, p. 14.
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When feasible and judged desirable, [the fruits of transformation] will 
be copied in parts. When borrowed, it will be domesticated to fit local 
cultural preferences and strategic circumstances. If it cannot or should not 
be imitated, then the challenge will be to find ways of warfare that negate 
much of its potential.597
Eliot Cohen wrote in 1996 of the emulation of technologies which would impact US 
military advantages. He was referring to information technologies.598 The rise of IEDs is 
a different variant of Cohen’s argument. IEDs are directly related to the advent of mobile 
communications technology and the internet in civilian society. They are a highly effec-
tive precision-guided munition; cheap, concealed and high-impact. While IEDs are gener-
ally small bombs their impact on Western interventions is disproportionate to their size. 
Fabricated in basements and back-alleys IEDs are made from explosive ordnance such as 
left-over artillery shells or other munitions and fitted with make-shift triggers or timers, 
ranging from simple pressure wires to garage-door openers and cell-phones. They are 
concealed in piles of rubble, walls, potholes or even carcasses of animals or humans bodies. 
IEDs have been responsible for a consistently rising percentage of American casualties 
in Iraq throughout the period 2004-2007 rising to approximately 80% of all casualties.599 
Their strategic impact lies herein that they deny the objectives of a stabilization campaign. 
The mission objective is to provide a secure environment so that reconstruction or devel-
opment can take place. With hidden explosives going off, injuring, maiming or killing 
civilians, police or the military, a sense of security and faith in government institutions to 
provide for public security is eroded.
The United States has answered the threat of IEDs mostly through technological solu-
tions. From late 2004 onwards, forces in the field were haphazardly adding armor plating. 
Since the initial war plan had not envisaged a long occupation, or a substantial insurgency, 
only a very small percentage of vehicles had heavy plating creating delays in delivering 
up-armored vehicles. Ad-hoc plating was being scrounged and welded to the vehicles and 
sandbags were placed on the floors of humvees to give added protection against the IED 
blasts.600 As vehicles were getting armor, they were also installed with electronic jammers. 
However, if the military used the jammers to counter the use of cell-phones, insurgents 
would start to use garage door openers as triggers. Added armor plating would lead to 
alternative and heavier IEDs such as Explosively Formed Penetrators which were able 
to pierce metal. As General Ton van Loon of the Royal Netherlands Army said in 2007, 
putting armor on vehicles was important for short-term protection. However, it could 
597 Ibid, p. 46.
598 Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2, (March/April 1996), 
p. 37-54.
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never be the solution.601 The battle against IEDs turned into an arms race. In 2003 the US 
armed forces stood up an entire organization to deal with roadside bombs. In 2007 all 
tactical vehicles were be replaced by the Mine Resistant and Ambush Protected (MRAP) 
vehicles. These vehicles had V-shaped hulls able to deflect the energy of an IED detonated 
underneath the vehicle. In 2008 $16.8 billion was appropriated to deliver 7774 MRAPs, 
with the amount increasing further.602 MRAPs were produced and a second-generation 
was in the makes able to withstand the new heavier blasts.603 An IED, on the other hand, 
averages “the cost of a pizza.”604
13.2 Translating Irregular Warfare into a new 
Adaptive Strategy
The challenges described above demonstrated the need for strategic (type II) transforma-
tion towards irregular warfare as opposed to continuing with operational effectiveness 
(type I) transformation. Initiating this strategic transformation was beset with difficulties 
as its efforts clashed with US strategic culture. Eventually it came to little. This became 
apparent through difficulties with personnel, a preference for a technology-heavy 
response, the military’s emphasis on force protection, as well as interagency and financial 
constraints. The following paragraphs detail the challenges the US Army encountered in 
pursuing such strategic transformation.
13.2.1 A Pentathlete Force?
The difficulties to adapt were firstly expressed on the practical level of personnel. Among 
the most salient was that shifting to sustained counterinsurgency operations required 
changes in the labor force. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq meant supporting 
reconstruction efforts, cooperating with civilian counterparts, building a relationship 
with the local population, while performing direct action against insurgents. It is a human 
capital-intensive style of operating, yet the Army’s operational effectiveness transforma-
tion had precisely been premised on removing the soldier further from the battlefield and 
‘substituting mass for information’, meaning reductions in manpower. For decades the 
military had focused on being the best at putting ‘metal’ on target, since this was what 
delivered the greater return to sustaining strategic dominance. A focus on force-on-force 
confrontations had promoted a technology-oriented approach to warfare, whereas coun-
terinsurgency emphasized its human side. In a way it was a clash between the “science of 
war” versus “the art of war,” presenting diametrically different models, particularly in terms 
601 Rick Atkinson, “You can’t armor your way out of this problem,” Washington Post, October 2, 
2007.
602 Mark Thompson, “Broken Down,” TIME Magazine, April 16, 2007.
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October 1, 2007.
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of personnel requirements. As a potential remedy the Army launched the concept of a 
Pentathlete model for its officer corps.
Announced under the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentathlete officer 
is an ideal type individual that unites several attributes that render him capable of being 
both a soldier and a statesman, giving him the agility to operate in any situation he encoun-
ters. Aside from military skills the Pentathlete is versed in “governance, statesmanship and 
diplomacy.”605 It reflects the necessity of the Warrior to participate in activities traditionally 
considered to be civilian. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review wrote,
[Pentathlete officers] are decisive, innovative, adaptive, culturally astute 
and effective communicators. In addition to being experts in the art and 
science of the profession of arms and demonstrating character and integrity 
in everything they do, they must be astute at building teams, boldly 
confronting uncertainty and solving complex problems while engendering 
loyalty and trust. Above all, our future leaders must be strategic and 
creative thinkers dedicated to lifelong learning and … are knowledgeable 
of culture, history and the language of the area of operations …understand 
foreign cultures and societies and possess the ability to train, mentor, and 
advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns.606
This view of the force was supported in 2007 by presidential-candidate Barack Obama 
who stated that the military must have “a program to bolster our ability to speak different 
languages, understand different cultures, and coordinate complex missions with our 
civilian agencies.”607 Julianne Smith, connected to the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, said plainly, “US troops lack cultural learning” yet it was considered a 
criterion for success in counterinsurgency operations.608 Secretary of Defense Gates 
similarly underlined that learning foreign languages and maintaining familiarity with 
different cultures would be essential, and soldiers would have to learn to embrace tradi-
tionally civilian duties: “Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public services, 
rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance.”609 This was a long way away 
from the notion professed during the 1990’s that ‘superpowers don’t do windows,’ a term 
used to express disdain for nation-building and stabilization activities.610 ‘Doing windows’ 
605 F.J. Harvey, “Building the Future Force while continue to fight the Global War on Terrorism,” 
ARMY, October 2005, p. 19.
606 Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, p. 42.
607 Barack Obama, “Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center,” Washington DC, August 1, 2007.
608 Interview with Julianne Smith, October 2006, Washington DC.
609 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,” 
Association of the United States Army, Washington DC, October 10, 2007.
610 See John Hillen, “Superpowers don’t do Windows,” Orbis, vol. 41, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 241-
258.
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had now become an operational necessity. To shift to a culturally-astute force required a 
force made up of a warrior Homo Universalis.611 
In the Fall of 2006 John Nagl and Paul Yinling, two lieutenant-colonels involved in 
the debate over the Army’s response to counterinsurgency and the development of the 
Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, argued that changing the promotion system was 
key.612
The focus on the promotion system reflected the conclusion from Stephen Rosen’s 
study on the topic of military innovation. His study emphasized the role of military lead-
ership in shaping promotional paths for innovation-minded subordinates to produce 
change in the military.613 In 2007 Secretary of Defense Gates similarly hinted at the neces-
sity to look at the promotion system: 
Going forward we must find, retain, and promote the right people – at all 
ranks, whether they wear stripes, bars, or stars – and put them in the right 
positions to see that the lessons learned in recent combat become rooted in 
the institutional culture614 
In spite of the declaratory statements to change the personnel system, lower-ranking offi-
cers with substantial counterinsurgency experience signaled change was not coming.615 All 
efforts aside, Fred Kaplan concluded that: “six years into this war, the armed forces – not 
just the Army, but also the Air Force, Navy and Marines – have changed almost nothing 
about the way their promotional systems and their entire bureaucracies operate.”616 Strate-
gist Thomas X. Hammes noted that the military’s personnel system was reflective of that 
611 Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military 
Review vol. 85, no. 6 (November- December 2005), pp. 2-15.
612 “To win the Long War, the Army must develop a more adaptive organizational culture. To 
create such a culture, the Army must change its focus from a centralized, specialized focus on 
major conventional wars to a more decentralized and less specialized focus on full-spectrum 
operations. This shift in organizational culture cannot occur within existing organizations 
— indeed these organizations can be an impediment to change. The best way to change the 
organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement 
within the officer corps. The Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive 
offers the surest path to promotion.”Lt. Col. J. Nagl & Lt. Col. P. Yingling, “New Rules 
for New Enemies,” Armed Forces Journal, October 2006. http://www.armedforcesjournal.
com/2006/10/2088425. Accessed April 7, 2008.
613 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991).
614 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks to the Heritage Foundation,” Colorado Springs, May 13, 2008.
615 Fred Kaplan, “Challenging the Generals,” New York Times, August 26, 2007. See also Andrew 
Krepinevich quoted in Grant, Greg, “Iraq Reshapes US Army Thinking,” Defensenews.com, 
August 29, 2005. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1026888&C=thisweek. Accessed 
September 7, 2005.
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in the early 1900’s; very hierarchical and not conducive to promote free-thinkers.617 The 
personnel system was not geared towards counterinsurgency, and neither was the educa-
tion system. In 2007 Kevin Reynolds concluded after researching the hours spent on 
counterinsurgency in the Army War College’s curriculum that: “it appears the Army War 
College is devoting a relatively small amount of its curriculum to the study of a type of 
warfare that for the past four years has taken up nearly 100 percent of the Army’s resources, 
energy, and effort.”618 Trying to find an explanation for the institutional indolence, 
Hammes said that the Army’s institutional bias to focus on technology was to blame.619 
Years of focusing on operational effectiveness transformation had removed creativity from 
the forces. Emphasizing information and decision superiority was turning officers into 
“system operators instead of creative strategists.” By September 2008, Defense Secretary 
Gates signaled continuing concern over the necessity to institutionalize a focus on coun-
terinsurgency missions among military personnel: 
One of the enduring issues our military struggles with is whether personnel 
and promotions systems designed to reward command of American troops 
will be able to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping 
foreign troops – which is still not considered a career enhancing path for 
our best and brightest officers. Or whether formations and units organized, 
trained, and equipped to destroy enemies can be adapted well enough and 
fast enough, to dissuade or co-opt them – or, more significantly, to build 
the capacity of local security forces to do the dissuading and destroying.620
A positive note appeared in the form of Lieutenant-General David Petraeus’ drafting of 
a new counterinsurgency manual. A bi-service manual, for both the Army and Marine 
Corps, it stated at the outset that “counterinsurgency is counterintuitive to the traditional 
American approach to war and combat operations.”621 Petraeus acknowledged difficul-
ties would arise because counterinsurgency contradicted the operational effectiveness 
mindset engrained in the military institution. Personnel change also figured centrally 
in his activities. In late 2006 for instance Petraeus supported sending military officers to 
civilian graduate schools as it would expose them to a different culture and mindset that 
would help them in an uncertain and flexible counterinsurgency environment.622 Besides, 
617 Interview with Thomas X. Hammes, January 10, 2008, Washington DC.
618 Kevin P. Reynolds, Insurgency/ Counterinsurgency: Does the Army Get It?, United States Army 
War College, Paper prepared for International Studies Association, Annual Convention, 
Chicago, February 28- March 3, 2007 (quoted with author’s permission) p.8.
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there were signs Petraeus might improve the promotional system as well. The decision 
in late 2007 to place Petraeus on the promotional board of brigadier generals seemed to 
signal this.623 However it had taken six years, almost as long as the Vietnam War had lasted, 
to gain traction on the issue. The Pentathlete force still remained a bridge too far.
13.2.2 Factors of Material and Personnel 
Rather than sustain operations in Iraq, by late 2006 there was a practical motivation to 
withdraw rather than sustain the mission in Iraq, frustrating efforts at strategic transfor-
mation. This was a consequence of the operational tempo related to the inadequate size 
of the Army and the rate at which hardware was consumed. Since the Army had been 
geared towards conventional rapid-decisive operations and had been unprepared for the 
duration and stress of sustained irregular operations, the urgency and costs of Army reset 
and readiness increased from 2005 onwards. Testifying before Congress on February 9 
2007, Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker highlighted the readiness problems the 
Army confronted. The operational tempo in Iraq and the rate at which materiel was being 
consumed was eating into the strategic depth of the Army. He noted that while the Army 
was able to cope with the Iraq surge, it was not easy to sustain. The statement by the Army’s 
highest ranking officer could not be misunderstood. The Army was under stress. The major 
reason being that several years into the Iraq campaign units were on multiple tours with 
very little time in between. Operational tempo was taking its toll. A year later, with little 
promise that a military draw-down would be announced, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff General Peter Pace acknowledged the dire state of affairs in the Army. He stated that 
the current operational tempo had on average “about a 1:1 deployed/at-home ratio- which 
is about half the time we believe is necessary to sustain readiness for the long term.”624 In 
other words, Army personnel were under tremendous strain. In fact, some deployed units 
were on fifteen-month tours with only one year at home, stretching the Army and weak-
ening the strategic flexibility of the service to address other challenges.625 Readiness of the 
Army had become an issue of critical importance and it led to a debate over the ability 
to remain in Iraq.626 “Our Army is broken,” Representative Solomon Ortiz, chairman of 
the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness stated unequivocally in January 
2007.627 Nine months later the Army’s chief of staff, General William Casey, declared the 
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, November 16, 2006.
623 Ann Scott Tyson, “Petraeus Helping Pick New Generals,” Washington Post, November 17, 
2007.
624 Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Posture Statement before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee,” United States Congress, Washington DC, February 6, 2007, pp. 4-5.
625 “Army Tours extended to Fifteen Months,” Military.com, April 12, 2007..http://www.military.
com/NewsContent/0,13319,131926,00.html.
626 See for an extensive review of the Army’s readiness issues Mark Thompson, “Broken Down,” 
TIME Magazine, April 16, 2007.
627 Solomon P. Ortiz, “Statement before US Congress House Armed Services Subcommittee on 
Readiness,” United States Congress, Washington DC, January 31, 2007. http://ortiz.house.gov/
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Army was “consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and [was] unable 
to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies.”628 The 
Secretary of Defense euphemistically mentioned by the end of the year that the Army was 
“out of balance”.
(Source: US Department of Defense)










































































One solution was to increase the size of the Army. Growing the size of the Army had run 
counter to Rumsfeld’s initial idea of transformation where information would substitute 
mass. In 2001 Rumsfeld wanted to decrease the size of the military with 90,000 troops and 
invest in the Future Combat System instead.629 Three years later, troop sizes became the 
dominant topic of discussion in Washington. The small size of the initial invasion force in 
Iraq was to blame for the struggles in the stabilization phase following the collapse of the 
Saddam regime.630 Contrasting Rumsfeld’s initial desire, the Army was now not becoming 
smaller but larger instead (see figure 12). The Army would grow with almost 20% in five 
years time to meet the challenges of sustained operations. 
In 2004, the Army was authorized to increase its force with 30,000 troops. This would 
take some strain off the deployed forces. In December 2006, in the wake of the Republican 
mid-term electoral defeat, President Bush announced a further increase in the baseline 
size of the Army and the Marine corps. During the State of the Union address on January 
23, 2007 the President requested Congress to support an increase over five years by 92,000; 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=284&Itemid=78.
628 General George W. Casey Jr., “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee,” 
United States House of Representatives, Washington DC, September 26, 2007.
629 Tom Bowman, “Pentagon to Consider Large-Scale Troop Cuts,” Baltimore Sun, July 10, 2001.
630 See Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, (New York: Penguin, 
2006).
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65,000 for the Army and 27,000 for the Marine Corps.
The Army cannot grow overnight yet the strain on the force was acute. With lower 
retention rates compounding the problem, growing the force came at a cost in terms 
of quality. Standards of required levels of education were lowered, crime-waivers were 
granted, and signing bonuses were increased to attract new personnel. “The data is crystal 
clear; our armed forces are under incredible strain, and the only way that they can fill 
their recruiting quotas is by lowering their standards,” the chairman of the House Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight said in 2007.631 These develop-
ments compromised the Army’s objective to develop the highly adaptive high-skilled 
Pentathlete forces. Quantity was taking precedence over quality, while in some corners 
there had even been talk of reinstituting the draft.632 
Regarding equipment, the Army had been unprepared for the long sustained use of 
its hardware in trying environments. A report by the Government Accountability Office 
in October 2005 indicated that the high pace of operations and use beyond the planned 
operation of a capability was significantly affecting readiness.633 In 2006 official US Army 
documentation, the Army Posture Statement, noted a reset requirement of “50 brigades 
consisting of over 350,000 pieces of equipment including 615 aircraft, 7000 combat vehi-
cles and 30000 wheeled vehicles.” The New York Times reported on December 5, 2006 that 
approximately 40% of all the Army’s and Marine Corps’ ground combat equipment had 
been deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq and that 280,000 pieces of equipment needed to 
be repaired; among them core assets like M1A1 Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 
Humvees and Stryker vehicles.634 The state of Army material provided a technical assess-
ment of how the Iraq war strategically weakened the Army. Concerns over personnel and 
631 See Eric Schmitt, “Army Recruiting More High School Dropouts to Meet Goals,” New York 
Times, June 11, 2005; Tom Philpott, “Army Signs More Dropouts,” Military.com, November 
22, 2006; Lizette Alvarez, “Army Giving More Waivers in Recruiting,” New York Times, 
February 14, 2007; Josh White, “Many Take Army’s “Quick-Ship” Bonus,” Washington Post, 
August 27, 2007. See also the National Priorities Project, http://www.nationalpriorities.org/
militaryrecruiting2007.
632 In 2003 Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY) introduced a bill to that extent. Rangel’s bill 
was introduced from a socio-economic point of view, saying that if the Bush administration 
wanted to go to war against Iraq, the military should be a more equal representation of society. 
The question reappeared when manpower shortages became apparent in the aftermath of the 
Iraq War. See also Phillip Gold, The Coming Draft: The Crisis in our military and why selective 
service is wrong for America, (New York: Random House, 2006).
633 This concerned key assets such as the Army’s Chinook helicopter. Of the entire fleet only 
70% was mission capable. The capability was being used three times more than planned. The 
M1A1 Abrams tank suffered from technical support staff and overusage and had roughly a 
70% readiness rate in 2004. Other troubled assets were the Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 
Apache Helicopter, flatbed trucks, the Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle and its Assault 
Amphibian Vehicle. Government Accountability Office, “Military Readiness, DOD needs to 
identify and address gaps and potential risks in program strategies ad funding priorities for 
selected equipment,” Washington DC, October 2005. www.gao.gov/new.items/d06141.pdf.
634 Ann Scott Tyson, “US Army Battling to Save Equipment,” New York Times, December 5, 2006.
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material both increased momentum within the Army to draw down participation in these 
sustained missions, and give up on such sustained missions altogether.
13.2.3 Budget concerns for the Army
Compounding the problem of personnel and material readiness were its financial implica-
tions. The financial implications of the ongoing campaigns were staggering. The costs of 
repairing broken material or buying new gear – known as the reset - ballooned after 2005. 
In FY2005 $688 million was earmarked for the Army reset in the bridge fund, an emer-
gency appropriation for the defense budget. By FY2008 the Bush administration requested 
$37.6 billion for resetting equipment. Meanwhile the forces that remained deployed 
continued to grind through material perpetuating a sizeable reset-bill.635 
Additionally, growing the force necessitated structural increases in Army and Marine 
Corps funds. In FY2008 $12.1 billion was requested for increasing the force with 7000 
soldiers and 5000 marines. Extrapolating from that figure, at roughly $1 billion per 1,000 
troops, in the four remaining years some $80 to $90 billion is required to meet troop 
increases of 65,000 Army and 27,000 Marine Corps troops by 2012.636 Because the size 
of many other budget functions is dependent on the end-strength of the services, such 
as equipment, maintenance, construction, salaries and health benefits, the real costs of 
growing the force are much higher.637 Besides, in 2008 Special Operations Forces were to 
be increased with 1890 billets requiring an increase in SOCOM’s baseline funding as well. 
It raised the question whether the war, and with it the Army’s strategic transformation, 
could be paid for? For this there are several reasons. 
There is substantial macro-economic pressure precluding a structural increase of the 
defense budget. Assessments by the Government Accountability Office suggest that an 
increasing US federal budget deficit coupled to an aging population necessitate increased 
federal outlays for Medicare, Medicaid and pensions, and until 2015 funds for national 
defense will be under pressure.638 According to the Congressional Budget Office, on the 
635 By contrast, in peacetime this amount was roughly $2.5 billion and $3 billion yearly. Ann 
Scott Tyson, “US Army Battling to Save Equipment,” New York Times, December 5, 2006.
636 Gordon Adams placed the figure in the same range saying that the Army and Marine Corps 
required between $70 and $90billion over the period 2008-2012 for increasing the force. 
Gordon Adams, “Budgeting for Iraq and the GWOT,” Testimony to the Committee on the 
Budget, United States Senate, Washington DC, February 6, 2007.
637 See also Linda J. Bilmes, Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the 
Iraq Conflict, (W.W. Norton: New York, 2008).
638 The Government Accountability Office analyzed in 2007 that balancing the budget by 2040 
may require “cutting total federal spending by 60% or raising federal taxes to two times 
today’s level.” Mandatory expenditure will increase further as a share of federal spending and 
discretionary spending, including Defense, will take up a smaller share. However, forecasts 
for economic growth show that the fiscal gap is too large and ‘the pie’ will not have grown 
large enough to avoid tough choices. The Office therefore argues that budgets, including 
for defense, will be under stress. See David M. Walker (Comptroller General to the United 
States, United States Government Accountability Office), “DOD Transformation: Challenges 
and Opportunities,” Presentation to the House Armed Service, House of Representatives, 
Washington DC, January 24, 2007.
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basis of these macroeconomic trends the share of US defense spending is calculated to 
decrease from 2007 levels of 4% of GDP to roughly 3.3% in the next ten years.639 The global 
financial-economic crisis further catalyzed this process.
(Source: US Department of Defense & United States Congress)


























































Throughout the Bush administration both military-wide operational effectiveness 
transformation and Army strategic transformation was made possible through substan-
tial budget increases and supplemental appropriations (see figure 13).640 These levels of 
spending must be maintained or hard choices cannot be avoided between pursuing either 
form of transformation.641 As the military looks beyond operations in Iraq and a drawdown 
is initiated, it is to be anticipated that the supplemental appropriations decrease instead of 
remain in the realm of tens of billions of dollars. On this all defense experts interviewed for 
this study agreed. Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, anticipated this 
arguing in late 2007 for a structural 1% of GDP spending increase for defense and warning 
for a peace dividend as the country looks beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.642 
639 Congressional Budget Office, Budget Outlook, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7731/01-
24-BudgetOutlook.pdf. See also figure 17 for a historical table of the US Defense Budget.
640 Supplemental appropriations include Emergency Supplemental funds and Title IX Bridge 
Funds.
641 The Iraq Study Group, the bipartisan commission advising on Iraq policy chaired by former 
Secretary of State Jim Baker and Senator Hamilton, similarly acknowledged that “it will be a 
major challenge to meet ongoing requirements for other current and future security threats 
that need to be accommodated together with spending for operations and maintenance, reset, 
personnel, and benefits for active duty and retired personnel,” noting that “the defense budget 
as a whole is in danger of disarray.” James A. Baker & Lee H. Hamilton, Iraq Study Group 
Report, (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace 2006), p. 76.
642 “Interview with New Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” New York Times, October 22, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/washington/22mullen-text.html?pagewanted=print.
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Given the size of the supplemental appropriations over the period 2002 to 2008 – nearing 
$180 billion in 2008 - it is important to consider their effect on the defense budget. In the 
event that supplemental appropriations collapse, the Army is affected most. 
(Source: Author’s analysis on the basis of United States Congress, Conference Reports on Department of Defense 
Appropriations)
Figure 14: Comparison of share of US Department of Defense budgets allocated to different 
















2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007


















2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Air Force Marine Corps
Figure 14 compares the shares of the entire defense budget the different services have 
received from 2002 to 2007. The graph to the left illustrates the division before taking 
supplemental funding into account. The graph to the right is the budget-share devoted to 
the services including supplemental funding. It becomes apparent that the Army has been 
receiving a steadily increasing share of defense expenditures, at the expense of the Navy 
and Air Force, particularly as a result of supplemental funding.
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(Source: United States Congress, Conference Reports on Department of Defense Appropriations & Author’s analysis)
Figure 15: US Department of Defense Annual Budgets, Supplemental and Emergency 
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Figure 15 demonstrates the percentage share per service per budget function of all funds. 
It includes both regular and emergency appropriations. It however includes a breakdown 
in budget-items. It illustrates how the Army has become the major recipient of defense 
funding, mostly due to increased shares allocated to Personnel, Operation & Maintenance 
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(O&M) and steep increases in Procurement. Only in research and development funding is 
it less than the Air Force and the US Navy. 
(Source: Author’s analysis on the basis of United States Congress, Conference Reports on Department of Defense 
Appropriations)
Figure 16: US Department of Defense Supplemental and Emergency Appropriations Per 
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Figure 16 depicts the percentage share per budget function per service of the supplemental 
appropriations only. It shows that the Army has been the primary benefactor of emergency 
funding, excluding R&D accounts. Whereas the Navy and Marine Corps received hardly 
any additional funding.
In 2006 and 2007 54% and 63% of all Army procurement funds came from the 
supplementals and in 2005 this was roughly half. In the four-year period between 2004 
and 2007 only between 50% and 30% of funds for Army operation & maintenance (O&M) 
was provided through the regular annual defense budget. From 2004 onwards, roughly 
one-third of all the Army’s personnel funds – which includes salaries and benefits-, came 
from emergency funding.643 In short, supplemental funds have heavily benefited the Army 
and any decrease will impact Army operations. 
A lack of supplemental funding puts pressure on the military in another way. In 2008 
supplemental funding climaxed at 20% of the total defense budget.644 This figure paid for 
many programs associated with counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. For instance in 
2006, half of the funds appropriated to procure an essential capability for network-centric 
warfare, the FBCB2 blue-force tracker, came from supplementals and emergency funding. 
In 2006 more than 25% of the funds for Special Operations Command came from the 
supplemental appropriations. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund for 
instance, was fully funded from supplemental and emergency funding. By being funded 
mostly through the supplementals, there is considerable risk that budgetary pressure will 
put some of these counterinsurgency capabilities at risk.645 Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates mentioned that in the supplemental for FY2007 $10.4 billion and in FY2008 $15.2 
billion was earmarked for among others body armor, the MRAP vehicles, non-lethal 
weapons and electronic jamming devices.646 It can be concluded that the Army’s strategic 
transformation has largely been funded through emergency appropriations. 
13.2.4 Technology & Force Protection
The overbearing faith in technology and the linear interpretation of the evolution of 
warfare derived from US strategic culture presented obstacles for the United States to 
adapt to irregular warfare and build stabilization and reconstruction force. And when it 
did it focused on technological solutions to counterinsurgency. We have already seen how 
the threats of IEDs produced a costly technology-driven arms race. US strategic culture 
643 Author’s analysis on the basis of US Congress Defense Appropriations conference reports.
644 In FY 2008 the supplemental request was $141.7 billion while the regular defense budget 
request was $ 481.4 billion. In 2007 36% of total military procurement funding was 
emergency money. A similar figure was provided by Gordon Adams, “Budgeting for Iraq and 
the GWOT,” Testimony to the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, Washington 
DC, February 6, 2007.
645 Other capabilities relevant for fighting insurgencies however, such as UAVs and Special 
Operations Forces were mostly funded through the regular budgets.
646 Robert M. Gates, “Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,” House Armed Services 
Committee, United States Congress, Washington DC, February 7, 2007.
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focused on high-intensity operations and adhered to the notion that technology could be 
a panacea for warfare.647
Effective counterinsurgency operations are based on restrained use of force and 
the subordination of the military instrument to the overall political objective. This runs 
counter to operational effectiveness transformation, which emphasizes precision targeting 
with advanced technology. In late 2005 during the Iraq stabilization phase the US Army was 
criticized for being “too kinetic.”648 Personnel was inclined to consider killing the insurgent 
as the key to a given situation, and “conversely failed to understand its downside.”649 Amer-
ican forces were predisposed to see counterinsurgency operations in the same adversarial 
context as major combat operations. Killing or arresting terrorists was the pre-eminent 
goal and there was a preference for “large-scale kinetic maneuver” in counterinsurgency 
operations.650 A kinetic approach to counterinsurgency was fostered by an institutional 
focus on technology and force protection measures. In the 1990’s force protection had 
been a central element of Operations Other Than War. These operations were considered 
a distraction from the Army’s strategic core business, leading to an emphasis on tech-
nology and choosing the least-risky route for forces deployed.651 Protecting less-than-vital 
interests translated to bombing from 15,000 feet and peacekeeping forces operating from 
well-protected bases far removed from urban centers, virtually excluding interaction with 
the local population.652 Enthusiasm about the Revolution in Military Affairs and opera-
tional effectiveness transformation further stimulated this. Congressional concern with 
force protection was one of the reasons it had endorsed network-centric warfare in the 
first place. The conferees of the 2005 Congressional Defense appropriation accentuated 
that the major benefit of the Stryker infantry vehicles deployed in Iraq was that they could 
“seamlessly review situational awareness and vehicle sensor data in a heads-up mode while 
the vehicle is on the move.” A primary benefit according to the conferees was that this 
“greatly enhanced force protection.” It was the same reason why Congress was quick to 
purchase the mine-resistant vehicles, the MRAPs. While undeniably safer for the soldiers, 
critics warned that there was a price to be paid for increased force protection in a coun-
terinsurgency setting, noting a potentially harmful second-order effect. Due to their bulky 
exterior and small windows, driving around in MRAPs made it difficult to have contact 
647 A somewhat anecdotal indication is that in FY2008, $57.5 million was appropriated for 
research on the “bi-directional English-Iraqi instant language translation system”. It would 
avoid relying on scarce translators in the field. Other items under development were 
biometric devices.
648 The term ‘kinetic’ is US military jargon for conventional operations, such as firing bullets, 
missiles or other projectiles to kill or disable an opponent.
649 Aylwin-Foster (2005), p. 4.
650 Ibid. See also Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, p. 83.
651 Edward Luttwak, “A Post-Heroic Military Policy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 75., no. 4 (July/ August 
1996), pp. 33-44.
652 See also Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and keeping Peace with America’s Military, 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).
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with the local population, even more so than in Humvees. British Brigadier-General Nigel 
Aylwin Foster stressed that: 
In an environment where, above all else, it is imperative that the occupying 
force be seen as a force for the good, it is counter-productive when 
technological solutions are employed that promote separation from the 
population.653 
Also, the fuel consumption of the MRAPs far exceeds that of the Humvees they replaced, 
requiring more fuel transports with accumulating force protection risks.654 Emphasizing 
force protection comes at a cost in counterinsurgency, especially with regards to intel-
ligence gathering and gaining the support of the local population. Counterinsurgency 
doctrine holds that “the more you protect the force, the less secure you are,” making it 
fundamentally contradictory to the US operational effectiveness transformation pursued 
until 2004.655
An additional element impeding successful strategic transformation is the congres-
sional bias against the capabilities required in counterinsurgency or rather, a bias in favor 
of procuring military hardware associated with high-end operations. The role of Congress 
in shaping defense procurement is skewed towards high-technology products and big-
ticket items such as new fighter jets, next-generation aircraft carriers and the Army’s multi-
billion dollar FCS program. Not only are these program backed by significant vested busi-
ness interests and accompanying lobbying power, Congress is keen to use procurement 
orders to provide jobs and income for constituencies. As T.X. Hammes observed, “there 
is no identifiable constituency for the major shifts in personnel and budget required to 
deal with [counterinsurgency].”656 Capabilities for stability operations and counterinsur-
gency require human capital and increases in end-strength more so than big ticket items. 
Jeffrey Nadaner, responsible for planning the Pentagon’s stability operations, likewise said, 
“After major weapons systems have been funded there is very little money left” to set up the 
required infrastructure for stability operations.657
This tenacious grip of technology on the American military-strategic approach had 
been met with criticism, albeit unsuccessfully. Paul Van Riper, the retired Marine Corps 
General, had warned for an over-reliance on technology to substitute boots on the ground. 
653 Aylwin-Foster (2005), p.10.
654 See also, Andrew Krepinevich & Dakota Wood, “Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in 
Complex Irregular Operations,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington 
DC, October 17, 2007.
655 Eliot Cohen, John Nagl, Conrad Crane, et al., “ Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of 
Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (March-April 2006), p. 52.
656 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, (St Paul, MN: Zenith 
Press, 2004), p. 226.
657 Jeffrey Nadaner, “DOD Directive 3000.05 - one year later,” Presentation at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, December 11, 2006.
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Writing in Parameters in 1997 he criticized the American emphasis on high-tech solu-
tions to replace ground forces and stated that, “Recurring proposals to substitute advanced 
technology for conventional military capabilities reflect a peculiarly American faith in 
science’s ability to engineer simple solutions to complex human problems.”658 Van Riper 
was describing the American Positivist idea that by mastering technology it could improve 
the human condition. In the 1970’s historian Russell Weigley termed the US tendency to 
rely on technology as “dangerous” because it gave prerogative to science over art, producing 
a hubristic technology-focused view of history.659 It has implied that when confronted with 
an operational challenge technology was believed to provide the answer. 
13.2.5 Civilian Counterparts?
A further element constraining strategic transformation was the congressional orienta-
tion towards high-intensity conventional operations which posed problems for the devel-
opment of civilian capabilities for counterinsurgency and stability operations. A week 
following Rumsfeld’s declaration of the 3000.05 directive, the White House published a 
directive that intended to address the lack of civilian expeditionary capabilities. National 
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 entitled Management of Interagency Efforts 
Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization decided that the State Department would 
coordinate all government activities relating to stabilization and reconstruction with the 
Pentagon in a subordinate, supporting role. It was the President’s response to improve 
interagency cooperation and prevent a reoccurrence of Iraq’s post-war planning fiasco, 
in which an ill-prepared military had to take up nation-building responsibilities. It led to 
the creation of the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) 
within the State Department. Along with the Pentagon’s support for stability operations 
provided by Directive 3000.05, NSPD 44 offered the policy framework for performing 
stability operations under civilian leadership. One of its hallmark initiatives was to develop 
a standby civilian response corps, a group of civilians with the skills to support stabili-
zation and reconstruction activities and can be deployed abroad. Expertise ranged from 
running a city-council to operating a sewer system. As Michael O’Hanlon argued, in Iraq 
the problem had not been a lack of military forces, but rather a lack of skill-sets in the form 
of “quickly deployable police officers, judges, criminal law experts, and other specialists 
in civil affairs.”660 The civilian response corps received significant political attention. Not 
only was it called for by NSPD 44, it was referenced in the authoritative Iraq Study Group 
Report, mentioned in the President’s 2007 State of the Union as well as in the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s testimony in February 2007. Even Secretary of Defense Robert 
658 Paul van Riper & Robert H. Scales jr., “Preparing for War in the 21st Century,” Parameters 
(Summer 1997), p. 4.
659 R. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p.416.
660 O’Hanlon (2005), p. 53.
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Gates argued for more funds for the State Department.661
Funding proved a severe problem. It would take two years for S/CRS to be allo-
cated initial funds by Congress. By late 2006 S/CRS was staffed with 11 people, yet had a 
mandate to be the military behemoth’s counterpart in stability operations. Only through 
the so-called 1207 section of a congressional amendment introduced by Senator Inhofe in 
2006 was a $100 million transfer authorized from the Pentagon to S/CRS in a rare instance 
of interagency budgetary cooperation. However, by early 2008 the amount received had not 
surpassed $10 million, nor was there structural funding for the agency. In February 2007 
Senators Biden and Lugar had reintroduced a bill from 2004 that would “authorize $80 
million for the operation of [S/CRS] and the creation of a 250-person active duty response 
corps” as well as a 2,000 person standby component. At the time of writing these S/CRS 
funds had not been authorized and S/CRS remained understaffed and underfunded. In 
contrast, in 2006 the Defense Department received additional emergency funding of more 
than $95 billion, while the State Department was waiting for a fraction of that amount.662 
The Pentagon receives roughly 17 times more funding than does the State Department (see 
figure 2). It portrays a structural skewing towards the development of military instruments 
over enabling civilian instruments. The difficulty with which Congress appropriated funds 
to the State Department for stability operations made strategic transformation challenging.
(Source: US Department of Defense & United States Congress)

































































661 Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture, Remarks as delivered by the Secretary of Defense Robert 
M. Gates,” Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/ 
speech.aspx?speechid=1199. Accessed August 21, 2008.
662 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians,” Washington Post, 
February 24, 2007.
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Given the practical difficulties to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the difficulty 
to change the personnel system, the financial pressure, the congressional emphasis on 
major weapons systems, the emphasis on force protection and technology, and the lack of 
adequately sourced civilian counterparts, the Army’s strategic transformation was under 
strain. 
13.3 Back to the Default
An operational necessity triggered the pursuit of strategic transformation. Yet given the 
difficulty to transform the Army towards a force for protracted stability operations, the 
adaptive strategy refocused towards high-intensity operations in the context of irregular 
warfare. This resonated stronger with US strategic culture and the American “way of war”. 
The first step in doing so was to institutionalize the military’s orientation towards irregular 
warfare.
13.3.1 Fighting the Last War?
Secretary Robert Gates embarked on an approach to readjust the military’s –and particu-
larly the Army’s - focus towards irregular warfare. He ran into difficulties as the military 
tried to fight a war it was unaccustomed to. The military’s focus on counterinsurgency and 
irregular warfare had been marginal. Gates scolded the bureaucracy for retaining a focus 
on major theatre conflict: “For too long there was a view, or a hope, that Iraq and Afghani-
stan were exotic distractions that would be wrapped up relatively soon – the regimes 
toppled, the insurgencies crushed, the troops brought home.”663 It echoed a commentary 
following the Vietnam War when Brian Jenkins wrote that, “the war in Vietnam is regarded 
as an exotic interlude between the wars that really count.”664 Gates however, declared that 
due to American superiority adversaries would continue to confront the US in an irreg-
ular manner.665 And so, in 2009 Secretary Gates took several steps to institutionalize the 
Army’s orientation towards irregular warfare. Firstly he cancelled the manned vehicle of 
the Army’s Future Combat System, effectively dismantling the entire FCS program. Gates 
said that the family of eight vehicles, “do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterin-
surgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.”666 General Casey, Chief of 
663 Robert M. Gates, “As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,” Maxwell-Gunter 
Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL, April 15, 2009. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.
aspx?speechid=1344.
664 Jenkins (1970), p. 7.
665 “It is hard to conceive of any country confronting the United States directly in conventional 
terms – ship to ship, fighter to fighter, tank to tank – for some time to come.[…] Smaller, 
irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – will find ways, as they always have, to 
frustrate and neutralize the advantages of larger, regular militaries. And even nation-states 
will try to exploit our perceived vulnerabilities in an asymmetric way, rather than play to 
our inherent strengths. Overall, the kinds of capabilities we will most likely need in the years 
ahead will often resemble the kinds of capabilities we need today.” Robert M. Gates, “Remarks 
to the Heritage Foundation,” Colorado Springs, May 13, 2008.
666 Robert M. Gates, “Defense Budget Recommendation Statement,” Arlington, April 6, 2009.
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Staff of the Army, said of the FCS ground-vehicle cancellation: “The original design of the 
vehicle, and we need to be upfront with this, when we started designing the FCS program, 
it was designed to fight conventional wars, we thought conventional war would be fought 
in the 21st century. That’s clearly changed.”667 The Pentagon leadership underlined that the 
operational environment had changed, and with it the idea underlying transformation. It 
was a major practical step by the Obama administration to shift budget priorities towards 
counterinsurgency and irregular warfare.668 Secondly Gates decided to cancel further 
procurement of the F-22, noting that 187 units of the fifth-generation fighter were suffi-
cient. The original plan, in line with operational effectiveness transformation in which the 
US would remain well ahead in terms of advanced technologies for high-intensity opera-
tions, had called for fifty more. There was obvious resistance to these plans. Michael Wynne, 
the Air Force Secretary under George W. Bush, postulated that the Obama administration 
was focusing on combating groups that posed no strategic threat to the interests of United 
States. Instead he advocated investing in future technologies to counter those states that 
might.669 Gates retorted that: “Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply 
embedded in our budget, in our bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My 
fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support – including 
in the Pentagon – for the capabilities needed to win the wars we are in, and of the kinds of 
missions we are most likely to undertake in the future. “670 It represented one of the funda-
mental dilemmas defense planners encountered, preparing for the future and preparing 
for the current war. The resistance Gates encountered was symptomatic of a movement 
with the military establishment that had coalesced two years earlier, and which empha-
sized a refocus towards high-intensity combat operations and the tenets of operational 
effectiveness transformation. In October 2007 the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Admiral Mullen, sent a memo to the Pentagon brass in which he implored the mili-
tary leadership to take, 
...a larger, longer view of risk assessment that helps us maintain a position 
of global leadership and preserves our freedom of action.[…] The demands 
of current operations – however great – should not dominate our training 
667 Greg Grant, “FCS Not Killed: Casey,” DODBuzz, May 19, 2009, http://www.dodbuzz.
com/2009/05/19/fcs-not-terminated-casey/.
668 Christopher Drew, “Conflicting Priorities Endanger High-Tech Army Program”, New York 
Times, July 19, 2009.
669 “Gates Cuts Leading to ‘Strategic Drawdown’: Wynne,” DODBuzz, April 13, 2009. http://www.
dodbuzz.com/2009/04/13/gates-cuts-leading-to-strategic-drawdown-wynne/.
670 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks at National Defense University,” Washington DC, September 29, 
2008.
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exercises, education curricula and readiness programs. The conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan will one day end. We must be ready for who – and 
what – comes after.671 
Gates by contrast had gone on record stating that a structural focus on irregular warfare 
would be logical: 
...one of the things that I think is very important in the transformation is 
continuing to strengthen our capacity to fight irregular wars. I think that’s 
where the action is going – is most likely to be for the foreseeable future. 
And so it’s very important that it go forward.672
However, for all the attention being paid to the Army’s efforts to pursue strategic transfor-
mation, it was not undertaken by the Air Force or the Navy. In general their focus remained 
on precluding the rise of peer competitor-states. In terms of numbers, with the US Army 
and the US Marine Corps engaged in strategic transformation to irregular warfare, and the 
Navy and Air force retaining an operational effectiveness focus, approximately one-third 
of the active component of the United States forces were engaged in strategic transforma-
tion with two-thirds still pursuing operational effectiveness transformation. Operational 
effectiveness transformation based on high-intensity capabilities remained the dominant 
change strategy. This was also reflected in the FY2010 budget discussions. Conciliating 
his critics, Secretary Gates said only a small amount of funding went explicitly to irregular 
warfare in the defense budget. In his budget statement Gates said it contains “10 percent for 
irregular warfare; about 50 percent for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and 
about 40 percent dual-purpose capabilities.”673 The message was that irregular warfare was 
not the mainstay of the armed forces. Furthermore, maintaining access for global power 
projection remained a prerogative for US defense planning. Michele Flournoy remained 
committed Barry Posen’s concept of the ‘command of the commons’ and wrote: “ensuring 
relative stability throughout the global commons remained central to the maintenance of 
US power and influence in the 21st century.”674 In other words, the mainstay of US defense 
policy remained the maintenance of US primacy, the ability to project power, exploiting 
the global commons, protecting sea lines of communication, maintaining air superiority 
and dealing with anti-access and area-denial threats. 
671 Michael Mullen, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance for 2007-2008,” October 1, 
2007.
672 Robert M. Gates, “Nomination hearing for Secretary of Defense,” Senate Armed Services 
Committee, United States Congress, Washington DC, December 5, 2006.
673 Robert M. Gates quoted by Jim Garamone, “Budget Recommendations Provide ‘Home’ for 
Warfighters, Gates Says,” American Forces Press Service, Washington DC, April 7, 2009.
674 Michele Flournoy & Shawn Brimley, “The Contested Commons,” Proceedings, vol. 135/7/1277 
(July 2009), pp. 16-21.
198 The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally
13.3.2 A Bifurcation Results
It led to a de facto division of labor, with the Navy and Air Force focusing on the potential 
rise of a peer competitor while the Army and Marine Corps concentrated on counterin-
surgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Army leadership underlined that the US Army 
would “remain the pre-eminent landpower on Earth – the ultimate instrument of national 
resolve,” this appeared to be questioned by Secretary Gates.675 Instead, he said that “for 
years to come, the Air Force and the Navy will be America’s main strategic deterrent.”676 
Gates’ reference to “years to come” seemed to imply that the Army would remain focused 
on counterinsurgency. While it was performing operations traditionally considered lesser 
contingencies, not surprisingly voices were heard to refocus the Army to high-intensity 
combat operations. The dilemma was best summed up by Andrew Krepinevich, former 
Pentagon official: 
The best way to assure a central role for ground forces [in the current 
strategic environment] is to tackle the irregular warfare challenge. Yet the 
Army as an institution is most comfortable preparing for traditional or 
conventional warfare.677 
From the Army’s strategic documents it can be concluded that from 2004 onwards there 
was a schizophrenic focus to maintain both conventional dominance as well focus on 
irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations. The key policy documents primarily 
outlined operational effectiveness transformation for the Army to fight the conventional 
war. The Army Transformation Roadmap stated unequivocally that “the primary goal 
of Army transformation is the development of the Future Force — a strategically respon-
sive, precision maneuver force that is dominant across the range of military operations.”678 
It referred to the Future Combat Systems. Similarly, the 2005 Army Strategic Planning 
Guidance declared that “the Army’s ability to dominate any form of the traditional armed 
conflict is a necessary overmatch that we must retain.”679 It added weight to the argument 
that operational effectiveness transformation to sustain strategic dominance was the 
default, while strategic transformation was driven by operational necessities. 
675 Army Vision, as mentioned by Gen. Peter Schoomaker, “Testimony to House Armed Services 
Committee,” United States Congress, Washington DC, February 14, 2007.
676 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks to the Heritage Foundation,” Colorado Springs, May 13, 2008.
677 Vago Muradian, “Is US Army Resisting Irregular War Focus,” DefenseNews.com, October 8, 
2007.
678 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army Operations, Army Transformation Office, 
“United States 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap,” Department of the Army, p. 4-1.
679 Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, December 12, 2005.http://
www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/ the_army_plan/army-
strategic-planning-g.shtml. Accessed September 6, 2010.
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Figure 18: Characteristics of US Transformation
As long as an operational necessity persists for the Army to remain engaged in irregular 
warfare, the US military is bifurcated, with ground elements focusing on irregular warfare 
and others on conventional superiority. This strategic rift runs between the platform-
centric and the people-centric services. It presents a dichotomy between strategic trans-
formation of the Marine Corps and the US Army and continued operational effectiveness 
transformation of the Air Force and US Navy. The de facto division of labor between the 
Army and Marine Corps and Navy and Air Force reflects a geographic division as well. 
While the former are primarily engaged in the region known as the Greater Middle East, 
the latter are occupied with East Asia. Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of Defense for 
Policy, acknowledged in May 2009 that the renewed focus on irregular warfare would 
“pull the Army and the military writ large, in two very different directions.”680 Richard 
680 Michele Flournoy, “Remarks by Michele Flournoy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,” the 
Army Leader Forum, Washington DC, May 4, 2009.
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Kugler and Hans Binnendijk similarly stressed that transformation requires a trade-off 
between short-term and long-term goals by “strengthening US forces for waging expedi-
tionary warfare along the southern arc of instability … while also transforming for new 
operations.”681 Stephen Biddle, a fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, goes one 
step further, arguing for a ‘double transformation’: 
...to avoid defeat in today’s wars may require a more thorough conversion 
to the needs of counterinsurgency, going beyond training and operations…
to weapon acquisition programs, military service budget shares, and even 
promotion priorities we use to shape the officer corps and its skills. But the 
military that results will not necessarily be suited to the demands of the 
postwar world.682
Figure 18 summarizes the dominant elements of the two types of transformation that the 
US military pursues. 
13.3.3 SOF-ING Returns
While the debate raged between the Secretary of Defense and the Pentagon brass, it slowly 
emerged that the US adaptive strategy to irregular warfare was becoming more in tune with 
US strategic culture. The intransigence to develop a stabilization force was a consequence 
of it being contrarian to US strategic culture. Yet by 2006 the Pentagon started to develop 
an approach to irregular warfare which was much more in line with its strategic culture, 
and in line with the initial thinking underlying operational effectiveness transformation. 
The United States Army had focused on sustained stabilization operations and ‘boots on 
the ground’ yet, in close cooperation with Special Operations Command it slowly adopted 
a more narrow SOF-like approach to counterinsurgency missions. It started to emphasize 
direct action against insurgents, while training partner nations in stability operations. It 
would allow the United States to maintain a strategy to focus on adversaries, reduce its 
footprint, as well as emphasize high-intensity operations and avoid ‘doing windows’ by 
outsourcing the bulk of sustained stabilization operations to allies and partner nations. 
Instead of being the main force provider for a stabilization mission, it would be a force 
multiplier, focusing on its high-intensity dimension.
The perception of the strategic environment had shifted and maintaining strategic 
primacy was equated to successfully pursuing irregular warfare as well. Until then as 
John Garstka said, the United States military believed it could afford to lose a stabilization 
campaign, but it could not afford to lose a major conventional campaign.683 On December 
681 Hans Binnendijk & Richard L. Kugler, Shaping Future Defense Budgets, Defense & Technology 
Paper 6, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Washington DC, November 
2004, p. 7.
682 Stephen Biddle, “Funding the US Counterinsurgency Wars,” Expert Brief Council on Foreign 
Relations, June 19, 2009.
683 Interview with John Garstka, Washington DC, December 11, 2006.
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1, 2008, eight years after Operation Enduring Freedom started, the Department of 
Defense officially increased the strategic importance of irregular warfare and counter-
insurgency. In DoD Directive 3000.07, the Secretary of Defense declared that irregular 
warfare: “is as strategically important as traditional warfare.”684 The directive was drafted 
in the same spirit as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that military forces should 
be “as proficient in irregular operations […] as they are today in high-intensity combat.”685 
The directive stated that irregular warfare included “establishing order in a fragile state” 
and summed up skills and capabilities to be improved. This included elements that used 
to be the prerogative of Special Operation Forces such as “train, advise and assist foreign 
security forces” and “through direct or indirect means….support a foreign government or 
population threatened by irregular adversaries.” Irregular warfare gave renewed impetus 
to SOF-ing the force.
The relevance of Special Operations Forces to irregular conflict had already been 
outlined decades before. In 1991 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said intra-state conflict 
would require the abilities of SOF more so than any other service. After all, these contin-
gencies “demanded unconventional solutions and the application of different criteria for 
victory – notably, winning popular support rather than merely capturing and control-
ling territory.”686 Special Operations Forces were considered essential in this regard. They 
could strengthen weak democracies by providing specific assistance including security, 
training, humanitarian and civil-military affairs. Cheney said they are useful for “assisting 
host countries in combating insurgencies, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking and related 
violence.” Even earlier, in 1962, in another clear example of the historical consistency of the 
American transformation debate, President Kennedy promoted counterinsurgency capa-
bilities and SOF when he argued that the United States direct its military attention away 
from purely focusing on conventional warfare and towards unconventional, irregular 
doctrine. Responding to the rise of small wars as a new front in the Cold War, the Kennedy 
administration made it a priority to focus on Special Operations Forces, irregular warfare 
and counterinsurgency, “a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to 
conventional warfare.”687 Kennedy advocated a response that was quick, lethal and stealthy. 
It was reminiscent of the limited, high-intensity role Secretary Rumsfeld had foreseen for 
684 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare: Directive 3000.07, Washington DC, December 1, 
2008.
685 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington 
DC, March 2006, p.42.
686 Richard Cheney, “Annual Report to the President and the Congress 1990” Library of Congress, 
Washington DC, January 1990, p. 96.
687 “This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, 
subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead 
of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. 
[…] It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we 
must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade 
if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and 
therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.” John F. Kennedy, “Address at 
the graduation ceremony at West Point,” West Point, February 6, 1962.
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the US military in conventional operations. The contemporary approach was outlined in 
the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. By 2006 it had become 
the Pentagon’s primary document to pursue the Global War on Terror.688 The strategy 
presented a SOF-like approach to operations in Iraq. High-intensity combat, defined as 
direct or kinetic action, remained the central focus: “the United States, its allies and part-
ners must maintain the offensive by relentlessly finding, attacking and disrupting terrorist 
networks worldwide.”689 Yet it would be accompanied by training local forces and building 
partner capability to enable them to police and stabilize their countries. The Strategic Plan 
notably excluded large-scale sustained US stability forces, which up until then had been 
the defining element of Army strategic transformation. Instead, building proxies across 
the globe to fight the War on Terrorism was the objective. 
It reflected an approach to pursue global terrorist networks, and do so in a manner 
befitting US strategic culture with smaller, lighter and more lethal military forces plugged 
in to local capabilities while investing in training capabilities. It applied to Iraq and 
Afghanistan but also to other locations, such as operations under the guidance of Africa 
Command, which took on a large training mission on the continent.690 The concept was 
based on operations in the Philippines in 2002, in which the United States provided a 
limited contingent of Marines to pursue rebel insurgents in the Southern Philippines while 
simultaneously training the Philippines’ military. With respect to Iraq, it resonated with 
plans to reduce the American presence by handing over responsibility to the Iraqis and its 
security forces, and instead focusing its efforts on training and performing counter-terror 
missions.691 As a key element, in late 2006 a 20,000-strong trainer force was proposed in 
order to meet the requirements of training the Iraqi army.692 By the spring of 2008, the 
688 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, 
Washington DC, February 1, 2006.
689 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington 
DC, March 2006, p.22.
690 See for instance William Ward & Stephanie Hanson, “Interview: Africom seeks military-to-
military relationships,” New York Times, May 22, 2008.
691 “After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting 
the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their 
country. As I have long said, we will retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct 
functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi Security Forces as long as they remain 
non-sectarian; conducting targeted counter-terrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing 
civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35-50,000 
U.S. troops.” Barack Obama, “Responsibly ending the war in Iraq,” Camp Lejeune, North 
Carolina, February 27, 2009.
692 This was one of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report: “The primary mission 
of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take 
over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to 
unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not 
necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq 
could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special 
operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and 
rescue.” James A. Baker & Lee H. Hamilton, Iraq Study Group Report, (Washington DC: 
United States Institute for Peace 2006) p.7, and pp.48-50.
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United States decided to send an additional 1000 trainers to Afghanistan.693 Focusing on 
training and counter-terrorist pursuit is a mode of operations that can best be classified 
as counterinsurgency-lite. According to Thomas Mahnken, deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Planning and Policy, this became the central objective of transformation. He 
said the primary measure of success in the Long War is “how well we enable partners to 
govern their countries.”694 The GWOT Strategy mentioned that “U.S. armed forces often 
contribute best by helping train the forces of other countries for the skills needed to combat 
terrorism.”695 The doctrine focused on the need to “enable partner nations to counter 
terrorism” with the goal to “establish conditions that allow partner nations to govern their 
territory effectively and defeat terrorists.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said training 
other militaries and empowering nations to defend and govern themselves was the “the 
most important military component in the war on terror.”696 He added in 2008 that “many 
of the [required] skills and tasks used to be the province of the Special Forces, but now 
are a core of the Army and Marine Corps as a whole.”697 He emphasized train and equip 
missions, and avoiding costly US military interventions: “Where possible, our strategy is to 
employ indirect approaches – primarily through building the capacity of partner govern-
ments and their security forces – to prevent festering problems from turning into crises 
that require costly and controversial American military intervention”698 The Commander 
of Special Operations Command, Admiral Olson, said it was based on “enabling a state 
to address its security deficit.” It meant persecuting the global war on terrorism by proxy. 
COIN-lite envisaged creating a military that could operate across the globe training, 
advising, mentoring other states to develop counter-terror units, or performing direct 
action. This required a “team of leaders and operators who are comfortable working in 
remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to 
foreign languages and cultures […]”699Admiral Olson, commander of SOCOM, captured 
these objectives under the concept of a ‘Project Lawrence.’700 Developing forces modeled 
after the famous T.E. Lawrence who fought and lived among his allies and who was versed 
693 Victoria Nuland, “The NATO Emerging in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, February 1, 2008.
694 Thomas Mahnken, “Remarks during Global Norms, Organizational Culture, and Military 
Transformation,” Panel at the Annual conference of the International Studies Association, San 
Francisco (CA), March 28, 2008.
695 United States Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military 
Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, Washington DC, February 1, 2006, p.25.
696 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,” 
Association of the United States Army, Washington DC, October 12, 2007.
697 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks to the Heritage Foundation,” Colorado Springs, May 13, 2008.
698 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks at National Defense University,” Washington DC, September 29, 
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699 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington 
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in local language and culture. It dovetailed with US strategic culture by being able to go 
after the “bad guys” through kinetic action, investing in high-tech forces such as advanced 
unmanned platforms, and being a high-intensity force multiplier to local counter-terror 
efforts. It meant operating within the US military’s own comfort-zone of high-intensity 
operations. 
Special Operations Forces thus benefited both from operational effectiveness trans-
formation as well as the strategic imperative to adapt to irregular warfare. Not surprisingly 
Special Operations Command in 2006 became the “supported combatant commander 
for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist 
networks.”701 This was Pentagon-speak for saying the Special Operations Command was in 
the lead. It was the summum of SOF-ing the military. 
US forces would offer local militaries a multiplier effect in the form of unmanned 
precision strike or sophisticated American reconnaissance and special operations capa-
bilities, just as CIA and SOF operatives had enabled the Northern Alliance in late 2001.702 
Such SOF-ing of the war on terror reflected Rumsfeld’s idea of the Afghanistan campaign: 
relying on Special Operations Forces, network capabilities and precision munitions, in 
support of other armed forces. In short, once again the US perspective of warfare would 
be sterile, speedy, surgical, stealthy but was also waged by surrogate forces trained by the 
US. It had all the hallmarks of the philosophy of operational effectiveness transforma-
tion within the paradigm delineated by US strategic culture. It presented an adversarial 
agency-focused interpretation of the US role in counterinsurgency. The focus remained 
on an American style of warfare, emphasizing high-intensity combat operations while 
training friendly forces. As the United States shifted its focus to include irregular warfare, 
it retained an emphasis on the same principles; smaller, faster, and lighter by for instance 
further removing the soldier from the battlefield with the prolific use of drones.703 The aim 
of the strategy is to deal with irregular warfare by having a very small presence. As Michael 
Vickers, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low intensity conflict 
announced in 2009 that within several years the global campaign against terrorism would 
not involve large troop rotations in a select number of theatres but rather small teams of 
Special Operations Forces spread around the globe hunting terrorists or training local 
forces.704 Vickers explained that an ‘indirect approach’ by functioning as a small-scale 
force multiplier to local capabilities, supported by clandestine operations, was the primary 
701 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2006), p. 29.
702 In order to decrease the amount of US forces on the ground and increase the tempo of 
operations, SOF-ing went hand in hand with a closer relationship with the private sector. 
Outsourcing combat support activities to private military contractors increased during this 
period. Even to the extent that CIA and private contractors were cooperating closely in 
counter-terror operations. James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, “Blackwater Guards Tied to Secret 
CIA Raids,” New York Times, December 10, 2009.
703 See also Peter W. Singer, Wired for War (New York: Penguin 2009).
704 Greg Grant, “The Man Behind Irregular Warfare Push: Mike Vickers,” DoDBuzz:Online 
Defense and Acquisition Journal, April 7, 2009. http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/07/the-
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US response to irregular warfare.705 It contrasted sharply to the ‘indirect’ or ‘comprehen-
sive’ approach as understood by European states where the military facilitates develop-
ment, institution-building and reconstruction in a subordinate role to other instruments 
of power. There where technology cannot substitute mass, or quick solutions are not avail-
able, but instead operations have become a slog and long-term deployments are necessary, 
the United States has been and remains fundamentally at unease. 
SOF-ing was also a strategy to minimize the amount of US forces required to reach 
the strategic objective. This was politically, organizationally and financially advantageous. 
But more so it satisfied the American preference to maintain an adversarial focus and to 
emphasize high-intensity operations. On paper, it became an exit strategy from the war in 
Iraq and Afghanistan as it enabled the United States to adopt a lighter footprint and with-
draw forces while empowering the Iraqi or Afghan military to wage stability operations. 
COIN-lite meant that the United States could focus on where its domestic preference lay, 
fighting adversaries instead of patrolling markets and manning checkpoints. 
14 Conclusion of US Case Study
The US transformation strategy was based on making the military more nimble, agile, 
lighter and quick in order to make warfare by the US military sterile, surgical and safe for 
American forces. A preference for high-intensity military confrontations of limited dura-
tion was shaped by US strategic culture. It additionally imbued US security policy with 
the drive to promote American Revolutionary values. In the 1990’s transformation was 
initiated under a constellation of mutually complementary forces. Unipolarity had created 
system-level hubris and the United States believed it had a unique moment to shape its 
environment. The Information Age appealed to American faith in technology and US stra-
tegic culture shaped an emphasis on the use of the military to pursue democracy promo-
tion, including through regime change. Together it produced an adaptive strategy based 
on operational effectiveness transformation whereby military-technological innovations 
would enable the United States to project power and perform interventions at lower costs 
and thereby to maintain a position of strategic dominance. President George W. Bush 
described this poignantly following the Iraq War: “By a combination of creative strategies 
and advanced technology, we are redefining war on our terms [...] more than ever before, 
705 “Dealing with this problem requires, again, looking back at the Quadrennial DefenseReview 
and other documents, fundamentally what we describe as indirect approach…..whether 
we apply [force] principally through ourselves as an instrument or through others that we 
enable in some way. This doesn’t necessarily have anything to say about the kind of power 
that’s applied, that one is more forceful or less forceful than the other, it’s just who is the 
primary instrument. Are we advising, training, enabling, doing something else, are we the 
smaller forces in number relative someone else’s larger forces that we are trying to amplify 
or are we the main force? And a clandestine approach, because much of this war is a war 
in the shadows, and fundamentally an intelligence war.” Michael Vickers, “Building the 
Global Counterterrorism Network,” Statement at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
Washington DC, October 24, 2008.
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the precision of our technology is protecting the lives of our soldiers, and the lives of inno-
cent civilians. [...] In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation.”706 Andrew 
Bacevich commented, rather than seeing the military as a club, as a blunt object, faith in 
operational effectiveness transformation produced an image of the military as a scalpel.707
This policy of transformation however, led to difficulties in response to the challenges 
presented by counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before the campaigns started, 
operational effectiveness transformation had infused the United States foreign policy elite 
with faith that quick military solutions to complex political problems were within reach. 
The reality on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to fit this mold. The case study 
has detailed how this process took shape. Below are presented the responses to the central 
questions underlying this case study, followed by a discussion.
What type of transformation strategy was pursued?
US transformation was a policy of operational effectiveness (type I) transformation to 
improve existing capabilities to perform high-intensity combat operations. This amounted 
to discontinuous change since the military relied on the technologies associated with the 
information revolution and the new doctrine of network-centric warfare. It was believed 
to produce vast improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of military interventions, 
reducing the human and financial cost of waging wars, and thereby shaping the future of 
warfare.
What change in the level of external vulnerability or 
opportunity, forming the transition in the international security 
environment, triggered transformation?
Transformation was driven by a window of opportunity identified to sustain US strategic 
dominance following the end of the Cold War, related to the advent of the Information 
Age. The Information revolution was seen as a sea-change event that – as an early adopter 
- would bestow increased capability on the United States, while unipolarity imbued the 
United States with a sense of power that it could shape the external environment.
What are the characteristics of the strategic cultural factors 
that shaped the transformation strategy?
US strategic culture is characterized by an adversarial approach to security, a belief in US 
exceptionalism producing a steadfast belief in the universal applicability of US values, faith 
in the ability of technology to solve complex social problems, a belief that interventions 
for moral purposes are justified, and that the existential purpose of the US is to contribute 
to spreading freedom and pursue absolute security in which the military is considered a 
706 George W. Bush, “President Bush outlines progress in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” St 
Louis, MO. April 16, 2004. http://georgewbush-whitehouse. archives.gov/ news/
releases/2003/04/20030416-9.html. Accessed October 13, 2009.
707 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: the end of American Exceptionalism, (Metropolitan: 
New York, 2008), p.127.
207Transformation in the United States
crucial component. These elements serve as the basis for justifying the use of the mili-
tary, explain the United States’ interventionist foreign policy and its acceptance of high-
intensity combat as a role for its military. By the late 1990’s and early 2000’s this strategic 
culture found its intellectual medium through the neoconservative movement in US poli-
tics, as well as in the US administration’s military strategic documentation, yet it appears 
throughout US political history.708 The prominence of neoconservative thinking cannot be 
disconnected from US unipolarity.
What did the interaction between the level of external 
vulnerability and strategic culture mean in terms of capabilities?
The objective of operational effectiveness transformation was to improve power projec-
tion capabilities for high-intensity operations. It was premised on the belief that the 
military could be a smaller and more effective tool for shaping the security environment 
and that the human, financial and political costs of an intervention could be reduced. 
To improve power projection, programs were developed to negate anti-access and area-
denial threats. Each service individually incorporated the advances in precision technolo-
gies and network-centric warfare which promised to make forces smaller, quicker and 
able to deploy from greater distance. Particularly the US Army was singled out to adopt 
more SOF-like characteristics, which the new technologies were making possible. The FCS, 
sea-basing and global prompt strike were archetypical programs. The idea behind many 
programs was that they would yield the US such advanced capabilities that they would 
deter an adversary from competing with the US. If that was not enough, the doctrine of 
prevention became the ultimate expression of this type of transformation thinking.
How did further events in the security environment impact the 
transformation strategy?  
Irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan posed a challenge to US military capability and 
it undermined the rationale for - particularly the Army’s – operational effectiveness trans-
formation. The service was ill-equipped to cope with counterinsurgency. The Army initi-
ated a new adaptive strategy to perform sustained stabilization operations. It amounted to 
preparing for a long protracted presence and focusing on state-building and reconstruc-
tion activities. This approach failed to mesh with US strategic culture and proved unsuc-
cessful. The threat environment changed and the military attempted to shift to stabilization 
forces, but US extractive capacity dwindled and it struggled to pursue strategic innova-
tion. Instead the United States formulated an approach to irregular warfare which did 
resonate the tenets of its strategic culture and mirrored the idea underlying operational 
effectiveness transformation; namely to ‘SOF’ the military and become a high-intensity 
force multiplier for local armed forces. Counterinsurgency contains both kinetic and non-
kinetic elements. The former concerns the realm of traditional combat, namely targeting 
specific adversaries. The latter involves winning local hearts and minds through security-
708 Farrell (2005), p.14.
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improving presence and trust-building measures. The United States slowly adopted an 
approach whereby it could continue to focus on technology and high-intensity combat. 
Under a COIN-lite approach strategic transformation was pursued in a way conducive to 
US strategic culture.
US strategic culture did not align with the Army’s initial effort to change its adaptive 
strategy to pursue sustained stabilization operations. It becomes clear that strategic culture 
is a key factor in shaping America’s adaptive strategy to security challenges. 
14.1  Transformation Hubris
The challenge posed by irregular warfare tempered the appeal of transformation. It became 
clear that although the information revolution yielded improvements, these were not 
exclusively to the benefit of the United States and provide it with a panacea nor would they 
make warfare a sterile activity.
Critics had already pointed out the fallacy of focusing too extensively on the tech-
nology for high-intensity operations to yield political success. Referring to the notion 
of information superiority as the basis for strategic dominance Van Riper cynically said, 
“Never saw and don’t believe bytes of information kill enemy soldiers.”709 Similar is the 
parallel with chess, where information is perfect and the positions of all pieces are known 
on the board, yet victory is all but guaranteed. Frederick Kagan has criticized the Penta-
gon’s logic of transformation. He believed it focused overwhelmingly on airpower and 
information technologies at the expense of land power. He identified two primary fallacies. 
The first related to interpreting transformation as an effort intent on improving the speed 
and precision of targeting. Kagan argued that this was only one element in the practice of 
combat and would increase the rate at which “metal” could be put on target but took little 
account of how this would impact an adversary’s political will. According to Kagan, the 
US was trapped in a conventional warfare mindset, in which transformation was intent on 
perfecting that “target-set mentality”. The second fallacy was an overemphasis on the busi-
ness-logic that the military should invest more in those capabilities that have the highest 
marginal rates of return. The idea that because the US was good at applying airpower, it 
should become excellent at it reinforced the military’s emphasis on speed and precision.710 
Kagan’s analysis echoed that of Eliot Cohen when the latter argued that the guided muni-
tions revolution might lead to tactical clarity – namely being able to see and target every-
thing within a 200-by-200 mile box – but “at the price of strategic obscurity.”711 A false 
sense of security and power pervaded US transformation enthusiasts.
A fallacy becomes apparent in relation to American difficulties to respond to the 
challenge offered by militants in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States foreign policy 
709 Paul van Riper quoted in William Arkin, “Spiraling Ahead,” Armed Forces Journal, February 
2006. http://www.afji.com/2006/02/1813685. Accessed February 15, 2010.
710 Frederick W. Kagan, “The US Military’s Manpower Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 4 (July/ 
August 2006), pp. 91-110.
711 Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare” in Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), 
p. 37-54.
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elite was burdened by the cognitive blinders and linear reasoning derived from US stra-
tegic culture which produced a lag in its ability to adapt to the reality of irregular warfare. 
Strategic dominance had been taken for granted and was thought to only be challenged by 
a peer competitor of similar alloy as the US. This came eerily close to a form of groupthink 
shaped by a strategic culture that was biased towards high-intensity combat.
Transformation also reduced the perceived need for allies underlining a unilateralist 
trend in foreign policy. In this it finds support in US strategic culture, which has favored 
the pursuit of strategic freedom of action in its foreign policy, minimizing reliance on allies, 
ever since Washington’s Farewell Address. While the objective of transformation is to 
make the military a more useful instrument for the political elite, US operational effective-
ness transformation gave the false impression that military force – due to its surgical, swift 
and sterile application - could solve complex security issues. It led policymakers to see the 
military as an instrument of choice. Hans Binnendijk, of Washington’s National Defense 
University, warned in 2002 that transforming the US military might make it more usable, 
but this risked creating a situation where policy-makers prefer the military over diplomatic 
means.712 This overbearing belief in transformation eventually led to overstretch where the 
United States claimed full-spectrum dominance and pursued interventionist foreign poli-
cies to pursue regime change with the military. This triggered counterbalancing behavior 
which we see – amongst others - in the form of irregular warfare. 
A 2000 survey among US military officers showed that two-thirds of the officers 
expected the adoption of new technologies to make it easier for the US to use force.713 
It created the political risk that, as Thomas X. Hammes writes, “with the assurance of 
battlespace dominance… political leaders will be more inclined to commit US forces to 
an unclear situation.”714 In other words, the jargon of US operational effectiveness trans-
formation fostered belief in the invincibility of the US military and, in connection with a 
strategic identity which holds that the military can be used to advance the human condi-
tion, the chance to use it increases. As Colin Gray writes, “a problem with [US transforma-
tion] is that it encourages its devotees to overreach with their expectations of consequent 
advantage.”715 Changes in the nature of war may lead to military output falling short of 
expectations, as has been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The promise of transformation had been hyped to such great heights yet the United 
States and its military had failed to anticipate the strategic challenge posed by irregular 
warfare. Von Clausewitz, the seminal strategist and eloquent promoter of the relation-
ship between political interests and the use of force, had already warned for the need to 
factor in strength of motives in warfare which can offset lesser, or weaker military capa-
712 Hans Binnendijk in Binnendijk (2002), p. xxx.
713 Thomas G. Mahnken & James R. FitzSimonds, The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes 
to the Revolution in Military Affairs, Naval War College Newport Papers 17, (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, 2003).
714 Hammes (2004), p. 194.
715 Colin S. Gray (February 2006), p. 11.
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bilities.716 War is not about destroying an adversary’s military, rather it is the activity to 
shape an adversary’s will through the use of the military. Colin Gray writes that “cunning 
and capable enemies fight grand-strategically, not only military-strategically.”717 US opera-
tional effectiveness transformation however was primarily focused on the latter. 
14.2 A Transformation Bubble
The events in Iraq and Afghanistan were akin to the bursting of a transformation bubble. 
In the corporate sector, the Internet proved to be a disruptive technology; it changed the 
way business would be done. Nevertheless the corporate sector had to go through a period 
of trial and error before the true value of the World Wide Web could be asserted. This was 
not appreciated until after the dot-com bubble at the end of the nineties. Initial enthu-
siasm over the Web’s potential trumped a true understanding of its value. At first there 
was wild speculation about “the new economy” which appeared to be producing immense 
profits. Subsequent the dot-com collapse, a reassessment of leveraging information tech-
nology took place. With defense transformation, the bubble burst following the Iraq War. 
Central to network-centric warfare and the American process of operational effectiveness 
transformation was that mass could be substituted by information. As mentioned above, it 
led enthusiasts to believe wars would be clean, short and sterile or non-existent. The Iraq 
War illustrated that reducing the number of boots on the ground brought substantial effi-
ciencies in conventional warfare, but also increased vulnerabilities during the stabilization 
phase if information too severely substituted boots on the ground. As illustrated in the 
chart below, conceptually there are different diminishing returns and different optimums 
at which mass can be substituted for information to achieve greatest military effectiveness 
depending on whether a stability operation or conventional war is undertaken. 
In stability operations, network-centric warfare is useful but in a different way than 
in conventional operations. Enamored by the dreams of pioneering the Information Age 
in practice, where war is reduced to a series of highly precise tactical acts fought by forces 
characterized by speed and stealth, the troubles encountered in stability operations consti-
tuted the bursting of the bubble. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld can thereby best 
be seen as a victim of this speculative bubble of transformation. He foresaw the impact of 
information technologies and pushed the military to adopt them, yet he failed to temper 
his enthusiasm with a dose of realism about the nature of war. Network-centric concepts 
have not been discounted but need to be understood in the wider context of military oper-
ations. A promising field for instance, is networking among different government agen-
cies. Just as bricks-and-mortar industries did not disappear after the rise of the Internet 
but rather corporations reassessed its merits, so too the US military has had to learn that 
716 “If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. 
This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely the sum of 
available means and the Strength of the Will. The sum of available means may be estimated in 
a measure, as it depends (although not entirely) upon numbers; but the strength of volition is 
more difficult to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of 
the motives.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (London: Penguin, 1982), p. 104.
717 Gray (2006), p. 43.
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IT ‘enables’ instead of ‘replaces.’ Boots on the ground will remain necessary, however the 
principles of network-centric warfare promise to create greater efficiencies in each and 
every operation, whether it is major regional conflict or greater situational awareness 
during a stabilization campaign through, for instance, use of advanced unmanned vehi-
cles.718 Information technology leveraged appropriately can enhance the flexibility of the 
military. Network-centric concepts are useful to create greater efficiency. However they 
should be seen for what they are, multipliers not solutions to the nature of human conflict. 
The US Army may have learned this lesson, however the US Air Force and US Navy - and 
therefore the majority of the US military - remain committed to the strategic Holy Grail 
offered by operational effectiveness transformation.
(Source: Author’s Analysis)
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718 For a description of the usefulness of network-centric warfare in complex emergencies see 
M. Cox, “They weren’t going to get this bird,” Army Times, November 22, 2004. See also P.W. 
Singer, Wired for War, (New York: Penguin, 2009) for an assessment of the role of network-
centric assets and unmanned aerial vehicles in counterinsurgency campaigns.

Part 2: 
Transformation in Europe: 
The Netherlands & Germany

The Netherlands: Between 
Relevance and Stability
“Why don’t the Dutch think it’s a good thing to fight Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban?”
 – American official in response to Dutch parliamentary 
deliberations to contribute troops to Uruzgan (2005)
15 Introduction
The end of the Cold War triggered a reassessment of the role of the Dutch military as 
an instrument of state power.719 While in the United States the basis for transformation 
rested on a strategic outlook to sustain US primacy in light of unipolarity and the advent 
of the Information Age, to the Netherlands the change in the security environment led 
to a wholesale revision of its defense and security posture. In 1989 the government had 
already concluded that “international developments and financial constraints constitute 
the pretext for drafting a new defense white paper by the end of 1990.”720 It led to the 1991 
Defense White Paper which formulated a transformation of defense policy based on “a 
thorough review of defense policy, involving reorganization and reductions at the same 
time [...].”721 
As the existential threat of a Soviet invasion and nuclear war receded, the military 
would be used to project stability and strengthen the international rule of law. In 1991 the 
Dutch constitution contained a clause (article 90) which declared the Dutch government 
would actively promote the international rule of law. In 2000, this was specified in rela-
tion to the military. It detailed a specific constitutional role for the military in furthering 
international stability. It reoriented the Dutch military to become an instrument of liberal 
719 Ministerie van Defensie, Defence Priorities Review: Prioriteitennota (Abridged Version), (Delft: 
January, 1993), p.2.
720 “De internationale ontwikkelingen en het vastgestelde financele kader vormen voor de 
regering aanleiding om eind 1990 een nieuwe defensienota uit te brengen.” Handelingen der 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Regeringsverklaring,” vergaderjaar 1989-1990, The 
Hague, pp. 14303-14305.
721 Ministerie van Defensie, Defence White Paper 1991: the Netherlands armed forces in a changing 
world (The Hague: 1991), p.6.
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interventionism in support of the international rule of law.722 This was not only driven by 
concerns over international stability, but also by the Dutch ambition to be part of a core 
group of Western nations that actively shape international relations. After all, making rele-
vant contributions would increase the international political standing of the Netherlands. 
It resulted in a transformation policy whose success was measured not only in the ability 
to perform expeditionary operations but also by how relevant Dutch contributions were 
to allied military operations.723 It consisted of bandwagoning with the principle ally in the 
system while simultaneously supporting balancing initiatives to bring about an interna-
tional system governed by international institutions based on Western liberal ideas. The 
adaptive strategy was thereby not intent on emulating the United States but rather a mix 
between emulation and innovation based on pursuing stability projection.
The Netherlands pursued a policy of strategic (type II) transformation. The benign 
security environment resulted in a debate over the fundamental question what the mili-
tary was for.724 This case study charts the development of Dutch transformation and it 
will be made apparent that although the end of the Cold War was the shift in the level 
of external vulnerability that triggered discontinuous change, Dutch transformation has 
been guided by two features of Dutch strategic culture. When these two tenets of strategic 
culture aligned, the Netherlands could push its adaptive strategy to perform expeditionary 
operations forward, yet when they did not - as a result of an increasingly challenging 
security environment - they produced tension in Dutch security policy. The debate about 
Dutch transformation was a clash between these two central elements and a security envi-
ronment that has become more challenging. The Netherlands has skippered between an 
Atlanticist tradition to bandwagon with the primary security guarantor, the United States, 
which provides the Netherlands with a balance in the European dynamic while improving 
its international stature and influence with the United States, and a continental-European 
orientation which amplifies a normative agenda to promote supranational governance 
and a policy of soft-balancing heavily influenced by the process of European integration.725 
It leads to the Netherlands pursuing the role of a bridge-builder among the greater powers 
in Europe and the United States and promoting the international rule of law, while advo-
cating stability projection rather than power projection. As the European and Atlanticist 
traditions clashed it produced friction over the direction of Dutch defense policy and 
has acted as a constraint on the extractive capacity of the state. Principally this tension 
722 Ministerie van Defensie, Defence Priorities Review: Prioriteitennota (Abridged Version), (Delft: 
January 1993), p.6.
723 “Een krijgsmacht wordt relevanter en bruikbaarder – en krijgt daardoor meer ‘politiek-
militair’ gewicht – naarmate deze beter voorziet in capaciteiten waar internationaal behoefte 
aan is.” Ministerie van Defensie, Commandant der Strijdkrachten, Militair Strategische 
Verkenning 2006, The Hague, February 6, 2006, p.26.
724 Interview with General (rtd) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.
725 Joris Voorhoeve delineates three concentric geographic rings to analyze Dutch security 
policy and makes the case that the Netherlands effectively plays a three-level game on these 
dimensions. The levels are the Benelux, Europe and Global. J.J.C. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profit and 
Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy, (Amsterdam: Nijhoff, 1979).
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has fuelled a domestic debate over developing capabilities for, and participation in, high-
intensity operations. Following the end of the Cold War it has led to emulating elements of 
American network-centric capabilities while similarly distancing itself from the American 
agency-focused approach to military operations. It has led to a pursuit of relevance to US 
military operations, while lambasting the United States for its unilateral approach. This 
tension has become apparent as expeditionary operations have become more challenging 
throughout the late 1990’s and the first decade of the new century. Where it gravitates 
between these two elements Dutch transformation has shown characteristics that may be 
considered schizophrenic. It will be made apparent in the last part of this case study that 
the friction that constrains Dutch transformation is brought about by whether or not to 
take part in high-intensity expeditionary operations.
The Netherlands embarked on a transformation strategy aimed at increasing the 
ability of the Dutch state to provide for its security. Yet as a medium power, it was not 
the Dutch desire to fight wars more effectively or counter a specific threat but rather to 
increase its influence within international, transatlantic and European contexts and do so 
within the context of supporting the international rule of law and projecting a stabilizing 
influence. In a low-threat environment providing credible and relevant contributions to 
crisis-management operations made the military instrument a more useful political tool. 
Transformation thereby had a distinct political-strategic motivation. The Dutch transfor-
mation strategy implied a reorientation away from territorial defense towards a ‘broad 
expeditionary’ force of limited size, able to contribute to operations anywhere around the 
world under all intensities to promote the international rule of law. 
This case study is structured in five chapters, with each addressing a question of the 
structured, focused comparison. The first chapter identifies what type of transformation 
strategy was pursued. The second details the rationale for Dutch transformation and how a 
change in the level of external vulnerability triggered the strategy. The end of the Cold War 
and the process of European integration shaped a benign environment that enabled the 
Netherlands to reassess the foundations of its security policy. The third chapter discusses 
the two main tenets of Dutch strategic culture and how they influenced Dutch transforma-
tion. They relate to the question ‘What are the characteristics of the strategic cultural factors 
that shaped the transformation strategy? These tenets are a structure-based, or institution-
alist, understanding of security policy and an emphasis on stability projection to pursue 
the promotion of the international rule of law, and the pursuit of being a relevant ally. The 
fourth chapter answers the question what the interaction between the trigger for trans-
formation and strategic culture meant in terms of defense capabilities. It describes how 
strategic culture influenced capability decisions and doctrine. The fifth chapter answers 
the question how further events in the security environment impacted the transforma-
tion strategy. It outlines how Dutch transformation was constrained as a result of events in 
the security environment that produced friction with Dutch strategic culture. The events 
that tested Dutch transformation strategy were participation in Operation Allied Force in 
Kosovo, the war in Iraq and most prominently, the deployment to the Southern Afghan 
province of Uruzgan.
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16 Dutch Transformation Defined
In the Netherlands transformation was an instance of discontinuous change in response 
to the system-level changes following the end of the Cold War and shift the military and 
defense policy towards expeditionary operations. It amounted to strategic (type II) trans-
formation and was stipulated in the defense white papers of 1991 and 1993, and given 
shape in subsequent policy papers.726 It was however not called transformation in The 
Hague. The Dutch term for transformation, transformatie, is all but absent in Dutch secu-
rity policy rhetoric. It appears regularly in reference to policy papers about the 2002 NATO 
Prague Summit, describing changes in the Alliance at large, but only once in the context of 
changes in the Netherlands defense policy. In the 2003 version of the Ministry of Defense’s 
Bundel voor Nieuwe Bewindslieden, an introductory document for the new civilian chief 
at the ministry, transformatie is detailed to have started in 1991 and 1993 in response 
to transitions in the international distribution of power.727 While the term was not used 
explicitly, the 1991 Defense White Paper captured the essence of strategic transformation 
by using associated terms such as ‘reorganizing’ and ‘restructuring’. The 1991 White Paper 
was entitled Reorganization and Reductions: the military in a changing world.728 The 
1993 Defense Priorities Review further announced a “reassessment of tasks and size.” It 
signaled the intent to improve the usability of the military instrument to contribute to the 
security of the state. The head of the policy planning unit at the Ministry of Defense, Lo 
Casteleijn, said that: “The major trend in Dutch security strategy has been the shift from a 
military based on mobilizing forces for territorial security to one primed on expeditionary 
forces.”729 Others interviewed for this study specifically pointed to 1991-1993 as the pivotal 
period in which the foundation for transformation was laid. Dutch transformation can 
thereby be understood as the fundamental repositioning of the military from an organi-
zation directed at static defense to a broad expeditionary organization with the ability to 
perform high-intensity operations in response to a new system-wide distribution of power.
726 Interviews with General (rtd) Henk van den Breemen, Vice-Chief of Defense from 1991-
1994 and Chief of Defense from 1994-1998, mr. Robert de Groot, head of the Security Policy 
Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007; mr. Lo Castellijn, head of the Defense 
Policy Planning Staff in 2007, prof. dr. Rob de Wijk who worked on the 1993 Defense White 
Paper; Henk Kamp, Minister of Defense 2002-2007; Maj-Gen (rtd.) F van Kappen.
727 Ministerie vand Defensie, Directie Algemene Beleidszaken, Ministerie van Defensie: Bundel 
voor nieuwe bewindslieden, May 22, 2003, The Hague, p.52.
728 Ministerie van Defense, Defensienota 1991:Herstructurering en Verkleining: de krijgsmacht in 
een veranderende wereld, (Den Haag, 1991).
729 Interview with Lo Casteleijn, September 7, 2007, The Hague.
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17  System-Level Factors that Triggered 
Dutch Transformation
Dutch transformation was triggered by several events that changed the level of external 
vulnerability. First and foremost was the abrupt and fundamental improvement of the 
security environment following the end of the Cold War. This was supported by the 
ongoing process of European integration that stifled intra-European military competition. 
Combined it led to a general discussion over the future of the military. The benevolent 
environment led the Dutch military to pursue a broader security agenda for which an 
appropriate defense organization was lacking. The Netherlands needed to develop expe-
ditionary capabilities and an expeditionary mindset. It amounted to a policy to pursue 
crisis-management operations to contribute to international stability on the one hand and 
to help promote Western liberal values on the other.
17.1 Sustaining Western Power after the Cold War
In Europe, the crumbling of the Berlin Wall led to a general sigh of relief. The events led to 
a profound shift in the international system and a significant improvement in the Neth-
erland’s security position. With the United States as the primary security guarantor of 
Western Europe and its position as military hegemon, European states were more secure 
than they had been for the previous decades. Although threats had dissipated from the 
European theatre, it soon became clear that beyond Europe instability festered. Secu-
rity risks were now perceived in the form of regional instability. A secondary issue was 
to contribute to the continuation of a security environment characterized by Western 
predominance and with it to sustain the credibility of US power to underwrite European 
security. The Gulf War led to concern. Not because The Hague itself was threatened, but 
rather because there was anxiety over what it would mean for the United States’ role as 
global policeman and enforcer of the international rule of law. Frits Bolkestein, MP for 
the liberal conservative party VVD, was a vocal exponent of this view. The Gulf War 
was considered an American war, with Europeans participating out of solidarity. Realist 
considerations to bandwagon with the principle security guarantor were supplemented 
by a liberal interventionist position to promote the international rule of law. Operation 
Desert Storm was considered a test of American global leadership in a post-Cold War 
environment. Failure on the part of the US would imply a failure of global Western domi-
nance, empower dictators around the world and pose a threat to global stability.730 Stability 
of the international system was crucial to protect the rule of law. In other words, American 
success was believed to be of vital importance to advance international stability. Further-
more, the reasoning went that participating alongside the Americans would avoid endan-
730 “Bij dit alles is de rol van de VS cruciaal. […] Als deze zaak slecht afloopt, zou het ernstige 
gevolgen hebben, niet alleen voor het machtsevenwicht in het Midden-Oosten maar ook 
voor de rol die Amerika bereid is in de wereld te spelen. Een slechte afloop nu, kan kleine en 
middelgrote dictatoren met bedreigende wapenarsenalen slechts aanmoedigen.” F. Bolkestein 
(VVD), Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, The Hague, January 11, 1991.
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gering the relationship with Washington.731 Although the Cold War had ended, an interest 
was perceived in supporting the United States’ position to remain the only superpower. The 
Dutch government provided three reasons to participate. Firstly, the necessity to enforce 
a United Nations Security Council resolution. Support for the Gulf War was expressed 
in terms of supporting the rule of law.732 The legitimacy offered by a UN mandate was 
believed to make participation nearly mandatory. Secondly, the “vital interest that Europe 
had in promoting stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty” in an oil-rich region. This 
was essentially an argument based on economic interests. And thirdly, the protection of 
Dutch citizens in Iraq and Kuwait.733 There was also a fourth reason which was given after 
the war ended, namely to support the United States in a show of solidarity to maintain 
US interest in European security. Following the liberation of Kuwait MP Ton Frinking of 
the Christian-Democrats said US participation in European politics was critical to avoid a 
resurgence of power politics on the old continent:
The countries in Western Europe cannot do without each other and Western 
Europe cannot do without the United States. Without the United States 
the old power game as played by the individual European states before the 
Second World War would soon emerge again.734
Thus support of the US was considered a Dutch vital security interest. The government 
decided to contribute naval and air-defense forces including two frigates in the Persian 
Gulf and Patriot air defense systems to Israel.735 Yet for lack of an All-Volunteer Force, 
ground forces were not deployed. Developing a professional military would become one 
of the concrete measures taken with the transformation strategy towards an expeditionary 
force. The lessons of the Gulf War – and particularly the notion that high-intensity warfare 
may still be necessary in a more benevolent unipolar world – informed the process of 
Dutch transformation.
731 Idem.
732 “De inval van Irak in Koeweit is een flagrante schending van de international rechtsorde. […] 
De regering is zich bewust van de gevaren die aan deze missie verbonden zijn. De handhaving 
van de internationale rechtsorde weegt echter zwaar. Nederland kan niet afzijdig blijven.[…] 
De inspanning is nu gericht op vrede en het respecteren van de internationale rechtsorde.” 
Queen Beatrix, Troonrede, September 18, 1990.
733 Tweede Kamer, 21664, nr.1, 1989-1990, August 13, 1990.
734 “De landen van West-Europa kunnen niet zonder elkaar en West-Europa kan niet zonder de 
Verenigde Staten. Zonder de Verenigde Staten zou het oude machtsspel van de afzonderlijke 
Europese staten van voor de Tweede Wereldoorlog weer snel opduiken […].” A.B.M. Frinking, 
“Commissievergadering Defensie,” UCV 51-4, June 10, 1991, p. 7.
735 No ground forces were deployed because there was no volunteer force available. It was 
considered that in defense of the international rule of law only volunteers rather than 
conscripts could be deployed abroad. See Relus Ter Beek, Manoevreren: Herinneringen aan 
Plein 4 (Amsterdam: Balans, 1996), p.49.
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The Netherlands supported the international rule of law from the realist motivation 
that it could moderate the behavior of rogue powers and contribute to global peace. The 
Gulf War, waged under a UN Security Council mandate, was a case in point. The Nether-
lands would participate in operations against rogue leaders that jeopardized the interna-
tional rule of law and regional stability. The vehicle to do so was through alliance with the 
United States. The Netherlands bandwagoned with the United States to preserve the status 
quo. This approach was held to best serve Dutch interests. 
17.2 European Integration
A further trigger for the fundamental reorientation of the Dutch military was that the end 
of the bipolar system allowed a model for promoting Western liberal values to emerge 
in the guise of the process of European integration. European integration had precluded 
intra-European competition through institution-building and by strengthening the supra-
national rule of law. This model of stability could be expanded beyond Europe’s borders as 
the end of the Cold War signaled an opportunity for its promulgation.
Both the fall of the Berlin Wall and the process of European integration had changed 
the calculus of power in Europe. European integration cultivated a stability-focused 
approach to security policy.736 European integration had several immediate implications 
on the European continent: a decisive trend to avoid the use of the military instrument, 
a stronger respect for human rights, and the notion that realpolitik was a lost cause and 
supranational legal regimes constituted a strategic interest instead. It bred support for the 
international rule of law.
The context in which the Netherlands formulated transformation policies was 
shaped by the European ‘post-modern system’.737 The idea of a post-modern system offers 
an explanation how European states have forsaken the military as an instrument to pursue 
their interests in their internal dealings.738 European integration – and with it the dissipa-
tion of the dominant security threat in the European arena – was caused by far-reaching 
economic and legal integration which started with the Coal and Steel Community in the 
1950’s and has been elaborated into an intricate supranational and intergovernmental 
system where elements of national sovereignty are surrendered for the sake of prosperity 
and security. Postmodern security relies on a system of mutual interference through insti-
tution-building, or focusing on the structural constraints which determine the context 
in which foreign policy elites can act. This breeds transparency and trust, de-emphasizes 
territorial sovereignty and merges domestic and foreign policy. The European scholar-
736 See Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on 
Security and Defence in the European Union, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006); Robert 
Cooper, The Breaking of Nation: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century,” (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004); Andrew Moravscik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose & 
State Power from Messina to Maastricht, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
737 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nation: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century,” (New 
York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004).
738 See also James Sheehan, The Monopoly of Violence: Why Europeans Hate Going to War, 
(London: Faber & Faber, 2007).
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diplomat Robert Cooper eloquently described the system of European integration 
whereby security issues are reduced to legal battles and competition policy.739 By changing 
the structure in which European states interacted, European states were able to move away 
from antagonism and towards cooperation. Given that the European Union established 
a regime where international legal frameworks superseded national law, it likewise gave 
rise to emphasize a legal regime that superseded the anarchy among nation-states. The 
European integration process was accompanied by a policy of enlargement, which was 
thereby able to extend the virtues and rewards of European integration beyond its borders. 
This demonstrated the viability of a liberal-European model that could be an alternative 
to an American model of addressing security risks and social progress; juxtaposing the 
liberating force of military power by removing specific actors to changing the structures 
in which foreign policy takes shape.740 In the European model, the military play only a 
subordinate role. Cooper explains that “in the postmodern world, raison d’état and the 
amorality of Machiavelli’s theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in 
the modern era, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international 
relations as well as to domestic affairs.”741 The benevolent strategic environment following 
the end of the Cold War opened the possibility for an expansion and deepening of this 
model and it cultivated the belief among politicians that a world of global governance was 
within reach if the European model could be exported. 
At the supranational level Europe was envisaged as a civilian, not a military power. 
As Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst noted in the 1970’s, 
“only this [civilian] Europe will be an additional force for stability and progress in the 
world, instead of a new factor of uncertainty, disruption and discord.”742 The civilian, non-
military Europe the Dutch government embraced reflected many of the core-elements of 
Dutch strategic culture: emphasizing stability through stimulating institution-building, 
embracing pacifism while shunning power politics, and achieving security ends by being 
virtuous instead of militarily victorious. The European Experiment embodied ideals the 
Netherlands pursued. Voorhoeve declared that “Europe should remain in the pre-federal 
stage and become a liberal, non-military force in the world, pursuing humanitarian objec-
tives,” just like the Netherlands had in mind for itself.743 In fact, as Voorhoeve poignantly 
observed, the history of European integration was reminiscent of the development of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the early 19th century.744 The Netherlands was able 
739 Cooper (2004); Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, & Jaap de Wilde, Security: A new framework for 
analysis, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
740 See also Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, 
(New York: Random House, 2008), p.3-9.
741 Robert Cooper, “The Post-Modern State,” in The Guardian, April 7, 2002.
742 Quoted in Voorhoeve (1979), p 192.
743 Voorhoeve (1979), p.192.
744 “After the Second World War, America tried to promote unity among its West European 
partners, as Britain had forged unity among the Low Countries almost a century and a half 
earlier.” Voorhoeve (1979), p. 288.
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to flourish under the security umbrella of Westminster then, just as Europe flourished 
under the US security guarantee after 1945. The comparison can be extended further. The 
American motive to defend Western European integrity during the Cold War was based 
on its desire to maintain a strong buffer against Soviet expansion, just as the Congress of 
Vienna had formed the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a buffer between the major powers 
of France, the United Kingdom and Prussia. Necessarily it meant that the buffer would be 
a non-military entity. Hence persistent US skepticism over the development of an autono-
mous European defense identity in the 1990’s.745 The success of this structure- and insti-
tution-based system created a zone of peace unique in European history. With the end of 
the Cold War, the model had an opportunity to develop further. It did however present a 
paradox. The peaceful postmodern system was able to flourish only as a result of the secu-
rity umbrella provided by an outsider power, the United States, who did not shun the use 
of the military. It allowed Europe to evolve beyond the modern system by being protected 
from modernity. It explains the essential role the United States has played and continues 
to play in European security and why the Netherlands has both pursued bandwagoning 
to the United States as well as soft-balancing in pursuing the European model of stability 
projection.
European integration also had realist logic. The Netherlands interpreted the process 
of European integration as a way to promote Dutch security. It was similar to promoting 
the international rule of law, a system through which the impact of the major European 
powers could be regulated. As former Minister of Defense Joris Voorhoeve argued: “supra-
nationalism can be a shield under which Small powers can resist political pressure of large 
integration partners.”746 European integration was expressed in defense capability initia-
tives throughout the 1990’s. The UK/NL amphibious force, the 1st German/Dutch Army 
Corps, European pooling initiatives on strategic transport, contributions to EU battle-
groups, the NATO Response Force, are examples of embedding Dutch armed forces in 
transnational structures and commitments to multilateral security structures. Doing 
so creates cost-efficiencies, as well as improves interoperability. Yet, there also is a solid 
political reason involved which fits within the Dutch focus on stability projection. Cross-
European frameworks preclude the renationalization of European defense. Renation-
alization is a concern from a geopolitical perspective, particularly following shifts in the 
international distribution of power. Such shifts, if they trigger a renewed exclusive focus 
on national military structures, could lead to a return to power politics within Europe. 
By integrating European militaries such inward-looking policies are limited. It means 
creating military interdependencies. For the same reason, the Dutch favored that the 
United States remained engaged with Europe since the United States is the guarantor of 
the post-modern system that has taken root in Europe. These cooperative mechanisms 
have an additional benefit that they favor multilateral action. Multilateralism is advanta-
745 At NATO’s 50th anniversary, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke of avoid 
the “three D’s” of NATO by any European Security initiative, referring to no diminution, 
discrimination and duplication.
746 Voorhoeve (1979), p. 189.
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geous for the Netherlands. It fits within the general objective to project stability and protect 
the international rule of law. It is a guarantee against the renationalization of the military in 
Europe, and it enables a check on unilateral tendencies of major powers. Transformation 
enabled the Dutch military to complement the forces of the major powers, and coalitions 
are thereby the primary framework in which the Netherlands’ military can perform opera-
tions.747 Multilateralism thereby is seen as a source of power. Martha Finnemore writes 
that for smaller and medium powers, “multilateralism not only creates opportunity … to 
become involved in military interventions; it also creates a normative premium on action 
by these states as opposed to the strongest states and gives them significant say in the kinds 
of rules that evolve concerning multilateral action.”748 For many states, the argument that 
an intervention has a multilateral character increases the pressure to participate. Playing 
a credible role in these institutions further strengthens the position of the state.749 Euro-
pean integration thus influenced the way in which the military instrument was seen and 
produced an emphasis on promoting the international rule of law through crisis-manage-
ment operations.
17.3 Towards Expeditionary Operations
17.3.1 A Benevolent, but Uncertain Environment
In 1991 the Dutch constitution stipulated that the Netherlands had a role to promote 
the international rule of law. In 2000 the Dutch constitution was amended to contain an 
article that the Netherlands armed forces had three main tasks: to protect Dutch territo-
rial integrity, to support civilian agencies and disaster relief, and to assist in promoting the 
international rule of law.750 In 1991, the low-threat environment in Europe gave rise to 
performing expeditionary operations and promoting the international rule of law became 
a principle reason for which the military was restructured. It took shape in the 1991 and 
1993 Defense White Papers. The end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in NATO’s 
strategy, the benevolent environment and reduced defense spending necessitated reassess-
ments of Dutch defense policy.
Two months after the Gulf War and as revolutionary changes were taking place in the 
Soviet Union the Netherlands published its first post-Cold War Defense White Paper, the 
Defensienota 1991. The document was the government’s first response to a shift taking 
place in the international system. It marked the beginning of Dutch transformation as it 
747 “Mede gezien de beperkte militaire middelen waarover Nederland beschikt, zal het altijd 
uitsluitend met andere landen – dus in enig internationaal verband – optreden. Onze 
deelneming zal dan ook steeds een complementair karakter hebben: zij zal een aanvulling zijn 
op de militaire eenheden van andere landen.” Defensienota 1991 (1991), p. 30.
748 Finnemore (2004), p. 20.
749 Duco Hellema, Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland: De Nederlandse Rol in de Wereldpolitiek 
(Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2006), p.364.
750 See Tweede Kamer, “Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) 
voor het jaar 2004,” vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29200, nr. 2, p. 24.
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provided the fundamental intellectual basis for shifting the military to an expeditionary 
footing.751 The Gulf War had made clear that the improvement of the security situation 
in Europe had not led to a world without crises and armed conflict, instead it gave way to 
uncertainty regarding the type, location and nature of future conflicts and crises.752 It was 
uncertain what this would imply for the use of the military, yet the Gulf War made clear 
that wars would still be fought. The end of the Cold War had given way to a lower-risk, 
but more uncertain security environment. The White Paper announced that Dutch secu-
rity interests could be threatened by activities that were less predictable, less concrete, less 
certain and less defined than they had been before. This implied that the type of conflict 
the armed forces would be called on to address would be of varying intensity. Minister of 
Defense Relus Ter Beek stated that: “one thing is certain, a common characteristic of the 
current security risks is that they are diffuse and unpredictable.”753 Uncertainty became 
a key word for defense planners. Fundamental questions were posed. How to deal with 
uncertainty and how to plan for it? And what did it mean for alliances? The main stra-
tegic question became: what was military force for? Trying to navigate these questions, the 
White Paper noted that three central elements driving change: changes in the Alliance’s 
strategy in response to the positive developments emanating from the Soviet Union, Euro-
pean disarmament initiatives yet mounting security risks outside the NATO area. It led 
to the following logical conclusions. First of all, the chance of a large-scale Soviet surprise 
attack had become unlikely. Nevertheless, the White Paper noted that “the Soviet Union 
remains the largest military power by far in Europe,” thereby warranting continuous atten-
tion and thus that the territorial defense task should not be cancelled altogether. The White 
Paper assessed that although the threat of a major Soviet attack would take several years 
to prepare, a limited incursion by Soviet forces was still possible. At the same time, NATO 
force-structure was reduced under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. It 
led to the mobile counter-concentration concept. The basis of that concept was that 
reduced numbers of allied forces should be able to offset their numerical disadvantage by 
being able to deploy over larger distances to defend allied territory. Rather than massing 
stationary forces, this idea became the prelude to developing mobile expeditionary forces. 
By 1991 the Netherlands was in the process of developing a capability which allowed it to 
concentrate force over relatively large distances, and would be useful in the expeditionary 
age following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The airmobile brigade became the spear-
head of this effort. At the same time, it was made clear that reorganization and restruc-
turing would be necessary and that operations outside the NATO treaty area, for instance 
through the UN, would increase in significance. That same airmobile brigade would now 
play “a key role in the new organization [of the Army].”754 The 1991 White Paper identi-
fied an increased need for forces that were “smaller, more mobile, and more versatile to be 
751 Interview with General (rtd.) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.
752 Defensienota 1991 (1991), p. 5.
753 Relus ter Beek, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, The Hague, June 10, 1991, p. 23.
754 Defence White Paper 1991, p.20.
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able to react to a crisis in the most flexible way possible” and it underlined the increasing 
demand for diverse out-of-area operations to deal with indirect security threats. Flexibility, 
mobility and interoperability were put forward as key concepts around which to restruc-
ture the military. While the context for the discussion was shaped by NATO’s mobile 
counter-concentration and the demise of a Soviet threat, the White Paper hinted that 
changes in the international environment would lead to a reorganization of the military. 
The first tell-tale signs of transformation were present. 
As a function of the benevolent security environment, the Dutch defense budget 
was significantly decreased. A peace dividend was taken and reductions in material and 
personnel were enacted. With 1989 as a reference a real decrease in the defense budget of 
9.1% by 1992 and 18.0% by 1993 was enacted.755 In mid 1990 it was decided to freeze the 
defense budget, and to start reducing it the next year.756 It triggered the need to reassess 
policy. 
With the Berlin Wall turned to rubble, the Netherlands moved beyond a strictly 
adversarial approach of a military aimed at countering a possible Soviet attack. The benev-
olent environment in Europe would allow the Netherlands to focus on security crises 
further away from home. Rather than prepare for war, the military would be an instru-
ment of stability projection. Conform neoclassical realism, it gave rise to the opportunity 
to expand Western influence. Minister Ter Beek hinted that now that the fall of the Berlin 
Wall had renewed the primary security threat there was an opportunity to address those 
other security issues that had been disregarded throughout the Cold War: 
I never defined security narrowly, such as the defense of the homeland or 
the protection of NATO territory. Security was and is for me more than 
the classic defense-task of the military. Now that the threat of large-scale 
conflict with the Warsaw-pact has dissipated, there was a possibility to give 
shape to addressing issues in other parts of the world. […] After the fall 
of the Berlin Wall greater weight could be accorded to peace operations.757 
Since the security environment no longer presented vital security risks, Ter Beek envi-
sioned that the Netherlands pursue an agenda of stability projection through contribu-
tions to both peacekeeping and crisis-management missions. It created a focus on sources 
of instability and on actively promoting the international rule of law. 
755 Prioriteitennota (1993), p. 69.
756 Willeke van Brouwershaven, Turbulentie en Strategisch Vermogen; Strategievorming bij het 
Ministerie van Defensie, (Eburon: Leiden, 1999) p. 152.
757 “Veiligheid definieerde ik nooit in enge zin, zoals de verdediging van het eigen grondgebied 
of de bescherming van het Navo-verdragsgebeid. Veiligheid was en is voor mij meer dan de 
klassieke verdedigingstaak van de krijgsmacht. Nu de dreiging van een grootschalig conflict 
met het Warschapact wegviel, was er ruimte om inhoud te geven aan betrokkenheid op tal 
van andere plaatsen in de wereld.… Na de val van der Berlijnse Muur zou aan vredesoperaties 
een groter gewicht kunnen worden toegekend.” Ter Beek (1996), p. 62.
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17.3.2 A Focus on Structures
Dealing with sources of instability, rather than specific threats or actors, became the 
cornerstone of Dutch security policy following the end of the Cold War. The 1991 White 
Paper identified several sources of instability: economic underdevelopment, rapid 
increases in population growth, non-democratic regimes, ethnic and religious tensions 
which connected to the spread of weapons of mass destruction, all had the potential of 
being globally destabilizing with “political, economic and military” consequences.758 It 
meant that conflicts far away from home would impact Dutch national security because of 
their destabilizing effects that rippled through the international system, particularly as the 
global straitjacket of the bipolar system had been removed. Global interdependence was 
creating mutual vulnerabilities and with it the increased risk of instability: “The security of 
the West, in its broadest sense, is increasingly intertwined with the security in the world 
as a whole.”759
Rather than focusing on particular leaders or regimes and advocating their removal, 
the 1991 White Paper formulated an approach to defense which relied on the develop-
ment of societal structures. The government sought the creation of security by addressing 
structural factors such as disarmament, spreading human rights, and equitable economic 
development: 
The government […] is led by the belief that security is not only benefited 
through credible defense-efforts, disarmament and political dialogue, but 
also through the improvement of democracy, respect for human rights 
and balanced economic development. In general she strives to improve an 
international rule of law that guarantees peace, security and justice.760
In Parliament, during the debate on the white-paper, a similar position was voiced by Ton 
Frinking, MP for the Christian Democrats (CDA).
758 “Buiten ons continent – in het bijzonder in het Midden-Oosten – doen zich 
ontwikkelingen voor die de stabiliteit bedreigen en die hun oorzaak vinden in economische 
onderontwikkeling, de afwezigheid van democratische structuren en etnische en religieuze 
spanningen binnen en tussen staten. Nieuw zijn deze ontwikkelingen niet. Wel zijn ze 
bedreigender geworden door de opkomst van militair sterke regionale machten, die over de 
middelen beschikken om op grote schaal moderne wapens te kopen of zelf te produceren, 
en door de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens en voor de inzet daarvan benodigde 
overbrengingsmiddelen. Regionale conflicten, zoals de Golfoorlog, kunnen in een steeds 
interdependenter wordende wereld gevolgen hebben – politiek, economisch en militair – die 
in grote delen van de wereld voelbaar zijn.” Defensienota 1991 (1991), p. 10.
759 Defensienota 1991 (1991), pp. 28.
760 “De regering laat zich […] leiden door de overtuiging dat veiligheid niet alleen gebaat is bij 
een geloofwaardige defensie-inspanning, wapen beheersing en politieke dialoog, maar ook 
bij het bevorderen van democratie, respect voor de rechten van de mens en evenwichtige 
economische ontwikkeling. Meer in het algemeen streeft zij naar het bevorderen van een 
internationale rechtsorde, die vrede, veiligheid en gerechtigheid waarborgt.” Defensienota 
1991 (1991), p. 10.
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The Netherlands is dependent on a strong im- and export […] The 
concentration of interests of the Netherlands with Europe and the rest of 
the world already indicates, that the current security-interests are not only 
addressed by defending the territory of the treaty, but can more and more 
be influenced by political, economic and military developments beyond it.761
Parliament supported crisis-management operations with the objective to promote inter-
national stability.762 A structural perspective was emphatically promoted by the Labor 
Party (PvdA). MP Maarten van Traa stated that, “security risks of which we speak are in 
first instance caused by the unequal distribution of economic opportunities, knowledge, 
income and power. Much less than before is [security] about the struggle against a military 
power that wants to inflict evil. This is a big difference.”763 Security policy was reinterpreted 
to address global social-economic qualms. Democracy, justice, and respect for Human 
Rights were central objectives to establish an end state of global governance based on the 
international rule of law. As MP Frinking said, the Netherlands’ defense policy focused on 
addressing destabilizing forces and could be used to further the foreign and development 
agenda: 
The armed forces are not geared to specific threats, as during the Cold War, 
but are there for the protection of the treaty-territory and the control of 
crises and other sources of instability. The presence of the Dutch armed 
forces can also be used to support foreign policy and development aid in 
areas where people are in need as a result of political armed conflicts.764
This altruism was a product of what was considered a benevolent security environment. It 
gave rise to a policy to perform out-of-area, expeditionary operations to “manage sources 
of instability”. It would turn out to be a dominant feature of Dutch defense policy for the 
subsequent decade and a half.
Changes in the security environment were proceeding faster than expected in 1991. 
Two years after the white paper was published, the Ministry of Defense produced an update. 
761 “Nederland is afhankelijk van een krachtige in-en-uitvoer […]. De verdichting van de 
belangen van Nederland met Europa en de rest van de wereld geeft al aan, dat de huidige 
veiligheidsbelangen niet alleen in de verdediging van het verdragsgebied liggen, maar meer 
en meer ook daarbuiten kunnen worden beïnvloed door politieke, economische en militaire 
ontwikkelingen.” A.B.M. Frinking, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, June 10, 1991, 
p. 10.
762 A.B.M. Frinking, (CDA) Ibid, p. 7.
763 M. van Traa (PvdA), Ibid, p.20.
764 “De krijgsmacht is niet meer gericht tegen specifieke dreigingen, zoals tijdens de Koude 
Oorlog, maar is er voor de verdediging van het verdragsgebied en de beheersing van crises 
en andere instabiele ontwikkelingen. Het bestaan van de Nederlandse krijgsmacht kan ook 
worden benut ter ondersteuning van het buitenlands en ontwikkelingsbeleid in gebieden 
waar mensen in nood zijn als gevolg van door politiek geweld ontstane conflicten.” A.B.M. 
Frinking, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, June 10, 1991, p.10.
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The 1993 Prioriteitennota, or Defence Priorities Review, carried the sub-title “A different 
world, a different Defense.” It suitably represented the strategic nature of Dutch transfor-
mation based on a re-appreciation of the role of the military in the new environment. In 
1991 a Soviet resurgence remained a distant, but possible event. In 1993 the Cold War 
had truly come to an end. The document spoke of a “paradox of international relaxation” 
because the benevolent security environment did not mean a world without security risks, 
and declared that the international security environment had “fundamentally different 
contours.” The government embraced an activist defense policy as a necessary element to 
pursue the promotion of the international rule of law.765 Flexibility of military capabilities 
became a necessity as type, place and intensity of operations were uncertain and both low-
intensity peacekeeping and high-intensity peace-enforcement were embraced.766 Territo-
rial defense receded to a secondary task while expeditionary operations took center stage. 
An important shift took place in the security discourse indicating the changing nature 
of the environment and the security perception. Rather than discussing specific threats 
to security, the more general and less acute term of security risks was officially adopted. 
Because of these changes Rob de Wijk, then head of the Concepts Division at the Ministry 
of Defense, later referred to the document as “the most important Defense White Paper 
since the end of the Cold War.”767
The document forcefully advanced a liberal-interventionist approach to promote 
international stability by using the military to set the conditions for changing structures 
and institutions: 
Sometimes support from the international community can be indispensable 
in providing humanitarian aid, helping to repair infrastructural and other 
basis facilities and assisting in the return of the populations put to flight. 
It is this international involvement that fosters lasting peace, economic 
development and democratic government.768 
Just as two years earlier, the lack of a specific security threat allowed a broad interpreta-
tion of security. Demographic trends coupled to economic distress and ethnic or religious 
polarization could jeopardize regional stability and cause spill-over effects, while political 
pluralism, rule of law and a market economy could provide stability. The developments 
in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990’s were a case in point.769 Seven years later, 
in 2000 this perspective was reasserted in the next White Paper. The 2000 Defense White 
765 “[…] het streven naar een internationale rechtsorde en naar stabiliteit [is] onverenigbaar met 
een politiek van afzijdigheid.” Prioriteitennota 1993 (1993), p.8.
766 Prioriteitennota 1993 (1993), p.15.
767 Rob de Wijk, “Defensiebeleid in relatie tot Veiligheidsbeleid” in E.R. Muller et al., Krijgsmacht: 
Studies over the organisatie en het optreden (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2004), p.156.
768 Defence Priorities Review- abridged version (1993), p.5.
769 Prioriteitennota 1993 (1993), p. 5.
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Paper expressed that the enlargement process in both NATO and the European Union had 
been important instruments to foster stability and security in Europe and moor Eastern 
Europe to a zone of democracy. It was based on projecting stability by advancing Western 
liberal principles through enlargement. According to the white paper, terrorism and mass-
migration had structural causes such as ethnic conflicts or “religious fermentation.” Secu-
rity in general was defined as a function of international stability rather than a specific 
threat. 
It was a staple for the coming years. The 2000 Defense White Paper, as well as its 
2004 successor, noted that European stability was primarily at risk by what was termed 
an ‘arc of instability’ lying along Europe’s southern and eastern borders. Stretching from 
northern Africa up to the Caucasus, this zone consisted of a multitude of factors contrib-
uting to overall instability: a ‘youth bulge,’ increasing unemployment, political-religious 
radicalism, ethnic tensions and autocratic regimes in the Middle East. The effects of which 
could be felt in Europe since “any intensification of the tensions in North Africa or the 
Middle East can increase the migratory pressure on Europe.”770 Such structural factors were 
putting regional stability at risk.771 Ethnic struggles, religious radicalization, the prolifera-
tion of small arms, demographic trends and economic underdevelopment figured in the 
government’s understanding of the security environment. It would remain so for the 
subsequent decade. 
“The Netherlands is an important and globally operating commercial nation that is 
economically dependent on a stable and flourishing international environment. Politically, 
militarily and socially ‘quiet’ stable resource- and export markets and commercial routes 
are of importance.” Thus begins the 2006 military-strategic assessment by the Commander 
of Dutch Armed Forces, General Dick Berlijn. He asserted that “a stable international envi-
ronment is a vital interest.” The delineation of stability as a vital security interest corre-
sponded with a worldview that viewed international stability and the rule of law as more 
important than actively liberating people by waging war. While stability projection was 
based on Western liberal principles, the means to do so was through addressing structural 
causes rather than using military coercion to topple a government. Rather than be a party 
to a conflict, the Netherlands would be a mediator. Projecting stability required military 
forces that could address crises and stem conflicts before ripples of instability could hit 
the Netherlands. Rather than focus on the potential rise of a peer competitor, it led to a 
focus on crisis-management and peace operations. In addition, to enhance stability, the 
military could not be deployed in isolation or in a purely kinetic fashion. It fostered a 
broad conception of security policy in which the military is embedded in the larger scope 
770 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Defensienota 2000,” vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 900, 
p. 25.
771 “Aside from interests, fundamental values and principles of law can be at stake: in the event 
of massive violations of human rights, forced deportations and genocide. In many crises both 
values and interests are at stake. Both are often related: serious violations of Human Rights as 
in Kosovo often are destabilizing.”Defensienota 2000, p. 42.
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of efforts to promote stability, such as development aid and economic policy. In 2000, the 
Defense White Paper noted: 
The prevention and control of crises demands a broad, integrated 
approach. […] An integrated approach is necessary also for stabilization 
and reconstruction after the cessation of fighting. Diplomatic, economic, 
humanitarian and, if needed, military instruments need to be deployed 
in an integrated fashion. […] Defense and development aid go hand in 
hand.772 
In 2004 this approach was reiterated in a document formulating the Netherlands’ “broad 
and integrated security policy,” rebranded as the 3-D (development, diplomacy and 
defense) approach.773 The first incarnation of a nascent 3-D approach became apparent 
during a major policy review in 1995.774 The policy review was an interdepartmental effort 
with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development Aid and Defense to develop an inte-
grated foreign and security policy combining international economics, development assis-
tance, diplomacy and defense. It epitomized the belief that the military could not be used 
in isolation to solve political problems, but only contribute to setting conditions for its 
solution. Dutch security policy revolved around stability projection since: “security and 
stability create essential preconditions for political, economic and social development.”775 
In addition, European security rhetoric matched the Dutch structure-focused 
approach to security policy. Late 2006 a strategy document was published by the Euro-
pean Defense Agency presenting its assessment of European long-term defense capability 
requirements.776 The booklet, endorsed by the European Council, set forth what it saw as 
the defining trends for defense capability needs by 2025. It is worth quoting for its struc-
ture-focused orientation and its contrast to American rhetoric: 
The global context is sobering, with the central predictions of demography 
and economics foreshadowing a Europe which, two decades hence, will 
be older, less pre-eminently prosperous, and surrounded by regions 
(including Africa and the Middle East) which may struggle to cope with 
the consequences of globalization. Defense will need to contend with public 
finances under pressure from a growing pension burden; a shrinking 
772 Defensienota 2000, p. 26.
773 Tweede Kamer, “Nederlandse Deelname aan Vredesmissies,” vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29521, 
nr.1, April 8, 2004.
774 Tweede Kamer, Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid: Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse 
Zaken, van Economische Zaken, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, van Defensie en van 
Financiën, 24337, nr. 2, 1994-1995.
775 Ibid, p. 7.
776 European Defence Agency, An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and 
Capacity Needs, Brussels, October 2006.
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recruitment pool; and societies increasingly cautious about interventions, 
concerned with issues of legitimacy in the use of force and inclined to favor 
‘security’ over ‘defense’ spending.777
It portrays pessimism about the security environment and the ability to solve security chal-
lenges rather than a virulent belief in strategic superiority and a Pax Americana. But more 
than that, causes for insecurity are deemed to lie in structural factors. Rather than specific 
actors, security risks are identified in the form of trends like demographics, shrinking 
public finances and societal aversion against expeditionary operations. The document 
underscored that military operations are intent on creating conditions for political solu-
tions, rather than military force being the solution itself.
In agreement with neoclassical realism, which holds that a state will advance 
elements of its domestic agenda when its perceived relative power in the international 
system increases, the benevolent security environment after 1991 triggered a military 
change program to actively contribute to expanding Western liberal values and to do so 
through a structuralist approach to support the international rule of law, stability and 
promote liberal institution-building. The Dutch transformation agenda was outlined in 
the first years following the end of the Cold War and entailed performing expeditionary 
operations to manage crises and uphold the international rule of law. The intent for doing 
so was on the one hand to show solidarity with the United States and keep Washington 
engaged in European security. On the other hand, the Netherlands pursued an active 
policy to promote Western liberal values. Not only in the years since the Berlin Wall but 
also throughout its modern history, Dutch thinking on security policy has underlined the 
necessity of stability as an objective. 
777 Ibid, p. 5.
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18 Strategic Culture and Dutch 
Transformation
Dutch strategic culture is based on two tenets that derive from the Netherlands’ geopo-
litical positioning, its status as medium power, its international legal tradition, its maritime 
orientation and its memory of historical prominence. These two tenets are on the one hand 
the preference for stability projection to promote the international rule of law and is repre-
sented in a continental-European approach, and on the other hand an Atlanticist tendency 
which is also reflected in using the military as an instrument to increase political relevance. 
These tenets are derived from an interest-based assessment of the Netherland’s security 
policy, yet they have remained stable over recent decades and their pursuit has become an 
end in and of itself. While the system-level dynamic determines the Dutch approach to 
military policy, the two tenets described above form the strategic-cultural context within 
which the Netherlands is constrained to pursue strategic transformation. They portray a 
mix between Atlanticist and European tendencies, which enable the Netherlands – rather 
than another European country - to play a role as bridge-builder.
That the Netherlands is caught between a more pro-Atlantic and a pro-Europe orien-
tation also becomes apparent from the following survey. A 2004 survey asked European 
and American respondents several questions regarding when the use of force is justified. 
The results of the survey illustrate that the Netherlands echoes both European and Amer-
ican positions. For instance, the Dutch are very European when deploying the military for 
a peacekeeping operation, yet are as militant as Americans in order to prevent the spread 
of nuclear weapons or defend a NATO ally.
When is the use of the military allowed? Europe NL USA
In order to provide humanitarian assistance to victims of war 91% 98% 81%
To provide peacekeeping troops in a post-civil war situation 80% 88% 66%
To prevent a terrorist attack 83% 84% 92%
To stop a civil war 56% 56% 38%
To defend a NATO ally under attack 75% 86% 87%
To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 69% 80% 81%
To guarantee the supply of oil 42% 48% 44%
To remove a government violating Human Rights 50% 53% 57%
(Source:  Nationaal Vrijheidsonderzoek 2003, 2004, as quoted in Philip Everts, “Ontwikkelingen in de publieke opinie,” in 
Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid 2004, p. 224)
Figure 20: Dutch Views Regarding the Use of the Military
A survey is naturally a snapshot of opinions, however the following paragraphs will illus-
trate the structural consistency of both the European and the Atlantic orientations of the 
Dutch security outlook.
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18.1 Stability Projection
“There is probably not a country in the world where girls are so happy to go to school.
Because for years it was forbidden by the Taliban.
In Afghanistan, peace is slowly getting back on its feet.
Also thanks to the Royal Netherlands Air Force.”778
“Everywhere in Afghanistan you still see election posters.
On September 18 the population could vote for the first time in 36 years.
In Afghanistan, peace is slowly getting back on its feet.
Also thanks to the Royal Netherlands Air Force.”
 – Transcripts of commercials for the Royal 
Netherlands Air Force (aired in 2006)779
A fundamental objective of international law is to create stable relations among states to 
avoid conflict and promote peace. The Dutch embrace of stability projection developed 
from a long-standing focus on the international rule of law. A realist argument lay at the 
roots of the focus on stability projection. The Netherlands is not a major power and it finds 
security in a strengthened regime of international law rather than being at the whims of 
the major powers in a system. This is a common position among developed liberal-demo-
cratic medium and smaller powers. 
Given Dutch economic dependence on global trade and international commercial 
relations, the Netherlands had an interest in preserving global stability. An international 
legal framework was considered a Leviathan that could act as a regulatory and moderating 
mechanism. This provided a logical inclination to identify an interest in the development 
of global governance. It also became a justification for interventionism under the pretext 
of owning a higher moral ground as a benefactor of the common good which is inter-
national peace and stability. As a correlate, being an active proponent or even an armed 
promoter thereof, it improved the standing of the Netherlands internationally. It subse-
quently became part of the Dutch strategic cultural vernacular. There where the United 
States emphasized the concept of ‘Freedom’ as a defining feature of its strategic culture, 
the Netherlands portrayed a similar inclination to ‘stability’ and the ‘International Rule of 
Law.’ It can be found in a historically continuous emphasis on structural factors as secu-
rity risks and on the spread of stability as the defining construct for undertaking military 
operations abroad. It has led the Netherlands to cultivate its position as an active protector 
of the international rule of law, for instance by emphasizing that it was the country that 
had brought forth the first international legal scholar in the guise of Hugo Grotius and has 
branded The Hague as the international legal capital of the world.780 
778 Royal Netherlands Air Force advertisement, www.luchtmacht.nl, accessed July 24, 2006.
779 Ibid.
780 This is worthy of consideration, since states with a strong international legal tradition, such as 
Britain and Italy, have not tended to cultivate this tenet of their foreign policy history to the 
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Aside from a defensive-realist response to the international system which relegates 
international law to an instrument for security promotion, the Dutch pursuit for the inter-
national rule of law is not only a means but an end and an element of its strategic culture. 
This part traces its historical roots. 
18.1.1 Appeal of the International Rule of Law
In its foreign and security policy the Netherlands appeals to a tradition of promoting the 
international rule of law.781 As a tangible expression, protecting the international rule of 
law has been codified in the constitution as one of the objectives of Dutch security policy. 
Article 90 of the constitution asserts that “the government promotes the development of 
the international rule of law,” while Article 97 reads that the Netherlands has a military 
to “defend and protect the interests of the Kingdom and to support and promote the 
international rule of law [emphasis added].”782 Joris Voorhoeve has written extensively 
on the roots of Dutch foreign and security policy. He identifies three causes for the Dutch 
orientation to stability. They are maritime commercialism, internationalist idealism and 
neutralist abstentionism.783 Maritime commercialism, particularly during the Golden Age 
hey-days of the 17th century, is a central element of Dutch economic livelihood. It has led 
to identifying a vital interest in stable international relations. The international legal tradi-
tion of the Netherlands, pioneered by Hugo Grotius, was driven by this mercantile orienta-
tion. It promoted checking the great powers through international agreements. Similarly, 
it stimulated the view that commercial ties could increase stability by establishing rela-
tions of mutual dependence. Dutch dependence on merchant shipping further ensured 
an interest in maintaining stability in North-western Europe and to act as a mediator and 
non-partisan in conflicts that stretched as far as the Rhine flows. The Dutch geopolitical 
location in the Rhine delta effectively made it dependent on good relations upstream. 
The shipping tradition also ensured a naval focus as well as open view toward the world. 
Voorhoeve further argued that the Netherlands had a natural orientation away from the 
continent as a result of the historical economic and political predominance of the prov-
ince of Holland and the subsequent perception that the Eastern and Southern provinces 
were merely buffer areas. This imbued it with an Atlanticist orientation. It furthermore 
accentuated the Dutch emphasis on trade rather than territorial expansion. It developed 
an impetus to avoid the use of force in its international dealings, unless it was done collec-
tively thereby providing a natural inclination to favor collective military action rather than 
unilateralism. 
extent that the Netherlands has.
781 P. Malcontent & F. Baudet, “The Dutchman’s Burden” in Bob De Graaf et al, (ed.), De 
Nederlandse Buitenlandse Politiek in de Twintigste Eeuw, (Boom: Amsterdam, 2003).
782 Article 97, de Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden.
783 See Voorhoeve (1979). Similarly Paul Scheffer has called these elements anti-continentalism, 
economic pacifism, emphasis on international rule of law and moral code. Paul Scheffer, Een 
Tevreden Natie: Nederland en het wederkerend geloof in de Europese Status Quo (Bert Bakker: 
Amsterdam, 1988), p. 45.
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Promoting the international rule of law also has a distinct idealist element to it. 
The international rule of law is closely related to the advance of global peace. Voorhoeve 
identified a measure of moral idealism in Dutch foreign and security policy: “Mundialist 
idealism has become an important driver in Dutch foreign policy …characteristic of the 
mundialist view of world politics is the notion of international solidarity.”784 Connected 
to it is a pacifist tendency, which is an underlying objective of international law. Notwith-
standing the declaratory power of supporting international law, by the early 20th century 
the Netherlands had developed a prominent position in the world as a neutral nation and 
host of the Hague Peace Conferences. Following the Second World War, this idealism bred 
respect for human rights, an element that would return in the Dutch tradition of develop-
ment cooperation. 
The third element has been to steer a course of neutralism and to avoid choosing 
sides in the dynamic among the European powers. Throughout the 19th century, Great 
Britain was the de facto guarantor of Dutch territorial integrity. Westminster had a security 
interest in avoiding the rise of a continental hegemon and thereby would not allow the 
breach of Dutch sovereignty. It enabled the Dutch to steer a course of abstentionism in 
European power politics: “Not the virtuousness of the Dutch, but the balance of power [in 
Europe] enabled Holland to abstain from power politics.”785 It did not hurt that the Neth-
erlands could bank on an international legal tradition to promote its position of neutrality. 
(Source: www.mindef.nl)
Figure 21: Dutch Forces Pay Their Respects to a Statue of Col. L. Thomson, Ofcer of the First 
Peacekeeping Operation in Albania (April 2009)
784 Voorhoeve (1979), p. 248.
785 Ibid, p. 48.
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The policy of neutralist abstentionism served a realist purpose as it could be molded to 
meet a domestic ambition. The presumed neutrality in Europe fostered a belief in the 
bridge-building qualities of the Netherlands. This quality could be leveraged to increase 
Dutch influence among the major powers, benefiting its prospects for security as well as 
to improve its international influence. Aside from geo-economic and geopolitical consid-
erations mentioned above, the Netherlands pursued a policy to promote the international 
rule of law because it believed it would accord the Netherlands a stronger position interna-
tionally. Influenced by its position as a medium power in Europe, the Netherlands resorted 
to a policy through which it could make its voice heard. Though geographically of limited 
size, its position in between the major European powers such as Germany, the United 
Kingdom and France ensured a natural disposition to play a role as an intermediary. It 
caused, and was reinforced by, its emphasis on the international rule of law. Promoting 
stability and defending the international rule of law thus had a neoclassical realist logic 
– made up of both domestic and system-level considerations - and performing expedi-
tionary operations with the intent to promote stability became a source through which the 
Netherlands could increase its influence in the international arena. The first indications 
of how this strategic cultural concept would affect Dutch expeditionary operations in the 
early 21st century can be found at the beginning of the twentieth. 
18.1.2 A New Vocation
In 1913 the Netherlands took the lead in what may be considered the first ever peace-
keeping mission. The young state of Albania, having seceded from the Ottoman Empire 
a year before, was beleaguered by its neighbors and threatened to implode due to internal 
turmoil precipitated by non-state actors, such as warlords and bands of irregular fighters. 
It would today be considered a failed state. The major European powers, Germany, Britain, 
Austria and France, decided to install a German as monarch, yet the Netherlands was 
asked to head a constabulary force to keep the peace and stabilize the country. The Nether-
lands was an ideal candidate. It was a medium power, small compared to the three political 
heavyweights and it maintained a policy of neutrality. Its role as host to the earlier Hague 
Peace Conferences demonstrated an internationalist but a non-threatening attitude. It 
meant that Dutch activities in Albania would not be a threat to the maneuverings that were 
taking place on the eve of the Great War and was therefore acceptable to all major powers. 
An added advantage was that due to its colonial experiences in the East Indies, the Nether-
lands had demonstrated it was capable of dealing with foreign, Islamic, cultures and popu-
lations. In November 1913 the first of fourteen officers, two medics and an assistant arrived 
in Albania. The mission soon met disaster. Six troubled months had passed when, as a 
foreboding example of the difficulties associated with complex stabilization campaigns, 
the Dutch commander of the mission Lodewijk Thomson was killed in an uprising on 
June 15, 1914. The event was of little consequences since several days later crown prince 
Franz-Ferdinand was shot in Sarajevo and Europe spiraled into World War I. 
In a eulogy for the fallen commander, Queen Wilhelmina argued that the Dutch 
contingent had been in Albania to bring Western civilization. Throughout the beginning 
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of the 20th century, the Netherlands was engaged in an ethische politiek (ethical policy) in 
the Dutch Indies, promoting liberal values in the Orient including through the military. 
A similar dynamic was at play in Albania. Thomson had written home that, “the era of 
the Middle Ages never seems to have ended in Albania.” The deeper motivation for the 
Dutch mission was more complex. The mission was believed to be a new source of interna-
tional influence for the Netherlands. The international legal scholar Professor Cornelis van 
Vollenhoven voiced it most powerfully in an article written in 1910 (republished in 1913) 
entitled Holland’s Vocation. 
(Source: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 
http://www.inghist.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/lemmata/bwn1/vollenhoven)
Figure 22: Cornelis van Vollenhoven, 1874-1933
In it he argued for a liberal Leviathan, a “supranational community of law in which an 
international fleet of police should maintain order.”786 Van Vollenhoven envisaged an 
impartial international police force which would operate as an international arbitrator to 
enforce the international rule of law. He wrote that the dictum should no longer be: “Si vis 
pacem, abjice arma,” but “Si vis pacem, para exercitum internationalem” instead. Rather 
than disarming, peace could only be achieved through an international armed force.787 
Van Vollenhoven argued that in any such organization, the Netherlands should play a 
central role: “If the topic of a world-organization is an actuality to all Modern States, to us 
786 Quoted in Peter Giesen, “Het Zedelijkste volk op vredesmissie,”De Volkskrant, January 14, 
2006.
787 C. van Vollenhoven, “Holland’s Vocation,” in War Obviated by an International Police (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1915), p.7.
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Hollanders of 1913 it is of vital importance.”788 He argued that the Netherlands should in 
fact provide the bulk of the international police force, because due to its nature the Nether-
lands was the most appropriate state to do so. Major powers were unacceptable, nor could 
it be a “rising country” like the United States. Instead it required a “small state but great 
nation” with a “distinguished and historical ancestry” and one that played a prominent 
role in international discourse. Given The Hague’s role in recent peace conferences, its 
international legal tradition, and its policy of neutrality the Netherlands was most suit-
able to embrace it as a new vocation. Conveniently it would also earn it “self-esteem and 
the esteem of others.” It would allow the Netherlands to act as an essential intermediary 
between the major powers. It was an argument to increase Dutch influence in the interna-
tional system making use of the international rule of law. Van Vollenhoven outlined a role 
for how the military could be more usable to the Dutch state. It was in effect a blueprint for 
increasing the international prestige of the Netherlands. He argued that it was only a ques-
tion whether the Netherlands grasped this opportunity, and with it the chance of playing a 
renewed role of importance on the international scene. The international rule of law thus 
provided a ticket for increased international influence. This first expeditionary operation 
had set the intellectual guidelines for transformation a century later.
18.1.3 Defending the Rule of Law by Force
The Netherlands used the military in support of international legal values. They served as 
the justifying principle. Not only peacekeeping operations, offensive interventions were 
also framed in these terms. Such was the case during the ‘police actions’ in the Dutch 
East Indies. Conceived as a mission to bring order and stability to the Eastern parts of the 
Kingdom, the military operations were the first instance following World War II when 
the Netherlands deployed the military far away from home in a high-intensity offen-
sive operation. Between 1946 and 1949 the Netherlands engaged in a series of military 
operations against nationalist forces in the Dutch East Indies. With the Netherlands in 
shambles following the destruction of World War II, nationalists under leadership of 
Suharto declared an independent Indonesian Republic. The dominant Dutch perception 
held that the nationalists had collaborated with the Japanese during the war and were in 
fact communists rebelling against the de jure Dutch government. It led to the mobiliza-
tion of the Dutch colonial army, the KNIL, to deal with what were called “terrorists” and 
“subversive elements”. A letter from the Government to each individual soldier deployed 
to the East Indies offered a justification for the mission based on the collapse of stability. 
The justification presented a structuralist focus of the security risks. Order had collapsed, 
which had been exploited by spoilers:
The Japanese occupation and its consequences – lawlessness, terror, poverty, 
hunger – destroyed the foundations and disintegrated social order. This 
situation did not end with the Japanese surrender. Too many irresponsible 
788 Cornelis van Vollenhoven, “Holland’s Opportunity,” in Annie Wood Besant, Theosophist 
Magazine July 1913 – September 1913 (Whitfish, MT: Kessinger 2003), p.798.
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elements – unfortunately part of every nation – took advantage of the 
disorder and the lasting defencelessness of their own people.789 
In total more than 100,000 Dutch troops participated in the subsequent occupation in 
parts of Sumatra and Western Java. The war was framed in legalistic terms, a tenet reflected 
in calling the war ‘police actions,’ and given the missions names such as “Justice and Secu-
rity” and “Law and Order”. The casus belli was considered to be Sukarno’s failure to abide by 
the rule of law. According to the ministerial minutes, Minister Lambertus Neher of Recon-
struction and Housing argued first that the constitutional agreement between the Neth-
erlands and the local population, known as the Linggadjati, warranted military enforce-
ment.790 It was seconded a few weeks later by Prime Minister Louis Beel. Respecting the 
constitutional agreement meant a willingness to defend it by force. 791 A “military mission 
with a policing nature” would be the result.792 
Dutch politicians made an important side-note. While the military would be used, 
it would not be a war. It was a policing mission. The euphemistic label was used to avoid 
a public outrage, since it was considered unacceptable that the Netherlands wage a war 
in the aftermath of the destruction of the Second World War. The term ‘police action’ 
advanced the image that the Netherlands was upholding the rule of law, something that 
was considered acceptable. Throughout subsequent military operations, in its outward 
justification and rhetoric, the Netherlands maintained it was not a war-fighting nation, 
opting for terms such as police-actions, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian interven-
tions or stability operations instead. 
In 1946, the Dutch cabinet also prescribed the military-strategic implications of 
performing a ‘police action’. To avoid the perception of a war, politics intervened in mili-
tary strategy. More than a month before the operation took place Minister of Overseas 
Territories Jan Anne Jonkman made clear in the ministerial council that the objective of 
the military campaign would necessarily fall short of seeking the destruction of the lead-
789 Letter Published in Garderegiment Prinses Irene, Van Arnhem tot de Poentjak: Herinneringen 
aan het 421e Bataljon Garderegiment Prinses Irene. Nederland-Indonesie: Maart 1948 – 
Augustus 1950 (1951), pp. 68.
790 “Als doel van een eventuele actie is toen duidelijk gesteld: het verkrijgen van de armslag welke 
noodzakelijk is om ons verblijf in Indie te verzekeren ter realisering van de verdere naleving 
van Lingadjati.” Nationaal Archief, Inventaris van de archieven van de Raad van Minister 
[Ministerraad], June 16, 1947.
791 “Nederland moet niet schromen de consequenties te trekken uit voortdurende 
onmogelijkheid langs de weg van onderhandeling tot een goede uitvoering van Linggadjati te 
geraken en had zij op grond van Haar alomvattende verantwoordelijkheid ermede rekening 
te houden, dat zij gedwongen zou kunnen worden als uiterste maatregel, Haar militaire 
machtsmiddel aan te wenden, zij het zo beperkt mogelijk.” Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, 
vergaderjaar 1946-1947, The Hague, July 10, 1947, p.2044.
792 “Indien dus de regering der republiek niet bereid of in staat mocht blijken tot uitvoering van 
Linggadjati mede te werken dan zou met behulp van een militaire actie van politionele aard 
het onhoudbaar karakter van de noodtoestand moeten worden opgeheven ….” Ibid, p. 2044 & 
2045.
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ership, located in Djokjakarta. If not, the government could not plausibly deny waging 
a colonial war. While he advocated a robust military intervention to demonstrate Dutch 
military superiority, it should fall short of the destruction of the city.793 It contrasted with 
the opinion of the commander of the colonial army who had said in May 1947 that if mili-
tary action were taken, the “natural strategic objective” would be Djokjakarta as it formed 
the core of the resistance.794 Vice-premier Willem Drees supported Jonkman’s position 
and said that the military should avoid the city.795 Well aware of the necessity to maintain 
the apparition of non-war, the cabinet ministers agreed not to mention the term “mili-
tary action,” and speak of “policing” or “police action” instead.796 A similar appeal was 
later placed to the media.797 Thus began an operation to occupy parts of Western Java and 
Sumatra which required more than 100,000 troops yet avoided the Indonesian Republic’s 
capital in Djokjakarta, and was a war but could not be called one.
18.1.4 Support for international institutions
The United Nations provided the international legal forum within which the Netherlands 
could play an important role, and potentially develop on the Dutch idea to create an inter-
national police force. In contrast to the League of Nations, the United Nations Charter 
did contain mechanisms for collective security. According to the Dutch government the 
creation of the United Nations would contribute to the promotion of peace and security 
on the basis of law and justice.798 Throughout the negotiations over the UN Charter the 
Netherlands was a supporter of limiting the power of the larger states. While they right-
fully had a permanent seat in the Security Council, the Netherlands wanted to introduce 
checks on a potential dictate of the major powers. The Hague was of the opinion that 
influence in international affairs was not only a question of military power, but should 
793 “Als noodgedwongen tot militaire actie moet worden overgegaan, kan, naar het oordeel van 
Minister Jonkman, de doelstelling niet inhouden de vernietiging van de Republiek. Daarmede 
zou men onvermijdelijk, althans propagandistisch onwederlegbaar, in een koloniale oorlog 
vervallen. Blijft dus over de mogelijkheid van beperkte militaire maatregelen [...] zulk een 
operatie moet overigens aan de Republiek een overtuigend beeld geven van onze militaire 
meerderwaardigheid, nog steeds wordt door de Republiek de eigen militaire kracht gevaarlijk 
overschat.” Ministerraad, June 2, 1947.
794 Lt. Gen. Spoor, quoted in P.M.H. Groen, Marsroutes en Dwaalsporen, (Historical Section of 
the Royal Netherlands Army, 1991), p.86.
795 Groen (1991), p.93.
796 Ministerraad, July 17, 1947.
797 Ministerraad, July 21, 1947.
798 “Nederland, dat zich in het verleden voortdurend tot taak heeft gesteld in de internationale 
samenleving der volkeren bij te dragen tot den opbouw van een vreedzame internationale 
wereldorde, zal ook thans naar vermogen krachtig samenwerken met al die landen, die 
eveneens den wederopbouw en de bevestiging van vrede en veiligheid willen dienen op 
grondslag van recht en rechtvaardigheid.” Opening of Government of July 23, 1946, quoted 
in Alfred van Staden, Een Trouwe Bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantisch Bondgenootschap 
(Baarn: In den Toren, 1974), p.16-17.
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also be measured by the morale and willingness to consistently defend the rule of law.799 
Resonating Van Vollenhoven’s argument, this would give influence to smaller powers with 
an activist foreign policy. Such as the Netherlands. As an example of the desire to keep 
the major powers in check the Netherlands tried, to no avail, to have the United Nations 
Charter create a council of eminent men – rather than national representatives - to oversee 
the resolutions of the Security Council.800 
In 1950 North Korea invaded its Southern neighbor. The United Nations Security 
Council subsequently mandated a military intervention to repel the attack. In justifying 
participation alongside the United States, the Netherlands said it was protecting the inter-
national rule of law. The government mentioned the need for an “international police force” 
to enforce peace. Marinus Van der Goes MP, the Labor party leader of the second largest 
party in Parliament quoted the US ambassador to the United Nations when he said, “the 
invasion of the Republic of Korea […] is in fact an attack on the UN itself.”801 Comparable 
to operations in the East Indies two years earlier, the operation was not considered a war 
but a ‘police action’ instead. This time to enforce a Security Council mandate to restore 
the international rule of law in support of the principles outlined in the UN charter.802 Van 
der Goes explained that by its very nature a police mission could not be a war: “if I speak 
of police, and in this case of a policing action, it is clear that this is not war, for none of 
the countries involved.”803 The statement reflected the dominant rhetorical construct of 
stability projection; that the Netherlands does not use the term ‘war’ to describe its inter-
ventions is a tradition rooted in Dutch strategic culture. Since the dominant paradigm for 
Dutch interventionism is to promote the international rule of law and project stability, and 
since warfighting and breaching the sovereignty of another state is contrary to interna-
tional legal principles and promoting stability, Dutch strategic culture holds no place for 
war and if an intervention is sanctioned by the UN it cannot be ‘war’ but a policing action 
instead. Avoiding the term ‘war’ also frames the strategic discourse on security policy, as 
it constrains Dutch strategic thinking when contemplating high-intensity expeditionary 
operations. ‘War’ is a laden term as it conjures images of aggression, destruction, human 
rights violations and occupation, just as the Netherlands experienced through the Second 
World War. A liberal-democratic nation would not perpetrate such acts. Nevertheless, the 
strategic cultural resistance to ‘war’ dates from at least the First World War as the Neth-
erlands promoted itself as a neutral country, rather than a potential aggressor, seeking a 
global role at the vanguard of the international rule of law. 
As the Korean War proceeded, the coalition had reason to believe that the Chinese 
799 Van Staden (1974), p.18.
800 Voorhoeve (1979), p. 202-206.
801 Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, vergaderjaar 1949-1950, The Hague, June 30, 1950, p. 2117.
802 J. Hoffenaar and G. Teitler (eds.), De Politionele Acties: Afwikkeling en Verwerking, 
(Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1990), p. 169.
803 “Indien ik spreek van politie en in dit geval van politiedwang, is het duidelijk dat dit niet 
is een oorlog, voor geen enkele der betrokken landen.” Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, 
vergaderjaar 1949-1950, The Hague, June 30, 1950, p.2117.
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were party to the conflict. In December 1950 the main concern was potential Chinese 
involvement in the war. The US commanding General Douglas MacArthur argued in 
favor of bombing Manchurian airports and infrastructure. Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Dirk Stikker, who had initially shown reluctance to deploy Dutch troops to Korea, now 
displayed a near automatic belief in the legitimacy of the United Nations and the legiti-
macy it offered to use the military. In this regard Stikker felt that acting against China was 
entirely contingent on whether the United Nations passed a resolution to that end: “If a 
resolution was adopted in the General Assembly [subsequent to a Soviet veto in the Secu-
rity Council] to that extent, war against China would be justified.”804 It presented further 
indication of the authority of international regimes in Dutch strategic considerations. 
18.1.5  A Global Order
Throughout the Cold War, the ideal to create a system of global governance along the lines 
articulated by Van Vollenhoven remained intact. In 1968 the Dutch government outlined 
its long-term security objectives and the role it envisioned for the Netherlands in interna-
tional relations. The Policy paper on NATO and Defense Policy (Nota inzake de NAVO 
en het Defensiebeleid) outlined the main norms and values to be furthered by the Nether-
lands in the international realm. The document resonated Van Vollenhoven’s earlier decla-
ration that the protection of international legal regimes was a strategic interest. The paper 
mentioned that all foreign and security policy should be directed at achieving an end state 
of a global order founded in international law: 
The eventual key objective of the Government’s foreign policy is the creation 
of an international order based on the rule of law…The Government’s 
entire policy, in all its facets, and also with regards to NATO, is directed at 
reaching that objective.805 
The Dutch government envisioned the development of a world government of sorts, the 
creation of a “collective government that has sufficient means to enforce the rule of law if 
necessary.”806 Unilateral use of force would neither be authorized, profitable, nor possible 
804 “Indien de Algemene Vergadering echter een resolutie inzake de aanwijzing van China 
als aggressor zou aanvaarden zullen de landen van de VN China moeten gaan bestrijden.” 
Ministerraad, December 4, 1950.
805 “[…] Het uiteindelijk hoofddoel van het buitenlands beleid der Regering [is] de vorming 
van een geheel in het recht gegrondveste internationale orde […]. Op dit einddoel wordt 
het gehele beleid, tot in al zijn onderdelen gericht en derhalve eveneens het beleid dat met 
betrekking tot de NAVO wordt gevoerd.” Tweede Kamer, “Nota Inzake de Navo en het 
Defensiebeleid,” vergaderjaar 1967-68, 9635, The Hague, June 20, 1968, p. 9.
806 “In een internationale rechtsorde […] zal essentieel zijn dat de betrekkingen tussen de 
eenheden die gezamenlijk de wereldgemeenschapvormen, door een sluitend stelsel van 
rechtsregels worden beheerst, waarbij de gemeenschappelijke overheid over afdoende 
middelen beschikt om naleving van deze rechtsregels zo nodig te kunnen afdwingen. 
Eigenmachtig gebruik van geweld in het verkeer tussen de samenstellende dele van de 
wereldgemeenschap zal niet geoorloofd, en ook niet lonend, of zelfs mogelijk behoren te zijn.” 
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in a constellation where a world government had a Leviathan force. And in such a collec-
tive framework based on international law the West in general and the Netherlands in 
particular would have a considerable say over global affairs. Western civilization, with 
its fundamental respect for legal principles, and the rich international legal tradition in 
the Netherlands would make anything less unthinkable.807 The paper posited the creation 
of such an international system to be the final objective of its foreign and security policy. 
International legal regimes would create a peaceful and stable world. But in such a global 
regime based on international law the Netherlands would have a prominent and influen-
tial position. The international rule of law had become both a means as well as an end.
Contributing to the international rule of law, projecting stability and being part 
of a quasi-international police force were part of the Dutch aspiration to play a role of 
significance in the international arena. It was realism wrapped in the mantle of idealism. 
Lacking a position of military power, it pursued a policy to nullify the military power of 
others through international regimes. It was termed the “shield of the weak.”808  It enabled 
claiming the moral higher ground. The Netherlands would be the most virtuous, rather 
than the most powerful of nations.809
18.2 Being Relevant
The second element of Dutch strategic culture that shaped the Dutch transformation 
strategy to develop a broad expeditionary force was the Dutch pursuit of international 
political relevance, particularly with respect to the primary security guarantor in the 
system, the United States, and using the military as an instrument to increase it. Stability 
projection and the promotion of the international rule of law were a means to increase 
Dutch influence internationally, yet from the latter half of the 1990’s onwards, as expe-
Nota Inzake de Navo en het Defensiebeleid (1968), p. 9.
807 “Gegeven het karakter van de Westerse beschaving, waarvan eerbied voor het recht als 
fundament van menselijke gemeenschap een essentieel bestanddeel uitmaakt en waarin het 
ideaal van een wereldrechtsorde zijn oorsprong heeft gevonden, kan zelfs worden gesteld dat 
in zulk een orde, en trouwens ook op weg daarheen – de westelijke landen een rol van zeer 
bijzondere betekenis zullen hebben te spelen.” Nota Inzake de Navo en het Defensiebeleid 
(1968), p. 38.
808 “…toen kracht ontbrak, schoot de jurist de diplomaat te hulp. Nederlands natuurlijke 
belang zich te onttrekken aan het machtsspel der ‘Groten’, vertaalde zich in het streven de 
machtsfactor zélf te neutraliseren, een andere grondslag te zoeken voor het interstatelijk 
verkeer. Men vond deze in de objectieve norm van het recht. Nederland omhelsde de 
arbitragegedachte, ‘het schild der zwakkeren.’” A. Eyffinger, “Moraal uit Noodzaak: het 
Nederlands buitlands beleid en de internationale rechtsorde” in R.E. van Ditzhuijzen et al 
(eds)., Tweehonderd Jaar Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Den Haag: 1998), p.152.
809 The historian W.J. Hofdijk wrote in the late 19th centruy : “Wij hebben eenmaal de zee 
beheerscht, en volkeren de wet voorgeschreven. Wij hebben Europa en de wereld doen 
spreken van, doen buigen voor den leeuw van Nederland, omwapperd van zijn driekleurige 
banier. Dat behoort tot het verledene, dat keert nimmer weder terug – en behoeft ook niet 
terug te keren. Een andere toekomst ligt voor ons [...]het is schooner het zedelijkste dan het 
machtigste volk ter wereld te zijn.” Quoted in H.J.G. Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet!: de 
maritieme bewapeningspolitiek van het kabinet –Ruys de Beerenbrouck en het succesvolle verzet 
daartegen in 1923, Proefschrift Universiteit van Amsterdam, May 8, 1984, p.7.
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ditionary operations became more challenging, a metric for the success of Dutch trans-
formation was the extent to which Dutch military contributions were relevant to major 
military partners.810 It became manifest through the notion that the Netherlands would 
be part of a so-called “A-team”; having the capabilities for, as well as have the political will 
to participate in, high-intensity expeditionary military operations.811 Underlying it was an 
element of strategic culture whose roots lie in bandwagoning. These paragraphs detail the 
structural persistence of bandwagoning with the United States as a foundation of Dutch 
security policy.
The relevance of a smaller power in an environment characterized by Western liberal 
interventionism is measured in terms of willingness to participate in operations alongside 
the major allies; the willingness to engage in high-intensity or initial-entry operations and 
developing the necessary military capabilities to achieve this. The pursuit of relevance took 
shape by being a good ally and making relevant contributions which would increase the 
political credit of the Netherlands. A healthy relationship with the United States would 
keep the United States committed to NATO, improving the Netherlands’ ability to protect 
its vital security interests and reducing the risk that the United States exclusively relied 
on London, Paris and Berlin as European interlocutors. Bandwagoning has its roots in 
a solid Atlanticist tradition of foreign policy. A close relationship with the United States 
would give the Netherlands greater leeway among the powers in Europe. It constituted a 
hedging strategy. There was concern over the possibility that if the United States dealt with 
Europe it would only approach Paris, London and Berlin. By proving itself a relevant ally, 
The Hague could make its voice heard.812
18.2.1  Bandwagoning: an expression of expeditionary solidarity
As a smaller power the Netherlands voiced realist concern over its relations with the 
major power in the system. In 1946, the police actions in the East Indies brought system 
level considerations to bear as The Hague considered the impact its actions would have 
on relations with Washington. Should they be informed prior to the operation or asked 
for approval? Minister of Foreign Affairs Pim van Boetzelaar was asked by the cabinet to 
assess getting Washington’s a priori approval to avoid “a catastrophe” to the Dutch inter-
national image.813 The cabinet’s final position was to inform London and Washington ipso 
facto of the ultimatum announced to Suharto, assuming that London and Washington 
810 Commandant der Strijdkrachten, Militair Strategische Verkenning 2006, February 6, 2006.
811 Frank de Grave, “Remarks of the Minister of Defense at luncheon for Vereniging van 
Europese Journalisten,” November 18, 1999; Interview with Henk Kamp, November 29, 2007, 
The Hague.
812 Alfred van Staden, Een Trouwe Bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantisch Bondgenootschap 
(1960-1971), (Baarn: In den Toren, 1974).
813 “Acht minister van Boetzelaer het mogelijk om vooraf overeenstemming met Engelend 
en Amerika te bereiken over een miltiaire actie? Anders kan een militair ingrijpen tot een 
catastrofe voor ons land leiden “ Ministerraad, June 19, 1947.
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would accept a police action to combat extremist elements and terrorists in the name of 
order and stability. 
Throughout the Cold War bandwagoning gave rise to solidarity with the United 
States and NATO. The new configuration of the international system sustained an Anglo-
Saxon dimension in Dutch security policy. While earlier the United Kingdom had been 
the de facto security guarantor of the Netherlands, it was now the United States. A healthy 
relationship with Washington would also be the primary hedge against the rise to domi-
nance of one of the larger powers in Europe and US strength was an insurance policy for 
stability in the international arena. 
As the risk of Soviet expansionism into Western Europe increased, and two opposing 
ideological blocs took shape, it became apparent that the global collective security organi-
zation, the United Nations, would not be effective at promoting peace and stability. Instead 
the Security Council remained burdened by dead-lock throughout the Cold War. Instead 
the NATO alliance was created as primary protector of Western European security inter-
ests and Western military postures were primed for territorial defense. NATO became 
the vehicle through which the United States was integrated in the European security 
dynamic and strengthening the alliance became equivalent to safeguarding the relation-
ship with the American superpower. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk Stikker, speaking at 
the signing ceremony of the Washington Treaty in 1949, stressed that the United Nations 
and NATO were complementary and that the latter was a necessary instrument to achieve 
the enduring peace envisioned by the former.814 In Stikker’s speech traces can be found 
of the international police force Van Vollenhoven envisaged to support a world governed 
by international law. A functioning NATO alliance could contribute to the protection of 
the international rule of law, particularly if it could stop Soviet expansionism. In itself this 
would contribute to Dutch security. Solidarity with NATO and protecting the principles 
formulated in the UN Charter became central tenets of Dutch security policy. The Korean 
War provided the first example that solidarity in NATO implied solidarity with the United 
States. It was a principle that would later be repeated during operations in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan. A year after the signing of the Washington treaty, the Netherlands partici-
pated in its first international expeditionary operation following the end of the Second 
World War. While it was not a NATO mission, NATO solidarity figured prominently 
in the rationale to deploy forces. The outbreak of hostilities in the Korean peninsula in 
1950 was perceived to be the result of communist expansionism, the precise reason for 
why NATO had been founded in Europe. Given the unusual circumstances in the UN 
Security Council due to the absence of a Soviet veto, a resolution was passed that called 
for “all necessary means” to be used to counter the North Korean advance. In response to 
814 “The Treaty we are about to sign marks the end of an illusion: the hope that the United 
Nations would, by itself, ensure international peace. Regretfully, we were driven to the 
conclusion that the Charter, though essential is not enough in the world as it is, to protect 
those vital principles for which we of the Western world who have gathered here, stand. 
Therefore, we felt it our duty to make this Treaty. So far from merely marking the end of an 
illusion it most especially marks the birth of a new hope of enduring peace.” quoted in Van 
Staden (1974), p.20.
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a request by the American ambassador in The Hague, the Dutch government signaled its 
intent to contribute to the international military operation. The government was explic-
itly concerned with the credibility of the US security guarantee for Europe if the US was 
not successful in Korea. If the United States did not come to the aid of the South Koreans, 
Prime Minister Willem Drees and Minister Stikker said, one needed to wonder whether 
Washington would come to the assistance of other states facing a similar threat.815 It led 
Drees to declare the interventionist principle that “Europe is being defended in Asia.”816 In 
Parliament Marga Klompé of the catholic KVP party concurred: “that which takes place 
in East Asia can tomorrow become the fate of Europe.”817 If East Asia would become 
communist, it would lead to a tremendous weakening of the West, Prime-Minister Drees 
explained.818 Failing to contain communist expansionism would weaken the West and 
jeopardize Dutch security. Therefore, Drees stated, troops and weapons should be made 
available for Korea.819 He continued that containment was only possible if the ‘free world’ 
collectively stood up against the aggressor. At the same time ‘free’ states must realize that 
solidarity should be actively pursued or each state will be victimized one by one.820 Having 
grossly underestimated the force of the North Koreans in the first stages of the war the 
United States was confronted with heavy human casualties and terrain loss. The United 
States turned to its European allies for support in a classic plea of burden-sharing. What 
did an alliance amount to, if it was only the Americans that were suffering casualties for 
the sake of the greater good of international stability? In the Dutch Ministerial Council, 
concern was expressed that the Americans might wonder why Washington should support 
Western Europe in times of danger if those countries were not prepared to support the US 
now.821 Both for its rapport with the United States as well as for its international image 
it was important to show the Dutch flag.822 The plight of South Korea became essential 
to European security. Peace, according to Dress, could only be guaranteed if aggression 
was confronted collectively.823 Thus support for the US in Korea was driven by concern 
over the Netherland’s own security interests. As we have seen above, following the end of 
the Cold War, in the run-up to Operation Desert Storm Dutch politicians used a similar 
argumentation to support the US-led operation; showing solidarity elsewhere as a means 
to maintain US participation in European security.
On July 3rd 1950 the Dutch ministerial council proposed sending the frigate Evertsen 
815 Ministerraad, June 26, 1950.
816 Ministerraad, December 11, 1950.
817 Idem.
818 Idem.
819 Ministerraad, December 23, 1950.
820 Remarks by Prime Minister Drees, Tweede Kamer, Handelingen vergaderjaar 1949-1950, The 
Hague, June 30, 1950, p.2128.
821 Ministerraad, August 7, 1950.
822 Ministerraad, August 2, 1950.
823 Idem.
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to the Korean theatre. The cabinet stated that its contribution was ‘symbolic.’ Ground 
forces could not be deployed as they were necessary for domestic territorial defense.824 
Yet discussion over a possible ground contingent persisted. More than a naval contin-
gent, solidarity would be confirmed through ground forces. Yet consensus in the Cabinet 
was absent. Minister Stikker said he preferred a humanitarian contribution with Dutch 
ambulances, while Minister of Reconstruction and Housing Joris In‘t Veld mentioned 
that the government should not be dissuaded from sending military forces to Korea since 
it concerned an appeal by the United Nations.825 Minister of Social Affairs Adolf Joekes 
proposed sending the marines which were the most mobile, expeditionary unit of the 
Netherlands armed forces.826 Prime Minister Drees however made clear that he was not 
willing to deploy conscripts to Korea, especially without the approval of Parliament.827 But 
Drees made an important exception, for “if the United States requested a volunteer force 
it would constitute a different situation.”828 It offered a convenient way out. It absolved the 
government from deploying conscripts, yet it allowed the Netherlands to show solidarity 
in response to a direct appeal from the United States. It also meant that the Netherlands 
could make itself directly relevant to the United States. When such a request came, the 
cabinet decided on August 28, 1950 to send a battalion of 600 forces to Korea.
Parliament supported the decision wholeheartedly. The Catholic party, the largest at 
the time and a member of the governing coalition, was a vocal proponent of the mission. 
MP Marga Klompé, the party leader, voiced her support for what she saw as a test-case 
for the free democratic world to avoid another ‘Munich’. Failure in Korea would lead to 
a defeat for all freedom-loving people, she said. It was a “challenge for the free democratic 
world…which under any condition cannot be lost.”829 MP W.H. Beaufort, a senator from 
the Catholic party cited the medieval philosopher Saint Augustine by emphasizing soli-
darity with Korea and collective security as a justification for Dutch participation: “he that 
is able and does not avert the injustice perpetrated on a neighbor is as guilty as the perpe-
trator himself.” 830 
824 “De Minister President is van oordeel dat Nederland geen troepen kan zenden aangezien met 
het oog op de eigen defensie geen mensen kunnen worden gemist, terwijl ons land de kosten 
evenmin zal kunnen dragen.” Ministerraad, July 17, 1950.
825 Ministerraad, August ,7, 1950.
826 Idem.
827 Idem.
828 Ministerraad, July 17, 1950.
829 “Wij zien het gebeurde op Korea als een test-case voor en tevens een uitdaging aan de vrije 
democratische wereld. […] deze steekproef [mag] onder geen voorwaarde slagen. Dit zou 
immers niet alleen noodlottig zijn voor Korea, op dit moment, maar ook voor de gehele 
gemeenschap van vrijheidlievende volken.” Tweede Kamer, Handelingen vergaderjaar 1949-
1950, The Hague, June 30, 1950, p. 2115.
830 “Wie, schoon daartoe in staat, een den naaste treffend onrecht niet afwendt, staat evenzeer 
schuldig als de onrechtpleger zelf.” MP W.H. Beaufort, Eerste Kamer, Handelingen, 1949-1950, 
The Hague, July 18, 1950, p.857.
249Transformation in Europe: The Netherlands & Germany
Throughout the Cold War the Netherlands remained firmly pro-American. The Soviet 
Union was the primary threat and the United States The Hague’s primary security guar-
antor. The Netherlands was a loyal ally.831 In 1961 State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hans 
van Houten asserted that in fact the security of the Netherlands could only be provided by 
the United States: “Nothing can change the Government’s conviction that under current 
circumstances the guarantee of Dutch territorial integrity can only be secured through 
defense cooperation with the USA.”832 According to Alfred van Staden, Dutch distrust of 
Soviet intentions was as strong as faith in American security guarantees.833 The world was 
contextualized within the bipolar struggle and the government supported NATO policies 
to achieve military strategic parity with the Soviet bloc, approving substantive defense 
investments.834 This attitude was reflected in the Netherlands structurally appropriating 
more than 4 percent of its GDP to defense expenditures, a level never reached following 
the Cold War.835
18.2.2 The 1995 Policy Review
As mentioned above, Operation Desert Storm had demonstrated a persistent willingness 
of the Netherlands to participate alongside the United States. Yet there remained concerns 
over the direction of US-European relations following the shift in the international system. 
If Europe and the United States started to drift apart because their natural alliance during 
the Cold War had come to an end, than the Netherlands needed to reassess its own Atlan-
ticist orientation. In the mid 1990’s an attempt was made to bring about a change. Changes 
in the distribution of power signaled that Europe was at risk of becoming a strategic back-
water, at the expense of increased attention for Asia and the Middle East. Concerns were 
rife that this would lead to decreased interest from the United States in European security 
matters. In 1995 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo, initiated a reappraisal of 
Dutch foreign policy. The Herijking, or Foreign Policy of the Netherlands: A Review, was 
driven by these “changing external circumstances,” amounting to a new calculus of power 
in the international system.836 It fit within the overall context of strategic transformation 
described by the 1993 Defense Priorities Review as it took stock of the “acceleration of 
political and economic processes of change” following the end of the Cold War. However it 
831 Van Staden (1974), p.42.
832 ““De voornaamste taak van buitenlands beleid dient te bestaan uit de handhaving van 
de nationale integriteit. Niets kan de regering afbrengen van haar overtuiging dat onder 
de huidige omstandigheden de garantie hiertoe slechts kan worden gevonden in de 
defensiesamenwerking met de Verenigde Staten van Amerika.” State Secretary Van Houten, 
Eerste Kamer, Handelingen, 1960-1961, The Hague, May 24, 1961, p.329.
833 Van Staden (1974), p. 52.
834 As quoted in Van Staden (1974), p.60.
835 Van Staden (1974), p. 171.
836 Tweede Kamer, Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid: Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse 
Zaken, van Economische Zaken, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, van Defensie en van 
Financiën, 24337, nr. 2, 1994-1995.
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drew a continentalist conclusion. Van Mierlo declared that the rapid rate of change meant 
that “the long-term has become the short-term” and that recalibrating Dutch foreign policy 
priorities and moving away from an Atlanticist focus was called for.837 He recommended 
a shift away from a reliance on the United States and an embrace of continental Europe, 
specifically calling for closer relations with Germany and France. 
Instead of observing the rise of a unipolar system based on US hegemony, the 1995 
policy review assessed that “on the whole developments are pointing in the direction of 
a multipolar international system without clear leadership.”838 The Herijking anticipated 
that US prominence would be short-lived and the persistent role of the United States in 
European security, irrespective of European shows of solidarity, was in doubt. American 
isolationism was foreseen. Secondly, following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, European inte-
gration was on the one hand given a new impulse with the plan for a European security 
and defense pillar but on the other hand, due to the enlarged membership, the government 
anticipated that the supranational, communitarian level would diminish in importance at 
the expense of intergovernmental European relations.839 It meant that the major powers 
in Europe would be more influential. The Herijking presented an outlook on European 
foreign and security policy where Europe was characterized by “less structure and more 
competition.” To make due, it required the Netherlands to refocus its security attention 
towards Europe and coming to terms with its traditional anti-continental perspective. Van 
Mierlo wrote: “It is clear that under these circumstances the Netherlands cannot stand with 
its back against the continent.”840
The 1995 Herijking policy review stated that “a European center of gravity should 
be much more pronounced in our policy than before – if not out of ideal than out of 
necessity.”841 It announced renewed bilateral relations with Germany and France as the axis 
Bonn-Paris was considered critical to any European security initiatives. An authoritative 
report by the scientific bureau of D66, the party from which Foreign Minister Van Mierlo 
hailed, argued in preparation of the Herijking that “the Netherlands must strive to actively 
influence the politics of France and Germany in order not to be marginalized.”842 Holding 
837 Ibid, p. 2.
838 “Per saldo wijzen de ontwikkelingen dan ook in de richting van een multipolair internationaal 
stelsel zonder duidelijk leiderschap.” Ibid, p. 4.
839 “Zowel het communautaire stelsel als het Amerikaanse NAVO-leiderschap schermden 
in de naoorlogse periode ons land af tegen de machtsverschillen in het nieuwe Europa...
Beide factoren zullen naar verwachting minder prominent figureren in het nieuwe Europa. 
Nederland wordt daardoor meer blootgesteld aan de machts- en belangenverschillen tussen 
Europese landen.” Ibid, p. 8.
840 “Het is duidelijk dat Nederland in deze situatie niet met zijn rug naar het continent kan staan.” 
Ibid, p. 8.
841 “het zwaartepunt Europa zal in het beleid nog krachtiger moeten worden aangezet dan 
voorheen – zo niet uit ideaal dan toch uit noodzaak.” Ibid, p. 13.
842 “Nederland dient te streven naar actieve beinvloeding van de politiek in Frankrijk en 
Duitsland om niet te worden gemarginaliseerd.” Rob de Wijk, M. de Kwaasteniet, M. 
Groothuizen, Nieuwe Prioriteiten in het Buitenlands Beleid: Projectgroep Herijking Buitenlands 
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on to its Atlanticist tradition risked reducing the Netherlands to the periphery of Europe.843 
Security independence from the United States would instead be realized through a nascent 
European Security and Defense Policy.844 
This security policy reappraisal never quite took off. The Herijking was an attempt to 
reorient foreign policy towards the European Union, yet Dutch strategic culture invariably 
resisted a clean break with its Atlanticist roots. Nor was the European Union yet an effec-
tive security actor which offered an alternative. The events at Srebrenica in 1995, as well 
as the persistent instability in the Balkans demonstrated that European states remained 
incapable of keeping their house in order, and were reliant on persistent US military 
support. Neither were relations with France and Germany easily intensified. Particularly 
with the former there were many political obstacles to overcome including differences 
over domestic policy on soft-drugs, immigration and strong resentment over the French 
continuation of nuclear testing. Critics also questioned the inevitability of US isolationism 
and the ability of the Netherlands to obtain political influence over France and Germany.845 
Instead a balance was sought between an Atlanticist and a European position, a posi-
tion where the relationship with the United States was reasserted while simultaneously 
strengthening the development of a European security identity. In its essence it was quint-
essentially Dutch as it became an expression of hedging, while strengthening its traditional 
policy to be a bridge-builder between states.846 
In addition, throughout the 1990s the intensity of the conflicts to which Dutch forces 
were deployed was increasing. The events at Srebrenica made it clear to all concerned that 
relative risk-free peacekeeping was no longer a possibility. Peace-enforcement and human-
itarian interventions in hostile areas started to take place. Events from 1995 onwards, and 
particularly the 1999 war in Kosovo, made it clear that high-intensity capabilities were a 
necessity in order to project stability and as a correlate that the United States remained 
critical to European security. September 11 further dissipated the belief in a benevolent 
security environment.
Instead support for an Atlanticist position became more pronounced. The inability 
to fully integrate the findings of the 1995 foreign policy review, as well as the persistent 
Beleid, Stichting Wetenschappelijk Bureau D66, vol. 4, no.1., (June 1995), p. 35.
843 “Vasthouden aan de traditionele transatlantsiche relatie en anti-continentale houding 
marginaliseert Nederland in Europa.” Ibid, p. 14.
844 “De European mogen er niet van uitgaan dat de Verenigde Staten steeds voor hen de kastanjes 
uit het vuur zullen halen.” Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid 1995, p. 17.
845 Peter Baehr, Erik Visser, “Eigenzinnig internationalisme is Nederlands kans in Europa,” De 
Volkskrant, July 24, 1995.
846 The bridge-building function of the Netherlands is also expressed in the Dutch military’s 
Atlanticist as well as continental orientation. The Air Force cooperates traditionally with 
the United States Air Force in terms of material and training, the Navy cooperates with the 
British Navy since the 1970’s in the UK/NL Amphibious Force and the Army in 1991 set up 
a multinational corps with the Germany Army. This geographic institutionalization of the 
Dutch military allows it to operate with both Atlanticist and continental allies and predisposes 
it to operate in a coalition.
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instability in the Balkans and later operations in Afghanistan, further cultivated the rela-
tion with the United States. At times it spilt into the public domain as politicians went 
to great extents to prove that the Dutch were taken seriously in Washington. A powerful 
example is the statement by Minister of Defense Frank de Grave in November 2001 in rela-
tion to his recent visit to the United States. “I have understood” the Minister said: 
[…] that some among you have expressed concern that I would be received 
[in the United States] by a mere under-secretary and that this would be the 
definite proof of the Netherland’s marginal position. To those of you that 
worry, I would like to point out that the Dutch Minister of Defense was the 
first Minister [of any nation] who has been received at cabinet level at the 
Pentagon following September 11 and also the first Minister to have visited 
Tampa [US Central Command]. For what it’s worth!847 
The attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon triggered an 
outcry of solidarity with the United States. Prime Minister Kok voiced his disbelief the 
following day with the words: 
The indescribable catastrophe that has hit the American people fills us with 
astonishment and revulsion. The United States grieves and we grieve with 
her in solidarity […] Along with the US government we also will not be 
led by fear, convinced as we are of the values of freedom, democracy and 
justice. The foundation of our democratic rule of law will not be harmed by 
the most brutal terrorist acts. The Netherlands and the United States share 
these same fundamental values.
At the EU Council the Netherlands indicated that the terrorist attack on the US constituted 
a direct attack on everything the West stands for: democracy, institutions that protect the 
freedoms and rights of the individual, free speech, free entrepreneurial spirit and respon-
sibility towards the international community.848 The response to the 9/11 attacks, invoking 
Article V of the NATO treaty and subsequent support for the military operations in 
Afghanistan flowed forth from a widespread sense of solidarity. On October 7 the United 
States and the United Kingdom commenced operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
regime. The Dutch government supported the action on the principle of self-defense and 
article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The Dutch government proclaimed: “The Nether-
847 “Ik heb begrepen dat hier en daar enige zorg was dat ik slechts door een onderminister was 
ontvangen en dat dit het definitieve bewijs was van de marginale positie die Nederland 
inneemt. Degenen die zich daar zorgen over maken, wijs ik erop dat de Nederlandse 
minster van Defensie de eerste minister is die überhaupt na 11 september in het Pentagon 
op regeringsniveau is ontvangen en ook de eerste minister is die in Tampa is geweest, voor 
wat het waard is!” Frank de Grave, Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 2001-2002, The Hague, 
November 15, 2001, pp. 24-1769.
848 Tweede Kamer, “Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme,” vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27925, nr. 1.
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lands stands right behind the United States in the fight against terrorism.”849 
In late November 2001, after the fall of the Taliban regime and as operations moved 
into a stability phase, the Netherlands contributed a frigate to the Arabian Gulf and F-16s 
in a close air-support role over Afghanistan. The Netherlands became part of the Coali-
tion of the Willing. During the debate in the Dutch Parliament over contributing forces 
to Operation Enduring Freedom, Frans Weisglas, MP for the liberal-conservative VVD 
party stated that, “Solidarity in words must be followed by solidarity in deeds.” Similarly, 
Jan Hoekema, MP of the liberal-democrats (D66) made clear that: “participation in a coali-
tion obliges to engage, one cannot stand empty-handed at the sideline.”850 
18.2.3 A member of the “A Team”
Rather than focus on any specific threat, following the end of the Cold War the opportu-
nity arose to use the military instrument to increase Dutch international political influ-
ence by participating in expeditionary crisis-management operations. It was declared in 
terms of an international political ambition; relevant military capabilities could increase 
international political influence. Critical to increasing this influence was the ability to 
rapidly deploy for high- and lower-spectrum expeditionary operations. In 1991, MP 
Pieter ter Veer of the liberal-democrats (D66) voiced his support for the development of 
the Air Manoeuvre brigade in these terms. Not only did the capability fit within the new 
NATO Force concept of mobile counter-concentration, and address the necessity of expe-
ditionary forces, but since there were few countries with comparable capabilities it gave 
the Netherlands a central position in the alliance.851 A similar position was held by MP 
Sari van Heemskerck (VVD) regarding the creation of a multinational army corps with 
the German army: 
Only by contributing substantially to an Army corps, will we be seated at 
the table of the major allies and will we be able to truly influence decision-
making that concerns not only the security policy but also foreign policy.852
The Netherlands wanted to play a role of importance in the European and transatlantic 
security framework. The ambition was never to have capabilities that were merely relevant 
but capabilities instead that were high-profile, and that would give the Netherlands a posi-
tion of significance. According to Van Heemskerck, only then would the Netherlands be 
849 Ibid, p. 2.
850 Weisglas (VVD) and Hoekema (D66), Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 2001-2002, November 15, 
2001, p. 24-1750.
851 Pieter ter Veer, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, June 10, 1991, p. 19.
852 “Alleen door substantieel aan een legerkorps bij te dragen, komen wij met de grote 
bondgenoten rond de tafel te zitten en kunnen wij echt invloed uitoefenen op de te nemen 
beslissingen, die niet alleen het veiligheidsbeleid, maar ook het buitenlands beleid betreffen.” 
Sari van Heemskerck Pillis-Duvekot, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, June 10, 
1991.
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able to play the role in the alliance “...it has played for years: as most influential of countries, 
after the major powers.”853
The 1995 Herijking Foreign Policy Review mentioned that there was an explicit 
quid pro quo associated with using the military. Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Mierlo 
stated that, “providing troops to peace keeping operations means that, in the Dutch vision, 
participation in relevant international deliberations is guaranteed.”854 As an input into 
the Review, the D66 liberal-democrats declared that, “The Netherlands has to translate 
its substantial contributions to international military operations into political influence. 
Until now that has happened insufficiently, as is apparent by the fact that we are not part of 
the international Contactgroup for Former Yugoslavia.”855
In 2000 the government made the link between military relevance and Dutch polit-
ical influence explicit in the Defense White Paper. It stated that “our international position 
and influence are determined by the Dutch contribution – politically, economically but 
also militarily.”856 It was an explicit reference to transformation as resource extraction by 
making it usable for overall state policy. According to General van den Breemen being 
part of the group of most capable nations had always underpinned Dutch defense policy 
objectives.857 He elaborated that this was part of the Dutch international outlook as well 
as the ambition the Netherlands had to play a role on the international stage. In 2006 the 
Commander of the Dutch Armed Forces General Dick Berlijn echoed this in a formal 
policy document, writing::
The Netherlands is not a major power, but it does want to partake in 
discussions and decision-making at the international level.858
The most forceful expression of this ambition was formulated as “remaining a member of 
the A-team”. The “A-team” is a group of Western countries, notably the United States and 
the United Kingdom, and includes other Western military powers that are most capable to 
perform expeditionary operations and are preferred coalition partners of the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands the “A-team” as a concept was first pronounced in 1999 by Minister 
of Defense Frank de Grave in reference to the congressional testimony in October 1999 
given by US Air Force Lieutenant-General Michael Short. In his testimony Short referred 
853 Ibid.
854 “Troepen leveren ten behoeve van een vredesoperatie betekent, in de Nederlandse visie, dat 
aan relevant internationaal overleg moet kunnen worden deelgenomen.” Herijking van het 
Buitenlands Beleid, 1994-1995, p. 18.
855 “Nederland zal zijn aanzienlijke bijdrage aan internationale militaire operaties meer moeten 
vertalen in politieke invloed. Tot nu toe is dit onvoldoende gebeurd, blijkens het feit dat wij 
buiten de internationale contactgroep voor het voormalige Joegoslavie staan.” De Wijk et al, 
(1995), p. 21.
856 Tweede Kamer, Defensienota 2000, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 900, p. 41.
857 Interview with General (rtd.) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.
858 Commandant der Strijdkrachten, Militair Strategische Verkenning 2006, February 6, 2006.
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to the Netherlands as part of an “A-team” of allies.859 The concept stuck. De Grave reiter-
ated these words and underlined that this group is very small, an elite club, and being part 
of it had substantial political-strategic benefits. It would allow the Netherlands to make 
its voice heard to promote its security interests. In November 2003 De Grave’s successor, 
Minister of Defense Henk Kamp said that, “the Dutch air force has shown itself to be a 
highly professional and motivated fighting force. It is recognized internationally as a 
member of the A-team of air forces.”860 During an interview a senior official at the Dutch 
ministry of Foreign Affairs said, to his satisfaction, that the Netherlands was proud that in 
2007 it was the only non-English speaking country able to credibly contribute forces to the 
challenging operation in the south of Afghanistan. It thus offered a means to differentiate 
internationally.
When the Netherlands deployed to Southern Afghanistan in 2006 it focused on 
projecting stability and enabling reconstruction, yet was also intent on demonstrating its 
unique value to the alliance. It could demonstrate that it was a serious and reliable member 
of the “A-team.” It led the Dutch government to distinguish itself from others, most notably 
Germany which at the time was facing substantial criticism from NATO allies regarding 
its reluctance to contribute to counterinsurgency operations. Lo Casteleijn recounted that 
with all the bad press the German armed forces were getting as a result of the caveats they 
had in place and their reluctance to deploy forces to Southern Afghanistan Dutch planners 
wanted clearly to avoid being branded as ‘Germans.’861 
A pro-American attitude was also reflected in the procurement policy for the Dutch 
Air Force. The US –built F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had been earmarked as the successor 
of the aging F-16, at the expense of the French Rafaele and the Swedish Gripen. The JSF 
would be the Dutch military’s largest procurement program in history. The Dutch govern-
ment’s accounting office, the Algemene Rekenkamer, estimated in 2007 that procure-
ment costs for the expected 85 aircraft would total €5.5 billion, excluding total operating 
costs throughout its 30-year lifetime of €15.1 billion.862 It was the United States’ premier 
air superiority fighter and Dutch procurement would not only give the Netherlands a 
capability to operate in the highest spectrum of conventional military operations but also 
to sustain a close relationship with the major superpower and the Air Force’s historically 
preferred operational partner. The Dutch Air Force favored the procurement of American 
aircraft, predominantly for military-technological and cost efficiency reasons. At the same 
time there was a close working relationship between the Dutch Air Force and its US coun-
859 “Dankzij onze moderne F-16’s konden goed getrainde Nederlandse piloten veel moeilijke 
aanvalsvluchten met succes bekronen. De Amerikaanse complimenten onderstrepen dit, van 
minister Albright tot luchtmachtgeneraal Short in de Senaat. Short rekent Nederland tot 
het A-team, en dat is niet groot.” Frank de Grave, “Remarks at luncheon for Vereniging van 
Europese Journalisten,” November 18, 1999.
860 Henk Kamp, “Remarks at Air Power Symposium,” The Hague, November 19, 2003.
861 Interview with Lo Casteleijn, September 7, 2007, Ministry of Defense, The Hague.
862 Algemene Rekenkamer, “Monitoring Verwerving JSF – Stand van Zaken,” Handelingen 
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 26488, no. 61, The Hague, December 4, 2007.
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terpart, and personal relations among top-level officers were strong.863 It contributed to the 
view of the Netherlands as part of an “A-Team”. A question that remains to be conclusively 
addressed in further research is what factors belie why the main weapons-systems of the 
Air Force – the F-16 and the Apache helicopter – are American while the main weapons-
systems of the Army – the Leopard tank and the Pantzerhaubitze 2000 – are German. It 
appears that aside from technological preferences it is also politically convenient since 
the United States and Germany are the principal cooperating partners of the respective 
services. From a political perspective this geographical division is expedient to enable the 
Dutch role as a bridge-builder.
While the US, UK, France and Germany were considered strategic partners, the 
Dutch 2006 Military Strategic Vision made clear that mainly the first two were preferred 
as operational partners. An Anglo-Saxon focus of the military was signaled by the UK/NL 
amphibious force and the link between the Netherlands Air Force and the United States 
Air Force.864 Regarding land forces, even though it had a close institutional relationship 
with Germany through the 1st Germany/ Netherlands Army Corps, due to cooperation 
with British, Canadian and Australian forces in Southern Afghanistan, and with Austra-
lian and British forces in Iraq, the Army also shifted further in the direction of Anglo-
Saxon nations. The military-strategic assessment in 2006 wrote that: “for robust and rapid 
expeditionary operations and to keep options open outside solely the German” a further 
orientation of the Royal Netherlands Army towards the UK and US was envisaged. Of 
course the Anglo-Saxon focus is not absolute and the military engages with various inter-
national partners while the Royal Netherlands Army retains its allegiance to the German 
corps. However, the trend is illustrative of a strategic cultural trait to focus on those coun-
tries which embrace high-intensity operations and enable the Netherlands to play a high-
profile role. These states are Anglo-Saxon.
The proof of the Dutch transformation strategy lay in its operational relevance. 
Only by using the military would the success of Dutch transformation be confirmed. The 
confirmation was expressed through operational relevance to Anglo-Saxon allies. The 
Netherlands’ strategic transformation, as enunciated in the 1991 and 1993 defense policy 
papers, was intent on creating an expeditionary military able to participate in the full range 
of operations, including high-intensity fighting. A consequence was that, after the 1995 
foreign policy review and the increasing intensity of expeditionary operations, it sustained 
a policy of military relevance vis-à-vis the United States. Transformation was measured 
in terms of its relevance to US operations. Army General Ton van Loon, commanding 
general of NATO’s Regional Command South in Afghanistan made this explicit in late 
2007. He said the fact that American Special Forces in Southern Afghanistan specifically 
requested Dutch F-16’s for close air support missions, “indicated how far we, the Dutch 
military, have come.” Van Loon concluded that it demonstrated the Dutch military had 
863 See Bert Kreemers, Hete Hangijzers: de aanschaf van Nederlandse gevechtsvliegtuigen, 
(Amsterdam: Balans, 2009), p.182 – 236.
864 Commandant der Strijdkrachten, Militair Strategische Verkenning 2006, February 6, 2006, 
p. 13.
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been, in fact, transformed. Due to this operational relevance to the United States in high-
intensity operations “transformation, Van Loon declared, “was finished.”865 
19 Expressions of Dutch Transformation
The two strategic cultural tenets – the emphasis on stability projection through a structur-
alist interpretation of human progress and support for the international rule of law, and the 
pursuit of political relevance through the use of the military instrument – have shaped the 
process of Dutch defense transformation. The mechanism by which these two constraints 
were internalized in Dutch transformation following the end of the Cold War was to link 
the use of the military, and with it the process of military change, to ‘political ambition.’ As 
General van den Breemen recalled, linking the development of the military to an expres-
sion of political ambition rather than specific threats was the key through which questions 
could be answered what the military was for following 1991 and how much the Dutch 
public was willing to spend on it.866 Political ambition addressed the question what the 
military was for and which capabilities would be required. It was the vehicle through 
which stability could be projected and the international rule of law promoted but also how 
the Netherlands’ international prestige could be increased and its relevance to the United 
States made clear. Due to the ambiguous nature of the term ‘political ambition’ however, 
a permanent topic of discussion was under what circumstances the Netherlands would 
actually use its military abroad and at what level of the conflict spectrum. This part details 
how the Netherlands interpreted its political ambition throughout the 1990’s and trans-
lated it to capability requirements. 
19.1 Ambition-based Planning: 1991 & 1993
Throughout the Cold War, the primary structuring element of NATO forces was deter-
rence through strength.867 NATO prepared for war, so as not to go to war. NATO was an 
organization that when functioning as designed, would not be called to act. Stability in the 
international system was maintained by balancing against the Soviet bloc and sustaining 
credibility of the alliance. After the end of the Cold War, stability had to be actively 
supported. The benevolent security environment and the lack of a vital security threat led 
to a focus on challenges to international stability and crisis-management.868 Crucial to its 
transformation towards an expeditionary force was the Dutch government’s decision to 
link its defense policy to particular political ambitions, rather than countering a specific 
865 General Ton van Loon, “Remarks at Counter Insurgency Symposium” (Netherlands Institute 
for Military History), The Hague, November 14, 2007.
866 Interview with General (rtd.) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.
867 “De NAVO strategie bovenal blijft gericht op afschrikking van agressie en daardoor 
op voorkoming van oorlog en handhaving van de vrede.” Nota Inzake de Navo en het 
Defensiebeleid, 1968, p. 25.
868 Prioriteitennota (1993).
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threat. It was the mechanism through which transformation took effect.
Political ambition became the guiding principle of defense policy following the 
discussions in preparation of the 1991 Defense White Paper.869 The concept would influ-
ence the shape, size and use of the armed forces. Defense Minister Relus Ter Beek acknowl-
edged that it meant disconnecting the size of the military from operational necessity. It was 
a clear enunciation of the political nature of the military instrument. It underscored the 
extent to which the military was an instrument of foreign policy and subject to the realm of 
political choice. Political will rather than countering a specific threat, Ter Beek said, would 
dominate the direction of security policy.870 
The enunciation that political ambition would guide defense policy was informed by 
the observation that the security environment offered little certainty over the type, timing, 
magnitude and location of challenges and threats. Rather than focusing on specific threats, 
it led to capabilities-based planning. Political ambition was formulated in terms of types of 
missions rather than types of threats, thereby reversing the logic for which defense plan-
ning had been initially pursued. At the same time, the Netherlands realized it was too small 
a power to perform an expeditionary operation by itself, and would necessarily be part of a 
larger coalition.871 This proved compatible with a multilateralist inclination to promote the 
international rule of law, as well as a policy to demonstrate its relevance.
Since the use of the military was now explicitly connected to a political expression 
of ambition, the use of the military became the product of political choice, as opposed to 
political necessity. The legalistically inclined Dutch strived to codify the terms on the basis 
of which operations could be undertaken and codify the mechanism how Dutch political 
ambition translated to expeditionary operations. In response to the 1991 Defense White 
Paper, requirements were formulated for engaging in operations outside NATO terri-
tory. On June 27, 1991, Parliament endorsed a motion citing a number of political criteria 
which any decision in favor of an expeditionary operation needed to fulfill.872 For instance 
an intervention needed to be embedded in a United Nations Security Council resolution. 
Absent a UN mandate, a peacekeeping operation was only possible when all parties to the 
conflict concerned accepted the presence of the Dutch forces; or in the event of a large-
scale and massive violation of Human Rights.873 
Underlying this rudimentary framework was a discussion at what level of intensity 
operations could be undertaken by the Dutch military. In the benevolent security envi-
869 Interview with Gen (rtd.) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.
870 “The link between size and military-operational necessity was separated. Much more than 
ever before would the political will to pursue an active security policy – the international 
political level of ambition of the Netherlands – determine the nature and size of the Dutch 
armed forces.” Ter Beek (1996), p.63.
871 Defensienota 1991 (1991), p.2.
872 Motie Van Traa, Tweede Kamer, 1990-1991, 21991, nr. 26.
873 The summation concerns the contents of the motion –Van Traa as discussed in Tweede Kamer, 
Betrokkenheid van het parlement bij de uitzending van militaire eenheden, vergaderjaar 1994-
1995, 23591, nr. 5, p.4.
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ronment, did the Dutch political ambition also extend beyond relatively risk-free peace-
keeping operations to higher-intensity peace-enforcement operations? It gave rise to fric-
tion between the two strategic-cultural traits. While stability projection and a protection 
of the international rule of law inclined a focus on peacekeeping, being a relevant ally and 
improving the political weight of the military instrument meant possibly participating in 
high-intensity operations as well. Since the military retained its task to protect NATO terri-
tory, and since this necessitated similar capabilities as higher-intensity peace enforcement 
operations, it initially made little difference in terms of force structuring. As the territorial 
threat became less important, this changed. As we shall see later on, making the political 
choice to participate in an actual high-intensity operation was a different matter altogether.
The military emphasized mobile and deployable assets to perform expeditionary 
missions. Triggered by a peace-dividend and the need for enhanced mobility, the Army 
would become lighter and smaller. Readiness, deployability and flexibility became key 
enablers.874 In 1991 it was decided that the Army would lose five of its twelve brigades and 
replace heavy armored units with lighter mechanized brigades. The number of tanks would 
decrease significantly. One of the major and most tangible initiatives lay in the creation 
of the 11th Air Manoeuvre Brigade. The brigade became the vanguard to transform the 
Army and it was the most prominent expression of developing expeditionary capabili-
ties. The brigade was planned as the central pillar of the new defense policy. Consisting of 
light-infantry forces, tactical transport helicopters and attack helicopters, it was a flexible, 
mobile and deployable unit able to operate in high-intensity missions. Defense Minister 
Ter Beek exclaimed in his memoirs that the Air Manoeuvre Brigade, “was and is … the 
example of the new armed forces.”875 The Navy would procure eight new frigates while 
six older platforms were decommissioned or sold, and to support expeditionary opera-
tions an amphibious transport ship was developed. For the Air Force the number of 
operational F-16s decreased from 162 to 144 while all remaining fighter aircraft received 
a Mid Life Update, increasing interoperability and prolonging their deployability. Two air-
to-air refueling aircraft would be procured along with six tactical transport aircraft. The 
military focused on those capabilities that contributed to the elements of expeditionary 
operations identified by NATO (see chart 23). A further step was to modularize the forces 
and make the battalion the building block of the Dutch military. An expeditionary focus 
also required higher qualified personnel; the draft was phased out and a shift was made 
towards an all-volunteer force.
874 Defensienota 1991 (1991), p.2.
875 Ter Beek (1996), p. 80.
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Concepts of Expeditionary Capabilities
Flexibility The ability to perform various tasks in diverse areas and conditions
Mobility Tactical mobility and strategic mobility
Multi-functionality Capable of performing different missions
Interoperability The ability to cooperate with other systems, units or services
Sustainability 
The ability to sustain operations until the objectives have been met, including 
survivability
Deployability The ability to perform at the right time and place in the right manner
(Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defense, Defensienota 1991, p. 78-79)
Figure 23: Concepts of Expeditionary Capabilities, According to NATO and Adopted by the 
Netherlands
In the 1993 Defense Priorities Review, which made crisis-management operations 
the principal focus of the Dutch armed forces, the political-strategic ambition was first 
explicitly defined. The ambition was to perform four simultaneous battalion-equivalent876 
peacekeeping operations sustainable for up to three years operating in the lower tier of the 
conflict spectrum.877 Rob de Wijk, former head of the Concepts division at the Ministry 
of Defense said that the number ‘four’ seemed “about right.”878 Higher up in the conflict 
spectrum, the armed forces would be able to participate with a brigade-sized force for a 
single rotation of six months.
During discussions over the Defense Priorities Review, Minister Ter Beek provided 
further detail to the criteria for using the military. He formulated eleven elements to 
support political decision-making on expeditionary action. He reiterated that the protec-
tion of the international rule of law was a cornerstone of Dutch security policy. Rather than 
a check-list, he said the elements were intended as a framework to assist decision-makers. 
It included the following:
876 Equivalents consisted of a squadron fighter aircraft or two frigates.
877 Why the choice for ‘four battalion-equivalent peacekeeping operations’ was made remains an 
element of debate. De Wijk and others within the Ministry of Defense claim that it was based 
on the so-called ‘Dorien-norm’ reflecting the number mentioned by De Wijk’s partner while 
he was preparing the Defense Priorities Review. Minister Ter Beek later said that the number 
was arrived at following a calculation of available deployable assets. See “Ter Beek Ergert 
zich op Feestje Landmacht,” De Volkskrant, November 24, 1999; C. Klep and R. van Gils, Van 
Korea tot Kosovo: De Nederlandse Militaire Deelname aan vredesoperaties sinds 1945 (Den 
Haag: SDU, 2000).
878 Steven Derix, “Propagandist van de Realpolitik,” NRC, June 14, 1999 (http://www.nrc.nl/W2/
Nieuws/1999/06/14/Vp/04.html).
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ӺӺ Dutch national interests need to be at stake, this includes the promotion of the 
international rule of law; 
ӺӺ Operations may be performed in response to violations of international law or 
human rights; 
ӺӺ An operation must be performed with the legitimacy of an international 
political (UN) mandate;
ӺӺ Cooperation with allies is necessary, stressing the multinational nature of an 
operation (either through WEU or NATO);
ӺӺ Sufficiently broad domestic political support is a requirement;
ӺӺ An appreciation must be made regarding whether the military instrument is 
more appropriate than other instruments;
ӺӺ The risks for forces deployed should be taken into account;
ӺӺ The expected length of participation should be assessed;
ӺӺ Are the capabilities of the forces appropriate? 
ӺӺ Financial consequences of the deployment must be considered;
ӺӺ The geographic proximity of a crisis is important.879
The latter criterion provided fuel for a political discussion which would remain vibrant 
throughout the next two decades, namely over a possible geographic focus of the armed 
forces. Left-wing parties in general portrayed an inclination to focus on military opera-
tions in conjunction with development aid, preferring operations in Africa. At the same 
time, it provided the necessary rationale to participate in high-intensity missions such as 
Operation Allied Force which did take place in the European backyard.
19.2 Srebrenica and the Framework of Evaluation
The discussion over the type of capabilities the Dutch military required and the condi-
tions under which they could be deployed continued throughout the 1990s. According to 
the ambition level peacekeeping did not require high-intensity capabilities, peace enforce-
ment did. Events in the security environment however, were showing that a strict distinc-
tion between these two was becoming more and more artificial. In early 1994, in line with 
its stated ambition, the Netherlands undertook one of four low-end operations by contrib-
uting to the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) mission in Bosnia. In 1995, 
the Netherlands armed forces witnessed the harsh reality of ethnic cleansing at Srebrenica. 
What was supposed to have been a ‘safe area’, was overrun by Serb forces and an estimated 
7000 people, mostly men and boys, were killed. The events demonstrated the failure of UN 
peacekeeping as understood in the narrow sense. The 600-strong Dutch contingent had 
been deployed under the political consideration that a light-armed UN force with a weak 
mandate by virtue of its blue helmets would be able to ‘keep the peace’ even if there was no 
879 Quoted in Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzending, Vertrekpunt Den Haag, 
vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 454, no. 8, The Hague, September 4, 2000, p. 27.
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peace to keep.880 Instead the Dutch contingent was outnumbered and out-armed and there 
was confusion at UN headquarters how to organize support for the Dutch contingent and 
the Muslim population they protected. Dutch requests for air support – which was to be 
provided by other countries – were repeatedly turned down.881 The enclave was overrun. 
‘Srebrenica’ came to denote the failure of the international community to keep the 
peace in a time of war, and the realization that peacekeeping is only possible when in fact 
there is a peace agreement. If not, a robust mandate and peace-enforcement capabilities 
are required. Sides need to be taken and escalation dominance is required if safe areas are 
created. As Kofi Annan reported, “they were neither protected areas nor safe havens…nor 
safe areas.”882 Although the Annan report held the international community in its entirety 
to blame for the events at Srebrenica, it led to the fall of the Dutch government in 2002 
after the publication of an official history chronicling the Dutch role in the collapse of the 
enclave. The predominant issue for defense policy was the political realization of the diffi-
culties associated with crisis-management operations. It demonstrated that the conflict 
spectrum was fluid rather than neatly categorized into low-end or high-end operations. 
It marked an end to naiveté over the results to be achieved by peacekeeping and reliance 
on other coalition partners for escalation dominance. These lessons were discounted in a 
further specification of the conditions for deploying Dutch forces abroad. 
In response to the events at Srebrenica, Parliament adopted the Toetsingskader or 
“Framework of Evaluation” for expeditionary operations. It was based on the elements that 
had been developed since 1991; the Framework was created to “structure deliberations 
with Parliament concerning participation of Dutch armed forces in crisis-management 
operations.”883 Crucial to the Framework was the need for escalation dominance and an 
exit-strategy:
...if necessary, while taking the limits of the mandate into consideration, 
[Dutch forces] should be able to act sufficiently robust. At all times, the 
880 See J.C.H. Blom, Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en 
analyse van de val van een Safe Area. (Amsterdam: Boom, 2002).
881 Kofi Annan, “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35,” 
November 15, 1999. http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf. Accessed March 23, 2009.
882 “Protected zones and safe areas can have a role in protecting civilians in armed conflict, 
but it is clear that either they must be demilitarized and established by the agreement of 
the belligerents, as in the case of the “protected zones” and “safe havens” recognized by 
international humanitarian law, or they must be truly safe areas, fully defended by a credible 
military deterrent… It is tempting for critics to blame the UNPROFOR units in Srebrenica 
for its fall, or to blame the United Nations hierarchy above those units. Certainly, errors of 
judgment were made - errors rooted in a philosophy of impartiality and non-violence wholly 
unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia - but this must not divert us from the more fundamental 
mistakes. The safe areas were established by the Security Council without the consent of 
the parties and without the provision of any credible military deterrent. They were neither 
protected areas nor safe havens in the sense of international humanitarian law, nor safe areas 
in any militarily meaningful sense.” Ibid.
883 Tweede Kamer, “Betrokkenheid van het parlement bij de uitzending van militaire eenheden,” 
vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 23 591, nr. 7, The Hague, July 24, 2001, p.3.
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own forces need to credibly provide in their self-protection. […] Plans will 
be made – nationally or internationally – in case of contingencies, and 
depending on the nature of the operation, to extract units and individual 
forces….884 
The protection of the international rule of law remained the basis for expeditionary inter-
ventions, however it would now be done while realizing the need to have, and possibly 
use, high-intensity capabilities. The events at Srebrenica were a political awakening that 
high-end capabilities were a necessity. From the military perspective it led to the assess-
ment to focus on high-intensity operations, assuming that it would enable the military to 
perform lower-risk missions as well. The 2000 Defense White Paper writes that, “Higher-
spectrum operations influence the organization of the armed forces, but through adjust-
ments the military [is] suitable for lower-spectrum operations.”885 The 2006 Military Stra-
tegic Assessment stated plainly that the armed forces were oriented towards deployment 
for high-intensity operations, and that downscaling was possible.886 It had an impact on 
how the Netherlands would deploy force packages.
19.3 Adding a high-intensity comfort zone
In October 2000 Eritrean and Ethiopian forces agreed to a ceasefire hoping to end their 
decades-long conflict. The two parties asked the United Nations to monitor the ceasefire, 
and to place a foreign force in the ‘Temporary Security Zone’, the buffer zone between 
Eritrean and Ethiopian forces. The operation took place at the express request of both 
parties on the basis of a chapter six UN mandate. The Netherlands decided to partici-
pate in the UN mission as lead-nation. The Hague reasoned that its participation would 
support African security and the international rule of law. In addition, the humani-
tarian situation would improve with the cessation of hostilities, reducing migrant flows 
to Europe and the Netherlands and contribute to stability in the Horn of Africa. Across 
the political spectrum, the mission had wide-spread support. One of the exceptions was 
the Christian-Democrat fraction which supported the objective of the mission but not 
the means; they did not support a classic peacekeeping mission without a robust mandate 
and a solid exit-strategy. The initial force package consisted of a marine battalion, logis-
tics units and Chinook helicopters. At the request of both the Christian-democrats and 
Labor party Apache attack-helicopters were added, for extraction purposes only.887 The 
Apaches were located in Djibouti instead of in the theater of operations. During a parlia-
mentary hearing Major General (rtd.) Van Kappen noted that the decision to send the 
Apaches was not a military-operational necessity but rather a political decision to increase 
884 Ibid.
885 Defensienota 2000, p. 41.
886 Militair-Strategische Verkenning (2006), p. 8.
887 Minister of Defence F. de Grave, Tweede Kamer, 2000-2001, 14 983, nr.14.
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support for the mission. The Apaches increased the “comfort zone” for the politicians.888 
The representative of the Labor party Bert Koenders acknowledged that it was indeed an 
“extra insurance.”889 In addition, a contingency planning effort with French and American 
forces was undertaken. By sending the Apaches and explicitly making contingency plans 
the Netherlands was sending a stronger-than-necessary force for political purposes. With 
the events of Srebrenica still fresh in the memory, the Netherlands opted for including a 
robust capability. It demonstrated how political choice was interacting with military-oper-
ational affairs, akin to the discussions in the 1940’s regarding the execution of the policing 
mission in the Dutch East Indies.
Not only was a robust force package introduced in the UNMEE mission. From then 
on, all deployments contained a high-intensity capability that could be used if events took 
a turn for the worse. This shift was an expression of coming to terms with the security 
environment which was less benevolent than initially anticipated. It demonstrated the 
changing environment in which the Netherlands was undertaking expeditionary opera-
tions. The promotion of the international rule of law through crisis-management opera-
tions would not be a risk-free undertaking. Peacekeeping missions that were initially 
considered straightforward were held to be potentially dangerous. 
The attacks of September 11 made this point clear. Much more than the somewhat 
altruistic crisis-management operations performed during the early 1990’s such as the 
Dutch contribution to the UN mission in Cambodia, the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington demonstrated the extent to which vital interests could be at stake as a result of 
instability in regions far from home. Protecting the international rule of law and addressing 
regional stability more poignantly could be a vital security interest and it further reinforced 
the necessity of having high-intensity capabilities. In particular, the attacks emphasized 
the need for precision-munitions, Special Forces troops and unmanned aerial vehicles.890 
Precision operations were specifically mentioned as a focus area. It led to the development 
of military assets comparable to American initiatives in the field of operational effective-
ness transformation. 
It also led to a further coalescing of stability projection and high-intensity opera-
tions. In December 2001 the Dutch government informed Parliament of its intention 
to send a 200-strong Air Manoeuvre contingent including Special Operations Forces to 
Afghanistan as part of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force. It was 
a contribution to the stabilization of Afghanistan and the protection of the international 
rule of law to avoid it becoming a safe-haven for terrorism.891 The operation contrib-
uted to the fight against terrorism, as stability and responsible governance was held to 
888 Tweede Kamer, “De Hoorn van Afrika; Verslag van een hoorzitting op 16 oktober 2000 over 
de uitzending van Nederlandse militairen in het kader van UNMEE,” vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 
22 831, nr. 13, The Hague, November 7, 2000, p.20.
889 Ibid, p. 18-20.
890 Tweede Kamer, “Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme,” vergaderjaar 2001–2002, 27 925, nr. 
40, The Hague, January 24, 2002.
891 Ibid, p.3.
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be a natural buffer against terrorism. The Dutch government stressed that the mandate 
was robust, being based on Chapter VII. Again the memory of Srebrenica appeared and 
liberal conservatives pressed for US guarantees in the event of an extraction. The six F-16s 
assigned to Enduring Freedom would also be available for “close air support” roles of the 
Dutch deployment under ISAF. 
In 2003 Apaches were attached to the Dutch contingent for SFIR (Stabilization Force 
Iraq) in al-Muthanna. In the run-up to the deployment it led to a parliamentary discus-
sion over the exit-strategy.892 The government announced that the British military would 
take responsibility for any extraction. Yet MP Camiel Eurlings of the Christian-Demo-
crats wondered whether the mandate was sufficiently robust, and the rules of engagement 
sufficiently solid. Why was the Netherlands not providing its own extraction capability, he 
wondered. Minister of Defense Kamp responded that details had been discussed with the 
British and an assurance had been given that within 15 minutes aerial support could be 
available, and within six hours tank support could arrive in the province. Eurlings pressed 
on asking if this guarantee was also on paper. Minister of Defense Kamp stated that, “we 
have analyzed what type of situations may arise. It is difficult to talk about it persistently 
with the British, because they think it strange, given our long-term intense cooperation 
and that we are part of their division at their invitation.”893 Robust force capabilities were 
likewise deployed to Northern Afghanistan in 2002, namely F-16s based out of Kyrgyzstan. 
Apaches, F-16s and Pantzerhowitzers were deployed for the mission in Uruzgan from 2006 
onwards. 
Critical to being a relevant ally was developing an expeditionary force and having the 
political ambition to perform high-intensity initial-entry operations. Frank van Kappen 
recalled: “Without the stated ambition to participate high in the conflict spectrum, the 
process of transformation would have resulted in an entirely different military. Those few 
words have been critical.”894 Minister of Defense Kamp echoed that many of the robust 
qualities of the Dutch armed forces were the result of its focus on preparing for high-inten-
sity operations. The transformation debate in the Netherlands revolved around whether 
the Netherlands would be willing to operate in high-intensity missions, later including 
counterinsurgency warfare as well. Aside from the military-operational argument to have 
escalation dominance, such capabilities served a political-strategic purpose; the Labor 
party for instance considered sending the F-16s to Afghanistan in 2002 as elemental to 
increase the Dutch voice in the alliance.895
892 Tweede Kamer, “De situatie in het Midden Oosten; Verslag algemeen overleg op 25 juni 2003 
over de mogelijke Nederlandse bijdrage aan de stabilisatiemacht voor Irak,” vergaderjaar 
2002-2003, 23432, nr. 120, The Hague, July 9, 2003, p.30.
893 Minister Kamp, Ibid, p.30.
894 Interview with Maj-Gen (rtd.) Frank van Kappen, The Hague, September 6, 2006.
895 Tweede Kamer, “Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme,” vergaderjaar 2001–2002, 27 925, nr. 
40, The Hague, January 24, 2002, p. 2.
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(Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defense)
Figure 24: Evolution of Dutch Political Ambition, 1993-2006
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(Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defense & Netherlands Ministry of Finance)
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The main thrust of the Dutch political ambition did not change much, it was however 
further specified. In 2003, the number of low-end operations was reduced from four to 
three while the ability to sustain a high-end operation with a brigade-size equivalent was 
doubled to one year.896 The Netherlands also expressed the ambition to be a lead-nation in 
an expeditionary mission, increasing its military profile among allied nations. In 2006, in 
896 As of 2003, Brigade-size equivalents implied for the air forces two squadrons with each 18 
aircraft and for the Navy a maritime taskforce with 5 frigates at maximum, or a combination 
thereof.
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light of an increasing number of multinational obligations, the ambition also included a 
commitment to a NATO Response Force rotation, an EU Battlegroup rotation, and a UN 
Stand-By High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) rotation.897 Later it specified that the three 
continuous battalion-sized commitments could also amount to one large one, as exempli-
fied by the mission in Uruzgan.898 Several smaller commitments were specified including 
police missions, making military experts available for security sector reform, participation 
with Special Forces in counter-terror operations and support for civil authorities. Further-
more, contributions to homeland security were detailed. At the request of relevant civilian 
authorities 25% of Dutch forces could be made available for domestic security tasks, 
particularly intended for disaster relief and assisting law-enforcement. With the Ministry 
of Interior it was agreed that at minimum 4600 armed forces would be available at any one 
time for disaster relief in the Netherlands. Figure 24 indicates the evolution of the Dutch 
political ambition. 
It was however, more a political-administrative tool, than a benchmark. Figure 25 
illustrates the expeditionary operations the Netherlands participated in since 1990 with 
more than 100 forces. It denotes the length of the deployment and force-size. The dark bars 
illustrate those operations that are considered major missions, due to their intensity or size. 
The chart shows that while the political ambition delineated a guideline for the number 
of concurrent expeditionary operations, in reality the Netherlands usually participated in 
more than that number of operations. Major missions for instance have taken place on a 
concurrent basis.
19.4 Capabilities for the A-Team
Minister of Defense Henk Kamp was in office during the Rumsfeld years in the Pentagon, 
as well as at the 2002 Prague Transformation summit. He had asked for the drafting of the 
2003 Defense White Paper (the Prinsjesdagbrief). Kamp defined transformation generi-
cally as the policy to make the military a relevant and usable instrument of government, 
and specifically as the shift towards expeditionary operations.899 He held a pragmatic view 
of the Netherlands’ moral-political ambition. If the Netherlands wanted to do something 
about human rights atrocities, he said, it could not accept being dependent on others to 
participate only with a particular capability or system. The Netherlands needed to be able 
to provide an autonomous contingent in the full range of operations, even if that meant a 
smaller force. Such had also been the lesson of Srebrenica. If the Netherlands wanted to 
be relevant to allies, and bear a responsible role in the world, it required the Netherlands 
to operate alongside any ally, and do so autonomously from start to finish.900 Developing 
897 Minister van Defensie, Nieuw Evenwicht, Nieuwe Ontwikkelingen: Naar een toekomstbestendige 
krijgsmacht. Actualisering van de Prinsjesdagbrief, HDAB2006018085, June 2, 2006.
898 Minister van Defense, Wereldwijd Dienstbaar, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 31 243, no.1, The 
Hague, October 16, 2007, p.15.
899 Interview with Henk Kamp, November 29, 2007, The Hague.
900 Idem.
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a relevant full-spectrum capability of limited size informed procurement decisions such 
as the intended acquisition of cruise-missiles, pantzerhowitsers and reinforced the argu-
ment for the replacement of the F-16. In order to have a ‘seat at the table’, the armed forces 
needed to be of a qualitatively high standard, and offer a politically visible contribution 
and be geared towards multilateral operations. Too small to be a threat of its own, but 
reliable enough to participate fully, politicians perceived the role of the Netherlands as a 
bridge-builder among the major powers, just as Van Vollenhoven had argued in 1910. It 
gave preference to procuring high-intensity capabilities. 
The 2002 Prague Capability Commitment was NATO’s capability wish-list in 
response to the new security environment. It underlined the importance of procuring 
assets for increased mobility and logistics support. These were key enablers for deploying 
and sustaining forces in an expeditionary operation. The chart below juxtaposes NATO’s 
capability list to the investment initiatives proposed in the 2003 Defense White Paper (the 
Prinsjesdagbrief). 
NATO Prague Capability Commitments Initiatives in the Netherlands
Strategic air- and sea lift LPD, DC-10
CBRN Defense Theatre missile defense
Air-to-air refueling DC-10
ISR capabilities Joint Strike Fighter, UAVs
Air-to-ground surveillance
Participation in Allied Ground Surveillance, UAVs, 
JSF
Suppression of enemy air defenses Joint Strike Fighter
Precision guided munitions PGMs, Tactical Tomahawks
Command, Control, Communications TITAAN, BMS, Link 16, NIMSIS
Deployable combat support units Bare base kits
(Source: Prinsjesdagbrief 2003)
Figure 26: Prague Capability Commitments and Netherlands Defense Efforts
The Netherlands invested in various elements of the Prague Capability Commitments such 
as strategic transport (the Landing Platform Dock and a DC-10 aircraft), tactical trans-
port, improved surveillance and reconnaissance by procuring the new F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF), a new Battle Management System similar to the United States’ network-
centric system FBCB2, but also in cruise missiles. Especially this latter capability as well as 
the JSF would enable the Netherlands to operate in high-intensity operations. While the 
Netherlands would procure 30 tomahawks, less than the opening salvo of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, it would make the Netherlands part of a select club which was allowed to share 
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in this high-tech capability and thereby give it extra political-strategic weight. But more 
on this later.
The emphasis lay on high-end, high-profile, visible capabilities – those capabilities 
that made it possible to be a voice in the alliance. They could only be afforded if substan-
tial reductions elsewhere were made. It had been a constant in Dutch defense policy 
since 1991 to make a choice for quality over quantity. The Netherlands’ limited defense 
budget and its desire to play a role on the international stage led it to procure expensive 
high-quality multifunctional capabilities. “It is better to have one multifunctional capa-
bility with which every task can be fulfilled satisfactory than to have a specific capability 
for each separate task,” the 2006 military strategic assessment wrote. For a small country 
with limited resources this makes sense. Due to its ambition to be relevant among major 
powers, the Netherlands made sure it could offer highly-visible capabilities. Whether they 
were cruise-missiles, an airmobile brigade or top-of-the-bill LCF frigates. Similarly, since 
the pool of such expensive capabilities is necessarily limited, it produces a natural inclina-
tion to embed the force within coalitions. It created a military-operational logic to support 
international institutions and the principle of multilateralism. The Netherlands could not 
operate on a stand-alone basis and was dependent on major powers for its fundamental 
security. Dutch vital security interests are not able to be protected solely by the Netherlands. 
A multilateral approach is thereby warranted. The Dutch resort to multilateralism is funda-
mental to its security approach. A 2003 joint publication by the Ministry of Defense and 
Foreign Affairs matter-of-factly stated that “our welfare and security is highly dependent 
on effective international organizations and security institutions,” read the UN, NATO and 
EU.901 This gave further momentum to engage in partnerships with other Western states. In 
this regard, the NATO Response Force was considered a solidarity-increasing instrument 
since it institutionalizes multinational cooperation in crisis-management operations.902 A 
case in point is the NATO Response Force. Lo Casteleijn said that the Response Force had 
spurred transformation, not because it was actually used but rather because it necessitated 
concept development and experimentation to realize joint cooperation. It was a means to 
enhance interoperability and improve multilateral action.
Investing in high-end capabilities meant investing in political credit which would 
allow the Netherlands to have increased influence among its Western peers. By being able 
to provide initial-entry capabilities, those assets needed at the start of a high-intensity 
operation, the Netherlands believed it would have a say about the shape and form of an 
operation. Not because the contribution of the Netherlands would be critical to mission-
success, but rather because in the international political arena the contribution of a conti-
nental European ally was a valued good to improve the overall legitimacy of a mission.903 
901 Tweede Kamer, “Nederlandse Deelname aan Vredesmissies,” vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29521, 
nr.1, April 8, 2004, p. 7.
902 Tweede Kamer, “Raad Algemene Zaken en Externe Betrekkingen; Verslag algemeen overleg 
op 13 november 2003 over het EVDB, de transatlantische betrekkingen en de NAVO,” 
vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 21501-02, nr. 510, The Hague, December 12, 2003, p. 6 & 9.
903 Interview with Maj-Gen (rtd.) Frank van Kappen, The Hague, September 6, 2006.
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Offering relevant, high-quality contributions meant keeping a close eye on the shortfalls 
in capabilities that NATO and EU heads of state had identified. The reasoning was as 
follows. The more high-end shortfalls the Netherlands could fill, the better reputation the 
Netherlands would have among its allies. The more credit it would get. The more it could 
make its voice heard, the better it could advance its interests associated with promoting 
the international rule of law and overall security. The 2006 Military-Strategic Assess-
ment made this explicit: a “military becomes more relevant and usable – and obtains 
more ‘political-military weight’- the better it is able to provide capabilities that are needed 
internationally.”904 Therefore, the “military contribution that the Netherlands provides 
must be credible, relevant, realistic, proportionate, high-quality and nationally as well as 
internationally visible. This increases the political-military meaning, also with respect 
to allies and enhances the position of the Netherlands [emphasis added].”905 The Dutch 
Military Strategic Assessment explicitly addressed the added political value of having a 
specific capability, for instance Air Manoeuvre capabilities, mobility assets, or helicopter 
capabilities paid a dividend by increasing the relevance and political-military weight of the 
Netherlands because they were in short supply among European partners. According to 
the Assessment, this would contribute to an optimalization of the defense budget in terms 
of its political-strategic relevance. 
19.5 Network-centric emulation
The keen focus on the United States fostered a degree of emulation to be able to interop-
erate with the US military. In 2007 the Dutch Defense Industry Strategy made a direct link 
between the American path of transformation and guidelines for Dutch defense capability 
development. Under the heading Transformation of Armed Forces the Dutch industry 
strategy outlined that the US 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review articulated the direc-
tion of transformation among armed forces in general, including for the Netherlands. It 
advocated a pursuit of network-enabled capabilities.906 Similarly, increased precision 
would decrease the risk of collateral damage as well as improve safety for friendly forces. It 
led to an embrace of elements of US operational effectiveness transformation.907 The Mili-
904 “Een krijgsmacht wordt relevanter en bruikbaarder – en krijgt daardoor meer ‘politiek-
militair’ gewicht – naarmate deze beter voorziet in capaciteiten waar internationaal behoefte 
aan is.” Militair Strategische Verkenning (2006), p.26.
905 Militair-Strategische Verkenning (2006), p. 6.
906 Ministerie van Defensie, Defensie Industrie Strategie – Eindrapportage, DMO/DB/2007012327, 
The Hague, August 27, 2007.
907 “Snelle inzetbaarheid, technologisch hoogwaardig materieel en het vermogen ver 
van Nederland te worden ingezet zijn belangrijke voorwaarden voor een optimale 
operationele samenwerking, zowel bij crisisbeheersingsoperaties in de hogere delen van 
het geweldsspectrum als bij operaties die gericht zijn op de duurzame stabilisatie en de 
wederopbouw van voormalige conflictgebieden. Deze voorwaarden en de noodzaak het 
eigen personeel optimale veiligheid te bieden en steeds preciezere wapens in te zetten om 
onbedoelde schade tot een minimum te beperken, beïnvloeden nadrukkelijker dan ooit de 
uitrusting van de krijgsmacht en de taakuitvoering.” Handelingen der Staten-Generaal, Tweede 
Kamer, De maatregelen bij Defensie in kort bestek, vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 28 600 X, no. 49, 
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tary Strategic Assessment expressed that network-enabled capabilities were, “a critical 
factor and must form the core of the transformation of the Dutch armed forces, not only 
for power projection but also for stabilization-operations and national support missions.”908
The drive to adopt network-centric capabilities was a function of facilitating interop-
erability and had a political-strategic dimension. Only by focusing on technologically 
advanced contributions would the Netherlands be able to “find allegiance with our most 
important allies,” principally Washington.909 Interoperability was critical to enhance rele-
vance. Network-centric warfare would lead to greater effectiveness and higher operational 
tempo allowing a “decisive advantage” to be reached over adversaries. Not in the least the 
Assessment noted that the US, UK and Germany, as well as NATO had embraced it. In the 
Netherlands, the introduction of network-centric capabilities came in the form of systems 
such as TITAAN and ISIS. These enabled the Air Force and Army to share information.910 
While in the United States network-centric warfare was a new doctrine promising to 
change war altogether, for the Dutch it was adopted for the practical pay-offs of improved 
interoperability and deployability, and to be a better bridge-builder.
19.6  Financial Constraints on the Extractive Capacity
Financial constraints impacted the ability to pursue the proposals of the 1991 and 1993 
White Papers. Resource extraction was affected by financial policy however, financial 
scarcity was used by policymakers as an instrument to spur transformation. If there had 
been any doubt, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington demonstrated 
that the benevolent environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union had dissi-
pated. During this period the Netherlands undertook a series of expeditionary operations 
of increasing intensity. In 1999 the Netherlands committed two squadrons to Operation 
Allied Force, provided the lead element of the UN operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 
2000, deployed a substantial contingent to Northern Afghanistan in 2002, two battalion 
rotations to the stabilization force SFIR in Iraq in 2003, and participated in the demanding 
operation in Southern Afghanistan from 2006 onwards. Throughout this period however 
defense budgets would not rise. As a percentage of GDP, the defense budget has steadily 
decreased. From 1995 onwards – when the defense budget started to level off following 
the peace dividend– until 2008 it has only increased marginally, roughly 7% (see Figure 
27). It meant that funds went to operations and maintenance at the expense of investment. 
June 30, 2003.
908 Militair Strategische Verkenning (2006), p. 25.
909 Minister van Defensie, Op weg naar een nieuw evenwicht: De krijgsmacht in de komende jaren 
(Prinsjesdagbrief), vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29 200 X, no.1, The Hague, September 23, 2003, p. 
26.
910 Gordon Adams et.al., Bridging the Gap: European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic 
Interoperability, Defense & Technology Paper (Washington DC: National Defense University, 
November 2004), p.45.
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(Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Finance)
Figure 27: Netherlands Defense Budget (real, nominal and as % of GDP), 1991-2008
































































The 2003 defense white paper, the Prinsjesdagbrief: Enroute to a new Balance, was 
characterized by a restrictive financial framework. The document, drafted under Minister 
Henk Kamp, at its outset extensively dealt with the dire financial situation of the ministry. 
It outlined a structural decline of the budget ranging between 255 and 380 million Euros 
over the period 2003-2008. It stated that reasons for the decrease were macro-economic: 
“increasing costs of pensions and dealing with health-care waiting lists” presented a typical 
choice of “butter and guns.”911 3400 billets were removed, several bases were closed and 
operational capacities were reduced. Nevertheless it was an ambitious plan for improving 
expeditionary capabilities. Figure 28 sums up the reductions and investments proposed in 
the 2003 White Paper. 
High-intensity capabilities such as howitzer artillery-pieces, tomahawk cruise 
missiles and a replacement for the F-16 were proposed, yet also key enablers to improve 
the expeditionary nature of the military, such as extra lift capabilities and network-centric 
capabilities, were put forward. These investments would be financed, not through increases 
in the budget, but in spite of them. Aside from the shifts in the distribution of power, Lo 
Casteleijn, the director of policy planning at the Dutch ministry of defense, signaled that 
budgetary constraints were in fact dominant drivers of Dutch transformation strategy.912 
Static defense budgets were used as a tool to shape the process of rationalization.
911 Tweede Kamer, “Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) 
voor het jaar 2004: Op Weg naar een Nieuw Evenwicht, dr krijgsmacht in de komende jaren 
(Prinsjesdagbrief),” vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29200 X, no. 4, The Hague, September 23, 2003, 
p.5.
912 Interview with Lo Casteleijn, September 7, 2007, Ministry of Defense, The Hague.
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defense with Army.
study into replacement 
of F-16 with Joint Strike 
Fighter
(Source: Ministerie van Defensie, Prinsjesdagbrief 2003)
Figure 28: Capability investments and Reductions in 2003 Netherlands Defense White Paper 
Casteleijn identified two key moments when this happened: the 1993 Defense White Paper 
and a decade later, the 2003 Prinsjesdagbrief. They combined two important dynamics. 
Both strategic reviews followed large-scale international upheaval: the end of the Cold War 
and following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Secondly, they came at a time of budgetary scar-
city. It created both a strategic and financial reason to prescribe a new direction in defense 
policy. In 1993 it was decided to reduce planned defense appropriations with half a billion 
Euros, and in 2003, three times that amount. It created a financial motive to “do things 
differently.” It was a stick the Minister could use to promote change among the services. 
The financial dimension was critical, Casteleijn said, in order to rationalize the defense 
organization: “It ensured that choices were made.” In 2006, this argument by Casteleijn was 
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explicitly mentioned in official defense policy documents. As the Ministry went through 
another round of budget considerations, the defense policy brief stated that “the budgetary 
framework that was set for this government defines the financial boundaries within which 
we must realize the new balance of the armed forces. We express that these boundaries 
are under pressure. Such pressure is however not a priori undesired, because it stimu-
lates effectiveness and prioritization [emphasis added].”913 A presentation by the deputy 
Commander of the Armed Forces stated that a dominant driver of transformation for the 
Netherlands has been the necessity to “balance between budget and means.”914 As we have 
seen in the previous case study, this starkly differed from the United States. Fiscal initiatives 
in the US at the beginning of the 90’s were similar to those undertaken in the Netherlands. 
A peace divided was taken. Yet in the United States, the peace divided led to criticism from 
Republicans and the military leadership, procurement was believed to be neglected and 
there was talk of a pending “defense train-wreck” as a result.915 In the Netherlands however, 
financial constraints were seen as a useful tool to drive change forward. 
Why was fiscal pressure considered a useful tool? Following the hallmark shifts 
presented in the 1991 and 1993 defense white papers, throughout the 1990’s defense 
reform had been characterized by incremental reductions. The services retained their own 
budgeting power, the external environment did not yield threats to vital interests, and 
without robust Ministerial leadership, there was little pressure to stimulate coordinating 
investments and procurement policies to develop effective expeditionary capabilities. It 
gave rise to a policy known as the kaasschaaf, or cheese-grater. It was the Dutch analogy 
to the ‘salami-slicing’ method of incremental reductions. The Navy reduced a frigate, the 
Army a number of tanks, the Air Force several F-16s and so on. This would last throughout 
the decade. For example in 2000 the number of frigates was reduced from 16 to 14, the 
number of mine countermeasure vessels from 17 to 14, maritime patrol aircraft from 13 
to 10, 136 Leopard tanks were divested, and the number of F-16s reduced by 18. While 
investments in new capabilities were made salami-slicing came at the expense of further 
weakening existing capabilities. A wholesale revision of capabilities was not undertaken, 
instead there were persistently fewer capabilities. When Henk Kamp came into office in 
2002 he was pragmatic in identifying weak spots in the capability pool.916 It became clear 
that for several capabilities the minimum threshold for operational sustainability had been 
surpassed and the cheese-grater had cut too deep. Capabilities that had been preserved at 
great cost were no longer fiscally viable and were cancelled altogether. Such was the fate 
of the MLRS artillery system and the maritime patrol aircraft. It resonated a similar move 
in the United States that occurred around the same time. Secretary Rumsfeld’s cancella-
913 Minister van Defensie, Nieuw Evenwicht, Nieuwe Ontwikkelingen: Naar een toekomstbestendige 
krijgsmacht. Actualisering van de Prinsjesdagbrief, HDAB2006018085, June 2, 2006, p.25.
914 Hans Sonneveld, “Transformation of the Armed Forces of the Netherlands: how to remain 
relevant and affordable,” Presentation, The Hague, October 19, 2006.
915 Daniel Goure & Jeffrey M. Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millenium, 
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 1999).
916 Interview with Henk Kamp, September 7, 2007, Ministry of Defense, The Hague.
276 The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally
tion of the Crusader artillery tube had as ulterior bureaucratic motive to assure the mili-
tary services that hard choices would not be avoided. The financial reality was a means to 
enforce the transformation strategy towards an expeditionary military. This has created 
a policy culture where budget cuts are considered a useful mechanism to pursue change. 
The question remains to determine when has the fiscal knife cut so deep that meaningful 
change to be relevant is no longer possible? 
20 The Impact of Changes in the Security 
Environment: Clashes of Culture
The two tenets of Dutch strategic culture were constraints on the extractive capacity to 
pursue Dutch strategic transformation. When they aligned they pushed transformation 
forward. Such was the case prior to 1995 when international operations were of lower 
intensity and did not lead to questions of relevance to NATO or the United States. After-
wards Dutch security policy at times struggled to match the promotion of the international 
rule of law and stability projection in line with its ambition to play a relevant international 
role alongside the major allies in the security environment. It followed from a changing 
security environment which required more robust peace operations and in which the 
United States demonstrated its tendency towards unilateralism more forcefully. It meant 
that one pillar of its strategic culture was at loggerheads with the other. Under the bipolar 
system of the Cold War, support for the international rule of law aligned with the promo-
tion of a strong NATO. Unipolarity however, had resulted in a more assertive US foreign 
and security policy and under the administrations of George W. Bush came greater US 
reluctance to work through international institutions. It created friction between the two 
elements of Dutch strategic culture. At the same time, with the attacks of 9/11 it became 
clear that the security environment had started to shift, although signs were already seen in 
the mid-1990’s. The operation in Srebrenica and Kosovo had demonstrated that Western 
forces would need to be willing to engage in high-intensity operations as well. The tension 
was expressed in the dilemma whether the Netherlands could participate in operations 
that were effectively wars or not. It was also a dilemma between stability projection and 
relevance to the United States. 
Four cases stand out to demonstrate how Dutch transformation policy was 
constrained by the clash when the two tenets of strategic culture did not align. They are the 
Kosovo air campaign, support for the Iraq War, the proposal to purchase Tactical Toma-
hawks, and participation in the ISAF operation in Southern Afghanistan with a “Dutch 
Approach”.
20.1 Allied Force: Identity in Friction
While the Netherlands had traditionally held the international rule of law in highest regard 
alongside the desire to be a good ally, Operation Allied Force created friction between 
these two elements. In March 1999 NATO embarked on a military operation to stop 
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human suffering but did so in contradiction to its own international legal norms, namely 
without an explicit UN mandate. Parliament argued however that the violation of human 
rights warranted the violation of its own requirement to have a UN mandate. Stability 
would also be promoted since the mission addressed sources of regional instability on 
Europe’s doorstep. 
On September 23, 1998, UN Security Council resolution 1199 was adopted on the 
basis of Chapter VII, calling for the cessation of human rights violations in Kosovo. The 
resolution did not contain the explicit reference to employ “all necessary means” – autho-
rizing military action - to enforce the resolution. Lacking an explicit mandate by the United 
Nations Security Council, a clear-cut international legal justification was unavailable for 
the Dutch government to participate in a military operation to stop the persecution of 
Kosovo-Albanians. Throughout deliberations leading up to the operation, the Netherlands’ 
government maintained that resolution 1199 did in fact provide sufficient basis for mili-
tary action. In a letter to Parliament on October 8, 1998 the continued refusal by Milosevic 
to abide by UN Security Council resolution 1199 was interpreted by the Government as a 
sufficient violation to authorize the use of military force.917 Jozias van Aartsen, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, said “It was a resolution under Chapter VII [of the UN Charter], a sequel to 
resolution 1160. It was a sufficient basis because the FRY [Former Republic of Yugoslavia] 
was in non-compliance. According to us [the cabinet], the Parliament, the experts in New 
York and the 19 members of NATO, resolution 1199 was sufficient.”918 During parliamen-
tary hearings, Van Aartsen was questioned over the necessity of judicial legitimacy for the 
operation. In his answer he made a distinction between judicial and political legitimacy. 
He explicated that, “only politics can take the decision” and that ultimately it was up to 
the politicians to decide whether an operation was legitimate or not. Although it defied 
the principle of international legal support for an operation, the distinction between judi-
cial and political legitimacy found support in Parliament. MP Marijke Vos of the left-wing 
social-greens stated that: 
[Resolution 1199] was judicially not a sufficient legitimization. …We 
however found that the political legitimacy did suffice, because the resolution 
did mention that in non-compliance further action would be taken. From 
the debates that were held in the Security Council and elsewhere it was 
clear what type of action this would be. For us the humanitarian necessity 
stood paramount, given the violation of human rights and given the failure 
of diplomacy.919
917 Tweede Kamer, “De situatie in voormalig Joegoslavië; Brief ministers over eventuele deelname 
van Nederlandse militairen aan NAVO-acties in Kosovo,” vergaderjaar 1998-1999, 22181, nr. 
213, The Hague, October 13, 1998, p.2.
918 Jozias van Aartsen, quoted in Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzending (2000), p. 314.
919 Ibid, p. 319.
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Aside from this flexible reading of the text of Security Council resolution 1199, a further 
argument put forward was that a group of Western states could take matters into its own 
hands if it felt it was acting in the spirit of international law and the UN Charter, even if it 
was not explicitly mandated to do so. This line of reasoning held that the foreign policies of 
Western states, because of their presumed liberal justness, were sanctioned by international 
law whatever the international institution decided. The argument was a slippery slope 
since it defied the notion of international relations based on the legal principles agreed 
upon by all signatory states to the UN Charter. Instead it should be seen within the context 
of the unipolarity of the international system, whereby Western states were convinced of 
the overall righteousness of their actions irrespective of international law. If existing inter-
national legal institutions were incapable of acting, Western states, or NATO, could take 
over its role. Maxime Verhagen, MP for the Christian-Democrats, posited the Netherlands 
and NATO as a vanguard of the international community acting in the spirit of the UN 
Charter. Speaking to the parliamentary committee he said, “When we say that the protec-
tion of the international rule of law is the cornerstone of our foreign policy, then as the 
international community we cannot sit back as thousands of people are on the run, villages 
and houses are destroyed and numerous people killed, threatened or arrested […] It is 
clear that Milosevic violated earlier Security Council resolutions. The humanitarian situa-
tion justifies the intervention.” In the end, the Dutch government continued to emphasize 
that Security Council Resolution 1199 did provide sufficient justification for the military 
intervention, thereby maintaining allegiance to the international rule of law. The 2000 
Defense White Paper made this position explicit when it declared that, “[although] the 
government adheres strongly to a sound international judicial basis for military action, 
however ultimately it places humanity over sovereignty.”920 The Netherlands participated 
in Operation Allied Force with sixteen F-16 aircraft supported by two tanker aircraft. 
The justification process surrounding the operation in Kosovo indicated how the 
Netherlands had walked up against its own self-declared vestige of international legal Puri-
tanism. It led to a confrontation between Western liberal, human rights versus the inter-
national rule of law. Not to mention did it violate the norms Parliament had set for itself 
to only participate in an operation with an explicit international mandate. Had no action 
been taken, the letter of the United Nations Charter would be preserved, yet a human 
atrocity would be unaddressed. If action was taken, credibility of the United Nations 
would be jeopardized. The argument to be a relevant military power appears as a deriva-
tive of dealing with human rights atrocities. Could the Netherlands or NATO be relevant 
in the international security environment if it did not act to deal with human rights viola-
tions on its own doorstep? While in the early 1990’s relevance implied contributing to 
peacekeeping operations, now the level of conflict intensity at which ‘relevance’ would 
be assessed had increased and had evolved to performing a humanitarian intervention. 
The Netherlands contributed to maintain the relevance of NATO as collective security 
organization, and thereby also a credible mainstay for its own security. Had NATO failed 
920 Defensienota 2000 (2000), p. 5.
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than a cornerstone of Dutch security policy would have cracked. Showing solidarity in 
NATO was thereby a principle issue of concern. Ultimately, influenced by the unipolar 
international system, in the justification-process a third set of values prevailed, namely the 
legitimacy offered by democratic regimes. It was a symptom of the weakened stature of 
the United Nations and the alternative legitimacy presumed to be offered by a collective 
of Western liberal democratic states under the leadership of US liberal-democratic unipo-
larity. The liberal world governance structure promised by Van Vollenhoven was now 
policed by a group of Western states instead of the United Nations. The slippery slope of 
the argument became apparent during the 2003 Iraq War. Then, European states criticized 
the United States for asserting that its Coalition of the Willing made up of a random collec-
tion of states was representative of the international community’s will. In fact Washington 
was using a similar line of reasoning it had done during Operation Allied Force. This time 
however, European states strongly objected, presenting a political ceiling for expeditionary 
operations.
20.2 Iraq: The Demand for Stability is larger than its 
Supply
The friction between being a relevant ally and promoting the international rule of law 
became apparent in the run-up to the Iraq War. Prime Minister Balkenende said on the 
eve of the war:  
Peace is vulnerable. That becomes clear when one regime chooses the path 
of threat and terror, and does so for years. The international community 
must patiently hang on to international agreements and try to remove the 
threat. That patience may be large, but not endless. ... But to defend that 
rule of law, it is necessary that those that have violated those principles 
endlessly do not walk freely.921 
The Dutch government declared on March 18 2003 that it believed Iraq had weapons of 
mass destruction and that the use of force was considered appropriate.922 To the outside 
world support for the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom was provided by referring to Iraq’s 
violations of international law. Yet there was an internal debate raging in the Dutch bureau-
cracy whether Security Council resolution 1441 offered a sound international judicial 
921 “Iedereen wil een wereld van vrede en veiligheid.[…] Vrede is kwetsbaar. Dat blijkt als één 
regime jarenlang het pad kiest van dreiging en terreur. De internationale gemeenschap moet 
dan geduldig vasthouden aan de internationale afpsraken en zo proberen de dreiging weg te 
nemen. Dat geduld kan wel heel groot zijn, maar niet eindeloos. Want dan komt de basis van 
recht en vrede zelf in gevaar.[…] Velen hebben de afgelopen dagen gewezen op het belang van 
de internationale rechtsorde. Terecht. Maar tot het verdedigen van die rechtsorde behoort ook 
dat degenenen die het recht sinds jaar en dag brutaal schenden, uiteindelijk niet vrijuit mogen 
gaan.” Address by Prime Minister Balkenende, Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst, March 20, 2003.
922 Tweede Kamer, “De situatie in het Midden Oosten; Brief minister over de Nederlandse 
opvatting ten aanzien van de laatste ontwikkelingen omtrent Irak in de VN-Veiligheidsraad,” 
vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 23432, nr. 94, The Hague, March 20, 2003, p. 3.
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validation for the war since again an explicit UN mandate was missing. The Netherlands 
decided to adopt a somewhat schizophrenic posture which reflected the two contrasting 
traits of Dutch strategic culture. It decided to support Operation Iraqi Freedom politically, 
but not militarily. 
Why did the Netherlands not choose to join the Franco-German diplomatic offen-
sive against the war, or alternatively support the US-led operation with the armed forces? 
The Netherlands opted to bandwagon with the major power in the system. Yet, it did not 
do so completely. Rather the Netherlands chose to walk a fine line. Overtly supporting 
Franco-German resistance against the war would have posited the Netherlands at odds 
with its principle security ally and would contradict its Atlanticist tradition. Supporting the 
United States militarily contradicted its concerns over promoting the international rule of 
law for the second time in four years, yet this time it would also antagonize major powers 
in Europe. Neither was regime change part of the structure-focused understanding of the 
use of force. Removing Saddam Hussein without a UN mandate would lead to greater 
instability, particularly in the short-term and it remained to be seen what would happen in 
the long-term. Although for the United States the situation was comparable with the lack 
of a UN resolution to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, for the Netherlands that instance of 
legal tight-rope walking would not be repeated. The government said, “The lack of a Secu-
rity Council mandate is an obstacle for national support for a further Dutch contribution. 
Therefore the government concludes that it will not provide an active military contribution 
to the operations.”923 Confronted with the discord in the West, the Netherlands chose the 
middle road and adopted a traditional position to remain a bridge-builder.924 
Though a combat role was excluded the Netherlands immediately offered to take a 
role in the stabilization process. In an effort to placate relations with the United States and 
support a niche for stability projection, Prime Minister Balkenende, even before the war 
had started, declared a willingness to contribute to the stabilization phase: “A war may be 
necessary, but it will not win you the peace. That must be won through the reconstruction 
of Iraq when the guns have silenced. The Netherlands is at its fullest prepared to contribute 
to this under the flag of the United Nations.”925 The war started the next day. A stabilization 
mission in support of the United States, of course, did align both of the Dutch strategic 
cultural constraints, and would be an acceptable expeditionary operation. 
On June 6, 2003 the decision was taken to send a marine battalion to the multina-
tional stabilization force in Iraq. Stability in the region and Iraq’s territorial integrity were 
deemed the interests at stake. Operating under overall command of the British, its objective 
would be to support the political process by improving security and the internal stability 
923 Ibid, p. 4.
924 A similar situation occurred during the Vietnam War. It presented the Dutch government 
with difficulties. Torn between loyalty to its primary security guarantor and widespread public 
resentment of the war, the diplomatic position was to neither provide military support nor to 
explicitly denounce the American intervention.
925 Minister-President J.P Balkenende, Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, March 18, 2003, TK 50, p. 
50-3276.
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of the country, crucial conditions for the process of reconstruction. It demonstrated the 
finesse of Dutch foreign policy to promote a liberal-structuralist view of social progress 
vested in stability projection while supporting the major power in the system. 
20.3 Left-Right Tensions over Defense Procurement
Debate over the direction of defense policy and transformation towards an expeditionary 
force is influenced by left-right political dichotomies. Both sides of the political spec-
trum support the strategic cultural tenets to promote the international rule of law, project 
stability and use the military as an instrument to boost Dutch international relevance. 
This is the bandwidth of Dutch strategic culture however, the mix between these tenets is 
different on different sides of the political aisle. Right-wing parties do not shy away from 
high-intensity operations in order to promote the relevance of the Netherlands among 
its allies, or to do so to protect human rights. Left-wing parties however, rather use the 
military to promote the international rule of law through lower-intensity missions, which 
thereby in turn contribute to the overall standing of the Netherlands internationally. In 
practice it boiling down to a distinction between an Atlanticist foreign policy aimed at 
bandwagoning and a European approach that is primarily structure-focused.
Former Minister of Defense Kamp, of the right-wing liberals, articulated his political 
concern with respect to future transformation efforts. His answer was straight-forward 
when asked when the Netherlands’ transformation policy would change. He said, “when 
leftist parties continue to be voted into power...We can break down in 5 years what it took 
20 years to build up.” Kamp was referring to the desire among left-wing parties to shift 
away from high-intensity operations and embrace lower-intensity stabilization forces as 
the mainstay of Dutch force structure. Three weeks before my interview with Kamp, on 
November 5, 2007 the Labor party (PvdA) and second-largest party in the Balkenende 
coalition government, presented a defense plan proposing to tip the scale towards lower-
intensity stability projection and reorienting the military towards peacekeeping opera-
tions and crisis-management. The plan’s title Serviceable to the Netherlands, Service-
able to the World articulated the implied altruism.926 The plan promised a dramatic revi-
sion of the capabilities of the armed forces that had been built up during the Kamp-era. 
Most notable would be revising the national level of ambition to remove the reference to 
operations in the highest spectrum. Furthermore heavy cuts in high-end platforms were 
proposed, including:
ӺӺ half the F-16s (51 systems);
ӺӺ half the operational tanks (44 systems);
ӺӺ  2/3rds of the pantzerhowitzers (24 systems);
ӺӺ  1 LCF frigate and 2 M-frigates. 
926 See Angelien Eijsink, In dienst van Nederland, in dienst van de wereld, een plan voor een 
actieve en doelmatige krijgsmacht (Den Haag: November 2007).
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Instead the party promoted a focus on “soldiers with moral competence”. More attention 
would be paid to education and training diplomatic and humanitarian skills. It was a plan 
firmly rooted in the stability projection tradition of the Netherlands. According to one 
of the authors, Angelien Eijsink, “the PvdA wants to specialize and it chooses for ground 
forces.”927 Air Force and Navy would become supporting services to ground operations, 
implying a greater emphasis on transport and support roles instead of combat missions. 
According to Eijsink, the PvdA had always been opposed to initial-entry operations 
and proposed to specialize in crisis-management operations instead. The plan demon-
strated the thinking of the Labor party, and supported the ideas promoted in the 1968 
policy paper forty years earlier, as well as the idealist interpretation of Van Vollenhoven’s 
concepts to develop a global governance system. Its vision contrasted sharply with Kamp’s 
procurement initiatives, such as the Tactical Tomahawks, which were also vested in Dutch 
strategic culture.
Four years before the Labor party presented its plans Minister Kamp announced 
his intention to purchase Tactical Tomahawks to be placed aboard the recently procured 
LCF-frigates. The planned purchase was typical of friction between the “stability projec-
tion through low-intensity missions” School of the Left and the “international relevance 
through participation in high-intensity missions” School of the Right-wing. The tactical 
tomahawk (TACTOM) stand-off weapon would allow the Navy to support land-oper-
ations through precision strikes with a minimum risk to friendly forces and collateral 
damage. It would also be a suitable tool to provide escalation dominance. Tactical toma-
hawks however conjured up the image of the opening salvos of recent wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and were considered an offensive capability. Henk Kamp said the principle 
argument for procuring the system was to support land forces rather than having an 
initial-entry capability. He presented it as a “logical military means in a modern military”. 
It was also considered a relatively cheap system. The LCF-frigates were already equipped 
with vertical launching tubes. Refitting the launch system would cost €9,5 million over a 
period of 5 years excluding the cost of the missiles. At the same time the capability would 
greatly augment the Dutch ability to participate in high-intensity operations, its stated 
ambition since 1993. Perhaps most importantly, not just any ally could procure the toma-
hawk system from the United States, and it was therefore a way to demonstrate the Neth-
erlands’ membership of an elite club of highly expeditionary and highly privileged states, it 
would support the Netherlands as an A-team member. 
During two separate Parliamentary meetings in November 2004, the issue of the 
tomahawks was hotly debated. In 2004, left-wing parties wondered what the need was for 
a weapon that addressed no real military need. The Socialist party and the Social-greens 
overtly opposed the procurement as they believed it would constitute a qualitative shift in 
defense policy, emphasizing offensive operations. The Labor party stated that the cruise-
missiles would empower the United States to “politically commit the Netherlands more 
strongly to potential preventive military actions that cannot be legitimated by the interna-
927 Noel van Bemmel, “Wij willen soldaten met morele competentie,” De Volkskrant, November 3, 
2007.
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tional community.”928 In 2006, left-leaning parties in Parliament stated that it was a purely 
offensive weapon only to be used at the beginning of a deployment. Given that the Neth-
erlands would purchase a limited number of thirty missiles, the procurement was also 
deemed symbolic for political purposes, the Netherlands would be asked to participate 
at the start of an offensive operation simply for the sake of participating. Minister Kamp 
countered that in itself this would not be a problem as he conceptualized Dutch participa-
tion in a mission as a guarantee that The Hague could make its voice heard and therefore 
ensure due regard be given to Dutch concerns over the international rule of law. Dutch 
participation at the start of an operation would “only constitute an extra guarantee that the 
decision-making process occurs in the right fashion,” he said.929 In 2004, Minister Kamp 
noted that much of the resistance to the system was based on the historical-emotional 
dimension of talking about cruise missiles. It evoked the anti-nuclear sentiment domi-
nant in the 1980’s. At the time, a heated discussion took place regarding the placement of 
US nuclear-tipped cruise missiles in the Netherlands. While the Tactical Tomahawk was a 
different system altogether, the focus of concern was on its offensive characteristics.
It was however decided to postpone purchasing the Tomahawks. The OPV, Ocean-
going Patrol Vessel, replaced the cruise missile in the budget. This ship could operate close 
to shore and would be useful in counter-drug operations. Also Parliament wanted to have 
a capability that stimulated the Dutch instead of the American defense industry. Two years 
later, as operations in Afghanistan were eating into the Ministry’s budget, Minister Kamp’s 
replacement Eimert van Middelkoop, of the Christian Union, decided not to purchase the 
tomahawks at all. He acknowledged in May 2007 that the Netherlands would not operate 
at a level of intensity for which the missiles would be useful and therefore had decided to 
cancel the program altogether. The right-wing liberal party disagreed wholeheartedly and 
said that without the missiles the Netherlands would not be able to talk with sufficient 
weight to the United States. 
20.4 Uruzgan
The fourth instance which makes apparent how Dutch strategic-cultural tenets clashed in 
light of a shifting systemic division of power is the decision in 2005 to deploy military 
forces to the Southern Afghan province of Uruzgan. Due to the high intensity of conflict 
and the deployment of ground forces in a counterinsurgency mission, ‘Uruzgan’ presents 
the most poignant case where internal friction in Dutch strategic culture was portrayed. 
In the summer of 2005, the Dutch government informed Parliament that it contem-
plated sending Dutch troops to Southern Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission in 
what would become the largest high-intensity deployment since the Korean War.930 Two 
928 Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, Defensie, TK 28, November 25, 2004, p. 28-1905.
929 Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, Defensie, TK 23, November 17, 2005, p. 23-1488.
930 “I inform you that in relation to a request by NATO [Secretary General] I have announced 
that the Netherlands will research the possibilities of contributing to the deployment of ISAF 
in South Afghanistan (stage 3) in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada.” Tweede 
Kamer, “Brief minister over de NAVO-defensieministeriële bijeenkomst, die op 9 en 10 juni 
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months later, on August 26, 2005, the Government informed Parliament that an inten-
tion to deploy had been communicated to the North Atlantic Council pending political 
approval from Parliament.931 Four months later, on December 22, 2005 Parliament was 
officially informed along the contours of the Toetsingskader that the Netherlands would 
send a contingent to Southern Afghanistan as part of ISAF to aid the Afghan authorities to 
guarantee security and stability in Afghanistan. 
Projecting stability in order to deal with a security threat was the overarching publi-
cally communicated objective of the mission. Minister Kamp wrote, “The stabilization and 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, particularly in the South where the Taliban’s roots lie, is of 
great importance to improving the international rule of law and combating international 
terrorism which also threatens Europe.”932 On January 10, 2006 Prime Minister Balkenende 
said, “I want our Dutch military to contribute to the reconstruction of Uruzgan.” If unsuc-
cessful, Minister Kamp had warned, Afghanistan would again become a sanctuary for 
terrorism, which amounted to a security threat for Europe. 933 
Operational risks connected to the operation were defined as “significant” and since 
Uruzgan was part of the Taliban’s heartland and “many among the local population did not 
support the ISAF coalition” the government recognized that the mission had “real military 
risks,” adding that “offensive actions may be necessary to create a safe environment”.934 On 
the other hand, the letter stated that the Netherlands had the necessary experience with 
high-risk operations and had performed them successfully before, citing operations in 
Iraq and Northern Afghanistan.935 The nature of the mission in Uruzgan would however 
be very different from the stabilization campaigns in the relatively risk-free environment 
of Al-Muthanna - where the Netherlands had left before the Iraqi insurgency picked up 
steam - and the peaceable area surrounding Pol-i-Khomri.936 Nevertheless, the letter to 
Parliament mentioned that the security-situation in Uruzgan was “bad.”937 Such a stark 
2005 te Brussel,” vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 28 676, nr. 22, The Hague, June 29, 2005, p. 1.
931 Tweede Kamer, “Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme; Brief ministers over ontwikkelingen in 
de aanloop naar de verkiezingen in Afghanistan op 18 september 2005,” vergaderjaar 2005-
2006, 27925, no. 182, The Hague, September 5, 2005.
932 “De stabilisering en wederopbouw van Afghanistan, in het bijzonder het zuiden waar de 
Taliban haar oorsprong vindt, is van groot belang voor de bevordering van de internationale 
rechtsorde en de bestrijding van het internationale terrorisme dat ook Europa bedreigt.” 
Minister van Defensie, Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan, DVB/CV-388/05, 




936 The Dutch SFIR contingent left Al Muthanna in April 2005, ten months before the Al-Askari 
bombing in Samarra which triggered widespread ethnic violence and fueled the insurgency, 
also directed at the coalition forces. Pol-i-Khomri lay outside the ethnically Pashtun, and 
troubled parts of Afghanistan. These notoriously instable areas were primarily found in the 
Eastern and Southern provinces along the border of Pakistan.
937 Minister van Defensie, Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan, DVB/CV-388/05, 
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reference to dire circumstances in an operational theatre had not appeared in the deploy-
ment letters for Iraq and Northern Afghanistan.
By 2006 the Netherlands’ transformation process found its focal point in the mission 
in Uruzgan. Deploying forces to Uruzgan was a landmark for the Netherlands’ secu-
rity policy and would shape transformation itself. Kamp affirmed that the operation in 
Southern Afghanistan had become the driving force for transformation more so than any 
top-down grand scheme.938 The 2008 defense budget confirmed that the “cornerstone of 
Dutch security policy is the mission in Afghanistan”. According to Casteleijn, the mission 
was the ‘proof of the pudding’ within the limits of the responsible.939 It tested the limits of 
the ‘broad expeditionary’ force under development since 1991. The operation represented 
a litmus test for the armed forces and Dutch politics. Could the Netherlands militarily and 
politically support the tougher implications of having a broad expeditionary capability? 
Central to this test was that the security environment had evolved since the early 
1990’s and now a high-intensity expeditionary operation with ground forces had dawned. 
The military had underlined this eventuality since 1991, however politically it had 
remained a hypothetical. Throughout the 1990’s stability projection to promote the inter-
national rule of law in coordination with promoting Dutch international relevance had 
encompassed relatively risk-free peacekeeping and peace support missions. Conflicts had 
however become more complex, and due to the threat of international terrorism, Western 
states had become a party to regional instability in places like Afghanistan. In short, the 
international system had changed and this affected the two main tenets of Dutch strategic 
culture differently.
While it was not presented as such at the time, the mission in Uruzgan was a high-
intensity counterinsurgency operation, the first of its kind for the Netherlands’ military 
and by far the largest and thereby the most demanding operation since the police actions 
in the Dutch East Indies in the late 1940’s. It tested the limits of “out-of-area” operations in 
terms of duration (two years, later to be prolonged to four), in terms of intensity (engaging 
in offensive operations with ground forces), in terms of logistics and in terms of climate 
and endurance (the operation was 6000 kilometers away in rugged terrain).940 In 2005 
Uruzgan was a black hole, lacking effective local governance but with plenty of warlords, 
guns, drugs, rebel activity and difficult terrain. It was a complex environment to bring 
stability, where people were more scared of the police than of the Taliban.941
The battalion-sized contingent consisted of approximately 1500, later to be increased 
to 1700, troops initially drawn from units from the 12th Air Assault Infantry battalion of 
The Hague, December 22, 2005, p. 3-4.
938 Interview with Henk Kamp, November 29, 2007, The Hague.
939 Interview with Lo Casteleijn, September 7, 2007, The Hague.
940 Minister of Defence, Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan, DVB/CV-388/05, 
The Hague, December 22, 2005, p.12.
941 Barbara Bedway, “Covering the ‘Other’ War: a reporter in Afghanistan,” Editor & Publisher, 
April 3, 2006.
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the expeditionary Air Manoeuvre Brigade and the 44th Mechanized Infantry battalion. 
Six F-16 fighter aircraft and six Apache assault helicopters were deployed alongside three 
armored pantzerhowitser artillery systems, and Chinook and Cougar transport helicop-
ters. It was the heaviest deployment abroad of the Dutch military in contemporary history. 
Prior to deployment a substantive political hurdle needed to be mounted by the 
government. Parliamentary support, although constitutionally not necessary but desirable, 
was not guaranteed. There was friction between the offensive element of the operation, 
which stood on a tense footing with the principle of stability projection, and expressing 
solidarity with NATO, ISAF and the United States. Public support for the mission in 
Uruzgan swayed heavily. On December 21, 2005, the day before Parliament received 
the government’s letter of intent, in a public opinion poll 26% of those questioned were 
in favor of the mission, while 68% were against. Following the debate in Parliament six 
weeks later on February 2nd, 49% were in favor.942 While it showed a significant increase in 
support for the mission, the question remains whether less than half was ‘sufficient’. 
In line with the emphasis on stability projection, the government presented the oper-
ation as a reconstruction mission. During the debate in Parliament in February 2006 three 
arguments in favor of the mission were put forward, all reflecting tenets of Dutch strategic 
culture: firstly the political-military responsibility to support NATO solidarity; secondly, 
the purpose of the mission to increase stability in a conflict-ridden part of the world and 
thereby avoid the creation of a terrorist sanctuary; and thirdly, the argument that the oper-
ation in Uruzgan would be qualitatively different from previous efforts in Uruzgan by the 
US military due to a unique “Dutch Approach” to stabilization missions. 
20.4.1 Solidarity with NATO
The most straightforward reason for the Dutch to deploy to Uruzgan was that the Neth-
erlands had the capability to do so and solidarity in the alliance required its participation. 
Now was the time to use the capabilities it had developed. As the contingent was on the 
verge of deployment, Foreign Minister Ben Bot, in an interview in NRC Handelsblad on 
June 13, 2006, wondered out loud what the use of the military was if it was not used. He 
implied that the existence of Dutch expeditionary forces provided ample justification to 
participate. Coupled to this was solidarity with NATO. Pressure to participate also came 
from Brussels. Two days before the crucial debate in Parliament, solidarity stood central. 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO’s Secretary-General, pressured the Netherlands with a 
similar “use it or lose it”-approach: 
942 J.S. van der Meulen & A. Vos, “Kwetsbaar draagvlak: de publieke opinie over Uruzgan,” Carré 
no.6 (2007), p.21-23. See also the Dutch Ministry of Defense’s monitor of Dutch public 
opinion regarding Uruzgan, “Monitor Publieke Opinie Uruzgan” which offers monthly public 
opinion surveys from August 2006 to July 2010. Available at http://www.defensie.nl/missies/
afghanistan/actueel/monitor_publieke_opinie.
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This is an alliance based on solidarity where nations cannot pick and 
choose. Solidarity demands in this alliance that if you are in a position to 
participate in this operation you should participate. You should not say, 
sorry, it is too dangerous. We will not go. That is an argument I do not buy. 
What do you have armed forces for?943
NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Jones signaled that NATO genuinely needed 
the Dutch contribution because the Alliance had little alternative aside from the Dutch.944 
Even before the cabinet had informed Parliament about the decision to go to Uruzgan, it 
was made clear that, “it is important to NATO that the Netherlands participates.”945 Dutch 
credibility in the alliance was deliberately used as a coercive instrument of diplomacy. 
Addressing parliamentary hesitations about the mission, former Dutch Ambassador 
to NATO Michiel Patijn said, “We are not doing what we say, we don’t put our money 
where our mouth is. It’s about our image and we’re losing our sense of direction …We 
have always said that we can best defend our interests through the UN, NATO as founda-
tion of our security policy, and the EU…I don’t understand where the sudden hesitations 
over this stability operation comes from.”946 The government acknowledged that the Neth-
erlands was under significant pressure from NATO to agree to the mission. Although it 
stressed that any contribution took place on the condition of domestic political approval, 
it would have a significant impact on the Alliance’s military planning process. The govern-
ment observed that it was under pressure from those allies intending to operate alongside 
the Dutch, meaning the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia. For the 
Netherlands, these were not the least of allies; instead these were the allies with which The 
Hague had historically the closest ties and towards whom they were most oriented.947
20.4.2 Support for Stability
The second argument combined solidarity with the notion of promoting the international 
rule of law. The Christian-Democrats noted as principle considerations solidarity with 
Afghanistan and the “obligation to improve the international rule of law” as well as The 
943 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer quoted in “Dutch Pressed over Afghanistan,” International Herald 
Tribune, January 30, 2006.
944 T. Koelé & M. Peeperkorn, “Tweede Kamer zwaar onder druk gezet,” De Volkskrant, January 
31, 2006.
945 A. Brouwers & T. Koelé, “Kabinet nu voor missie Afghanistan,” De Volkskrant, December 2, 
2005.
946 “We maken onze woorden niet waar, we don’t put our money where our mouth is. Het gaat 
om beeldvorming. En we verliezen ons richtingsgevoel.… We hebben altijd beleden dat wij 
onze belangen het best kunnen behartigen via de Verenigde Naties, de NAVO als hoeksteen 
van het veiligheidsbeleid, en de Europese Unie.… ....Ik begrijp dan ook niet goed waar de 
plotselinge aarzelingen over deze stabiliseringsmissie vandaan komen.” M. Patijn quoted by 
Juurd Eijsvoogel, “Blauw Oog voor Nederland,” NRC Handelsblad, January 13, 2006.
947 See Commandant der Strijdkrachten, Militair Strategische Verkenning 2006, February 6, 2006.
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Hague’s responsibility as a NATO member to deny terrorists a sanctuary.948 The third-
largest party, the liberal-conservative VVD, argued that solidarity, as a central element 
of creating a system of collective security, was a major justification for sending the force 
to Uruzgan. The interest of relevance was put forward. The argumentation was framed 
around the historical role of the Netherlands as an international player. VVD party-leader 
Jozias van Aartsen referred to an international “calling of our country,” which was based on 
solidarity with NATO to protect Western values of democracy and human rights: 
For centuries we have looked beyond our dikes, we have stood on the 
frontline to promote our solid belief in human rights, in democracy and 
international cooperation. That is why we are member of international 
alliances: the UN, NATO and the EU.949 
Similarly, the second-largest party, the Labor party, indicated their support in principle 
because it was a United Nations operation executed by NATO at the invitation of President 
Karzai.950 The mission met the requirement of an international legal mandate to contribute 
to the rule of law.
The smallest party of the governmental coalition, liberal-democratic D66 was 
however vehemently opposed to the operation. This jeopardized the cohesion in the 
governing coalition. D66 questioned the feasibility of the mission and complained that 
reconstruction would be difficult in such an adverse conflict environment. D66 said they 
“hardly identified opportunities for reconstruction, and instead saw many and substantial 
risks.” Nor was the party convinced that ISAF could realistically be separated from the 
American-led Operation Enduring Freedom, which emphasized counter-terror opera-
tions rather than reconstruction and stabilization. D66’ considerations were based on the 
question whether stability projection could take place. The party disagreed with the outset 
of the mission because its character would not be a representation of its publically stated 
objective; rather than reconstruction, the mission would involve fighting the Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda operatives because of the non-permissive operational environment. What 
remained unclear was whether the party disapproved of the mission because it was consid-
ered too dangerous and included offensive actions, or whether it was against the operation 
because the government proposed a type of mission which it believed would not be able 
to take place. To substantiate his argument D66 leader Boris Dittrich recalled the situation 
948 M. Verhagen, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan,” Tweede 
Kamer, The Hague, February 2, 2006.
949 “Eeuwenlang hebben wij over onze dijken heengekeken, hebben wij vooraan gestaan om 
ons rotsvaste geloof in mensenrechten, in democratie en internationale samenwerking uit te 
dragen. Daarom zijn wij ook lid van die internationale bondgenootschappen: de VN, de EU 
en de NAVO.” Jozias van Aartsen, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-
Afghanistan,” Tweede Kamer, The Hague, February 2, 2006.
950 Bert Koenders, quoted in Trouw, January 14, 2006.
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in 1995 prior to the deployment to Srebrenica when the armed forces participated in an 
operation unprepared for the situation they would encounter on the ground: 
Then, as now, there was significant pressure from the international 
community, the media and the population. Then, we agreed without really 
thinking it through. We must not stumble into another war.951 
References to the troubled operation in Srebrenica in 1995 hung over the decision-
making process like a thunderstorm. Looking back, the noble objective of that mission 
had clouded rational judgment over the operation. The fear was that the decision-making 
process regarding Uruzgan would be based on similar good intentions. While recognizing 
the danger of the operation, the Christian-Democrats also made clear that if they were to 
partake in a dangerous military operation, they would only do so within a NATO frame-
work alongside larger states. They wanted safeguards and guarantees for force protection 
and an exit strategy to avoid a second ‘Srebrenica.’ The Minister of Foreign Affairs noted 
however that the comparison with Srebrenica was not appropriate: “At the time, our soldiers 
were lightly armed because they had a different mandate.”952 In the case of Uruzgan, he said, 
the soldiers would be “optimally armed” and NATO had given various guarantees in the 
event the situation went bad, referring to assurances given by an American counterpart.953 
Additionally, six Dutch Apaches and six F-16s were available for an extraction operation if 
necessary. D66’s complaints that the mission could not contribute to stability projection 
left the other parties unconvinced. 
20.4.3 Differentiation with the Major Ally: Agency vs. Structure
The previous two arguments portrayed the schools of Dutch strategic culture; solidarity 
with NATO and stability projection. The third argument was the most important in terms 
of demonstrating tension between these two elements and how it affected transformation. 
Just as the political deliberations over the police-actions in the 1940’s had outlined mili-
tary-strategic implications - prohibiting the destruction of Djokjakarta - so too did parlia-
mentary deliberations over Uruzgan proscribe military-strategic aspects: the Netherlands 
would operate differently from the United States. 
While the Netherlands would show solidarity and assert its relevance to the US and 
NATO by participating, the Dutch emphasis on stability led it to criticize the United States 
951 “Ook toen was erg grote druk vanuit de internationale gemeenschap, de media en de 
bevolking. Toen zijn we akkoord gegaan zonder dat we het goed hadden doordacht. We 
moeten ons nu niet weer een oorlog in laten rommelen.” Boris Dittrich quoted by Raoul Du 
Pré, “Dittrich vreest een nieuw Srebrenica,” De Volkskrant, January 27, 2006.
952 Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Bot quoted by P. De Waard, “Bot prijst ‘vrienden bij 
PvdA,’” De Volkskrant, February 1, 2006.
953 “We had a clear message. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said, “There can be no 
misunderstanding on our solidarity. The Dutch can rely on getting the military support that 
is necessary.” D. Fried quoted in “US Promises Dutch Military Support in Afghanistan,” NIS 
News Bulletin, December 1, 2005.
290 The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally
and its adoption of a primarily agency-focused approach in Afghanistan. The United States 
was focused on removing the threat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, not by emphasizing 
structural improvements and institution-building but rather through a “kinetic approach”; 
targeting insurgents and terrorists with military capabilities including Special Forces 
conducting search & destroy missions and air-strikes.954 This clashed with the Dutch inten-
tion to embrace the military as part of a broader toolset in order to change the structures 
and institutions of Afghan society and bring stability. The Netherlands wanted to pursue 
stability projection. The Netherlands is not a warfighting state. It was the same reason why 
the Netherlands had been uncomfortable supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom militarily, 
and why it had been among the first to offer troops for subsequent stability campaigns. It 
clashed with the US perspective based on its liberating view of warfare.
During the debate for approving the Uruzgan mission, it led to friction in Dutch stra-
tegic culture. Between solidarity with the United States and the desire for stability became 
apparent. A key requirement formulated by Parliament was to explicitly separate, what 
was seen as the terrorist-hunting US mission Operation Enduring Freedom and multilat-
eral stability-projecting ISAF. It was made explicit in the government’s letter to Parliament 
of December 22, 2005 which indicated that American activities in the region were ques-
tionable and that there was widespread concern over the US-style of operating: 
Among large parts of the population there is no support for the behavior 
of coalition forces [the US] which is considered to be inappropriate. Their 
actions seem to impact the local situation negatively instead of positively. 
An operating style of ISAF, explicitly focused on winning the hearts and 
minds of the population, is therefore necessary.955 
It was direct criticism of the agency-focused approach of the US military that was part of 
US strategic culture. The government later explained that in its perception the United States 
had not been successful in winning local ‘hearts and minds’ as a result of the collateral 
damage associated with the prolific use of airpower in a close air support role. Suspected 
terrorists were targeted with precision capabilities, but at the expense of the civilian popu-
lation. Similarly, the heavy-handed way in which search efforts and arrests were performed 
had led the population to view US forces unfavorably.956 The underlying reason was that 
the United States had taken an enemy-centric rather than a population-centric perspec-
954 See Aylwin-Foster (2005) and Barack Obama, “State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, 
January 27, 2010.
955 “Daarnaast is er onder grote delen van de lokale bevolking geen draagvlak voor het als 
ongepast ervaren optreden van de coalitiestrijdkrachten. Dat optreden lijkt daarmee op dit 
moment eerder van negatieve dan van positieve invloed op de lokale situatie. Een overgang 
naar de aanpak van ISAF, met meer nadruk op het winnen van de ‘hearts and minds’ van 
de bevolking, is daarom geboden.” Minister van Defensie, Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF in 
Zuid-Afghanistan, DVB/CV-388/05, The Hague, December 22, 2005, p. 10.
956 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken & Ministerie van Defensie, “Antwoorden op Kamervragen 
van 20 januari 2006,” DVB/CV -041/06, January 27, 2006.
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tive, and focused on targeting terrorists at the expense of promoting stability. The Dutch 
government underlined and criticized the American kinetic and agency-focused approach 
in Afghanistan: 
The international military presence, over the past years, has been directed 
at the armed fights against the OMF [Opposing Military Forces] instead of 
improving the living conditions of the population.957 
The Dutch government, with its focus on structure and stability, believed it would be better 
predisposed to address these needs, and thereby argued in favor of the deployment.
The parliamentary deliberations evolved into a debate over the military tactics Amer-
ican forces used in Afghanistan. Criticism over the US style of operating was commonly 
held throughout Parliament, across the political spectrum. Femke Halsema, the leader of 
the social-green party (GroenLinks) said that “Reconstruction can only work if it rests on 
the willingness of the population to open their hearts and minds to foreign forces. This 
is not possible if Americans kick in their doors at night.”958 Boris Dittrich of the D66 
liberal-democrats noted that the Americans were partially to blame for the level of resis-
tance: “Over the past period, Uruzgan has become more unsafe, in spite of, but also due to 
the actions of the Americans.” The leader of the Christian-democrats Maxime Verhagen 
argued that the Dutch would be more effective than American forces because of a greater 
level of consideration for the local population since “if you can improve the living condi-
tions, even only in small steps, than they [Dutch forces] will definitively win the hearts 
and minds. If you “… do not kick in the doors but hang them up again, it implies a very 
different military operation.”959 Dittrich responded to Verhagen asking whether the popu-
lation in Uruzgan would indeed be able to tell the difference between US and Dutch forces. 
Verhagen replied that not only different insignias on the uniforms but more so a different 
modus operandi would make the distinction clear. 
The political elite went to great lengths to underline military differences with the 
Americans. In response to a question how the Dutch contingent would communicate with 
the local population, the cabinet reaffirmed that the Dutch forces would make clear to the 
local population that they were not American: “During the communication that members 
of the [Dutch contingent] will have with the population, they will advance the position 
that the Dutch or European effort is different from the American effort as it has been so far.” 
The government explained that it would do so through personal contacts, public meetings 
but also over radio broadcasts. The greatest risk to Dutch troops seemed not to be the 
Taliban but rather whether they were considered ‘American’ or not. 
An additional element fuelling concern over US tactics was the public and political 
957 Ibid.
958 Femke Halsema, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan,” TK 
45, February 2, 2006, pp. 45-3022.
959 M.Verhagen, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan,” TK 45, 
February 2, 2006, pp. 45-3014.
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outcry against the Abu Ghraib prisoner-scandal in Iraq and the dire humanitarian situa-
tion at the military prisons at Guantanamo Bay. For fear of Dutch complicity with human 
rights violations, Parliament wanted a formal promise from the Government that no 
individuals arrested by the Dutch contingent would be sent to Guantanamo.960 Maxime 
Verhagen said that in contrast to Operation Enduring Freedom there should “be no doubt 
that the humanitarian law of war will be upheld” and that “we want to build up a relation-
ship with the local population in our area in our own way.”961 Thereby juxtaposing a “Dutch 
Approach” to seeming disregard for humanitarian law by the Americans. The Netherlands 
was committed to take a qualitatively different approach to ‘Uruzgan’ from the other prov-
inces where the US continued to operate. Dutch politicians went so far as to equate Dutch 
participation in the operation as a guarantee that no violations of humanitarian law would 
occur. The Labor party said that if the Dutch did not go to Uruzgan there was a “100% 
guarantee” that any arrested individuals would end up in Guantanamo Bay. 
The main issue for the decision makers was whether the Dutch forces were suffi-
ciently able to differentiate themselves from the Americans. The Dutch would be more 
effective in Uruzgan because they were not Americans. This was a surprising line of argu-
ment since solidarity with NATO and sustaining relevance to the United States were prin-
cipal considerations to participate in the mission in the first place, as well as a core element 
of Dutch strategic culture. The reason must be sought in that other element of Dutch stra-
tegic culture, namely a structure-focused understanding of interventions and a military 
emphasis on stability projection. The military would not be deployed to fight wars, but 
rather to contribute to stability in order to enable liberal institutions to take root. It led to a 
concomitant resistance to the American agency-focused approach, and a belief that there 
where they had failed, the Netherlands would be successful. Because the Dutch operated 
from the vantage point of stability projection, they were disinclined to use the military in 
isolation from other instruments of power or purely with the intent to fight adversaries. 
This attitude was specifically promoted through belief in a successful “Dutch Approach” to 
stabilization operations. 
20.4.4 The “Dutch Approach”
During the SFIR stabilization mission in Iraq, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
argued that by participating in the alliance the Netherlands could shape the operation so 
that SFIR would not resemble an occupational force. Dutch participation was believed to 
give the mission a different image. MP Camiel Eurlings of the Christian Democrats said, 
“I am convinced that a large majority of the Iraqi population will see our men and women 
not as occupiers, but as liberators and that the overall majority of the Iraqis will welcome 
the international support to the reconstruction of the country.”962 Just as had been done 
960 Ministry of Defense, “Answers to Parliamentary questions,” DVB/CV-041/06, January 27, 
2006, p.36.
961 M. Verhagen, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan,” TK 45, 
pp. 3013-3035, February 2, 2006.
962 Camiel Eurlings, Tweede Kamer, “De situatie in het Midden Oosten; Verslag algemeen overleg 
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during the police actions in the Dutch Indies, and later during the mission in Southern 
Afghanistan, it became government policy “not to emphasize the military presence.” For 
this there were two reasons. Firstly, it would cultivate the culturally preferred role of the 
Netherlands as a stabilizing power and not as an occupier or warfighter instead. Secondly, 
it was believed to improve force protection. By adjusting non-verbal communications 
– such as driving in light-armored vehicles, not wearing sun-glasses or only carrying 
weapons when necessary - the Dutch forces would come across as non-confrontational. 
Of course, it was far from new. Dutch politicians had preferred to perform crisis-manage-
ment operations in this manner throughout the 1990’s. Nevertheless the way in which the 
Netherlands military operated in Iraq became the basis for what was termed the “Dutch 
Approach,” a term that remained in the public discourse to describe what was considered 
to be a qualitatively different way of operating in complex stabilization missions. The ques-
tion was whether this “Dutch Approach,” or stabilization with a light touch, would hold up 
in a high-intensity environment like Uruzgan?
The label “Dutch Approach” was used for operations in Southern Iraq and Northern 
Afghanistan. It was described by the government as an operating style based on “knowl-
edge of and respect for the local culture”. The term found widespread appeal in Parliament. 
While acknowledging the complexity of the environment in Uruzgan, Wouter Bos, leader 
of the Labor party, stated that if there was one approach that had a chance of success it was 
the “Dutch Approach” as it had already demonstrated its value during the NATO mission 
in the north of Afghanistan.963 Prior to the Parliamentary debate over Uruzgan, the 
commander of the Dutch armed forces, General Dick Berlijn, elaborated on the “Dutch 
Approach.” He summarized it as showing respect for the local population while remaining 
aware of the risks of an operation. The Approach had been nourished as a result of the 
experience with expeditionary operations throughout the 1990’s. Berlijn said, “the Dutch 
Approach is based on respect and understanding for the cultural context, but one that 
neither closes its eyes to the risks and gives our soldiers the protection and rules of engage-
ment that are necessary to act adequately.”964 It was held to be a combination of limited 
force and cultural respect while maintaining the ability to escalate. It sounded sensible 
enough and appealed to Dutch strategic-cultural preferences to promote the international 
op 25 juni 2003 over de mogelijke Nederlandse bijdrage aan de stabilisatiemacht voor Irak,” 
vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 23432, nr. 120, The Hague, July 9, 2003, p. 5.
963 W. Bos, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan,” TK 45, pp 
3013-3035, February 2, 2006.
964 “Sinds 1993 heeft de Nederlandse Krijgsmacht deelgenomen aan vrijwel alle internationale 
missies van formaat. We hebben daardoor veel kennis en ervaring opgedaan en een wijze 
van optreden ontwikkeld die succesvol is gebleken. Ook in risicovolle omstandigheden. 
Deze zogenoemde Dutch Approach is gebaseerd op respect en begrip voor de culturele 
omgeving, maar sluit de ogen niet voor de risico’s en geeft onze soldaten de bescherming en 
geweldsinstructie die nodig zijn om adequaat op te treden.” Gen. D. Berlijn, “Toespraak bij 
Vertrek F-16 detachment naar Afghanistan,” January 9, 2006.
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rule of law in a non-confrontational manner. Aware that the term could be misconstrued, 
Berlijn added that in Afghanistan there would be no luxury of choosing for either recon-
struction or fighting, and that both would be necessary.965 
The “Dutch Approach” repeated traditional tenets of counterinsurgency such as 
engaging the local population and applying minimal force. It emphasized engaging the 
population rather than fighting. It thereby created the public impression that, although 
the need for offensive operations had been mentioned in the Government’s letter of 
December 22, 2005, the Netherlands could be successful in Uruzgan with a minimum 
use of force. Traditional counterinsurgency doctrine however dictates a necessity to be 
prepared to engage in direct action against insurgents as well.966 With a strategic culture 
focused on stability projection, this latter element was not publicly promoted. Winning 
local “hearts and minds” became the stated objective of the “Dutch Approach” in Uruzgan. 
“Our work was primarily directed at getting the support of the local population instead 
of hunting groups of Taliban warriors across the province,” battalion commander of Task 
Force Uruzgan Piet van der Sar said one year into the mission. He said it fit “perfectly in our 
counterinsurgency strategy.”967 
Although it could be distilled from the government’s deployment letter, no mention 
was made of the term “counterinsurgency,” nor was it referred to in the Parliamentary 
debate. On October 4, 2006 MP Farah Karimi of the social-green party asked the govern-
ment whether the Uruzgan mission was a counterinsurgency operation. The response was 
an elaborate description of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan describing both its indirect, 
stability-oriented elements emphasizing engagement with the local population, as well as 
its elements associated with warfighting. Yet the term itself was avoided.968 I asked a senior 
policy official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs why this was. His response was that the 
letter of November 22, was clear enough that offensive operations associated with coun-
terinsurgency would occur. However, it proved politically expedient to avoid giving the 
965 “Er is in een gecompliceerd land als Afghanistan niet een zwart-wit keuze tussen vechten of 
opbouw. Het is op vechten voorbereid zijn, maar de bevolking vooral laten zien dat opbouw 
de hoofddoelstelling is.” Ibid.
966 See also Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, John Nagl, et al. “Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes 
of Counterinsurgency” in Military Review (March-April 2006), p. 49-53.
967 “Dat paste perfect in onze strategie van counterinsurgency. Kijk, ons werk was vooral gericht 
op het verwerven van steun van de lokale bevolking, in plaats van het jagen op groepen 
strijders van de Taliban door de hele provincie. Het eerste heeft meer zin, want de mensen in 
Uruzgan zijn niet zo pro Taliban. Overleven komt op de eerste plaats en daarbij kunnen ze de 
Nederlandse hulp goed gebruiken. Aan de andere kant kan het verzet onmogelijk zonder de 
steun van de plaatselijke bevolking. Voor voedsel en onderdak kloppen ze bij hen aan en daar 
nu ligt een kans voor de locale overheid en de International Security Assistance Force. Slaag je 
erin in de mensen in Uruzgan voor je te winnen, dan breng je de Taliban een zware klap toe.” 
Interview Colonel Van der Sar. http://www.regimentvanheutsz.nl/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=244. Accessed June 13, 2007.
968 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Vragen van het lid Karimi (GroenLinks) aan de minister 
van Defensie over de rules of engagement van ISAF in Afghanistan. (Ingezonden September 
21, 2006),” Kamervragen met antwoord 2006-2007, TK 30, October 4, 2006.
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impression of fighting, nor did it fit in the Dutch strategic culture of stability projection. 
Emphasizing the offensive nature of counterinsurgency risked failing to get public support 
for the mission.
The idea that the Netherlands could achieve success in Uruzgan without fighting the 
Taliban was utopian. Asked in late 2007 about the existence of a “Dutch approach,” General 
Ton van Loon, commander of ISAF Regional Command South was adamant. “Fighting a 
bit” does not exist, he said. It however captured the impression shared by Parliament in 
the run-up to the decision-making process for the operation in Uruzgan. The day after the 
favorable parliamentary vote Minister Kamp finally stressed offensive operations would 
likely take place. He said, “the hard core of the Taliban and Al Qaeda must be eliminated 
with hard action. If attacks are planned in our province of Uruzgan, we will make sure they 
are not executed.”969
The Dutch emphasis on stability projection, and the “Dutch Approach,” translated 
into a focus on ‘hearts and minds’ rather than engaging the Taliban directly. Initially this 
was believed to have consequences for the military material and apparel used in Afghani-
stan. A different style of operating would necessarily mean a different set of tools should be 
taken along. This was another dimension along which the Netherlands would distinguish 
itself from the United States. Dutch forces would ride in open jeeps if possible, only “in an 
armored personnel vehicle if necessary.”970 It resonated traditional counterinsurgency prin-
ciples that the more a force is protected the less secure it is because it is unable to contact 
the population. Another seemingly trivial element was that Dutch forces would not wear 
sunglasses which were favored by US forces, but open transparent ski-masks instead. The 
wrap-around sun-glasses American forces were known for had become a straw-man, 
criticized for being indicative of cultural insensitivity. This, as well, was believed to reduce 
the interpersonal barrier between soldier and Afghan civilian. It soon became apparent 
however that adequate force protection was indeed a priority.971 Several steps were taken to 
this extent. The Netherlands purchased twenty-five mine-resistant Bushmaster armored 
vehicles. They would complement the open jeeps, although soon they were the only 
vehicles to leave the compound given the threat of improvised explosives. Dutch forces 
were prescribed to wear sun-glasses instead of transparent ski-masks to cope with the 
glare. Initially Dutch forces would also wear green camouflage uniforms to distinguish 
themselves from the desert-khaki American forces wore. Yet all other ISAF troops were 
outfitted with the same desert-khaki and the Netherlands soon abided. Besides, the mili-
tary said, “[khaki] camouflages better in the surrounding environment” of Uruzgan.972 
969 “Als we een klap moeten uitdelen om ellende te voorkomen, zullen we dat zeker doen. De 
harde kern van de Taliban en Al Qa’ida moet met harde actie worden uitgeschakeld. Als er 
aanslagen dreigen in onze provincie Uruzgan, zorgen we ervoor dat dit niet gepleegd worden.” 
Minister of Defence Henk Kamp, quoted in De Volkskrant, February 3, 2006.
970 “In een MB [Mercedes-Benz] als het kan, in een YPR rupsvoertuig als het moet.”Gen. D. 
Berlijn, “Toespraak bij Vertrek Deployment Task Force naar Uruzgan,” March 14, 2006.
971 S. Ramdharie, “Uruzgan-ganger in ’t nieuw,” De Volkskrant, July 14, 2006.
972 “Nederland wilde eerst rondlopen in groen spul. De bevolking moest duidelijk worden 
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While the Netherlands had tried to be different from the United States, the environment 
had rules of its own. Slowly it became accepted that the Netherlands was engaging in a 
high-intensity counterinsurgency operation. Military battles, such as the battle of Chora 
in June 2007 where the full range of capabilities was used and the most intensive fighting 
involving Dutch forces took place since the Korean war, removed any doubt regarding the 
nature of the operation.973 Following his command at ISAF Regional Command South 
General Ton van Loon would publicly elaborate on how the Dutch operation was a coun-
terinsurgency, an impression that had been avoided in order to accommodate Dutch stra-
tegic culture.
The “Dutch Approach” offered the political label to stress that the Netherlands could 
indeed operate differently than the United States in Uruzgan. The Netherlands deployed 
to Uruzgan stressing how different it was from its most important ally, the ally with whom 
it would be deployed in the same operational theatre and for whose political-strategic 
credit amongst others it was participating in the first place. Dutch criticism of the US style 
of military operations, and the argument to participate out of solidarity with that same 
United States and NATO, demonstrated the friction not only between the Dutch struc-
tural and the US agency-focused approach to liberal interventionism but also internally 
within Dutch strategic culture. In the challenging security environment involving complex 
expeditionary counterinsurgency missions could the Netherlands be a relevant ally to the 
major power in the system whilst at the same time adhering to the premises of stability 
projection? Could the Netherlands show solidarity to the United States whilst simultane-
ously criticizing its approach?
20.4.5 Avoid Being like Belgium
The operation in Uruzgan impacted Dutch transformation. The military and financial 
burden of being a member of the “A-team” and participating in the intensive counterin-
surgency environment of Uruzgan was high. In late 2007 as the first two-year deployment 
to Uruzgan was reaching its zenith, the focus of Dutch defense procurement turned to 
transport capabilities, recruitment and communications and information capabili-
ties. These bottlenecks had appeared as a result of the tough surroundings which were 
impacting personnel and material alike. Particularly the Army’s material and manpower 
shortages resembled the problems that the US Army was encountering in Iraq.974 Combat 
gemaakt dat de Nederlanders geen deel uitmaken van de operatie Enduring Freedom. Maar 
alle ISAF-landen gaan rondlopen in woestijnkleur. Van der Zee: “Bovendien trekt een donker 
pak meer warmte aan. In woestijnkleur val je beter weg in de omgeving.” S. Ramdharie, 
“Uruzgan-ganger in ’t nieuw,” De Volkskrant, July 14, 2006.
973 For descriptions of the Battle for Chora see Noel van Bemmel, “Infanteristen, commando’s: 
iedereen vecht tegen Taliban,” De Volkskrant, June 23, 2007 and Paul Brill, “Ze schoten een 
magazijn op me leeg,” De Volkskrant, June 28, 2007.
974 On March 27, 2007 an internal assessment at the Dutch Ministry of Defense concluded that 
there were shortfalls in logistics personnel due to the high operational tempo, the amount 
of spare parts had dwindled leading to the procurement of new material on the commercial 
market at high cost, and higher than expected levels of maintenance were required due to 
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and service support forces such as technicians, but also more mundane affairs including 
catering staff, were in short supply as a result of the operational tempo. The harsh condi-
tions both in terms of climate and Taliban resistance were straining the military one year 
into the operation. By September 2007, two extra platoons were sent to the province, while 
human, material and munitions shortages were putting deployability and sustainability 
of forces at risk. Helicopters and tactical transport were in short supply. For six months 
no Chinook helicopters were in use because there was a shortage of spare parts and tech-
nicians. The Army had to rely on the aging Cougars instead. In general the Ministry of 
Defense noted a 25% shortfall in helicopter-lift capability. It led to tactical air transport 
being acquired expensively on the commercial market implying that costs were drastically 
increasing. The two-year operation was initially budgeted at 380 million Euros in total but 
in the first year the budget had exceeded 600 million Euros, almost four times more than 
originally planned.975 With little over 1500 forces deployed, the operation was consuming 
9% of the entire defense budget. 
The 2007 Defense Policy Brief (the Hoofdlijnennotitie) outlined how the Ministry 
of Defense would deal with the budget constraints arising from the increasing costs of the 
mission. The financial hardship and the desire to continue the operation in Afghanistan 
necessitated the sale of the military’s “silverware.” Substantial cuts were announced in the 
primary weapon systems, including:
ӺӺ 28 Leopard tanks ( equivalent to 31% of the remaining stock);
ӺӺ 12 Pantzerhowitsers which had been purchased only four years earlier 
(equivalent to 33% of the total operational stock); 
ӺӺ 18 F-16s (a 20% decrease in capability); 
ӺӺ Withdrawal of one of the two marine battalions from the Caribbean; 
ӺӺ Cancellation of participation in NATO’s Allied Ground Surveillance system, 
ӺӺ Cancellation of the Dutch MALE Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program; 
ӺӺ Cancellation of intended procurement of the Tomahawk cruise missiles.976 
These decisions would free assets to invest in support capabilities such as civil-military 
units, intelligence capabilities and logistical support. The military was cannibalizing its 
hardware to sustain current operations. It risked turning the Dutch armed forces into a 
highly experienced military force lacking the high-end capabilities to sustain high-inten-
sity operations. Minister of Defense Van Middelkoop acknowledged that the Netherlands 
was close to hitting rock-bottom: “If you do not want to end up in a situation where the 
Dutch armed forces have the same allure as the Belgian, than you need to consider which 
the harsh operational climate. These three elements combined led to substantial risks for the 
availability and deployability of troops. Document published in De Telegraaf, April 19, 2007.
975 “Kosten Uruzgan 200 Miljoen Hoger,” NRC Handelblad, June 27, 2007.
976 Ministerie van Defensie, “Het Defensiebeleid op Hoofdlijnen,” HDAB200718939, The Hague, 
July 2, 2007.
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financial measures are necessary to sustain the military.”977 Van Middelkoop proposed 
setting a fixed percentage of GDP as defense budget to replace the yearly negotiations over 
its size. Years of reductions threatened to reduce the military to what was believed to be a 
politically insignificant force. It would hurt the Dutch ability to use the military for inter-
national political significance. The remark by Van Middelkoop confirms how the Neth-
erlands was aware of the political-strategic effect of having a particular type of military. 
Operating in Afghanistan, Van Middelkoop said, “should be part of the Dutch political 
honor.”978 
Increasing Dutch international political clout by making relevant contributions to 
expeditionary operations was a mainstay of Dutch security policy since the 1990’s.979 It 
remained throughout the missions of the 2000’s. Relevance has two dimensions. On the 
one hand the ability to make useful contributions, and on the other hand the political 
will to participate. Minister van Middelkoop’s comment with respect to the quality of the 
Dutch military highlighted concern over the first dimension. He expressed concern over 
the high-level usefulness of Dutch military forces if funds were not appropriated. In late 
2009, Maxime Verhagen, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, referred to the second 
dimension, when he supported continued participation in Uruzgan as a function of 
sustaining Dutch international political relevance. Verhagen mentioned that the “Dutch 
Approach” had been made the predominant NATO strategy in Afghanistan since March 
2009, and that in the event of withdrawal all NATO members except the Netherlands 
would remain.980 He insinuated the damage the Netherlands would suffer to its reputation 
as a result. In October 2009, on the question whether a Dutch withdrawal would diminish 
the Dutch political reputation abroad, the Minister of Defense answered in the affirmative, 
stressing that it was an important, if not the most important, dimension in his consider-
ations:
This is a very relevant question and at the same time the most important 
element of my answer. I know that the Netherlands has gained a significant 
increase in reputation as a result of the Dutch commitment in terms of 
numbers and quality. That is why we could organize the Afghanistan 
977 ““We lopen op onze tenen,” zegt de bewindsman. “Als je niet terecht wilt komen in een situatie 
waar de Nederlandse krijgsmacht dezelfde allure heeft als de Belgische, dan moet je gaan 
nadenken welke financiële middelen nodig zijn om deze krijgsmacht in stand te houden.,” De 
Telegraaf, July 8, 2007.
978 “Ik vind dat een land als Nederland, met z’n bevolkingsomvang, met z’n enorme welvaart en 
z’n enorme internationale oriëntatie, bereid moet blijven inspanningen te verrichten zoals 
hier in Afghanistan. Dat betekent dat je niet mag afdoen aan je ambitieniveau. Dat moet een 
deel van de politieke eer van Nederland zijn.” De Telegraaf, July 8, 2007.
979 Rob de Wijk, “Defensiebeleid in relatie tot Veiligheidsbeleid” in E.R. Muller et al., Krijgsmacht: 
Studies over the organisatie en het optreden, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2004) p.156.
980 Minister Verhagen, interview with Business News Radio, September 24, 2009.
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conference in The Hague. Also our participation in the G20 is related to it. 
This is something each of us should realize.981 
It offered further testimony to the tenet of using the military as a means to improve Dutch 
international political credit. By contrast, left-leaning parties in parliament, including the 
Labor party’s Minister of Development Aid were calling for a Dutch withdrawal with 
the intent to organize a mission in Africa instead in support of regional stability and to 
promote peace-building.982 The cases showed the tensions between the two domestic 
constraints that drive Dutch transformation toward expeditionary operations.
21 Conclusion: Torn between Relevance 
and Stability
What type of transformation strategy was pursued?
The Netherlands pursued a policy of strategic (type II) transformation with the objective to 
change the military and Dutch defense policy towards expeditionary operations, including 
high-intensity missions. It amounted to a discontinuous change from how the use of the 
military had been perceived before. To the Netherlands it thereby was a political-strategic 
issue revolving around the question, for what and how to use the military in the wake of 
a system transition. The principle documents in which this was outlined were the defense 
white papers of 1991 and 1993. 
What change in the level of external vulnerability or 
opportunity, forming the transition in the international security 
environment, triggered transformation?
The system-transition that triggered transformation was the end of the Cold War which 
produced a benevolent, low-threat environment. Following the end of the Cold War the 
Dutch security situation improved and gave rise to an expeditionary era where security 
policy was based on acting abroad. As security issues were downgraded from ‘threats’ to 
‘challenges’ it yielded the promise that the Netherlands, as part of the West, could contribute 
to the spread of liberal values and institutions as a means to improve global security. Rather 
than spreading this through unilateral military interventions, the Netherlands advances 
981 “Dat is een zeer relevante vraag en dat is meteen ook het belangrijkste deel van mijn antwoord. 
Ik weet dat Nederland door de inzet, in aantallen en kwaliteit, een forse reputatiewinst heeft 
geboekt. Daarom konden wij de Afghanistanconferentie in Den Haag organiseren, ook onze 
participatie in de G20 heeft ermee te maken. Dat is iets waar we ons met zijn allen bewust van 
moeten zijn.”Minister of Defense, Eimert van Middelkoop, quoted in “Nederland onder druk 
NAVO,” NRC Handelsblad, October 23, 2009.
982 See “Koenders werkt in geheim aan missie Afrika,” Algemeen Dagblad, November 4, 2009; 
“Politiek Den Haag dubt over militaire missie Afrika,” De Volkskrant, November 4, 2009 and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Reactie Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie op 
publicatie AD,” November 4, 2009.
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a structure-focused position on the premise that liberal institutions cannot be imposed 
through force, but rather should be grown from within. To the Netherlands it became a 
policy of stability projection, perceiving the use of the military as setting conditions for 
the promotion of liberal institutions and where military interventions are only justified 
when mandated by a system of international governance entrenched in international law. 
It was further driven by the process of European integration which conditioned European 
states to avoid the use of force to settle international disputes, and to adopt a posture to 
promote stability through exporting political-economic institutions that underlie peace 
and prosperity within the European Union. The end of the Cold War spelled an oppor-
tunity to advance this model of Western liberal values. It turned into a policy of stability 
projection, by which the military is used in multilateral operations to support the condi-
tions for stability, promote the international rule of law, and foster the creation of liberal 
institutions. In addition, the Netherlands could attain a position of greater international 
influence if it succeeded in strengthening a supranational governance system in which it 
played a central role.
What are the characteristics of the strategic cultural factors 
that shaped the transformation strategy? 
Two elements of Dutch strategic culture determined the context of Dutch transforma-
tion. The first is the drive to support the international rule of law. It resonates directly with 
Dutch security interests. As a smaller power with limited military capabilities, a stable 
international environment benefits Dutch economic relations, and a strong international 
rule of law can act as a supranational Leviathan keeping rogue powers in check. Stability 
is a necessary precondition for prosperous economic relations and it coincided with a 
commercialist, rather than a military, view of international relations. The Dutch interna-
tional legal tradition offered a suitable framework for playing a strong role in its promotion 
and thereby to enhance the Netherlands’ influence internationally. It leads to the view of 
the military as a peacekeeping force to support international stability, or as one element 
within a broader pallet of national instruments to set the conditions for reconstruction 
and stability. It however strongly supports the shift towards expeditionary operations. 
In the early 1990’s the Netherlands participated in UN-mandated peace operations as a 
result, and afterwards all expeditionary missions were justified on the basis of its contribu-
tion to stability. 
It has led to an aversion to wage ‘wars’, preferring to term deployments ‘peace 
support’, ‘stabilization’ or ‘policing’ operations instead. It has also contributed to ‘stability’ 
being an overarching objective of Dutch security policy rather than decisively removing 
threats. Dutch security policy is characterized by an attempt at risk management, rather 
than threat resolution. The military is deployed in order to create the conditions for liberal 
institutions to take root, however the Netherlands denounces the use of force purely for the 
removal of a specific actor. The title of the 2007 Defense White Paper Wereldwijd Dien-
stbaar, translated as “Of Service across the Globe.” This is symptomatic of this element of 
Dutch strategic culture, demonstrating that the government intends to develop a military 
301Transformation in Europe: The Netherlands & Germany
“where civilians and military forces collectively contribute to enhancing the security of our 
country and to improve the living conditions of people elsewhere around the world.”983
The other tenet of strategic culture influencing the shift of the military to expedi-
tionary operations is to use the military as a political instrument to demonstrate relevance 
to the major power in the international system. Until an international Leviathan is created, 
the Netherlands depends primarily on the relationship with Washington to guarantee 
its security. Although after the end of the Cold War a specific security threat to Europe 
evaporated, by 1995 as Former Yugoslavia crumbled on Western Europe’s doorstep it was 
clear that the United States remained a necessary factor in the European security dynamic. 
Following the attacks of 9/11 this was further reinforced. Using the military in coalition 
operations to demonstrate its international political relevance allowed the Netherlands to 
have a voice in those Western-liberal institutions that were important to European security 
policy, most notably NATO. It led to policy explicitly underlining the international polit-
ical credit the use of the Dutch armed forces could harvest by having particular capabilities 
and performing particular operations. Being relevant was an objective of its security policy 
in a benign environment for the indirect purpose that bandwagoning would increase its 
security relationship with the major power as an insurance policy in the event that the 
security environment took a turn for the worse. As Peter van Ham wrote, if the Nether-
lands wants to have some influence on Washington’s foreign policy, it is only possible 
through NATO.984 Essentially, combined these strategic cultural tenets are both dimen-
sions of a defensive realist hedging strategy, resting on both bandwagoning and counter-
balancing behavior. 
The specific character of Dutch strategic culture is that it has both a European as well 
as an Atlanticist focus.985 Because the Netherlands embraced the concept of stability projec-
tion but accepts the need for high-intensity operations in order to remain relevant to the 
United States, it has also allowed the Netherlands to have a security policy acceptable both 
to Atlanticists as well as Europeans. It has fostered the perspective of the Netherlands as a 
trustworthy and capable partner in the international environment and promoted the view 
of the Netherlands as a bridge-builder between nations. It politically facilitates a natural 
inclination of pursuing a hedging strategy. This hedging strategy allowed the Netherlands 
to increase its international position. This effect was largest, and transformation was most 
successful, when the nature of a mission reflected and aligned both these elements. This 
was for instance the case with the deployment of Dutch forces for the SFIR mission in 
Iraq. The two tenets of Dutch strategic culture were however not aligned when the security 
983 “Een krijgsmacht, ten slotte, waar burgers en miltiairen zich gezamenlijk inzetten om de 
veiligheid van ons land te bevorderen en om de levensomstandigheden van mensen elders 
in de wereld te verbeteren.”Ministerie van Defensie, Het Defensiebeleid op Hoofdlijnenen, 
HDAB2007018939, July 2, 2007, p. 3.
984 “Als wij nog enige invloed willen hebben op het buitenlands beleid van de Amerikanen dan 
kan dat alleen via de NAVO. Dat is een Europees en Nederlands belang.” Peter van Ham, 
quoted in NRC Handelsblad, July 30, 2006.
985 Rob de Wijk, “Defensiebeleid in relatie tot veiligheidsbeleid,” in E.R. Muller et al., Krijgsmacht, 
Studies over de organisatie en het optreden, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2004), p. 168.
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environment became more challenging.
What did the interaction between the level of external 
vulnerability and strategic culture mean in terms of capabilities?
The objective of transformation is to increase the usability of the military as an instru-
ment of state power. In terms of capabilities it has meant an orientation towards expe-
ditionary operations, while having the ability to contribute with high-intensity capabili-
ties. The Netherlands developed a leaning towards high-quality and high-tech material. 
Quality over quantity, coupled to visible and valuable capabilities was perceived by The 
Hague as creating political credit among the major allies. It allowed the Netherlands to 
sit at the table where decisions were taken since the Dutch military could offer capabili-
ties that mattered and there was a willingness to use them. The desire to have influence 
within the alliance also reinforced support for multilateral operations. The armed forces 
were organized to offer capabilities complementing a coalition operation. Not only has 
this led to an emphasis on multilateralism and internationally mandated operations, it is 
also born out of a realist counterbalancing perspective in the European framework. By 
maintaining interoperability and relevance to the United States, albeit with limited capa-
bilities, it assures the Netherlands of a prominent position within the alliance and a way 
to preclude a dictate from the three major European powers in security affairs. While the 
international rule of law was promoted to increase the power of the medium powers vis-
à-vis the United States, the Dutch policy to provide relevant and high-end capabilities to 
operations with the US was a way to make itself heard among the major powers in Europe. 
While the Netherlands emulated certain elements of US operational effectiveness transfor-
mation, such as investing in precision weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles and network-
centric capabilities, it did so within the broader context of a strategic level reorientation 
towards expeditionary operations and the interest to increase interoperability with the 
United States, rather than due to a belief these technologies would revolutionize warfare.
Rather than identifying specific threats, the concept of political ambition became the 
guiding light of Dutch security policy. It exemplified the political prism through which 
the use of the military was perceived. The military is used to promote the standing of the 
Netherlands in the international-political arena, whether that was through European 
stability-projection or Atlanticist relevance promotion. In Dutch transformation it has 
meant that discussions over capabilities are shaped by either being relevant or pursuing 
stability. During the early 1990’s these tenets were aligned yet as the security environment 
became more complex and the United States responded differently to the security environ-
ment friction within Dutch strategic culture appeared.
How did further events in the security environment impact the 
transformation strategy?  
From the mid-1990’s onwards the security environment slowly deteriorated. In the early 
1990’s the benevolent security environment allowed the Netherlands to focus mostly on 
stability projection. As it became clear that high-intensity operations would remain neces-
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sary, the relationship with the United States started to gain in importance. The events at 
Srebrenica, persistent turmoil in the Balkans and European weakness to cope with it, rein-
forced a focus on NATO and the US. It led to several operations of increased intensity 
which affected Dutch transformation. Operations became more challenging and tested the 
tenets of stability projection. The debacle at Srebrenica served as a crude wake-up call that 
stability could not be projected without a willingness to deploy high-intensity capabilities. 
Operation Allied Force led to friction between the two tenets of Dutch strategic culture. 
The Netherlands participated in an offensive military campaign in order to support Alli-
ance solidarity and protect human rights, but doing so without a UN mandate it violated 
its own principles for stability projection. With the mission in Uruzgan, the Netherlands 
encountered the limits of its political ambition and with it the limits of its strategic trans-
formation. The mission was the most challenging and high-intensity ground operation the 
Netherlands had pursued since the Korean War. It involved large-scale offensive opera-
tions with only limited progress in the field of stability projection to show. Instead it was 
a warfighting mission and clashed with Dutch stability projection. Because it did increase 
the relevance of the Netherlands within the Alliance and thus supported one element of 
Dutch strategic culture, the mission was prolonged in first instance. It was so controversial, 
and divided the Dutch foreign policy elite, that it also led to the fall of the Dutch govern-
ment in 2010 when NATO requested a further extension of the mission. 
With this in mind Dutch transformation has revolved around the fundamental ques-
tion how much warfighting is considered acceptable in order to promote its liberal values 
of stability projection. When the objectives of stability projection and relevance promotion 
have been in line, in other words when the Netherlands could demonstrate its relevance 
and gain international political credit through participating in a mission that supported 
the idea of stability projection, the relevance of the military to foreign and security policy 
was high and it pushed transformation forward. Operations that expressed this combina-
tion were for instance the SFIR mission in Southern Iraq as well as the UNMEE mission in 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. This was comfortably within the bandwidth defined by Dutch stra-
tegic culture. Pursuing transformation and increasing the usability of the military to politi-
cians, has been more difficult when these two elements were not aligned, such became 
apparent throughout the political discussions over the Uruzgan mission where stability 
projection and the aversion to ‘wage war’ clashed with the strategic cultural tenet to remain 
a relevant partner. It led to reduced capacity for resource extraction and impacted procure-
ment efforts for high-intensity operations and capabilities whose contribution to stability 
projection were questioned. It led to a clash of strategic culture, or phrased differently it led 
to identifying the limits of the bandwidth formed by Dutch strategic culture.
As the saying goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. With transformation, 
its proof lies in the actual use of military capabilities. Dutch transformation has been 
constrained by the demands of a deteriorating security environment which brought 
clashes to the fore between the strategic cultural tenets along which the Netherlands uses, 
and believes it should use, its military power. The reason the friction exists is due to a 
security environment which has slowly evolved to require higher-intensity operations to 
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be undertaken. As NATO engages in high-intensity missions, the resource extraction of 
Dutch transformation to contribute will be hampered, unless the case can be convincingly 
made domestically that the mission contributes to international stability. 
Germany: A Slow, Strategic 
Awakening
“Those who know our European history understand that we do not live on 
Venus but, rather, that we are the survivors of Mars.”
 – Joschka Fischer, Address to the United Nations 
Security Council, March 19, 2003.
22  Introduction
Throughout the Cold War, German strategic culture was characterized by a self-perception 
intent on “keeping a low profile” and “a desire for international rehabilitation.”986 It led to 
a hesitant approach to the use of the military instrument, rather emphasizing territorial 
integrity as the basis for its security policy. During the 1990’s German security policy 
slowly turned towards low-intensity peacekeeping and crisis-management operations as 
NATO was embracing out-of-area operations. By the mid-2000’s Germany was among 
the largest troop contributors to Afghanistan, but only in the relatively risk-free North. 
Germany appeared committed to an anti-militarist approach. 
Neoclassical realism predicts that a medium power facing a benevolent security 
environment will promote an activist foreign policy to expand its domestic agenda abroad. 
However, it is constrained in doing so by its strategic culture. For none of the other coun-
tries in this research have domestic variables impeded the pursuit of a transformation 
strategy as in Germany. For Germany, defense transformation encompassed the process 
of changing the military organization towards, and politically coming to grips with, an 
expeditionary era of Western security policy in the European Union and NATO following 
the end of the Cold War. Due to the constraining influence of its strategic culture German 
transformation has led to a focus on low-intensity crisis management operations.987 A 
key limiting factor has been that in German security policy the role of the military is 
de-emphasized. As will be made clear in this chapter, security policy instead is geared at 
986 Wilke (2007), p. 69.
987 See Anja Dalgaard- Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester 
University Press: Manchester, 2006).
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promoting stability abroad through economic and diplomatic means, by projecting the 
same values that have made it a civil power at the heart of Europe, and shunning the use of 
the military.988 This strategic culture has been codified in constitutional-legal obstacles to 
use the military abroad.989 
German strategic culture is made up of two elements. On the one hand, a construc-
tivist-idealist resistance to the use of the military based on its historical self-perception as 
a Zivilstaat and secondly, its defensive realist posture to pursue alliance solidarity. In its 
defense transformation, the premise to be a civil power has clashed with its attempt to shift 
the military towards expeditionary operations in order to sustain its credibility within, and 
the overall credibility of, the NATO alliance. 
As NATO moved towards embracing expeditionary operations in the 1990’s, 
Germany had to follow suit. This clashed with domestic constraints and negatively impacts 
the ability of the government to improve the usability of the military instrument. In this 
chapter, it will be demonstrated that Germany’s process of defense transformation is shaped 
by the tension between the international security environment and Germany’s attempts to 
accommodate its expeditionary requirements to its strategic cultural constraints. As long 
as NATO pursues an expeditionary course, and robust interventions such as Afghanistan, 
take place, German extractive capacity will be limited and transformation will proceed 
with substantial political friction. The four questions addressed in this segment are what is 
transformation in Germany? How has transformation developed since the end of the Cold 
War and what domestic factors shaped it? What did it imply for capability development? 
And how has German transformation faired in a changing security environment? 
23 German Transformation Defined
German transformation is a story of strategic awakening. Transformation is described 
in the 2006 Security White Paper as “a process of adaptation” in order to “improve the 
usability of the Bundeswehr in a changing environment.”990 It implied a military change 
program motivated by a rapidly evolving security environment. Since 1991 Germany has 
been engaged in multiple reform initiatives of the military and German policymakers have 
interpreted transformation to expeditionary operations as the “reform of the reform.”991 
Throughout the period under consideration, German changes in the military have been 
988 See for instance, Hans Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Europa Archiv, vol. 
47, no. 10 (1992); Rainer Baumann & Gunther Hellmann, “Germany and the Use of Military 
Force: ‘Total War’, the ‘Culture of Restraint’, and the Quest for Normality,” in German Politics, 
vol. 10, no. 1 (April 2001).
989 See Deutscher Bundestag, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Article 87a, 
Section 2.
990 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, White Paper 2006, on German Security Policy and the 
Future of the Bundeswehr, Berlin, October 2006, p.95.
991 See Henning Riecke, “Höchste Zeit für Reformen: Die Bundeswehr vor wichtigen 
Entscheidungen,” Internationale Politik, nr. 7 (2002), pp. 29-34.
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three-pronged. The first step was taken when the West-German military moved to absorb 
the military of former East Germany upon unification in 1991. This fusion of forces had a 
significant socio-economic dimension since barracks were built, moving forces to former 
East Germany, and investing in infrastructure spurring the development of the impover-
ished region. It was a reform process that was definitely not geared at making the military 
more expeditionary. The second and third steps are the focus of this segment. The second 
step has been the paradigm shift to deploy forces beyond national borders for crisis-
management and peacekeeping operations including operations beyond NATO territory. 
The third step has been to deploy forces in a combat environment. This final step has yet to 
be finalized. The story of German strategic transformation is thus still ongoing. 
In 1991 the dominant perception of German security policy was that the interna-
tional system had made a turn for the better. In Europe, the change in the security environ-
ment and the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to a general sigh of relief. Partic-
ularly in Germany, where the 1992 Defense Policy Guidelines, the first Defense White 
Paper after the Cold War, outlined that the European security threat had dissipated. No 
longer held hostage by the bipolar struggle of the Cold War, and reassured in its territo-
rial security through the European integration process, the Government declared that “the 
security dilemma …has been resolved.”992 Germany was no longer a Frontstaat or front-
line state. Instead it was surrounded by allies and befriended neighbors. German defense 
transformation has been a process of internalizing the implications of this new security 
environment and move towards developing a force for expeditionary stability operations. 
More than the two other states under consideration in this study, factors of Innenpolitik 
limited the extractive capacity of the German government to pursue military change 
towards full-spectrum expeditionary operations predicated by the overarching security 
environment. German defense policy is driven by the strategic pause following the end 
of the Cold War and a cultural historic legacy that is antithetical to the use of force. It has 
given rise to a policy of transformation framed by a structure-focused approach to secu-
rity based on non-military means, where the use of the military is constrained by legal 
considerations and military forces are viewed as armed development workers at best or 
a deplorable necessity at the worse. Transformation in Germany is the process of coping 
with these constraints of German strategic culture in pursuit of strategic transformation to 
have a usable military instrument in an expeditionary age. As in the Netherlands, transfor-
mation takes place at the political-strategic level more so than the military-organizational. 
It regards the fundamental question, what is the military for and how should it be used? 
It has required a shift in mindset, a discontinuous change in the German approach to the 
military. Changes in the security environment in 1991 slowly directed NATO towards 
expeditionary crisis-management operations.993 If it wanted to maintain relevance and 
992 “Das Sicherheitsdilemma […] hat sich aufgelöst” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992, Bonn, November 26, 1992.
993 See North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, November 7, 1991 http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm; and North Atlantic Council, The 
Alliance’s Strategic Concept, April 24, 1999 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_
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solidarity to NATO it necessitated a redefinition of Germany’s strategic orientation and 
a redefinition of the dictum nie wieder Krieg. Strategic transformation concerned the 
fundamental reorientation of the German armed forces away from a territorially-focused 
force towards expeditionary operations also prepared to participate in higher-intensity 
operations.  
Germany is however torn between the reality of the new security environment 
and maintaining its appreciation of Western liberal values and its status as a Zivilmacht. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer pronounced this dilemma in the Bundestag in 
1995 prior to the deployment of German forces to former Yugoslavia: 
We are in a real conflict between basic values. On the one hand, there is the 
renunciation of force as a vision of a world in which conflicts are resolved 
rationally, through recourse to laws and majority decisions, through the 
constitutional process and no longer through brute force; a world in which 
military means are rejected and in which the aim is to create structure to 
replace them and them redundant. On the other hand, there is the bloody 
dilemma that human beings may be able to survive only with the use of 
military force. Between solidarity for survival and our commitment to 
non-violence – that is our dilemma.994 
Fischer’s speech clearly articulated the dilemma confronting Germany’s strategic culture 
and brought to the fore the impact of the changes in the system-level distribution of power. 
German transformation is heavily influenced by the state’s pacifist roots originating 
from the end of the Second World War while underscoring the desire to maintain a 
position of relevance in NATO and supporting the European model that fostered peace 
and stability in Europe throughout the Cold War.995 The second half of the 20th century 
revolved around a divided Germany and the legacy of military defeat in the 20th century. It 
fostered a strategic culture where the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy 
was shunned culturally, politically and constitutionally. The dominant dictum became nie 
wieder Krieg’ (never again war) derived from Chancellor Willy Brandt’s famous statement 
that “niemals wieder Krieg von deutschem Boden ausgehen dürfe.”996 It fed the belief that 
the human condition could not be improved by the use of force. While nie wieder Krieg 
was a defensive strategy during the Cold War, it became a call for an activist foreign policy 
following 1991. Germany did not become isolationist and felt instead it had a role to play 
texts_27433.htm.
994 Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer quoted in Hans W. Maull, “Germany and the 
use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?,” Paper prepared for the Workshop on Force, Order and 
Global Governance, An Assessment of US, German and Japanese Approaches, Washington 
DC, July 1-2, 1999, p. 21.
995 See Cooper (2004).
996 Willy Brandt, Erfurt, March 19, 1970, quoted in Julia Brauch, Nationale Integration nach dem 
Holocaust: Israel und Deutschland im Vergleich (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2004), p.290.
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as civil power to promote global peace, rightly because of its history. It embraced a policy 
to contribute to global stability by emphasizing civilian mechanisms such as economic 
cooperation and strengthening international institutions. Changing the structures of 
international relations became a central element of German security policy, and solidarity 
to NATO stood paramount. Both NATO and the evolving European integration process 
provided Germany with its security throughout the Cold War, shielding it from the Soviet 
Union and solve its security dilemma. It posited Germany as a civilian power, reluctant to 
use the military aside from territorial security. German transformation is therefore consid-
ered the struggle to pursue a Sonderweg as a Zivilmacht and to come to terms with the 
expeditionary agenda of NATO which critics were referring to as a ‘normalization’ of the 
German state.997
24 System Level Factors that Triggered 
German Transformation
The end of the Cold War led the NATO alliance to embrace expeditionary operations. 
Germany had to follow suit if it wanted to sustain its relevance to the NATO alliance. This 
provided the primary trigger for German strategic transformation. This meant that two 
important hurdles had to be overcome. The first important step was to change the German 
military, German security policy, and the German constitution to perform expeditionary 
operations. The second step involved the discussion whether German forces would also be 
able to undertake offensive military action.
24.1 An Expeditionary Era
24.1.1 the 1992 Defense Policy Guidelines: Going Expeditionary…
In November 1992, twelve months after NATO’s new Strategic Concept declared a shift 
toward crisis-management operations, the German government published a document 
that started the process of strategic innovation of German defense policy. It stated that a 
“radically improved” strategic environment triggered a shift towards a new defense policy.998 
It became the starting point for German transformation. 
In the same spirit as the US Bottom Up Review and the 1991 Dutch Defense White 
Paper, in 1992 the German Minister of Defense presented the Defense Policy Guide-
lines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien).999 It took stock of German unification and 
997 See Jan Ross, “Die Deutschen und der Krieg: Warum eigentlich herrscht so große Ruhe im 
Land?,” Die Zeit, March 31, 1999.
998 The 1992 Defense Policy Guidelines speak of a “historical instance of political change has 
radically improved the international situation.” (Die historische Dimension des politischen 
Umbruchs hat die internationale Situation grundlegend verbessert.).
999 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992, Bonn, 
November 26, 1992.
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the post-Cold war environment. Events following the collapse of the Soviet Union were 
described as a period of Übergang, or transition, acknowledging the systemic changes 
that were taking place. While Germany was no longer a Frontstaat and the environment 
had become more benevolent, the document voiced concerns over factors of uncertainty. 
Crisis and conflict management would become more important, and the document iden-
tified a necessity for expeditionary forces. It read that “a part of the German Armed Forces 
must be able to deploy outside Germany.”1000 Such forces however would only be deployed 
within the appropriate international institutional context and in order to restore interna-
tional security and the international rule of law. It was not specified under what intensity 
they could be deployed. Furthermore, in anticipation of the instability in the Balkans, the 
document specified a geographic focus on Europe’s immediate periphery.1001 The 1992 
document did provide the textual basis for German transformation to be put into practice 
in the years ahead. 
A structure-focused security concept pervaded the 1992 defense policy guidelines. 
The document stated that security policy would focus on non-traditional security chal-
lenges (the so-called weite Sicherheitsbegriff). Along constructivist lines, it advocated the 
development of an integrated international security culture (internationalen “Sicher-
heitskultur”) based on collective security mechanisms (gemeinsamer Sicherheit) and a 
disposition to promote stability (Stabilitätsorientierung) for the German government. 
As an anecdotal illustration, ‘stability’ or its antonym ‘instability’ was mentioned twenty-
three times throughout the entire document. It presented an idealistic approach to secu-
rity policy, which was no longer held to be exclusively military. Instead socio-economic, 
judicial and structural political factors were held responsible for creating international 
security risks. The document identified challenges to security in the form of social griev-
ances, demographic pressures or ecological disasters. Rather than a military force-on-
force calculus these structural trends in international relations would shape the priori-
ties of its security policy. The focus lay on “regional crises and conflicts and non-military 
risks.”1002 Dealing with these challenges necessitated a broader response than the military 
could offer.1003 Hence, Germany required a crisis-management capability but only within 
1000 “ein teil der Deutschen Streitkräfte muss daher zum Einsatz ausserhalf Deutschlands befähigt 
sein.”Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992, Bonn, 
November 26, 1992, p. 38.
1001 See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Defence Policy Guidelines, Berlin, May 21, 2003, 
p. 18.
1002 “Nach Auflösung der bipolaren Ordnungsstruktur gewinnen regionale Krisen und 
Konflikt und nicht-militärische Risiken an Virulenz und Brisanz,.” Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992, Bonn, November 26, 1992.
1003 “Ursachen von Risiken und Konflikten werden generell nicht durch den Einsatz militärischer 
Mittel behoben. Jedoch können Streitkräfte gleichsam in einer “Katalysatorfunktion” die 
notwendigen Voraussetzungen schaffen, unter denen nichtmilitärische Instrumente 
einer ursachenorientierten Krisen- und Konfliktbewältigung Wirkung entfalten können. 
Um diese Instrumente nutzbar zu machen, wird im internationalen Krisenmanagement 
künftig auch eine Wiederherstellung der internationalen Sicherheit und des Völkerrechts 
unter einem legitimierenden Mandat der VN oder der KSZE erwogen werden müssen.” 
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the context of a broader range of instruments to address root causes. By 2006 this would 
evolve into strong support for a ‘comprehensive approach’ to security. It fostered a multi-
lateral approach to promote a strong role for international institutions. The 1992 Defense 
Policy Guidelines stated that out of international security cooperation (Kooperation) 
a norm-based security community could emerge to collectively address threats. Simul-
taneously collective security institutions would prevent a unilateral resort to force. The 
resistance to unilateralism and faith in the sole legitimacy of multilateralism which was 
voiced in the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003 was already apparent in this document.1004 It 
reflected Germany’s inclination to view multilateral action as the only justified means to 
act militarily in the international security arena. 
German security policy advanced strong regional and international institutions. 
NATO and the Western European Union, later the European Union, would be anchors of 
stability in Europe. As an element of its security policy, Germany embraced wider enlarge-
ment of these organizations. To promote security within Europe Germany envisaged deep-
ening European integration, further promoting reform in Eastern Europe, and strength-
ening transatlantic relations.1005 The policy paper presented a liberal-institutionalist view 
based on the post-modern European system of integration and mutual interdependencies. 
Given its size, exporting the European model would also increase the political weight of 
Germany. The government was thereby promoting a similar recipe for its security policy 
as had been the basis for its prosperity and peace throughout the Cold War, namely inte-
grating the German economy with those of other European states and strong transatlantic 
relations. NATO would remain the foundation for German security and it acknowledged 
the organization had a role to play in crises in an “enlarged geographic” space, beyond 
NATO borders.1006 Support for these institutions when the international rule of law is at 
stake meant showing operational solidarity and thus Germany would have to be able to 
provide a military contribution (militärische Solidarbeiträge). 
The 1992 policy paper thereby provided the policy framework to make the 
Bundeswehr an expeditionary military, or Einsatzarmee.1007 The policy guidelines enun-
ciated that the Bundeswehr would focus on the following missions: Traditional territo-
rial defense protecting Germany and its citizens from oppression and external danger; 
contributing to military stability and European integration; protecting Germany and its 
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992, Bonn, 
November 26, 1992.
1004 Joschka Fischer, “Address to the United Nations Security Council,” New York, March 19, 2003.
1005 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992, Bonn, 
November 26, 1992.
1006 Ibid, chapter IV.
1007 “Die Notwendigkeit, bei kurzfristig auftretenden Krisen und Konflikten rasch, flexibel 
und solidarisch reagieren zu können, erfordert präsente Kräfte. Deutlich begrenzte 
Teilkomponenten dieser Krisenreaktionskräfte werden, nach Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen, 
Friedensmissionen im Einklang mit der UN-Charta übernehmen, um der deutschen 
Mitverantwortung in der Völkergemeinschaft gerecht zu werden.” Ibid, para. 47.
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allies if attacked; serving global peace and international security in line with the Charter 
of the United Nations; and providing aid in humanitarian or natural catastrophes. It also 
declared that the military would be divided into main defense forces for territorial security 
and crisis-response forces, able to operate abroad.1008 
24.1.2 The German Constitution
While the 1992 defense policy guidelines opened the door to expeditionary operations, 
they would be difficult to put into practice. A persistent obstacle to Germany’s transfor-
mation policy has been considerations over the constitutional legitimacy to send German 
military forces abroad, and to use German forces for something else than territorial defense. 
It has made using the military a controversial and highly politicized affair. At its incep-
tion in 1949 West-Germany prohibited the use of the military as an instrument of foreign 
policy.1009 The German state was a product of the violent first half of the 20th century and 
following allied occupation West-Germany was left without a military. In 1955, prompted 
by the threat of Soviet expansionism and the Cold War, West-Germany rearmed and 
simultaneously became member of the NATO alliance. The German constitution or 
Grundgesetz of 1949 stipulated, in a spirit of nie wieder Krieg, that “the Federation shall 
establish Armed Forces for purposes of defense.”1010 It ruled out the use of the military 
for operations beyond its borders and it implied that German governments could never 
legally use the military outside German territory. It was further accentuated by article 26 
which explicitly reads that Germany will not partake in offensive military operations: “Acts 
tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, 
especially to prepare for a war of aggression (Angriffskrieges), shall be unconstitutional.” 
The end of the Cold War changed the distribution of power and the threat to terri-
torial security dissipated. Western states, such as the Netherlands, adopted new defense 
white papers in which a focus towards using the military for crisis-management purposes 
was detailed. For Germany it posed legal-institutional difficulties. Even though the 1992 
Defense Policy Guidelines opened the door to expeditionary operations, it produced fric-
tion between German solidarity vis-à-vis the NATO alliance and its constitutional restric-
tion not to use the military abroad. However, conflict erupted in the former Yugoslavia and 
it became clear that the move to develop crisis-management capabilities had been correct. 
Yet the German military could not be deployed abroad to help stem a crisis without a 
new constitutional interpretation of ‘defense’. It presented a constraint on the extractive 
capacity of the German state to make the military a usable instrument of its foreign policy. 
Because of the changing nature of the security environment, German transformation had 
to find a way around it. In 1994 the German constitutional court decided that participation 
in expeditionary operations in support of collective security arrangements was permitted. 
1008 Ibid, para. 44 & 45.
1009 See also Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison,” European Journal 
of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 3. (2001), p 315- 348.
1010 Deutscher Bundestag, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Article 87a, Section 2.
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This decision is detailed further below, however suffice to say now that it removed a crucial 
hurdle for German transformation.
24.1.3 ...and combat operations: The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines 
It would be eleven years before an update of the Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien was 
published. The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines underlined the observation that secu-
rity policy required crisis-management and conflict prevention, and stressed that the 
Bundeswehr would “conduct armed operations only together with allies and partners in 
a UN, NATO and EU context.”1011 2003 however marked a turning point as it provided 
the doctrinal basis for the third step of German transformation. It explicitly embraced 
expeditionary operations beyond NATO territory, including missions of high-intensity. 
The 2003 Guidelines state at the outset that “defense as it is understood today …means 
more than traditional defense at national borders against conventional attack. It includes 
the prevention of conflicts and crises, the common management of crises, and post-crisis 
rehabilitation.”1012 It continued to state that the necessity to participate in a multinational 
operation could lead to a deployment anywhere across the globe, on a short notice, and 
across the entire conflict spectrum “including operations of higher intensity.”1013 
Aside from the structure-focused emphasis, the 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines 
provided indications that it was moving in the same direction as other NATO nations 
and was accepting a role for an expeditionary military as a government instrument. The 
document declared that military force was a necessary element of the credibility of foreign 
diplomacy, “the political will and ability to enforce or restore freedom and human rights, 
stability and security with military means if necessary are a sine qua non of a credible 
comprehensive approach to security policy.”1014 The explicit willingness to use military 
force for complex stabilization missions amounted to a step towards the country’s stra-
tegic awakening. 
The intention to create an Einsatzarmee was declared in 1992. Eleven years later 
Germany presented the military-organizational force structure for it, and announced the 
creation of a full-spectrum capability. The 2003 guidelines also outlined the capabilities to 
be developed to deploy a high-intensity expeditionary force, which were specified some 
four years later for the Bundesheer. Developing the policy framework to perform expe-
ditionary operations was a long drawn-out process but the policy documents were there. 
Putting the policy guidelines into practice has been a different issue altogether. More than 
any of the other two states in this study, German transformation is a case of “the proof 
1011 Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003, p.4 .
1012 Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003, p. 3.
1013  “Die Notwendigkeit für eine Teilnahme der Bundeswehr an multinationalen 
Operationen kann sich weltweit und mit geringem zeitlichen Vorlauf ergeben und 
das gesamte Einsatzspektrum bis hin zu Operationen mit hoher Intensität umfassen.” 
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003 para 57.
1014 Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003, p. 9.
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of the pudding”. Crucial to it has been Germany’s relation to NATO and the process of 
European integration.
24.2 Solidarity
Throughout the Cold War NATO has been central to German security. The end of the 
Cold War presented a system-level shift that led to discontinuous change in German 
defense policy. It triggered German transformation because of a German commitment to 
NATO solidarity. When the alliance ventured into the area of expeditionary operations 
Germany had to follow suit. The adoption of an expeditionary mindset was driven by alli-
ance dynamics coupled with a value-based argumentation of ‘never again genocide.’ From 
a defensive realist perspective, abstaining from participation in NATO operations would 
diminish Germany’s influence in NATO. 
Persistent allegiance to NATO and European institutions was a vital security interest 
for Germany. Instead of disavowing the use of the military, which had been the dominant 
paradigm until 1994, Germany embraced expeditionary operations for the sake of soli-
darity. German participation in Operation Allied Force in 1999 was explicitly framed in 
these terms. 
Defending the government’s proposal to use military assets to stop Slobodan Milos-
evic, Volker Rühe, the Minister of Defense, underlined the role of solidarity to the NATO 
alliance as a justification for possible military intervention: 
It is no exaggeration when I say that our allies today look at the decision 
of this Bundestag. All of the governments and parliaments of our NATO 
partners - including the three future members, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic - have unequivocally backed the planned air operations of 
NATO. They all expect a clear vote of the Bundestag. Even if there are 
early political successes on the basis of a credible military deterrent, I must 
say of your decision today: a deployment of German armed forces cannot 
be ruled out. When you cast your vote, you have to do so in the knowledge 
that such action can be taken, and can be demanded of us.1015
Karsten Voigt, MP of the traditionally-pacifist Labor Party, concurred: 
1015 “Es ist keine Übertreibung, wenn ich sage, daß unsere Verbündeten heute auf die 
Entscheidung des 13. Deutschen Bundestages schauen. Alle unsere NATO- Partner - auch 
die drei künftigen Mitglieder, Polen, Ungarn und Tschechien -, deren Regierungen und 
Parlamente haben sich unzweideutig hinter die geplanten Luftoperationen der NATO gestellt. 
Sie alle erwarten ein klares Votum des Deutschen Bundestages. Auch wenn es erste politische 
Erfolge auf Grund einer glaubwürdigen militärischen Abschreckung gibt, muß ich Ihnen für 
Ihre heutige Entscheidung sagen: Ein Einsatz auch der Deutschen Streitkräfte kann keinesfalls 
ausgeschlossen werden. Wenn Sie Ihre Stimme abgeben, müssen Sie das in dem Bewußtsein 
tun, daß dieser Einsatz durchgeführt und von uns abverlangt werden kann.” Statement by 
Volker Rühe, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/248, October 16, 1998.
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A different policy than that which is proposed by the majority [the 
government] will isolate the Federal Republic of Germany within 
NATO and in Europe. You will reward those who use violence and leave 
unpunished those who violate UN resolutions. That is why Germany, 
with this decision, is now proving itself as a European and transatlantic 
partner.1016
From an alliance point of view Germany needed to show that it was a good ally by 
embracing the shift towards expeditionary operations.1017 As the decade neared its end, 
not only the reality of Operation Allied Force but also important EU and NATO docu-
ments such as the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Helsinki Headline Goal 
emphasized the need for crisis-management capabilities and the ability to send ground 
forces abroad. Drafted in 2000, the report by the Kommission Gemeinsame Sicherheit 
und Zukunft der Bundeswehr chaired by Richard von Weiszäcker, advised the Schröder 
government to adopt a policy of ‘Europeanization.”1018 It meant German security policy 
should embrace the development of expeditionary capabilities in a European institutional 
framework. It amounted to a similar shift NATO had made with its adoption of out-of-
area operations.1019 
The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines further underscored Germany’s relation to 
the North Atlantic alliance. Germany “has a crucial role and responsibility for the future 
course of NATO.” Throughout the Cold War, as Lord Ismay had famously said, NATO’s 
raison d’être was to “keep the Germans down, the Americans in and the Soviets out.” 
Germany was the frontline of NATO. It meant that Germany had a key role to play in the 
alliance. There was also a constitutional necessity to support international institutions, as 
Germany could only act within a multinational context. Strong international institutions 
were the path for Germany to play a military role internationally. 
Institutionally the German army was explicitly multinational- and NATO-oriented. 
Throughout the Cold War, the Bundeswehr had been extensively integrated with other 
European armed forces. The Eurocorps with France and the 1st NL-German Army Corps 
are still expressions of this. This was the product of the end of the Second World War as 
well. Just as the German economy was integrated in the Coal and Steel community, rather 
than be disarmed the German military was integrated into European structures. It had a 
political purpose, signaling Germany’s connection to Western Europe and a submission 
1016 “Eine andere Politik als diejenige, die von der Mehrheit vorgeschlagen wird, hätte die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland innerhalb des Bündnisses und in Europa isoliert. Sie hätte 
diejenigen, die Gewalt anwenden, belohnt und hätte diejenigen, die die UN-Resolution 
verletzen, ungestraft gelassen. Deshalb bewährt sich Deutschland heute mit dieser 
Entscheidung als europäischer und transatlantischer Partner.” Statement by Karsten Voigt, 
Ibid.
1017 Zehfuss (2001), p 315- 348.
1018 Richard v. Weiszäcker, et.al., Kommission Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr, 
Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 23, 2000.
1019 See NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” Washington DC, April 24, 1999.
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to Western European political values. This dimension of European integration precluded 
military renationalization across the continent. 
Due to its strategic-cultural inhibition to use the military Germany had an interest 
in enhancing NATO as a political, rather than a purely military organization. Cred-
ibility of the alliance is necessary to guarantee a German voice in the security debate. Yet 
Germany does so by emphasizing a comprehensive approach and denouncing US reliance 
on military power to assert the relevance of NATO. Deemphasizing the military func-
tion of NATO means making NATO more acceptable to Germany while at the same time 
providing a rationale to keep the defense budget low. Keeping NATO together is one of 
Berlin’s primary security objectives. In line with its structure-focused approach, Germany 
advocated a more non-military approach to operations in Afghanistan. As Chancellor 
Merkel said at the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich in February 2009, “NATO must be a 
place for political debate. You cannot promote a networked [or comprehensive] approach 
to security and at the same time see NATO as only a military alliance.”1020 Germany’s rela-
tion to NATO deemphasizes the military while stimulating the need for internal coopera-
tion. Coupled to it is a desire to stimulate US multilateralism in a policy of soft-balancing. 
German participation in the NATO Response Force, a high-end expeditionary instrument 
whose deployment the German Bundestag is unlikely to support, was a prize to be paid in 
order to maintain and strengthen the cohesion of the alliance. 
25 Strategic Culture and German 
Transformation
25.1 A Culture of Defeat
German strategic culture is defined by an aversion to the use of the military, which in an 
expeditionary era limits the extractive capacity of the German government. This has been 
called a culture of anti-militarism.1021 Domestic level variables dominated the process of 
transformation as the German state since its reinvention following the end of the Second 
World War had been conditioned in the role of a pacifist status-quo power.
The shock to the international system following the end of the Second World War led 
to a revised division of power which led to a changed dynamic in Europe. It impacted the 
policies of all states.. But none more so than for the erstwhile expansionist powers which 
had been defeated by the allied states in 1945. The result of German defeat in the two world 
wars of the 20th century and the subsequent dismantling of Nazi Germany precipitated an 
1020 “Die NATO muss ein Ort politischer Diskussionen sein. Man kann nicht Vernetzte Sicherheit 
fordern und anschließend die NATO nur als militärisches Bündnis begreifen.” Angela Merkel, 
“Speech at the 45th Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, “ Munich, February 7, 2009.
1021 John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, 
andGerman Security Policy After Unification (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
p. 172.
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international system-level shift in power which would have lasting effect on the European 
geopolitical landscape and the psyche of the German state. It led to a set of domestic-level 
constraints for the newly formed German state which helped develop a strategic culture 
that shunned the use of the military and provided the blueprint for a German Zivilmacht. 
Not surprisingly, May 1945 was considered a new political and societal departure point, a 
Stunde Null (zero hour).1022
A “culture of defeat” shaped the German government’s strategic perspective regarding 
the use of the military. Nazi Germany’s policies to promote the ‘human condition’ had led 
to immense human, material, moral and psychological costs. The German population had 
suffered a form of collective shell-shock which helped cement a fundamental skepticism 
vis-à-vis use of the military instrument in West-Germany. The West-German government, 
and the political institutions of the state, had thoroughly changed and West Germany had 
become a qualitatively different regime than in the previous two decades.
By contrast, as we have seen, the United States retains a “culture of victory,” a belief 
that warfare is at times justified and can be used as an instrument to advance its liberating 
tradition. Germany instead has tried that strategy and found it wanting. This notion is 
reinforced by the concept of the German Zivilmacht (Civil Power), reflecting an institu-
tionalization of pacifism, a disdain for military force, and a structure-focused approach to 
security policy that denounces unilateralism.1023 It is expressed through legal and organi-
zational obstacles for the government to effectively use the military. Among these obstacles 
is the constitutional prohibition for using the military abroad, the parliamentary mandate 
necessary to use the military and military-organizational constraints, including conscrip-
tion. 
25.1.1 Constitutional Obstacles
 It has been described above that the German Basic Law was among the primary obsta-
cles for German transformation as it forbade the use of the German military abroad. 
Nevertheless, the security environment had changed and NATO nations were adopting 
expeditionary operations. In this context the Labor party (SPD) and the liberal FDP had 
placed complaints before the constitutional court to challenge the constitutionality of the 
German government’s decision to deploy German assets in three smaller scale missions. 
The missions included piloting AWACS surveillance airplanes over Bosnia to enforce a 
no-fly zone, a contribution to a naval embargo in the Adriatic, and a humanitarian opera-
tion in Somalia. On July 12, 1994 the constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
ruled that article 87 of the Grundgesetz, which restricted the German military to territo-
rial defense, did not preclude German participation in collective security arrangements as 
delineated in article 24 of the same constitution.1024 The ruling meant that the constitution 
1022 Wilke (2007), p. 54.
1023 More on this in chapter 25.2. Hans Maull, “Zivilmacht Deutschland,” in Gunther Hellman et 
al. (eds), Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, (VS Verlag, 2006). http://www.uni-trier.
de/fileadmin/fb3/POL/Maull/pubs/zivilmacht.pdf.
1024 Article 24 (2) of the German Basic Law reads “With a view to maintaining peace, the 
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did not preclude contributing to peacekeeping operations preformed within the context of 
collective security arrangements, either out of solidarity or obligation.1025 The only precon-
dition was that such missions were preceded with a UN mandate. Solidarity with NATO 
hence became the basis for German military deployments abroad and the two central 
elements of German strategic culture were brought in line. Several further requirements 
for deploying forces abroad were formulated. As part of the court’s ruling three criteria 
were outlined. Germany could only pursue objectives promoting international peace and 
security; do so in an institutionally mandated context by the UN Security Council; and 
with the explicit approval of the Bundestag. While the Bundestag had a constitutional 
oversight role of the military, this latter specification now underlined the ‘parliamentary’ 
nature of the German military. In practice it meant that Parliament controlled the deploy-
ment of the military. It amounted to a constraint on the German government’s ability 
to wield the military instrument as an instrument of foreign policy. From a neoclassical 
realist perspective, it reduced the executive power’s ability to extract military resources 
from the state. 
In late 1994, as several requests for German contributions to UN operations piled 
up, the government of Helmut Kohl specified five political guidelines for military missions 
abroad. It portrayed a narrow interest-based focus:
ӺӺ Military actions have a geographical limitation to Europe and its periphery;
ӺӺ Germany only acts in a multinational framework under an international 
mandate;
ӺӺ Any deployment should have broad parliamentary and public support;
ӺӺ A ‘compelling reason’ must be advanced to support a mission beyond 
territorial or Alliance defense, such as a threat to Germany’s political stability; 
ӺӺ Only reluctantly would Germany deploy to states that had been occupied 
during the Second World War.1026
From the guideline mentioned last it becomes clear that Germany was well aware of the 
historical baggage that an international deployment of the German military implied. This 
historical baggage further limited the ability of the government to use the military as an 
instrument of foreign policy.
Ten years later, the German Parliamentary Participation Act of March 18 2005 
(Gesetz über die parlementarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung über den Einsatz 
Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent 
to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lastingpeace in 
Europe and among the nations of the world.”
1025 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) 90, 286, July 12, 1994, Karlsruhe. Amongst others it 
Reads: “ Art 87a GG steht der Anwendung des Art. 24 Abs. 2 GG als verfassungsrechtliche 
Grundlage für den Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkraefte im Rahmen eines Systems gegenseitiger 
kollektiver Sicherheit nicht entgegen.”
1026 Guidelines enunciated by Minister of Defense Volker Rühe, “Rühe: UNO-mandat – 
Voraussetzung fuer Auslandseinsaetze,” Suddeutsche Zeitung, November 25, 1994.
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bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland) codified the constitutional court’s decision and 
Volker Rühe’s guidelines above. It required the government to send a request of deploy-
ment to parliament with details on the operational objective, theatre of operation, length, 
costs, legal mandate, and amount of forces required.1027 The important difference with the 
Dutch Toetsingskader described earlier is that the German version is approval-seeking 
and not informative. 
The importance of constitutional legitimacy was also expressed in the 2006 White 
Paper. In it two full pages are dedicated to the summation of constitutional and other legal 
doctrine that reflect on the use of the military in the new security environment.
The first test of the legal ruling of 1994 and the expeditionary concept of the 1992 
Defense Policy Guideline came in 1995. As the Yugoslav crisis continued to fester and 
human rights violations were broadcasted on German televisions, politicians contem-
plated deploying German forces in support of regional stability. It led to political fric-
tion as not all parties in the Bundestag supported the new expeditionary approach. The 
pacifist ideal of Nie wieder Krieg clashed with its Human Rights derivative of Nie wieder 
Auschwitz. Because of the benevolent security environment, proponents embraced the 
paradox of using the military to end the wars that others started. It would also serve a 
therapeutic purpose; the German military could be used to protect the world from a 
new holocaust, in this case in former Yugoslavia. This argument was brought forward by 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in his speech in 1995 proposing to participate in NATO’s 
rapid reaction force to the former Yugoslavia. According to Kinkel, Germany had in fact 
an overwhelming responsibility to contribute to these operations precisely because of its 
history. The “never again Auschwitz” argument, and its spin-off “never again dictatorship,” 
was reinforced by Kinkel’s articulation that Germany in 1945 had been rescued from its 
dictatorship through the allied use of force. Using the military could serve a benevolent 
purpose. Germany now had a responsibility to save the world from a new incarnation 
of its historic alter-ego. Others were opposed. Joschka Fischer, who would later become 
Foreign Minister in 1998, opposed sending forces to Bosnia, because of historical sensi-
tivities associated with German troops in the Balkans.1028 In 1999 Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder referred to a similar nie wieder Auschwitz construct when justifying sending 
German aircraft to participate in Operation Allied Force. As crisis-management opera-
tions became the focus of NATO and the United Nations, Germany used this value-driven 
line of reasoning to support deploying forces abroad. 
The 1994 decision by the Constitutional Court should be seen in light of the events 
of that period. A conflict took place not far from German soil, and the destabilizing effects 
of the conflict were spilling into the region. More than 450,000 refugees came to Germany 
during the period of the collapse of former Yugoslavia. Images suggesting the existence of 
Bosnian concentration camps increased the pressure to act. A realist as well as an idealist 
1027 Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 2005, Teil I, Nr. 17, Bonn, March 23, 2005.
1028 See Nico Fried, “Ich habe gelernt, nie wieder Auschwitz,” Suddeutsche Zeitung, January 24, 
2005. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/612/351445/text/.
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argument could be put forward to send troops to keep the peace following the Dayton 
agreement. A sense of urgency was felt while at the same time the military could be used 
for peaceful purposes. Resultantly, it led to Parliamentary support to deploy German 
forces in a peacekeeping mission in former Yugoslavia.
On March 24, 1999, German chancellor Schröder announced that German forces 
would participate in the first combat operations since the Second World War.1029 The 
contribution to Operation Allied Force consisted of a deployment of Luftwaffe Tornado’s 
to suppress Serb air defense systems. Not only was it the first participation of German 
aircraft in a combat mission, Operation Allied Force was also executed without a UN 
mandate. Nevertheless, the German Bundestag supported the mission. The nie wieder 
Auschwitz argument played a central role. The geographic proximity of the human 
suffering in Kosovo further reinforced the strength of the argument. Chancellor Schröder 
declared that it was impossible to accept that European values of freedom, democracy and 
human rights were violated at less than an hour’s flight.1030 Foreign Minister Fischer made 
clear that the humanitarian catastrophe necessitated Germany to act.1031 Several months 
earlier, in October 1998, the Bundestag had adopted a resolution to support military 
strikes against Milosevic in the event of a pending humanitarian catastrophe.1032 It was 
part of increasing diplomatic pressure on Milosevic to stop his actions against the Kosovo-
Albanian population. But in March 1999, the content of the resolution would be put into 
practice. Standing before the Bundestag on March 26, 1999, Chancellor Schröder declared 
that a “humanitarian catastrophe had to be ended” and that the Serb leader Milosevic was 
“intensifying his war against the population of Kosovo.” In that regard it would be “cynical 
and irresponsible to sit by idly.”1033 Fischer appealed to the international rule of law, noting 
that aggression - in this case against a minority group, would not be tolerated.1034 Rather 
1029 “schließlich stehen zum erstenmal nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges deutsche Soldaten 
im Kampfeinsatz.” Gerhard Schröder, “Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder 
zur Lage im Kosovo,” Berlin, March 24, 1999. http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/
rede/96/11696/multi.htm.
1030 “Mit der gemeinsam von allen Bündnispartnern getragenen Aktion verteidigen wir auch 
unsere gemeinsamen grundlegenden Werte von Freiheit, Demokratie und Menschenrechten. 
Wir dürfen nicht zulassen, daß diese Werte, nur eine Flugstunde von uns entfernt, mit Füßen 
getreten werden” Gerhard Schröder, “Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur 
Lage im Kosovo,” Berlin, March 24, 1999. http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/
rede/96/11696/multi.htm.
1031 “Wir werden diesem Konflikt, wenn wir wegschauen, nicht entkommen können, sondern 
wie in Bosnien wird dann das Drama - das Morden, die Zerstörungen und die Flüchtlinge - 
letztendlich zum Hinschauen und dann zum Handeln zwingen” Joschka Fischer quoted in 
Die Zeit, March 25, 1999. http://www.zeit.de/1999/13/199913.kosovo.xml.
1032 Antrag der Bundesregierung, “Deutsche Beteiligung an den von der NATO geplanten 
begrenzten und in Phasen durchzuführenden Luftoperationen zur Abwendung einer 
humanitären Katastrophe im Kosovo-Konflikt,” October 12, 1998. http://dip21.bundestag.de/
dip21/btd/13/114/1311469.pdf .
1033 Gerhard Schröder, “Speech before the Bundestag,” Berlin, March 26, 1999.
1034 “ Aggression darf sich nicht lohnen...Ein Aggressor muß wissen, daß er einen hohen Preis 
zahlen muß. Das ist die Lehre des 20. Jahrhunderts.” Berliner Zeitung, March 24, 1999 http://
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than participate in a war, Schröder argued, Germany was operating alongside the interna-
tional community to use “military means to bring about a peaceful solution to Kosovo.”1035 
The German participation would be a deployment in the name of “humanity and peace.” 
The chancellor also noted that the credibility of NATO was at stake. Germany contributed 
fourteen tornado aircraft and support forces to Operation Allied Force.
In the wake of the operation, the Zeit newspaper published an editorial entitled Die 
Deutschen und die Krieg (The Germans and the War). In the article the author, Jan Ross, 
declared that a remarkable transition had taken place in the country and that a deeply 
embedded social pacifism had been left behind by the participation in Operation Allied 
Force.1036 There was little popular resistance and yet Germany was silently at war, he wrote. 
Ross observed that the country had returned to ‘normalcy’, meaning that it had shaken 
off the burden of history, yet the author was surprised that its population underwent the 
state’s return to arms “surprisingly ahistorical (geschichtslos).” While on the one hand 
Germany was slowly coming to terms with NATO’s understanding of an expeditionary 
era, Ross however had jumped to conclusions. The circumstances surrounding Operation 
Allied Force were unique and would not be replicated in future deployments. While the 
Air Force had participated in combat operations over Kosovo, no ground forces had been 
involved. Geographic proximity strengthened the humanitarian argument to intervene, 
and NATO credibility was at stake. As the world’s most powerful alliance, and the West 
being unchallenged militarily, violations of human rights on the European continent had 
to be confronted. While nie wieder Auschwitz had trumped the need for an explicit UN 
mandate in the German justification, this would remain a unique situation. The deploy-
ment of ground forces in offensive combat operations, even with a UN mandate, remained 
only a hypothetical possibility. 
By 2007 Germany had 8500 soldiers abroad, and was the third largest contributor 
of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan with roughly 3000 troops in the Northern 
Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif and Faisabad. The constitutional frame-
work however specified that German forces could not be deployed abroad in areas where 
offensive actions might take place, and only be engaged in stabilization and peacekeeping 
missions. Thus, while the military was actively engaged abroad, deployments were rela-
tively small and relatively risk-free.1037 The German weekly Der Spiegel captured this 
www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/1999/0325/ politik/0010/index.
html.
1035 “Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft kann der dadurch verursachten menschlichen 
Tragödie in diesem Teil Europas nicht tatenlos zusehen. Wir führen keinen Krieg, aber 
wir sind aufgerufen, eine friedliche Lösung im Kosovo auch mit militärischen Mitteln 
durchzusetzen.” Gerhard Schröder, “Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder 
zur Lage im Kosovo,” March 24, 1999. http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/
rede/96/11696/multi.htm.
1036 Jan Ross, “Die Deutschen und der Krieg: Warum eigentlich herrscht so große Ruhe im Land?,” 
Die Zeit, March 31, 1999.
1037 See Michael Rühle, “Am Rubikon der Kampeinsätze,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
February 4, 2008.
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element of the Bundeswehr’s mindset in an article in 2006 addressing Germany’s role in 
ISAF. German forces were social workers, not warriors. It wrote: 
German soldiers drag sandbags in flooded areas, they help Serb mothers 
in Kosovo, they build schools in Afghanistan, they are social workers – but 
one thing they are definitely not in the public conscience : warriors who are 
trained to kill other people, and if possible to be killed.1038 
Several tenets of what can be considered a “German Approach” delineate a preferred 
way of operating. General Viereck, former commander of EUFOR, the EU mission in 
Congo, mentioned among the elements to deploy troops the necessity to give priority to 
“social-human conduct” in the field, patrolling without weapons when possible and inter-
acting with the local population with sensitivity. In other words, he embraced a culture of 
minimum force, where a very hesitant approach to the use of weapons was considered a 
trust-building measure.1039
In 2007, I interviewed Rudiger Cristoph Zettel, a senior official with the policy plan-
ning staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He told me Germany’s strategic comfort-zone 
over the past years rested in armed development assistance. Zettel argued that Operation 
Amber Fox in Macedonia was an ideal type operation for the Bundeswehr. Here the mili-
tary could facilitate reconstruction efforts in a non-hostile peacekeeping environment 
close to home. On November 18th 2006, the Economist published a three-page article on 
“Germany’s place in the world”. It wrote that “most people see soldiers as little more than 
armed development-aid workers ... who expend goodwill and good works, but do not get 
harmed.”1040 
25.1.2 Conscription
Conscription remains at the heart of Germany’s defense policy and is an exponent of 
the historical baggage weighing down on the Bundeswehr’s efforts to transform towards 
an expeditionary force. Conscription is widely considered to hamper the flexible use of 
Western military forces, as they can generally not be deployed abroad in potential combat 
situations. By contrast, the 2006 White Paper declared that conscription had proven itself 
useful in the changed security environment.1041 Conscription has been kept in place for 
historical and social welfare reasons. On the one hand, it is to prevent the rise of an autono-
1038 “Deutsche Soldaten schleppen Sandsäcke im überfluteten Dreden, sie helfen serbische 
Muettern im Kosovo, sie bauen Schulen in Afghanistan, sie sind Sanitäter und Sozialarbeiter 
– nur eines sind sie im öffentlichen Bewusstsein bislang nicht: Kämpfer, die dazu ausgebildet 
sind, andere Menschen zu töten. Und die womöglich selbst getötet werden.” “Das 
Afghanistan-Abenteuer,” Der Spiegel, no. 47 (2006), p. 20 –30.
1039 General Viereck, “Remarks at WIIS Conference,” Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 
Berlin, April 26, 2007.
1040 “Germany’s Place in the World,” The Economist, November 18, 2006, p. 29.
1041 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006), p.76.
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mous service culture, which had erstwhile been instrumental to the failure of the Weimar 
Republic and led to the empowerment of Hitler. The purpose of conscription is to create 
gesellschaftliche Integration (societal integration) of the military. It is meant to “anchor 
the Bundeswehr into society.” During the Weimar Republic, the small and centralized 
volunteer army operated as a state within a state, disconnected from society. Promoting 
Staatsbürger in Uniform (uniformed citizens) would allow such a historical repeat to be 
avoided. Secondly, conscription provides a cheap workforce for community service, as 
draftees that choose to forego military service are put to work in the Zivildienst instead. 
The 2006 White Paper stated that the government was committed to the Zivildienst as an 
alternative for military service.1042 At the time there were approximately 66,000 conscripts 
in the German armed forces and nearly 100,000 conscientious objectors performing a 
social service in the Zivildienst (see Figure 29). It had made the military an integral part 
of the German welfare state. 
(Source: Data aggregated from website Bundeswehr.de and Bundesamt für den Zivildienst)























































A possible abolition of conscription, which other European militaries have done amongst 
others to perform crisis-management operations abroad, fuels the political fear of discon-
necting the military from society as well as to increase the costs of social welfare now 
partially undertaken by draftees. Finally, abolishing conscription, and reducing the size of 
the military, would lead to base closures which will solicit criticism from the Bundesländer 
over the regional economic implications. Precisely because the Bundeswehr is connected 
1042 Ibid., p. 76.
324 The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally
to other policy areas including social and economic policy, as well as being associated with 
a sensitive part of the country’s history, has meant that reshaping the military is politi-
cally sensitive. It makes any initiative regarding conscription vulnerable to political oppor-
tunism and has effectively stalled discussions on conscription.1043 While the Netherlands 
abolished conscription to free necessary resources to invest in expeditionary capabilities 
and create a pool of deployable forces, in Germany conscription is among others preserved 
for political-historical sensitivities, and serves to “anchor the Bundeswehr in society.” In 
the period 2006-2007 the German Ministry of Defense announced a yearly increase of the 
number of conscripts with 6500 troops.1044 
25.1.3 Financial constraints
(Source: www.nato.int)
Figure 30: German Defense Expenditures (real, nominal and as % of GDP), 1991-2008































































A further symptom of German intransigence towards transformation is the restrictive 
financial context in which Germany’s strategic innovation has taken place. In eighteen 
years, the defense budget has decreased as a percentage of GDP, from 2.4% in 1991 to 
1.4% in 2006 (see Figure 30). A peace dividend was taken after the end of the Cold War. 
In nominal terms the defense budget has remained more or less steady, however with an 
inflation correction it becomes apparent that the defense budget has been reduced with 
more than one-third since the end of the Cold War. While the slope of the decrease flat-
1043 Tom Dyson, “German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic 
Constraint over International Opportunity,” European Security, Vol. 14, No.3 (September 
2005), pp. 361-386.
1044 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006), p. 77.
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tened out in 1997, the budget was further reduced in 2002. In that year a massive debt 
control program was rolled out by the German government. Defense budget appropria-
tions were kept static in absolute terms, and percentage-wise capped at roughly 1.5% of 
GDP. Minister of Defense Peter Struck was forced to take substantive measures. Force end-
strength was reduced from 283,000 to 250,000, two air force squadrons were disbanded, 
and 80 Tornado aircraft were recapitalized. The number of Leopard tanks was reduced 
from 2200 to 850 and the planned number of A400M transport aircraft to be procured 
was reduced from 73 to 60. In 2004, Struck announced further budget cuts.1045 It makes 
freeing resources for performing expeditionary operations or other investments difficult.
25.1.4 Organizational Impediments
The German military has been organized to avoid attaining a strong position within the 
state, and more than for efficiency, has been organized for civilian political control. Several 
key institutional processes are disentangled from key individuals in order to avoid central-
izing too much power in the hands of a few. Aside from the parliamentary nature of the 
military, the military organization itself has not emphasized the ability to perform or plan 
for joint operations. In a desire not to strengthen the highest military officer, and centralize 
military power in one person, the German military organization has empowered indi-
vidual services and their service chiefs.1046 In addition, the procurement of military capa-
bilities is handled by civilian agencies, rather than the services.1047 The German judicial 
system also does not have a permanent military court system. Incidents that occur during 
deployments are processed under civil rather than military code. In all, although Germany 
does partake in NATO, EU and UN missions, these constitutional and organizational 
constraints impede Germany from efficiently pursuing expeditionary operations.
25.2 Zivilmacht Germany 
25.2.1 “We are the Survivors of Mars”
Arguably the most accurate descriptor of Germany following the end of the Second World 
War is that of a civil power. The World Power Survey, organized by the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung in June 2006 compared the views of respondents in several countries worldwide 
regarding the status of global power.1048 Among German respondents only 7 % indicated 
that military power was one of the most important qualities of a world power, whereas 
one third of respondents from the US felt this was the case, almost five times as many. The 
American results were on par with those from French, Chinese and Russian respondents. 
By contrast one-third of US respondents felt that the UN should have a more impor-
1045 Craig S. Smith, “Germany to Overhaul Military and Reduce Defense Spending,” New York 
Times, January 14, 2004.
1046 Interview with Henning Riecke, Berlin, April 2007.
1047 Ibid.
1048 Bertelsmann Stiftung, World Powers in the 21st Century, Berlin, June 2006.
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tant role in maintaining peace and stability, whereas 83% of German respondents felt 
so. Germans are also stronger advocates of a viable ESDP than the French with 84% of 
Germans in favor and little over half of the French. 
There is however a realist argument for focusing on international institutions and 
avoiding the use of force based on counterbalancing. Positing the United Nations as a 
proto-European model of global governance, Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer 
noted during the Iraq crisis in 2003 that: “above and beyond we want a multilateral world 
order; we want a strong United Nations.”1049 As the Iraq War started he elaborated on 
Germany’s overarching idea for a global world order based on multilateralism and inter-
national institutions. He asked, “How should a new world order be molded? Should it be 
cooperative? Should it be built on a multilateral foundation? Or is it a unilateral world, 
which makes substantive differences along the fault lines of power?”1050 It was an expres-
sion, in direct reference to US unilateralist action against Iraq, to develop international 
institutions and moderate major powers in the system. The dominant explanation for this 
emphasis on multilateralism however rests not only in a defensive realist posture, but also 
with a constructivist understanding of Germany’s psyche. An additional element from the 
survey mentioned above adds further context to this German profile. Large majorities in 
all polled countries felt it important for their country to play an active role in world affairs: 
82 percent in England, 86 percent in France, even 90 percent in Italy. Germans, at 65 
percent, too are internationally minded but much less so. Conversely it means that almost 
a third of the German population wants the country to “stay out” of world affairs.1051 Marco 
Overhaus has termed this a lack of German Gestaltungswille, or will to shape the interna-
tional environment.1052 Hans Maull has been the preeminent scholar in the field defining 
Germany as a Zivilmacht. His interpretation of the German psyche is closely related to 
Robert Cooper’s understanding of the European postmodern system. Maull described 
Germany as “projecting its influence and identifying its interests in a multilateral, not a 
national framework. It seeks influence through cultural and economic means rather than 
through the use of force.”1053 Maull identified several core components of the Zivilmacht, 
among them were:
ӺӺ The German state being fully anchored in the community of Western 
democracies;
ӺӺ Foreign policy being based on Western democratic norms;
1049 Joschka Fischer, “Speech at German Bundestag,” Berlin, March 20, 2003.
1050 Ibid.
1051 Russell Berman, “The German Difference,” Hoover Digest, no. 1 (2003) http://www.hoover.org/
publications/digest/3063211.html .
1052 Marco Overhaus, Between Military Interventionism and Cooperative Security: Germany’s Policy 
Towards NATO Transformation since September 11, 2001, Paper presented at International 
Studies Association Conference, Chicago, February 28, 2007.
1053 Szabo (2004), p. 75.
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ӺӺ Skepticism towards military force and seeing the military as an instrument of 
foreign policy;
ӺӺ Policy goals are based on economic growth and societal welfare.1054
Besides, Maull writes, the Zivilmacht relies on “strong and vibrant international institu-
tions.” It was closely echoed in the European integration process, a notion underlined in 
the German Grundgesetz. While the preambulatory clause of the constitution refers to 
the goal of a ‘unified Europe’, article 23 outlines that Germany will work to achieving a 
united Europe.1055 
Germany’s traumatic historical experience created the Zivilmacht. As Maull sums 
up: 
the lessons of history led to aversion or at least profound skepticism 
vis-à-vis any use of military forces and a fierce determination never again 
to allow German militaries and nationalism to threaten European stability, 
a desire never again to break ranks with Western democracies and – later 
on – also to a strong commitment to projecting universal democratic values 
in foreign policy.1056 
Strengthened by the new geopolitics of Europe, the Zivilmacht concept was reinforced by 
the European post-modern system which had relinquished military competition between 
Western European states. European integration thereby both enabled the German Zivil-
macht to take root – as it resolved Germany’s security dilemma - and at the same time 
further integration was a product of German policy to promote its vision of foreign policy 
abroad. 
Total defeat and the destruction caused by World War II were shock-therapy to 
Germany’s security policy. The German state went through a process of regime change 
after World War II, similar to the extent that the Iraqi government changed as a result of 
the Iraq War. The nature of the German government changed. The German state pursued 
wealth and stability rather than an offensive-realist policy of power maximization. Two 
major defeats following two offensive military campaigns in the early 20th century 
produced ample disillusionment over what the military could achieve, while institution-
building was embraced. As Joschka Fischer said on the eve of the Iraq War in reference to 
Robert Kagan’s dictum that ‘Europeans are from Venus, Americans are from Mars’: 
Those who know our European history understand that we do not live on 
Venus but, rather, that we are the survivors of Mars. War is terrible. It is a 
1054 Hans Maull (2006).
1055 Article 23 of the Grundgesetz starts off with: “Zur Verwirklichung eines vereinten Europas 
wirkt die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Entwicklung der Europäischen Union mit...”.
1056 Hans W. Maull, “Germany and the use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?,” Trier Arbeitspapiere 
zur Internationalen Politik, nr. 2, November 1999, p.1.
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great tragedy for those affected and for us all. It can only be the very last 
resort when all peaceful alternatives really have been exhausted.1057 
Networked security, the core concept presented in the 2006 White Paper, supported the 
Zivilmacht since it gave increased relevance to the non-military dimension of security. 
Including more civilian instruments into security policy also meant that relatively less 
attention would be paid to military measures. As Michael Rühle argued, “those who 
emphasize non-military factors so much, want to downplay the role of the Military 
[factor].”1058 Rühle continued to outline that the Zivilmacht cultivates stability projection 
as being superior to waging war. 
Germany, like the United States, perceived itself as a historical reference-model. The 
German self-image was based on becoming a “power of peace”. It echoed a structure-
focused understanding of society. Chancellor Schröder invoked Germany’s historical 
experience to denounce a security policy too narrowly focused on the military: 
 […] as we know from history as well as our own experience, to follow any 
strategy focused narrowly on military and police aspects would be a recipe 
of failure. What is needed is to address the root causes of terrorism and 
insecurity. To combat fanaticism, we must ensure social and material but 
also cultural security. That we can do only on the basis of a broad concept 
of security.1059 
As a ‘power of peace’ conditioned by the defeat in two world wars and the process of 
European integration, Germany advocated a structure-focused approach to security. By 
contrast, the United States’ culture of victory leads it to accept the use of the military to 
push history forward. Given these dichotomies, it is not surprising that US-German rela-
tions were strained and will likely remain so in an expeditionary environment where these 
different visions clash. Both states advance their particular models of promoting social 
progress, one as a Zivilmacht, the other as a Machtstaat. As Stephen Szabo writes, “the 
Bush revolution in foreign policy ran directly counter to the evolution of the German stra-
tegic culture.”1060
1057 Joschka Fischer, “Address to the United Nations Security Council,” New York, March 19, 2003.
1058 “Wer nichtmilitärische Faktoren so sehr betont, will die Bedeutung des Militärische 
herunterspielen.” Rühle (2008).
1059 Gerhard Schröder, “Address at the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” New 
York, September 24, 2003.
1060 Szabo (2004), p. 52.
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25.2.2 Structure focused: Network Security
Central to the status of Zivilmacht, and along with the legal constraints for deploying 
German forces abroad, is the structuralist orientation inherent in German strategic 
culture. The 1992 Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien stated that it was a European-
wide interest to engage in stability-building processes in its geographic periphery.1061 The 
Paper explicitly tasked Germany to embrace Eastern European countries and to integrate 
them in the European security architecture, as part of its security policy. Stability projec-
tion, not military force was articulated. It led to an approach using the military as but one 
of the instruments involved. Foreign Minister Fischer made this clear when he stated in 
2003 in relation to the fight against terrorism that “[i]f we take the fight against terrorism 
seriously we must also fight the causes and intervene to bring stability wherever it draws 
strength from intolerable conditions and finds save havens.”1062 Dealing with terrorism 
required improving institutional structures, as opposed to fighting terrorism by focusing 
on terrorist agents. Furthermore Minister of Defense Struck at the Wehrkunde confer-
ence in 2003 for instance reflected that defeating terrorism in Afghanistan required “the 
stabilization of Afghanistan, the consolidation of a multiethnic government committed 
to national reconciliation, the creation of favorable conditions for economic development 
and a democratic society […].”1063
The 2006 White Paper was a study in structural approaches to security and defense.1064 
It was a white paper published by the Ministry of Defense on “Security Policy and the 
future of the Bundeswehr.” As the name implied, its scope was broader than defense 
policy. “Network security” (Vernetzte Sicherheit) was its central concept. To substantiate 
a structure-focused perspective on security challenges, the German defense department 
proscribed an integrated approach where the use of the military is supporting to other 
instruments. Its core premise was to improve cooperation in the interagency and to 
develop civilian-military partnerships, rather than adopt network-centric warfare, as its 
name might have suggested. It was an expression of a desire to embed the military strongly 
among other agencies dealing with foreign policy. The 2006 White Paper outlined the 
objective of the Bundeswehr “to guarantee the capacity for action in the field of foreign 
policy,” rather than be part of the action of foreign policy itself.1065 It resonated in the 
perspective advanced elsewhere that the military is an enabler rather than a problem-
1061 “eine Prozess stabilitätsorientierter und vertrauensbildender Zusammenarbeit 
einzubinden, das gegensitige Verständnis zu fördern und auf die Entwicklung 
regionaler Sicherheitsstrukturen hinzuwirken.” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992.
1062 Joschka Fischer, “Remarks at German Bundestag,” Berlin, September 10, 2003.
1063 Peter Struck, “NATO’s Future Role,” Remarks at Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, August 2, 
2003.
1064 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, White Paper 2006, on German Security Policy and the 
Future of the Bundeswehr, Berlin, October 2006.
1065 Ibid., p. 9.
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solver.1066 “Network security” represented strategic transformation within the contours, or 
bandwidth, shaped by Germany’s strategic culture.
The White Paper assessed that internal and external security overlap and that 
combined they create a mosaic of security challenges which threaten the foundations of 
international stability. Rather than threats, the document identified ten risks and dangers 
in its strategic environment. These factors impact the underlying structures of the inter-
national system, none of them referred to specific actors per se. The paper stated that the 
categories of security challenges were: Globalization; Proliferation and Military Build-
up; Regional Conflicts; Illegal Arms Trade; Obstacles to Development and Fragile State-
hood; Disruptions of Transportation routes; Energy Security; Uncontrolled Migration; 
Pandemics or Epidemics and Terrorism.1067 All these categories were structural in nature 
and impacted regional stability rather than pose specific threats to the German state.
The 2006 White Paper further made explicit that not only is the military an instru-
ment of last resort but also that military developments did not define the nature of secu-
rity risks: “The chief determinants of future security developments are not military, but 
social, economic, ecological and cultural conditions, which can be influenced only 
through multinational cooperation. It is therefore not possible to guarantee security by 
going it alone, or with armed forces only.”1068 Vernetzte Sicherheit, or networked security, 
is intellectually on par with the comprehensive approach. It outlines that the military has 
a role to play, but only embedded in a broader pallet of national instruments in order to 
project stability. Not only nationally, but also internationally. Inspector-General Schnei-
derhan, commander of the German Armed Forces, said that the Bundeswehr needed to 
be embedded in a “network of security correlations,” referring to improved EU-NATO 
cooperation. A networked approach to foreign and security policy was advocated, based 
on interagency coordination and embedding the military into multinational institutions. 
The 2006 White Paper further concluded that NATO will increasingly have to deal with 
stabilization and nation-building efforts. 
26 Expressions of German Transformation
26.1 Capability and Personnel Initiatives
Due to the focus on stability and crisis-management operations, many of the German 
procurement initiatives were capability programs enhancing deployability such as the 
A400M and the NH-90 helicopter. Funds were also made available for expensive high-end 
platforms such as new frigates, submarines and Eurofighter aircraft.1069 This is remarkable 
1066 See also, Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: the art of war in the Modern World (London: Allen 
Lane, 2005).
1067 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006), p. 19.
1068 Ibid, p.22.
1069 Josef Janning & Thomas Bauer, “Into the Great Wide Open: The transformation of the 
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given German reluctance to engage in high-intensity missions. Perhaps they were exclu-
sively procured for territorial defense missions. Regarding the Eurofighter/Typhoon EFA 
2000, initially designed in the 1980’s as an air-superiority fighter, it came into production 
in the early 2000’s as a fighter-bomber. Its high cost meant it dominated defense procure-
ment budgets, making it difficult to pay for new systems that are more applicable to the 
stabilization missions Germany performed in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Congo.1070 
Reasons for its procurement must be sought in part in the realm of defense industry as it 
is a German-built plane. As for the next-generation Sachsen-class frigates and Type 212 
submarines, they could be used in certain peace operations as well as classical naval tasks 
to secure lines of communication. In terms of capabilities it demonstrated that Germany 
was prepared to procure high-end capabilities for high-intensity missions. Deploying 
these capabilities was a whole different issue altogether. 
Since the Cold War only limited changes had been made to the force structure. In 
1990 the force structure consisted of 370,000 forces including 170,000 conscripts. In 1994 
this was reduced to 340,00 including 140,000 conscripts. Six years later this same force 
profile was reduced to 277,000 forces including 77,000 conscripts.1071 It was not until the 
2003 defense guidelines that a new pyramid-shaped force structure based on three force-
types was proposed. It included a group of 35,000 response forces which would constitute 
the tip of the spear. These forces would be capable of operating across the entire intensity 
spectrum and form the core of the Bundeswehr. They would receive the bulk of Germany’s 
defense investments. Secondly, a group of 70,000 stability forces for low-risk peacekeeping 
operations. And thirdly a group of 147,500 support forces, mostly conscripts, for duties 
inside Germany. Remarkably, this model resembled NATO’s mobile counter-concen-
tration force concept of the early ‘90’s which was similarly based on three tiers of rapid 
response, follow-on and support forces. 
In response to the guidelines, in June 2007 the Bundesheer, the German Army, 
published a transformation paper called Das Neue Heer, Transformation Transparent. 
The document can be seen as the German equivalent of the US Army’s Transformation 
Roadmap. It offered both rationale and guidance for the Bundesheer’s transformation 
drawing on the 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines. The German Army had a clear trans-
formation objective in mind, namely improving deployability in a joint framework.1072 
Lieutenant General Hans-Otto Budde, Chief of the Army, wrote that German transforma-
German Armed Forces after 1990,” Orbis, vol. 51, no. 3 (2007), pp. 529 – 541.
1070 See for instance Stephen Szabo, “The Future of German Defense,” AICGS Analysis. http://
www.aicgs.org/analysis/security/szabo.aspx. Accessed January 16, 2008.
1071 See Tom Dyson, “The Politics of Military Convergence: Neoclassical Realism and post-Cold 
War Armed Forces Reform in Britain, France and Germany,” Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the ISA’s 49th Annual Convention, Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, USA, 
March 26, 2008.
1072 “Verbesserung der Einsatzfähigkeit im streitkräftegemeinsamen Verbund.” 
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Das Neue Heer: Transformation Transparant, Bonn, 
June 2007.
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tion revolved around making German forces expeditionary, including for high-intensity 
operations.1073 
These capabilities however did not improve the ability of the German armed forces to 
project power. Instead they have generally taken a long time to develop. The Bundesheer’s 
transformation document noted that following the attacks of 9/11 the urgency for German 
transformation received a new impulse since it became clear that the environment was 
not as benevolent as expected. According to the Bundesheer document, instead of world-
wide peace the end of the Cold War had led to worldwide violence. The world was not 
as benevolent as initially anticipated. Six transformation objectives were formulated for 
the Army to develop multinational expeditionary capabilities.1074 A key emphasis was on 
creating an Air Mobile brigade, the Luftbewegliche Brigade. While the analysis was solid, 
the proposal to develop an air maneuver brigade came fourteen years after the Nether-
lands drew up a similar capability. 
Investing in high-end platforms came at the expense of investing in sufficient commu-
nications and sensor (C4ISR) systems, which lie at the heart of expeditionary efforts.1075 
Although Germany is introducing various networking technologies, experts believe it has 
proceeded slowly.1076 It underscores the view drawn from multiple conversations at the 
Ministry of Defense that network-centric capabilities are not considered a central priority 
of German transformation. While it figures prominently under the heading “Transforma-
tion” in the 2006 White Book, nowhere in my interviews at the Ministry of Defense’s policy 
planning staff, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the connection between German 
transformation and net-centric operations made. In my conversations with various 
German officers and policymakers about transformation, network-enabled capabilities 
or advanced C4I-systems were not brought up. Rather than discussing capabilities and 
military-organizational reform, the transformation debate in Germany revolved around 
the overarching political-strategic question for what purposes to use the military. 
26.2 Inapplicability of American Transformation
The term transformation met with skepticism among policymakers due to its resonance 
of US defense policy. Interviews in Berlin in 2006 and 2007 portrayed an aversion to the 
term. At the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the perception was 
widely held that transformation encompassed a US concept, applicable to a US style of 
using the military which met with strong German criticism. The debate about transforma-
1073 Hans-Otto Budde, “Einsatz verpflichtet,” Internationale Politik (May 2007), p. 28 – 33.
1074 These were: focuses on expeditionary operations; remaining the core provider of ground 
forces; operating and thinking jointly; embedded in a multinational framework; planning 
within the scope of available resources; using modern technology. Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung, Das Neue Heer: Transformation Transparant, Bonn, June 2007, p.6.
1075 Interview with Benjamin Schreer, Berlin June 2007.
1076 Gordon Adams, et.al., Bridging the Gap: European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic 
Interoperability, Defense & Technology Paper (Washington DC: National Defense University, 
November 2004), p.34.
333Transformation in Europe: The Netherlands & Germany
tion in Berlin revolved around the usefulness of US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s idea 
regarding changing the military and its impact on US foreign policy. The US process of mili-
tary change meant to reduce the footprint and substitute mass for information, but with 
the overall intent to prosecute rapid high-intensity campaigns such as in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and elsewhere. Although these wars had indicated the obvious strength of American mili-
tary potential, its relevance was questioned in light of the obstacles to stabilize these coun-
tries. The discussion about transformation thereby invariably became a referendum on the 
Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and the usefulness of network-centric warfare for stabi-
lization operations. This same sentiment dominated in relation to the NATO Response 
Force (NRF). According to Zettel, NATO’s vehicle of transformation was believed to 
impose an American concept on European militaries.1077 Zettel underlined that by 2006 
the NRF no longer was the focal point of transformation. Operations in Afghanistan were 
shifting NATO’s attention towards counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. It 
conversely led to the feeling that the NRF was not the adequate instrument with which to 
address the challenges of the new security environment. Instead interagency operations 
and the comprehensive approach – or ‘network security’ as the Germans called it - would 
be guiding. The high-end NRF only appeared of limited usefulness in these operations that 
were ‘people-centric.’ Aside from the domestic-level constraints, the security environment 
changed and the transformation envisaged by the United States did not appeal to Germany. 
27 The Impact of Changes in the Security 
Environment
27.1 Transforming for combat?
The third step of Germany’s transformation policy, which is yet to be taken, is to deploy 
‘boots on the ground’ to engage in combat operations. It presented the latest iteration of 
tensions between Germany’s strategic-cultural tenets as a Zivilmacht and its support 
of NATO solidarity. For some years NATO allies increased the pressure on Germany to 
participate in higher-intensity crisis-management operations. Already in 1994, in rela-
tion to the crisis in former Yugoslavia US President Bill Clinton said, “I do not see how 
Germany, the third biggest economic nation in the world, can escape a leadership role. […] 
It has no other choice but to assume a leadership role. Germany cannot withdraw from its 
responsibility.”1078 
While Germany wished to contribute to global peace and stability, it had difficulty 
coping with its implications in the contemporary security environment. Throughout 
the 1990’s and the early 2000’s the security environment changed. The 2003 Defense 
1077 A similar position was voiced by Henning Riecke at “NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” 
conference hosted by the Netherland’s Atlantic Council, The Hague, May 27, 2009.
1078 “Deutschland muss ein Fuehrungsrolle uebernehmen,” Suddeutsche Zeitung, July 4, 1994.
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Policy Guidelines made clear that “the boundaries between the different mission-types 
[peace-keeping & peace-enforcement] are fluid.”1079 Stability operations implied complex 
campaigns in an environment in which high- and low-intensity events are a continuum 
rather than a digital dichotomy. In counterinsurgency and complex stability operations, 
Western nations, including Germany, are itself part of the conflict, rather than bystanders. 
“In these asymmetric conflicts, Michael Rühle wrote in 2008, “there is no place for an 
unequivocal distinction between ‘peacekeeping’ and combat operations.”1080 Germany 
could not suffice by cherry-picking low-intensity operations. The security environment 
had changed and operations required elements of both. In addition solidarity in NATO 
implied that burden-sharing had to take place across the full spectrum of operations.
 In December 2002, as Germany discussed the contribution to NATO’s ISAF opera-
tion, Defense Minister Peter Struck declared that the security of Germany was defended in 
the Hindu Kush.1081 In late 2001, some 100 German Special Forces had been deployed to 
Afghanistan to support Operation Enduring Freedom.1082 The Special Forces fall outside 
the prevalent regulations necessitating parliamentary approval, and thus these forces have 
also been used in combat operations. The two events contributed to an ongoing debate 
over whether regular German forces could be deployed for offensive operations or not. 
NATO’s new operational reality in Afghanistan was leading to friction within Germa-
ny’s strategic culture. By 2006 Dutch, British and Canadian allies were confronting strong 
resistance in Southern Afghanistan and calls erupted for increased support. Germany was 
caught between solidarity with the alliance and a strategic culture that resisted using mili-
tary force. In the Netherlands, a similar dynamic was at play. Yet while the Dutch found 
a political solution and approved the mission in the restive province of Uruzgan, the 
Germans remained in the relatively peaceable North. Even this German contribution in 
Afghanistan was however, burdened by legal considerations. Exemplar was the proposed 
deployment of six Tornado reconnaissance aircraft to Afghanistan in 2007. Initially 
NATO’s request was for aircraft able to provide close-air support. Yet given Germany’s 
constitutional restrictions regarding an Angriffskrieg, they were deployed in a reconnais-
sance role and were armed with sidewinder air-to-air missiles for self-defense only, even 
though the Taliban does not have known aircraft of its own. Since the aircraft, if supplied 
with different munitions, could operate in a ground-attack role whereas Germany was 
only mandated to perform stability operations, a complaint had been filed in the constitu-
tional court by the left-wing PDS/die Linke. The plaintiff argued that the deployment was 
1079 “Die Grenzen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Einsatzarten sind fließend.” 
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003, para 58.
1080 “In diesen asymmetrische Konflickten eine eindeutige Trennung zwische “peacekeeping” 
und Kampfeinsatz zu fordern ginge an der Realität vorbei.” Michael Rühle, “Am Rubikon der 
Kampfeinsätze,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 4, 2008.
1081 Dirk Eckert, ”Die Sicherheit Deutschlands wird auch am Hindukusch verteidigt,” Telepolis, 
December 13, 2002.
1082 See for instance Timo Noetzel & Benjamin Schreer, German Special Operations Forces: The 
case for Revision,” SWP Comments 26, November 2006.
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illegal. The constitutional court ruled in favor of the government and the aircraft were not 
withdrawn.1083 The ruling confirmed that the aircraft would explicitly not conduct close air 
support missions: 
The NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan serves the security of the 
Euro-Atlantic area. ... [In this deployment] no combat operations will 
take place, this is clear from the decision of the Federal Government for the 
deployment of Tornado reconnaissance aircraft. They will be prepared for 
reconnaissance work, the ability for a close air support role is not provided, 
and the planes are only armed for self-defense.1084
The aircraft would not be used for combat operations and the deployment could go ahead 
as planned. This method of deploying capabilities subject to court proceedings presented 
obvious limitations to the extractive capacity of the state. Other instances of constitutional 
proceedings relating to the operations of German forces abroad were the deployment of 
AWACS aircraft to Turkey in the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003, the stationing of German 
troops in Kosovo after its independence and a decision in March 1999 which related to the 
legality of Germany’s decision to support Operation Allied Force.1085
Although the Constitutional Court has enabled rather than inhibited the government 
to perform out-of-area operations, the central role persistently played by the Constitutional 
Court on questions pertaining German security policy and how the German government 
can use the military, is a limiting factor on the extractive capacity of the government and 
hampers Germany’s ability to transform its military institutions to perform expeditionary 
operations as detailed in its policy documents. As mentioned earlier, the proof of trans-
formation is in the actual use of the military. From a neoclassical realist perspective, the 
strong role of the Constitutional Court illustrates how strongly domestic factors influence 
1083 “Tornado-Einsatz in Afghanistan verfassungsgemäß,” Focus, July 3, 2007. http://www.focus.
de/politik/deutschland/urteil_aid_65325.html.
1084 “Der NATO-geführte ISAF-Einsatz in Afghanistan dient der Sicherheit des euro-atlantischen 
Raums….Dass von integrierten Kampfeinsätzen nicht gesprochen werden kann, ergibt 
sich bereits aus dem Beschluss der Bundesregierung zur Entsendung der Tornado-
Aufklärungsflugzeuge. Danach sollen die Tornado- Flugzeuge Aufklärungsarbeit leisten, die 
Fähigkeit zur Luftnahunterstützung ist nicht vorgesehen, und die Flugzeuge sind nur zu Eigen- 
und Selbstschutzzwecken bewaffnet.” Bundesverfassungsgericht, “Klage der Linksfraktion 
gegen Tornado-Einsatz in Afghanistan zurückgewiesen,” Pressemitteilung Nr. 72/2007, 
July 3, 2007.
1085 The latter complaint was filed by the PDS left-wing party. It dealt with the issue whether the 
rights of political parties had been violated by the government given the government’s support 
to Operation Allied Force. While the Constitutional Court concluded that the Bundeswehr 
acted in violation of article 25 and 26 of the Basic Law because there was no explicit 
international legal mandate for the mission. The court case was however ruled inadmissible 
on its merits since the Bundestag had supported the use of military force in October 1998 
irrespective of a UN mandate. “Bei diesem Beschluß war dem Bundestag bewußt, daß 
der Einsatz aller Voraussicht nach ohne eine Ermächtigung durch den Sicherheitsrat der 
Vereinten Nationen durchgeführt werden würde.” For more see, 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es19990325_2bve000599.html.
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German security policy. Additionally, since the Constitutional Court has a central role in 
justifying German expeditionary operations, it contributes to stifling a strategic debate 
regarding the use of the military which is fundamentally political-strategic question rather 
than a legal-constitutional one. The debate is removed from the political-military realm 
and diverted to a legal-constitutional setting. This leads to a legalistic approach to security 
policy and limits the ability of the state to pursue transformation. 
The security policy debate in the Bundestag was considered “provincial” and domi-
nated by party politics.1086 It was a product of a “parliamentary” military, reducing decisions 
on strategy to domestic referendums or court rulings. The PDS and die Linke left-wing 
parties defended German pacifism and were the primary plaintiffs with the Constitutional 
Court on expeditionary operations. In 2007 the governing Labor party (SPD) had difficul-
ties to convince its own constituency of the usefulness to remain involved in Afghanistan 
since it appeared to contradict its image as Friedenspartei. 
27.2 Caveats
A further aspect that indicated tensions between German strategic and the operational 
environment were capability caveats declared for operations in Afghanistan. These 
consisted of limitations on the use of capabilities in-theatre and restrictive rules of engage-
ment. It led to Alliance-wide criticism against German forces. Such caveats have included 
not allowing other NATO allies to make use of certain assets such as the above-mentioned 
Tornado aircraft, not deploying German forces to combat zones, or not being able to take 
prisoners.1087 Another German caveat was that German transport capability could only 
be used for flights between Kabul and Termez. The capability would not be available for 
other NATO purposes for fear of providing support to a combat operation. It increased 
the scarcity of transport assets within ISAF and led to substantial criticism from allies. US 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates speaking in Heidelberg in late 2007 criticized the lack 
of burden-sharing among allies and its consequences for alliance cohesion. Although he 
did not mention Germany specifically, it was clear from the context: 
The failure to meet commitments puts the Afghan mission – and with it, 
the credibility of NATO – at real risk. If an alliance of the world’s greatest 
democracies cannot summon the will to get the job done in a mission 
that we agree is morally just and vital to our security, then our citizens 
may begin to question both the worth of the mission and the utility of the 
60-year-old transatlantic security project itself.1088 
1086 Interview with anonymous official at German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, July 9, 2007.
1087 See for instance Susanne Koebl & Alexander Szandr, “Not Licensed To Kill: German Forces 
in Afghanistan Let Taliban Commander Escape,” Der Spiegel Online (International), May 19, 
2008. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,554033,00.html.
1088 Robert M. Gates, “Speech by Secretary of Defense,” Conference of European Armies, 
Heidelberg, Germany, Thursday, October 25, 2007.
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Gates referred to alliance solidarity as an overarching justification for providing additional 
assets. Even though German policymakers were sensitive to the solidarity argument, the 
caveat discussion was not resolved. In fact, German politicians further denounced the role 
of the military, portraying strong disbelief that the war in the Southern part of Afghani-
stan could be won militarily.1089 German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung said in early 
2007, “I do not think it is right to talk about more and more military means [in Afghani-
stan]. When the Russians were in Afghanistan they had 100,000 troops and didn’t win.”1090 
Instead, Germany increasingly emphasized a comprehensive approach, promoting non-
military instruments.
27.3 A Process of awakening?
German commentators have continuously argued that Germany accept a greater role in 
burden-sharing in Afghanistan and share the burden of high-intensity stability opera-
tions.1091 Yet given that the military is subject to parliamentary approval and the underlying 
strategic cultural traits, this has been difficult. From this perspective transformation can be 
considered a process of re-education, particularly for the political elite, on using the mili-
tary in an expeditionary environment.1092 It also underlines the political nature of German 
transformation, since it involves redefining a German political-strategic orientation to the 
military and its place in foreign and security policy. It requires aligning the Zivilmacht 
with the ambition of solidarity to collective security organizations and the operational 
requirements of the external security environment. Since NATO is now engaged in stabili-
zation missions with a strong civilian component, it is logical to see Germany emphasizing 
this element of the mission. 
This issue of ‘re-education’ appeared with the military as well. In 2007 the commander 
of the Army, General Hans-Otto Budde, wrote that the German military should prepare for 
‘worst-case’ scenarios when German forces deploy abroad. This required, he said, mental 
preparedness and self-knowledge (Selbstverständnis) since “to the soldier on deploy-
ment [the mission] is a case of life and death. This is a consequence that all citizens, with or 
without uniform, must realize.”1093 Budde addressed the traditionally pacifist psyche of the 
German population to provide some reality that missions are not risk-free.
Officials at the Ministry of Defense interviewed for this research had a tendency to 
excuse the German military and downplay allied criticism over the caveats. By mid-2007 
there was a growing chorus in the West that Germany was not contributing sufficiently in 
1089 “Sterben fuer Kabul,” Der Spiegel, no. 47 (2006), p. 34 – 44.
1090 Franz-Josef Jung, quoted in Thom Shanker, “NATO Asked to Meet Promises Already Made to 
Afghanistan,” New York Times, February 9, 2007.
1091 See for instance Timo Noetzel & Benjamin Schreer, “The German Army and 
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” SWP Comments, February 2008; Michael Rühle, “Am 
Rubikon der Kampfeinsätze,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 4, 2008.
1092 Interview with anonymous policy official at German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 
July 9, 2007.
1093 Hans-Otto Budde, “Einsatz verpflichtet,” Internationale Politik (May 2007), p. 28 – 33.
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Afghanistan, and that it was hiding behind caveats to avoid participating in the warfighting 
in the Southern provinces. Most of my interlocutors went to great extents to weaken that 
criticism. Instead they said “Germany was not ready yet for counterinsurgency operations” 
or “Germany requires re-education”. Paraphrasing Germany’s highest-ranking officer, 
Inspector-General Schneiderhan, he said that German participation in a stabilization 
operation necessitated winning hearts and minds of the Germans first, before the military 
could win hearts and minds abroad. It was a remark that captured the dilemma that has 
burdened the German process of change. Fabian Breuer wrote in agreement that Germa-
ny’s civilian power, “does not exclude the use of force, but military interventions have to 
be in accordance with German values.”1094 Breuer supports his argument with data from 
surveys that even though large majorities support the Bundeswehr undertaking humani-
tarian missions, only a small majority support peacekeeping missions and only 38% 
support an active German foreign and security policy.1095 At the same time, criticism was 
dampened by pointing out that Germany had already come a long way. German Special 
Forces had operated in Operation Enduring Freedom, German aircraft had flown combat 
missions over Kosovo, and Germany had also suffered casualties in Northern Afghanistan. 
As an indication that this process of re-education is slowly taking place was the 
acknowledgement by the Defense Minister that two German soldiers killed by improvised 
explosives in Afghanistan in October 2008 were casualties of war, or Gefallenen. Until 
then, this word had not been used when soldiers were killed by enemy-fire. Minister Jung 
said that the soldiers “had become casualties in Afghanistan while performing their duties 
on a mission for peace.”1096 While the Minister did not describe the Afghanistan mission 
as war, it signaled a process of internalization. The Economist quoted a German top offi-
cial saying, “Germans are still learning that they have to take over more responsibility.”1097 
Further indication was offered by reports that the national caveats on rules of engagement 
in Afghanistan were slowly being revised.1098 The Spiegel outlined that this was related to 
a process of normalization of the German self-perception. In other words Germany was 
coming to terms with NATO’s expeditionary era, albeit slowly. Yet for every step forward 
there were also reaffirmations of German intransigence. In May 2010 the German presi-
dent Horst Köhler suddenly resigned. The reason was a series of remarks Köhler made 
concerning the German deployment in Afghanistan which attracted fierce criticism. 
Köhler had suggested that missions as in Afghanistan were at times necessary to protect 
vital interests, and that a country as large and outward-looking as Germany should be 
1094 Fabian Breuer, “Between Ambitions and Financial Constraints: The Reform of the German 
Armed Forces,” German Politics, vol. 15, no. 2 (2006), p.210.
1095 Data is retrieved from a 2004 survey conducted by Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, Die Wehrpflicht 
und ihre Hintergründe (Wiesbaden: Sozialwissenschatfliches Insitut der Bundeswehr, 2004).
1096 “...in Wahrnehmung ihres Auftrags im Einsatz für den Frieden in Afghanistan gefallen.” “Jung 
spricht erstmals von Gefallenen,” Die Welt, October 25, 2008.
1097 “Germany’s Place in the World,” The Economist, November 18, 2006, p. 29.
1098 “German Troops Beef up Fight Against Taliban,” Der Spiegel, September 7, 2009. http://www.
spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,635192,00.html.
339Transformation in Europe: The Netherlands & Germany
willing to participate in a military mission to protect trade routes and promote regional 
stability.  His remarks portrayed a narrow realist view of the use of the military. It clashed 
with German strategic culture and the German constitution which only permitted expe-
ditionary operations in support of a collective security organization and mandated by the 
United Nations. A mission in support of narrow economic interests did not fit this mold.
A Sonderweg argument appeared frequently as well. “You can’t expect the same from 
Germany as from other countries, Germany is different,” Franz-Jozef Meiers writes, “the 
problem facing Germany is how to define a rule of conduct that neither shirks responsi-
bilities nor reawakens the fears of its allies.”1099 There was concern, both among politicians 
and the military, regarding the way other states perceived German forces abroad. Even 
if Germany wanted to perform an expeditionary operation by itself, Inspector-General 
Schneiderhan categorically stated, “nobody would invite the Germans to go anywhere by 
themselves.”1100 Such fears were vested in offensive realism believing that Germany could 
resort to its former regional hegemonic role to protect its security.1101 The remark was 
telling for the political tightrope of German transformation. 
The domestic dynamic has been fundamental to the pursuit of transformation. 
Germany’s strategic culture is military-averse. In an age of expeditionary operations of 
uncertain intensity, is the German population ready to take on the responsibilities that 
have been described in the policy documents? Zettel said that in his assessment Innen-
politik, domestic political factors, were the primary determinants of German foreign and 
security policy.1102 Internal politics rather than considerations of the international system 
were shaping German defense policy. Neoclassical realism however makes clear that it 
was the interaction between domestic and system-level factors that produced the process 
of German transformation, for without an expeditionary NATO, the debate in Germany 
would have been very different.
28 Conclusion of German Case Study
What type of transformation strategy was pursued?
Transformation in Germany was a process of strategic change to shift the military towards 
expeditionary operations in response to a shift in the security environment, and more 
prominently a shift in the posture of NATO. It amounted to a policy of strategic transfor-
mation. It was political-strategic in nature as it addressed the fundamental question how 
the military could play a role in German foreign and security policy. German transfor-
mation however was not accompanied by a grand strategy about Germany’s role in the 
1099 Franz-Jozef Meiers, “Germany: the Reluctant Power,” Survival, vol. 37, no.3 (1995), p. 97.
1100 Inspektor-General Schneiderhan, “Remarks at WIIS Conference: German contribution to 
European Security and Transatlantic Cooperation – the White Paper,” Berlin, April 26, 2007.
1101 See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).
1102 Interview with Rüdiger Zettel, Berlin, July 9, 2007.
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world.1103 Nevertheless, given this political dimension as well as German constitutional 
constraints, transformation takes place as much within the Bundestag and the heads of 
the decision makers as much as it is written in the evolution of the Defense policy papers.
What change in the level of external vulnerability or 
opportunity, forming the transition in the international security 
environment, triggered transformation?
The shift in the security environment following the end of the Cold War required Berlin to 
develop a military policy in line with NATO’s expeditionary outlook. 
What are the characteristics of the strategic cultural factors 
that shaped the transformation strategy?
Innenpolitik and history pervade the reform of the German armed forces and its under-
standing of transformation. Germany’s constitutional constraint on using the military 
abroad made transformation a troublesome endeavor, comparable to a patient in psycho-
logical therapy. Transformation has gone to the core of the identity of the German state. 
Two elements have shaped German strategic culture, namely its Zivilmacht and the 
pursuit of alliance solidarity. The interaction between these two tenets, following a change 
in the security environment producing an expeditionary era, has shaped the contours of 
German transformation. Throughout the Cold War, in fact since the creation of Germany 
in its current constitutional form, these two factors have been aligned. Solidarity to NATO 
throughout the Cold War meant sustaining a defense infrastructure while not using 
it, mainly preparing for its use should its territorial security be threatened. It allowed 
Germany to develop its status as Zivilmacht.
As NATO reorients itself towards expeditionary missions, Germany is weighted 
down by its domestic constraints. Given German historical and legal-constitutional 
factors, responding to the shifts that NATO has put forward has been troublesome. Its 
extractive capacity has been limited as a result and transformation has moved at a slow 
pace. Neoclassical realism suggests that domestic level variables may limit the ability of 
states to respond to system-level incentives. The case study shows that Germany has been 
unwilling to emulate the principles of US and unable to pursue the strategic innovation it 
envisioned in its White Papers as a result of these domestic constraints.
What did the interaction between the level of external 
vulnerability and strategic culture mean in terms of capabilities?
Due to the intransigence of German transformation and the limited financial resources 
available, only few initiatives in the field of capabilities have been taken. Among them 
are improved assets for deployability by procuring the A400M, the creation of a pool of 
deployable forces and the development in 2004 of an airmobile brigade. However, these 
capabilities have not been able to be realized in a timely fashion. In addition, the persis-
1103 Dalgaard-Nielsen (2006), p. 146.
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tence of a significant conscription force remains a practical impediment to free necessary 
funds to pursue transformation initiatives. Furthermore crucial is the role played by the 
Bundestag and the Constitutional court to shape military policy. 
How did further events in the security environment impact the 
transformation strategy?  
Germany was caught between solidarity with the alliance and a strategic culture that 
resisted using military force. As the security environment slowly deteriorated, this tension 
remained. German strategic culture fundamentally clashed with the high-intensity 
mission NATO was undertaking in parts of Afghanistan. The resource extraction of the 
German state dwindled as it committed to only deploy in the relatively risk-free areas in 
Afghanistan and denoted substantial caveats and preconditions for the use of its military 
assets. Subsequently this tested the foundation of Alliance solidarity. As NATO undertook 
more challenging missions, it forced Germany to confront the limitations offered by its 
strategic culture. It hampered transformation.
The expeditionary era following the end of the Cold War however shifted NATO’s 
attention from preparing to defend, to acting in defense of regional stability and performing 
crisis-management operations. From 1999 onwards, and particularly following the events 
of September 11, it became apparent that NATO’s security interests could be directly 
challenged by events taking place across the globe necessitating robust action, including 
combat operations. To Germany it implied a clash between its defensive-realist posture to 
sustain a credible position within NATO and a constructivist self-perception as a struc-
ture-focused Zivilmacht. 
While Germany is economically the strongest, and militarily the largest of the Euro-
pean allies, on the basis of its strategic culture a form of Sonderweg will remain, leading 
to inhibitions to deploying military forces abroad in robust interventions. To that extent, a 
normalization of German foreign policy is unlikely to take place as NATO’s expeditionary 
persists. In the event that the security environment leads to more robust action from NATO, 
it will amount to further difficulties for the German Innenpolitik. Germany has yet to send 
ground forces into combat operations, or to be directly involved in large scale offensive 
operations. Operation Allied Force marked the first combat mission since the end of the 
Second World War, yet the first mission involving ground forces still needs to take place. 
Nor has Germany confronted the same level of attrition on its military organization as 
states such as the United States, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. These are further 
tests that await it, if it wants to successfully pursue its transformation to a full-spectrum 
expeditionary force. As with every educational process, it is characterized by trial and error. 
After Operation Allied Force the belief was prevalent that a German Sonderweg had been 
disavowed. The operation in Afghanistan indicated that this is not the case and that the 
Zivilmacht tenet of its strategic culture continues to weigh on German transformation. As 
Germany tries to take on more responsibility in military operations, succumbing to the 
pressure of alliance solidarity, the risk of a domestic backlash increases. Instead it is to be 
expected that within NATO Germany will remain a strong advocate of a comprehensive 
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approach to complex operations, and avoid making NATO a purely military organiza-
tion. It offers the only way through which Germany can align both tenets of its strategic 
culture within an expeditionary environment. An additional element is to strengthen the 
European Union’s Security and Defense Policy as it appears more in tune with Germany’s 
Zivilmacht status. A strong Zivilmacht European Union could replace Germany’s handi-




How Transformation Divided 
NATO in an Expeditionary 
World 
29 Introduction
This study has explored the nature of defense transformation and the elements that shaped 
it in three Western countries to explain variance in policies of transformation and its 
impact on the future of NATO. Transformation has failed to be the source of Alliance 
cohesion, as had been envisaged in 2002. Variance in transformation strategies created 
different responses to the expeditionary environment and are symptomatic of the different 
philosophies that have proliferated in the West regarding the use of the military. How these 
states have gone through the process of transformation goes a long way to explain the 
discord within the alliance in the contemporary security environment where the military 
instrument is deployed abroad in a variety of missions. This study implies that as long as an 
expeditionary environment persists, NATO’s response to security challenges will remain 
troubled and subject to internal divisiveness. The reason for this is that states can only 
effectively pursue a process of fundamental change in their military policy if the content of 
that change program aligns with the state’s tenets of its strategic culture.
The research question is How has the interaction between system-level factors 
and domestic strategic cultures influenced the trajectory of defense transformation 
of NATO member states and how does it shape future transatlantic security relations 
and the future of NATO? In this chapter, the most relevant conclusions of the structured 
focused comparison are presented. Additionally, the results from the three case studies 
are compared to make an assessment of its implications for the NATO alliance. The chart 
below presents the answers to the questions guiding the research on the transformation 
strategies pursued by the three states. A synopsis of the case studies follows below, followed 
by answering the final overarching question what differences in transformation imply for 
the future of NATO. 
Transformation is the term used to denote the process of change in Western mili-
taries in response to major transitions in the international security environment. Specifi-
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cally it was used in Western strategic discourse throughout the late 1990’s and early 2000’s 
to denote their strategic-level change initiatives for defense and security policy. Within 
NATO, transformation was considered the dominant construct along which allied mili-
taries would change in order to collectively meet the challenges of the first decades of the 
21st century. The trajectories of transformation within the alliance thus become an indi-
cator for the development of alliance cohesion. On the basis of the case studies it becomes 
apparent that there are fundamental differences in the way European states and the United 
States have viewed transformation. 
In this study defense transformation is defined as the process of pursuing deliberate 
discontinuous change in a state’s military policy, the purpose of which is to increase the 
compatibility and relevance of the military instrument to a state’s foreign and security 
policy objectives, in response to major shifts in the international security environment. 
Transformation is pursued with the objective to make the military more usable for poli-
cymakers. This makes transformation an adaptive strategy to increase resource extraction; 
namely to increase the usefulness and relevance of the military in response to a changing 
international environment. It implies matching political objectives and preferences with 
the international security environment in order to reform defense policy and the military 
organization. Its effectiveness can only be assessed when the new strategic orientation 
or the newly developed military capabilities are proofed in real-life operations and the 
political decision-making procedures leading up to their use. It makes transformation a 
fundamentally political endeavor in which the measure of success corresponds to a state’s 
interpretation of how the military is most useful to its policy objectives given a changed 
international environment. 
 A specific characteristic of transformation, as opposed to less far-reaching forms 
of military change, is its discontinuous nature. In contrast to incremental modernization, 
transformation is a form of radical change which impacts the existential character of the 
armed forces. Either it produces a magnitude level of change allowing revolutionary ways 
of operating to emerge, or it leads to a wholesale revision of the overarching activities of the 
military. In that regard there are two variants of transformation: Strategic and Operational 
Effectiveness. While the former emphasizes “doing different things” with the military, the 
latter is a policy to “do the same things differently.” Both strategies have been apparent in 
the case studies researched for this study. 
The choice for these strategies has been dependent on a state’s power, its position in 
the international system and its interpretation of major shifts in external vulnerabilities or 
opportunities as filtered through its strategic culture. Neoclassical realism offers a theo-
retical basis on which to pursue the study of how transformation was interpreted and how 
it was shaped by these different variables, offering analytical value to both the system-level 
factors and a state’s strategic culture which gives context to state behavior. The case studies 
make clear that primarily strategic culture has had a strong impact on the direction of trans-
formation, particularly during a benevolent international system as it developed following 
the end of the Cold War. Neoclassical realism holds that a state will be more activist in 
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promoting a domestic agenda abroad if the security environment is more favorable to it.1104 
Yet how this pursuit of an expanding mission is undertaken is subject to factors at the level 
of the polity. On the basis of a historical analysis it becomes clear that the tenets of strategic 
culture are semi-permanent in nature. They appear consistent over different distributions 
of power, are slow to change and illustrate a polity’s understanding how it can ‘create’ secu-
rity for itself and its “modes of thought and action with respect to force.”1105 These “ways of 
war” are unique and it is their interaction with perceived shifts in the external environment 
that reveal why and how a process of discontinuous change in military policy is pursued. 
While transformation has been closely connected to developments in military technology 
in the 1990’s, including what has become known as the Revolution in Military Affairs, in 
Germany and the Netherlands, transformation was hardly technology-focused. Instead, 
for them it was a shift in the strategic orientation in response to the operational environ-
ment. The expeditionary environment meant that Western states were to operate far from 
home and it led to a more prominent role for political and domestic considerations associ-
ated with a state’s strategic culture. 
On the basis of this research it can be asserted that strategic culture – aside from the 
relative distribution of power - is a central component to explain the variation of trans-
formation strategies between the three cases. This in turn explains the roots for discon-
tent within the alliance regarding the use of the military in an expeditionary environment. 
While the international distribution of power defines the contours of a spectrum in which 
security policy takes shape, strategic culture shapes the bandwidth of each individual 
state. The policy of defense transformation is then a product of how the new international 
security environment interacts with principle tenets of a state’s strategic culture. Strategic 
cultures and international system-level variables meet when military forces are deployed 
to a particular theatre of operations and the political assumptions underlying the deci-
sion to deploy and its transformation policy are put to the test. This encounter, more than 
anything, offers the validating experience for the pursuit of transformation by the state.
The United States pursued a policy of escalating its existing strategy pursuing opera-
tional effectiveness by improving on its warfighting capabilities, while lesser powers, such 
as Germany and the Netherlands, pursued a strategy of innovation. The success with 
which the three states have engaged in this process has been dependent on the alignment 
of the state’s strategic culture with the position of the state in the international distribu-
tion of power and the nature of the security environment. When domestic-level variables 
enable – rather than inhibit - a state in a given position in a given international distribution 
of power, the extractive capacity of transformation is high. The United States experienced 
such a situation in the 1990s and early 2000s as its strategic culture, governed by US excep-
tionalism and belief in the liberating force of warfare, was met by the promise of informa-
tion technologies and a unipolar environment. When strategic culture and system-level 
1104 Rose (1998).
1105 Colin Gray, “ National Style in Strategy; The American Example,” International Security, vol. 6, 
no. 2 (1981), p.21-22..
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factors do not line up, friction between domestic and system-level variables increases 
and the extractive capacity is limited. This has been the case in Germany as it struggled to 
combine a strategic culture resistant to the use of the military and a security environment 
in which allies undertake expeditionary operations. 
From this it follows that in order to foster successful transformation and achieve a 
high level of resource extraction in which the process of military change results in a mili-
tary instrument in line with the political ambition, the state’s response to the security 
environment must be aligned with its strategic culture. In other words, if a program of 
military change is pursued that runs contrary to a state’s strategic culture, the process will 
be tedious at best or impossible at all. The alignment of strategic cultures and system-level 
variables is critical for the effective pursuit of transformation.
29.1 Differences in Transformation Strategies
Transformation was pursued differently by the United States, the Netherlands and 
Germany as a result of different positions in the international system and a variance in 
strategic culture. The following distinctions can be identified. First of all, transforma-
tion started in the United States as a strategy of operational effectiveness transformation 
based around the Revolution in Military Affairs whereas the two European countries 
both pursued strategic transformation to shift their militaries towards an expeditionary 
posture. The United States embarked on improving its ability to perform high-intensity 
combat operations, principally conventional warfare, since the Information Age was 
believed to enable a magnitude increase in combat effectiveness. In addition, its overall 
strategic objective was to prevent the rise of a peer competitor and to sustain an interna-
tional system based on unipolarity. It meant improving its ability to project power globally 
and formulate solutions to area-denial and anti-access threats. It turned US transforma-
tion into primarily a military-technological and military-operational endeavor with a view 
to sustaining US military dominance and primacy. For the Netherlands transformation 
was not pursued for military dominance or to improve on existing modes of operation. 
Instead it was a process to reorient the military to undertake expeditionary operations in 
order to contribute to stability projection. It was informed by the benevolent security envi-
ronment which offered an opportunity to expand the international rule of law, support 
human rights and promote stability. This transformation was strategic since it implied that 
the military would be refocused to actively undertake expeditionary operations, meaning 
a wholesale reassessment of what the military was for. To Germany, transformation was 
similarly strategic in nature. It was driven by the notion of alliance solidarity, which trig-
gered participation in crisis-management operations abroad. However, given the histor-
ical and cultural constraints on the German polity and its military, the process of German 
transformation was slow. 
Underlying these differences in transformation was a fundamentally different way in 
which the three states identified and interpreted the changing nature of the security envi-
ronment. All three states accorded importance to the changing international distribution 
of power following the end of the Cold War. However, to the United States it represented 
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an opportunity to extend its influence. This was reinforced by the advent of the Informa-
tion Age originating from US business and innovation in the field of IT. The United States 
saw the advent of an Information Age as a revolutionary event. The National Defense 
Panel report in 1997 concluded that “if we do not lead the technological revolution we 
will be vulnerable to it.”1106 Network-centric warfare and substituting mass for information 
were viewed as a game-changer and a source of strategic power, just as the nuclear weapon 
had been in the 1940’s. A benevolent security environment and a first-mover advantage to 
shift to the Information Age produced a dynamic to expand a domestic agenda abroad and 
sustain its dominance, amongst others by undertaking interventions to promote non-vital 
interests, and ultimately to actively enforce unipolarity through a doctrine of prevention.
Interestingly, the attacks of September 11 were not the key milestone to reshape US 
transformation as the security environment changed. Doctrine such as the Joint Swiftness 
Goals formulated in 2003 underlined that even subsequent to the terrorist attacks high-
intensity combat operations with the possibility of regime change remained central to 
Washington’s defense outlook. Instead it was the tenacity of the insurgency and the difficul-
ties associated with irregular warfare that did. The United States had remained convinced 
that it could defeat any regime, yet by 2004 it had to adapt to counter insurgencies. Notably, 
this mainly concerned the US Army and Marine Corps. The Navy and Air Force retained a 
focus on operational effectiveness transformation in their change initiatives. As the insur-
gency in Iraq and Afghanistan picked up steam and it became clear that, after 9/11, leaving 
a weak state at risk of being preyed upon by an international terrorist movement was unac-
ceptable, a strategic transformation was initiated by the United States. A shift in the threat 
environment translated into an urgency to deal with irregular warfare. It meant that rather 
than be focused on avoiding the rise of a peer competitor and being able to destroy it, the 
US military should also accord strategic weight to successfully pursuing irregular warfare. 
But this only concerned the Army and Marine Corps.
In the Netherlands and Germany, the Information Age was not perceived as the 
strategic opportunity the United States’ government held it to be. Instead, strategic trans-
formation was triggered by the end of the Cold War and gave rise to a re-evaluation of 
the nature of defense policy. It spawned new Defense White Papers that accorded greater 
attention to crisis management operations and expeditionary capabilities and a move away 
from territorial defense. The concept of security was broadened. To The Hague, the over-
arching intent was to strengthen the international rule of law and so doing to promote 
its own position as a credible and relevant ally. It was a policy of bandwagoning with the 
major ally, pursuing political relevance through the use of the military as well as damp-
ening unilateral tendencies of major powers through soft-balancing and promoting the 
international rule of law. It meant that the Netherlands also partook in interventions to 
promote Western values. To Germany, the end of the Cold War implied a sigh of relief 
however it challenged the foundations of German security policy. Along with the changes 
proposed in NATO’s alliance strategic concept, Germany produced the policy documents 
1106 Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st 
Century, December 1997, p. 8.
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that embraced expeditionary operations however it would be due to domestic constraints 
that these could only tediously be put into practice. 
Furthermore the process of European integration had altered the security dynamic 
in the European region. After the end of the Cold War this picked up speed and it predis-
posed European states to promote the tenets of European integration – namely economic 
relations and institution-building – as a key element in their broader security agenda. In 
foreign policy it translated into a policy of stability projection.
To the Netherlands, the system-level drivers that impacted transformation after the 
initial shift towards expeditionary operations were the policies of the United States and the 
increasing challenges of expeditionary operations. A guiding principle of Dutch security 
policy is soft-balancing by supporting the international rule of law. However, it led to diffi-
culties for Dutch transformation towards expeditionary crisis-management operations 
as the security environment changed. During the first half of the 1990’s the benevolent 
security environment allowed the Netherlands to undertake deployments that were rela-
tively risk-free. It even led to domestic calls to reorient away from reliance on the trans-
atlantic partnership and towards the European continent instead. However, as a result of 
continuing instability in the Balkans, the Netherlands became enmeshed in challenging 
security issues which European states were unable to resolve leading to a reaffirmation of 
the relationship with the United States. It gave renewed support to NATO. Solidarity with 
the United States and the Alliance strengthened the Dutch resolve to partake in Operation 
Allied Force. The Netherlands similarly deployed forces to Afghanistan following the fall 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan and to Iraq subsequent to the removal of Saddam Hussein. 
In the wake of US initiated interventions the Netherlands has stood as a loyal ally. However, 
as operations became more challenging it tested the limits of Dutch political appetite for 
high-intensity operations and with it Dutch transformation. Strategic transformation in 
the Netherlands rested not only on the development of capabilities but also on the polit-
ical willingness to deploy forces. The Uruzgan mission has brought these limits to bear as 
the Netherlands struggled to find the political and military capability to continue in that 
testing environment. 
To Germany, following the end of the Cold War the missions that NATO decided to 
undertake shaped its trajectory of transformation. Similar to the Netherlands, the strategic 
effectiveness of transformation was shaped by its ability to develop expeditionary capabili-
ties as well as to deploy these capabilities in real missions. Yet more so than the Nether-
lands, Germany has found it difficult to cope with NATO’s expeditionary ambitions, only 
hesitantly contributing and foregoing participation altogether in the most challenging 
elements of complex operations the alliance has been involved in. 
Not only did the three states pursue different transformation strategies, they also 
identified different incentives from the international environment to pursue transforma-
tion. The primary differences are between the United States, which as a great power had an 
interest in perpetuating a unipolar system and saw the rise of the Information Age as its 
enabler, and the smaller powers Germany and the Netherlands which pursued a defensive 
realist strategy, switching between bandwagoning and soft-balancing, and were condi-
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tioned by the process of European integration. Yet there were ample differences between 
Germany and the Netherlands as well. Central was The Hague’s willingness, and Berlin’s 
reluctance, to partake in high-intensity operations. However, the system-level factors 
offer little context to understand the actual trajectory of transformation beyond its broad 
contours. Nor do they explain why different system-level factors were identified by the 
three states that shaped the overall trajectory of the transformation strategies.
29.2 Differences in Strategic Cultures
According to neoclassical realism, the ability to extract resources for the polity is based 
upon the interaction between system- and domestic-level factors; between the security 
environment and how the state filters these events. Strategic cultures are a defining variable 
to understand transformation. Strategic culture frames a state’s sensitivity to particular 
system-level events, while at the same time it gives shape to the execution of a transforma-
tion strategy within the outlines set by the international distribution of power. Strategic 
cultures are critical for understanding the justification framework of liberal democracies 
undertaking military operations in an expeditionary environment. These justification 
regimes act as paradigms, or lenses, through which the use of the military is perceived. It 
also informs capability or operational decisions since strategic cultures preordain specific 
modes of military conduct. 
US strategic culture is defined by a widespread and long-standing political tradition of 
exceptionalism, which disposes it to a natural tendency for pursuing a strategic Sonderweg 
and a tendency towards unilateralism. The underlying motive for its security policy is to 
achieve a state of absolute security. This tendency is a direct result of the founding values 
of the American Revolution. It translates either to isolationism or a liberal-interventionist 
disposition to pursue the spread of Freedom and democracy as foreign policy objectives. 
This corresponds to a belief in the democratic peace theorem and a proliferation of its 
values - which are held to be universally applicable - abroad. This tradition has become a 
justification framework for waging wars, and in its public discourse the United States culti-
vates this liberating tradition as a central objective of, and justification for, its security policy. 
The American Creed and its underlying Lockean philosophy produce an agency-focused 
perspective to security policy in which threats are identified in the form of specific actors. 
Its corollary is that threats may be resolved when these actors are removed or killed. In 
terms of military strategy it sustains a tendency to emphasize decapitation - for instance as 
exemplified at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom or continued support for unmanned 
drone strikes – pushing for decisive victories and to see the waging of war as an at times 
acceptable form of policy. In its strategic culture it leads to an emphasis on technology 
and a preference for high-intensity operations. Technology is developed to make the US 
military quicker and more lethal, or otherwise shielding it from security threats that may 
impede its strategic reach. For operational effectiveness transformation, it corresponded to 
an emphasis on rapid, decisive operations and precision technologies.  
The strategic culture of the Netherlands is vastly different. Cultured by a maritime 
tradition and geopolitically surrounded by major European powers, the Netherlands 
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has emphasized the international rule of law out of strategic necessity. This has evolved 
into being an end in itself. The Netherlands cultivates an image as a bridge-builder based 
on stability projection. The strategic objective of transformation in the Netherlands is to 
increase the political position of The Hague within transatlantic and international frame-
works. It informs a policy to “be relevant,” as former Minister Kamp said, and increase 
Dutch political relevance within the NATO Alliance, particularly vis-à-vis the United 
States, and to contribute to strengthening the international rule of law through stability 
projection. Dutch strategic culture influenced its policy of strategic transformation by 
using the premise of stability projection – as opposed to power projection - as a means 
to increase its international standing and satisfy its international ambition in line with an 
approach to security issues that emphasized the role of structures and institutions. Dutch 
political culture is popularly described in terms of a tension between moralism and 
commercial interests, between “the priest and the merchant”. However, this is too quaint 
when considering Dutch transformation policy. Instead, its strategic culture rests on a 
complex two-pronged approach to pursue relevance and promote the international order 
at the same time; producing a tension between soft balancing and bandwagoning, and 
between an Atlanticist and a European approach. 
Its structure-focused approach leads it to favor managing instability rather than 
resolving specific threats. It produces policies that promote dealing with ‘root causes’ or 
building governance structures rather than “fighting and winning the nation’s wars.” The 
Dutch emphasis on stability has also led it to support the democratic peace theorem, but 
with less military verve than the United States; international stability is more secure if 
pluralist democracies proliferate. The difference with the American perspective is that it 
denounces the unilateral use of force in order to promote democracy due to the inherent 
instability that militarily imposing a political model on others creates. Instead it empha-
sizes shaping democratic societies over the long-haul through institution building, trade 
relations, multilateral engagement and strengthening international regulatory institutions. 
It explains the prominent position development aid has claimed in Dutch foreign policy 
while fostering resistance, both in rhetoric and policy, to ‘waging war.’
The other dimension is that the Netherlands has positioned itself as a ‘bridge-builder’ 
and a loyal ally. Over the past century, this posture has remained consistent. The peace-
keeping operation in Albania in 1913, the contribution to the Korean War and later the 
deployment to Southern Afghanistan all reflected elements of this reasoning. While the 
Netherlands did not support the Iraq War militarily, it offered political support for the 
invasion and immediately promised assistance in the stabilization phase. The Hague 
pursues a policy of bandwagoning with Washington in an attempt to be a relevant ally. The 
Netherlands sees in relevant alliance relations a direct promotion of its security, a vehicle 
to promote its position internally within the alliance as well as internationally, and a way to 
prevent the United States from pursuing unilateral policies. 
The two constituent elements make Dutch security policy appear somewhat schizo-
phrenic. On the one hand support for the international rule of law is a means to decrease 
the influence of the great powers, while supporting the United States is meant to increase 
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its influence in the transatlantic security framework. The tension between these two objec-
tives is a core element of Dutch security policy and forms a domestic constraint on the 
country’s extractive capacity. This became apparent as the Netherlands struggled to align 
its support for the United States with a policy based on stability projection. The mission 
in Uruzgan suffered from this tension, as politicians on the one hand were committed to 
solidarity while others argued to stop an operation that was a combat operation more than 
a reconstruction mission.
German strategic culture is defined by its experience following the end of the Second 
World War, which conditioned it to denounce the use of force in its international rela-
tions. It led Germany to cultivate a status as Zivilmacht, or civil power. Constitutional 
constraints were imposed on the use of the military and its strategic culture was informed 
by the process of European integration. The military obtained a strong social profile, 
with conscription playing a necessary role to keep the military embedded in society, and 
permitting draftees to fulfill social services. Nevertheless Germany demonstrated strong 
support for the NATO alliance given the alliance’s history as Germany’s primary security 
guarantor. Its strategic culture thereby rests on two pillars; that of the Zivilmacht and the 
pursuit of alliance solidarity. Until the advent of the expeditionary era these two tenets 
could be satisfactorily fulfilled together, as defense policy was primarily based on territo-
rial defense and alliance solidarity could be maintained through a deterrent posture while 
nourishing its Zivilmacht status. Following the end of the Cold War, this became more 
difficult since sustaining solidarity to NATO now implied actually using the military, and 
doing so in operations outside German borders. This had explicitly been prohibited in the 
German Basic Law. Besides the necessity of alliance solidarity, the military was viewed as 
either a superfluous instrument under the concept of nie wieder Krieg or as an instru-
ment that could be used to prevent the world from reliving the horrors of Nazi Germany. 
It gave rise to policy argumentation based on nie wieder Auschwitz requiring Germany 
to actively strengthen the international rule of law. As Germany slowly embarked on expe-
ditionary operations, its strategic culture created an explicit focus on structures. Germany 
supported the deployment of military capabilities only within an overarching multilateral 
setting, in which the promotion of stability and the international rule of law stood central. 
In addition, to avoid the appearance of warfare, or Angriffskrieg, Germany became a 
strong supporter of embedding the use of the military in a broader range of state instru-
ments and to see the military as but one part of a potential solution to security threats, and 
the most deplorable at best. This became known as Vernetzte Sicherheit.
The question remains, are strategic cultures susceptible to change? Germany offers a 
clear example of the affirmative. Transitions in the security environment may change the 
domestic character of the state. Following the end of the Second World War, the system-
level distribution of power shifted and changed the domestic-level composition of the 
German state. It led to a shock to German national identity and a transformation in its 
interpretation of the use of the military. In between these shocks however, strategic culture 
is not static and politicians have a role to lead it, rather than to be led by it. An example 
is the German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg who in 2010 was edging 
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Germany’s strategic culture in a direction where it became accepted that the nation was 
engaged in battle in Afghanistan. This does not imply that politicians can simply extend 
the bandwidth of strategic culture at will, as this risks overextension with the potential for 
a backlash, however it does yield an opportunity for politicians to play a role as a strategic 
cultural entrepreneur rather than wait for events to take over. Zu Guttenberg’s resignation 
in 2011 also demonstrates how fragile such momentum for change is.
29.3 Products of Transformation
When Europeans and Americans discuss defense transformation, they mean decisively 
different things. The interplay between strategic culture and the international distribution 
of power producing the outcome of transformation is discussed below.
The United States
In the United States throughout the 1990’s the operational effectiveness argument for 
transformation prevailed. It rested on the belief that the advent of the Information Age 
amounted to a major shift in external opportunity that if harnessed could extend US stra-
tegic primacy. Richard Kugler at the National Defense University defined the operational 
effectiveness aim of US transformation in 2006 as getting “greater strategic mileage out of 
force structure and to stretch military resources to maximum operational effect.”1107 The 
introduction of information technologies could make the military a more usable instru-
ment, reducing the costs of intervention, requiring fewer people to achieve greater effect 
at lower cost in capital and blood. It promised to produce discontinuous change in the 
American way of warfare as it rested on new network-centric models that allowed serious 
reductions in the force required, revolutionary improvements in the speed, precision, and 
lethality of conventional operations and at lower risk to friendly forces. It led to a process 
I have termed SOF-ing, or making the military stealthy, surgical, quick and precise, similar 
to Special Operations Forces. It yielded the promise that political objectives could be 
achieved at relative ease as the US would have the ability to deploy an order-of-magnitude 
more capable military force to any crisis or conflict. It produced a focus on rapid, decisive 
operations. The lessons of the Vietnam War, but also Desert Storm, held that the United 
States had a comparative advantage in fighting wars – rather than messy complex emer-
gencies - and that it should expand that capability in which the US had an advantage, not 
in the least because these operations were also considered the primary source of strategic 
competition. Precision, stealth and network-centrism made it possible that wars would be 
waged with close-to-zero friendly casualties thereby satisfying liberal political concerns. 
By early 2006 Admiral Cebrowski said transformation would make the military not only 
more effective but also, more humane. The Revolution in Military Affairs “had great moral 
seductiveness,” promising “to make it easier to protect the innocent.”1108 Resource extraction 
1107 Richard Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs (Washington DC: Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy, 2006), p. 292.
1108 William A. Arkin, “Spiraling Ahead,” Armed Forces Journal, no. 143 (February 2006), p. 39-42.
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would be increased as the substitution of mass for information through the introduction 
of net-centric principles and guided munitions implied that the military footprint could 
be reduced. Operations could be performed quicker and with less risk to friendly forces. 
Operational effectiveness transformation ensured that political support for a mission 
would thus be easier to attain. In sum transformation “promised war a brand-new lease on 
life.”1109 This vision was substantiated by an ever decreasing amount of US casualties since 
the Second World War culminating in Operation Allied Force, a military confrontation in 
which no friendly forces were killed. Operation Iraqi Freedom further proved the ability 
of the United States’ land forces to defeat a medium power within several weeks and with 
limited casualties. This overall increase in efficiency renders US politicians less reluctant to 
use force, making it a tool of US foreign policy policymakers more often turned to. It was 
only a small step to reason from this vision of unchallenged military power to the political 
pursuit of a “new world order.” The political implication of operational effectiveness trans-
formation was that the ideals of the American Revolution could be further advanced. It 
strengthened the conviction that societies could be molded to US interests with little cost 
to US society, and promoted the view of the United States as a global system administrator. 
Democracy promotion, possibly by using force and regime change, became a key objective 
of US foreign policy, critically enabled by the promise of a vastly superior military.1110 The 
process of operational effectiveness transformation, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
the liberal-interventionist agenda’s of Presidents Clinton and Bush are thereby fundamen-
tally connected.
More than the attacks of September 11, the Iraq War was a key moment in US trans-
formation. In political-strategic and military-strategic terms, the Iraq War signaled the 
apotheosis of the US operational effectiveness agenda. The ‘shock and awe’ philosophy 
central to planning for the Iraq war was based on the idea that by demonstrating over-
whelming force the United States could startle the adversary into defeat. It was the pinnacle 
of a rapid, decisive operation. Yet, because of the superiority the United States demon-
strated in conventional operations during the Iraq War, it also triggered balancing reac-
tions which appeared only after President George W. Bush claimed on the USS Lincoln 
that the mission had been accomplished. Irregular warfare necessitated a strategic trans-
formation to adopt counterinsurgency skills and capabilities. Irregular warfare in Iraq 
and Afghanistan put pressure on the Pentagon leadership to pursue strategic transforma-
tion, reorienting the Army and Marine Corps to a mission of sustained stability opera-
tions. This proved difficult as a result of institutional, financial and political constraints 
reflecting a strategic culture that favored high-intensity operations of short duration rather 
than lengthy deployments manning checkpoints. It led to reassessing the US approach to 
irregular warfare along US strategic cultural contours. A form of SOF-ing was pursued that 
emphasized training local forces while acting as a high-lethality, high-speed, surgical force 
multiplier for counter-terrorist missions. Whether in operational effectiveness or its brief 
1109 Bacevich (2005), p. 166.
1110 On the historic background of US democracy promotion see Monten (2005).
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experience with strategic transformation, the United States retains a focus on the combat-
element in warfare and strives to improve it further.
Neoclassical realism holds that the more power a state believes it has, the stronger 
it will promote its domestic agenda abroad. It leads to the conclusion that given Ameri-
ca’s great power status and the strategic pause following the end of the Cold War, it was 
substantially influenced by its strategic culture and pursued the promotion of its founding 
values. Whereas smaller powers, including the Netherlands and Germany, articulated the 
pursuit of their domestic agendas less strongly and are guided more by realist consider-
ations pertaining to their position in the international system. The reason is simply that 
given less perceived power, a state has less incentive to promote its foreign policy agenda 
abroad. In short, it demonstrates that the United States has been more idealist in its secu-
rity policy than European states. This was substantiated by the US emphasis on democracy 
promotion and other Wilsonian tendencies throughout the late 1990’s and early 2000’s.
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands transformation led to the development of high-end, highly visible expe-
ditionary capabilities to perform crisis-management and stability missions. It was a policy 
based on being a member of the “A-team,” a select group of highly capable expeditionary 
Western militaries, but with the intent to pursue expeditionary operations in the name 
of promoting the international rule of law. An example is offered by the development of 
the Air Maneuver Brigade, a force package developed in the early nineties to allow the 
Netherlands to partake in high-end expeditionary missions. But it was also reflected in the 
discussion over procuring the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which would provide a high-end 
platform at the visible front of the Alliance, and US, capability efforts. By providing limited 
but high-end capabilities the Netherlands would increase its political credit among allies 
and allow The Hague to ‘sit at the table’ among the major players. Investing in high-end 
capabilities attests to solidarity with its major allies, especially the US. And cultivating the 
transatlantic relationship sustains fundamental security guarantees, but also decreases the 
political risk that the Netherlands be marginalized by the three major European powers in 
collective security affairs. Given the limited size of the Netherlands’ military, participating 
in a military mission primarily had indirect benefits. Respected by the United States, it 
gives the Netherlands credit within NATO and enhances its image as a bridge-builder. The 
Netherlands emulated US network-centric concepts as necessary instruments to develop 
a broad expeditionary military with limited resources and to maintain interoperability 
with the US.1111 By focusing on high-end capabilities within a limited defense budget the 
Netherlands however, constrains its own strategic freedom of action albeit within the 
contours of its strategic culture. It creates a default inclination to operate in a multinational 
setting. This however dovetails with its political preference for multilateralism to increase 
the legitimacy of a military operation, reducing the risk of international instability asso-
1111 Ministerie van Defensie, Nieuw Evenwicht, Nieuwe Ontwikkelingen: Naar een 
toekomstbestendige krijgsmacht. Actualisering van de Prinsjesdagbrief, HDAB2006018085,  
June 2, 2006.
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ciated with unilateral operations. In fact, it is this latter aspect that is noted as a central 
political condition for any operation in the Toetsingskader. The development of capabili-
ties that could also be used for high-intensity missions stood on a tense footing with that 
other element of Dutch strategic culture, an approach based on stability projection which 
focused on the role of structures and institutions in its security policy. While the experi-
ences in Srebrenica had convinced the Dutch polity that escalation dominance was a key 
military necessity, using these capabilities in the operational environment led to friction as 
it tested the limits of where stability projection ends and warfighting begins. The intended 
procurement of tactical tomahawk cruise missiles, but also the increasingly challenging 
mission in Uruzgan brought these tensions to bear. 
For the Netherlands stability projection is a derivative of promoting an international 
order. Since the 1990s this has evolved from post-conflict crisis management to devel-
oping an integrated approach for reconstruction and stabilization activities in war-torn 
territories. The Dutch structure-focused approach has both system- and domestic-level 
drivers. It is based on its heritage as cradle of international maritime law as well as the 
realist notion that being a smaller power which can build bridges between Atlanticism 
and a European approach benefits its reputation internationally. This is seen as a source of 
international influence, which can be used to further its liberal domestic agenda including 
the international rule of law and human rights. While originating as a realist response to 
the security environment, support for international institutions and playing an active role 
in stability promotion became a way for the Netherlands to increase its power and has 
become engrained in its strategic culture. As Joris Voorhoeve asserted, “A small power with 
vitality can find a respectful role and constructive vocation in the world arena by following 
mundialist ideals.”1112 Van Vollenhoven said something similar in the early years of the 20th 
century; the Netherlands could both promote itself, its security agenda, as well as limit the 
powers of larger regional powers by promoting an international security framework. This 
Dutch vocation, to claim a role at the vanguard of promoting the international rule of law, 
has been consistent in justifying its use and development of the military throughout the 
20th century. 
The focus on structures and an emphasis on stability have nourished a political real-
ization that societies are not easily shaped by outside force. This has fostered a hesitant 
approach to the use of the military and led to the deployment of the military within a 
broader framework of instruments. It has also dampened the call for developing high-
intensity capabilities. This mindset has proved helpful in developing a comprehensive 
approach in contemporary complex operations, which some Dutch policymakers have 
claimed to be a “Dutch Approach.” The near-parity in budgets between the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and Defense also creates a natural inclination towards cooperation. 
Compared to the United States where the Defense Department receives nearly 18 times 
1112 Voorhoeve (1979), p. 247.
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more funding, it is not surprising that effective interagency has been difficult in Washing-
ton.1113
Germany
The strategic objective of German transformation is to develop expeditionary capabilities 
for peacekeeping and stability operations in a multinational framework and contribute to 
nie wieder Auschwitz while sustaining Alliance solidarity. It represents a policy of stra-
tegic transformation, shifting away from a posture based on territorial defense. While this 
is the objective, Germany has the lowest extractive capacity of the three states considered 
in this research as a result of the friction between its strategic culture and NATO’s shift 
to expeditionary operations. The strong constraints on German extractive capacity have 
stifled substantial strategic debate in Germany. This is reflected in the limited size of the 
case study in this research. 
Similar to the Netherlands, Germany has a structure-focused philosophy where the 
use of the military is considered but one element within a broader framework, a notion 
substantiated by the 2006 White Paper concept of Vernetzte Sicherheit. As a medium 
power it has a realist interest in promoting international institutions, the international 
rule of law and institution building. Its inclination towards crisis-management capabili-
ties is informed by realist considerations and support for the Alliance. Germany’s stra-
tegic culture however is a decisive domestic constraint on the use of the military abroad. A 
‘culture of defeat’ following two World Wars that left Germany destroyed has conditioned 
Germany as a Zivilmacht. Constitutionally, Germany is bound to a pacifist heritage and 
the extractive capacity of the state advances only in response to cumbersome and slow 
constitutional court rulings, parliamentary debates or haphazard individual political lead-
ership. This has meant that Germany is intrinsically hesitant to use military force in pursuit 
of its foreign policy goals. While it can deploy military forces within a UN framework for 
peacekeeping purposes, it remains impossible to send German forces to an area where 
they may have to operate offensively. As a senior official at the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs said, Operation Amber Fox in Macedonia is the archetype of operations that the 
German public and parliament wish to pursue: close to home, in a relatively risk-free envi-
ronment but in obvious proximity to Germany, engaging in reconstruction activities with 
support from the local population. 
American and Dutch officials criticized Germany in late 2007 regarding German 
unwillingness to send forces to Southern Afghanistan. The so-called national caveats that 
the German government had imposed, mandating its forces to only operate in the rela-
tively peaceful North of the country, were a reflection of a pacifist strategic culture. While 
the Netherlands complained from the perspective of NATO solidarity, the United States 
1113 Within this context neither is it surprising that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates – intent on 
improving US capabilities for operations in Afghanistan - has requested more funds for the 
Department of State. Donna Miles, “Gates urges more emphasis, funding for all aspects of 
national power,” American Foreign Press Service, November 26, 2007, Washington DC. http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48226.
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did so from its purview that military forces must and should be at times used robustly. 
Germany instead was torn between considerations of alliance solidarity and domestic ill-
preparedness to deploy troops for offensive operations. 
However, the extractive capacity of Germany is slowly increasing as a timid strategic 
awakening takes place. To its commendation, at the time of writing the German govern-
ment has taken an active approach to mediate between its strategic cultural constraints and 
the requests of the alliance including the requirements of the security environment. It has 
done so by making the case that an interest-based assessment of the security environment 
requires German military commitments. This strategic awakening occurs at a slow pace 
and steps of improvement can be identified only in the marginal shifts in public discourse 
as German politicians accustom the German public to the discourse of warfare when 
describing the mission in Afghanistan. The nature of these adaptations demonstrates the 
difficult and highly political nature of German transformation. As the security environ-
ment continues to lead to expeditionary operations, this friction will persist. 
29.4 Different Expectations in an Expeditionary 
environment
Strategic cultures explicitly come to the fore in the event of expeditionary operations, since 
it forces states to individually decide why and how to use the military abroad. Expedi-
tionary operations make the politics of using the military much more poignant than terri-
torial defense. In the current security environment, which has primarily led Western states 
to focus on expeditionary operations, this political dimension has become all the more 
important. In Germany and the Netherlands, politics has explicitly intervened in mili-
tary operations. It has led to preferring specific terminology to describe a mission which 
thereby ties a state to specific objectives. Such is the case with euphemistically calling mili-
tary interventions ‘reconstruction missions’. It leads to prohibitions on the use of specific 
capabilities and it creates a domestic political struggle to avoid the impression that the 
mission is contrarian to its strategic culture. In fact, given the variance in transformation 
strategies described above, one could argue that the expeditionary environment is the root 
cause for the lack of cohesion with the transatlantic alliance as it has brought these differ-
ences in strategic culture explicitly to the fore. 
An insightful way to capture the differences in strategic culture towards expedi-
tionary operations is through the differences in constitutional jurisdiction over the use of 
the military. The US Constitution states explicitly that “the President shall be Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”1114 The document does not offer 
specific constraints on the use of the military. The Dutch constitution makes explicit that 
the Kingdom has a military, amongst others, “for the purpose of upholding and promoting 
the international rule of law.”1115 This offers a primary responsibility to undertake expedi-
1114 The United States Constitution, Article II, section 2. .http://www.usconstitution.net/const.
html.
1115 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Article 97. http://www.st-ab.nl/wetgrondwet.
htm.
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tionary operations, albeit within the context of international stability. The German Basic 
Law however explicitly forbids undertaking actions in preparation of an offensive war.1116 
This makes the German constitutional framework the most restrictive as it fuels a contin-
uous debate over whether or not an expeditionary operation, or the capabilities involved, 
have an offensive dimension. This has also led political parties to argue before the Consti-
tutional court that a particular deployment of German military forces is unlawful, thereby 
hampering the extractive capacity of the state and the responsiveness of the government.
The rhetoric of transformation is also decidedly different. As an anecdotal example 
and a straightforward test, the frequency with which words such as “liberty,” “freedom” 
and “stability” appear in Dutch and American defense white papers can be compared. This 
yields a broad, textual metric of the dominant concepts which are central to policy. In the 
2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review, “freedom” or one of its derivatives was mentioned 
twenty-eight times. In the Dutch 2007 White Paper Wereldwijd Dienstbaar, the term was 
used twice. In the German 2006 Defense White Paper “freedom” was mentioned eleven 
times. When considering the different sizes of the papers, the weighted numbers become 
28 (US), 19 (Germany) and 4.9 (Netherlands). By contrast, the weighted figures for 
“stability” are 23 for the United States, 19.6 for the Netherlands and 66 for Germany. While 
a soft measure at best, it illustrates the salience of these concepts in the leading defense 
documents.
To justify interventions Western states promote grand ideas of human progress. 
Whether it is the international rule of law, universal peace, the promotion of democracy or 
the advent of Freedom, ‘grand ideas’ to improve the human condition mobilize domestic 
support for military operations abroad. For the United States democracy and freedom are 
the dominant constructs, for the Netherlands stability and the international rule of law, for 
Germany an appeal to international stability and nie wieder Auschwitz. Present-day expe-
ditionary operations have an explicit moral undertone. The desire to change and shape 
foreign societies, by force if necessary, is not new. Rather it is a Western liberal concept 
vested in Christianity, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. It appeared as the mission 
civilisatrice, a white man’s burden or the ethische politiek throughout the colonial age 
and is profoundly paternalistic.1117 The philosopher John Gray asserts that belief in the 
universal applicability of particular ideas to advance human society serving as the moral 
basis of interventionism is fundamentally Western.1118 Prevalent within Western societies 
1116 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Article 26, May 23, 1949. http://www.
bundestag.de/dokumente/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg.html.
1117 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 65.
1118 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic religion and the Death of Utopia (New York: Farrar, Strauss 
& Giroux, 2007). Gray points out that when other non-Western cultures have used terror or 
violence to advance their cause, they have done so only after Western ideas have fused with 
indigenous beliefs or religions. Jihadi terrorism, Gray suggests, cannot be explained without 
understanding its ideological basis, which is heavily influenced by Trotskyite reasoning. 
In fact, Gray asserts that Islam shares with Christianity certain millenarian beliefs and is 
therefore part of the Western philosophical tradition. “Only Christianity and Islam have 
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is the belief that liberal democracy, is not only the best political system but also exportable. 
It is underwritten by the broad support for the democratic peace theorem. One way to 
export it is with assistance of the military, as the United States has attempted to do unilat-
erally but European states have pursued as well through the ‘comprehensive approach.’ In 
this regard, the use of the military is viewed as a benign force, in line with Augustinean 
‘just war’ philosophy.1119 This produces a paradox of liberal interventionism: what drives 
Western states to intervene in other societies is often not congruent with the way the inter-
vention is performed. The inverse of this statement is that the values that drive the US or 
other Western states to intervene similarly hamper its success. The problem lies with the 
high expectations generated by justifying an intervention on such Grand Ideas. No liberal 
democracy wages wars, or deploys the military, without appealing to higher values to gain 
public support. But the values that are appealed to by each state are a reflection of a stra-
tegic culture of how a polity accepts the use of force in an expeditionary operation. It has 
implied that persistently these constructs are referred to, and reaffirmed by a polity. This 
makes looking at justification regimes informative. Strategic cultures create a bandwidth, 
which describes how the military can and cannot be used. This leads to expectations that 
do not necessarily correspond to the operational reality or the justification frameworks of 
other allies or partners in the field. Friction then arises when the operational reality does 
not correspond to the expectations generated by the appeal to strategic cultural constructs, 
both among the allies, as well as within the polities. 
In the context of coalition operations, strategic cultures produce dissenting views 
among allies over the purpose and objective of (their contribution to) the military opera-
tion. The strategic cultures resonate the domestic justification regime rather than the 
requirements of the operational reality. These different interpretations of a common 
mission hurt NATO solidarity. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan is a case in point. 
According to Germany, one of the reasons for installing national caveats was because in 
those areas where German forces were not deployed, an Angriffskrieg was being fought. 
It led Germany only to deploy to those locations where it could convincingly argue that 
the nature of the mission was stabilization and training. To the United States, ISAF had a 
strong counterterrorist dimension requiring large-scale military offensives and domesti-
cally the United States spoke of the mission as a war. To the Netherlands, ISAF was a stabi-
lization mission and in Parliament the case was made that Dutch participation was critical 
to ensure that a Dutch presence implied a qualitatively different approach than the US 
mode of operating. Under the influence of divergent strategic cultures different interpreta-
tions of the same mission were put forward. These different understandings, even if they 
are for domestic consumption only, impacted capability decisions. It influenced domestic 
engendered movements that are committed to the systematic use of force to achieve universal 
goals.” (p.71).
1119 Saint Augustine said: Apud veros dei cultures, eciam ipsam belli patrati sunt, que non 
cupiditate aut crudelitate, sed pacis studio geruntur, ut mali coherceantur et boni subleventur. 
[“True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of 
aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and 
of uplifting the good.”] Augustine, De Verbis Domini et est 23, 4, 1 quid.
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expectations of the mission, and acted as a constraint on the alliance dynamic. Germany 
for instance could not offer logistical transport in Southern Afghanistan, as it would 
lead it to aid an Angriffskrieg. European allies criticized the United States for an overtly 
kinetic approach which was in line with US perspectives on warfare, pleading instead for a 
more ‘European’ approach built around stabilization and reconstruction. European states 
criticized the United States for focusing too extensively on getting the bad guys and not 
investing in building local relationships, while the United States criticized Europeans for 
not being sufficiently willing to combat the Taliban and share the risk of fighting. Symp-
tomatic is that the American response to irregular warfare has been to focus on Special 
Operations Forces acting as a force multiplier, while the Dutch response to the challenges 
in Afghanistan has been to develop a comprehensive approach. 
As individual strategic cultures demonstrate, the way in which, and the purposes for 
which, the military instrument is used differs. In coalition operations this leads to friction 
inside an alliance. This is the key problem for the future of NATO’s expeditionary opera-
tions. 
29.5 Two Philosophical Models of Progress
What then are we to draw from these case studies? First and foremost, the interplay 
between strategic cultures and shifts at the level of the security environment enhance or 
incapacitate a state to pursue transformation. Assessments of the international security 
environment may point in a particular direction however the constraints offered by stra-
tegic cultures have the final say over whether and how a state will adapt to these changes. 
In addition, strategic cultures enable a state to extract military resources and provide the 
context for the justification regime to garner political support for expeditionary missions. 
However, at the same time they form constraints. The United States, for right or wrong, 
is caught in a strategic cultural paradigm in which warfare is viewed as a series of high-
intensity combat sequences. Just as Germany is confined in a pacifist paradigm. One of the 
most poignant examples of the influence of strategic culture was the US attempt at strategic 
transformation from 2005 onwards. The balancing reaction to US unipolarity through 
irregular warfare was a logical outcome of its conventional superiority. The United States 
however failed to anticipate the strategic nature of the challenge posed by the insurgency 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. When it finally did, it had difficulty to adapt to it because irregular 
warfare ran counter to its strategic cultural anticipation of what the military should focus 
on and what ‘warfare’ was. In fact, for a long time irregular operations had been consid-
ered ‘military operations other than war’. By contrast, in the Netherlands and Germany 
the paradigm is the reverse and there is resistance to the notion of ‘war’ choosing to term 
deployments, policing missions or stability operations instead. It risks domestic friction 
as well as discontent within the alliance when it becomes apparent that robust action is 
required on the ground.
If placed on a spectrum, the United States and Germany would occupy opposite 
poles. In many regards they have opposing strategic cultures. While the United States 
accepts waging wars within the context of its political-strategic tradition of liberating 
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other peoples and states, Germany suffers from a form of strategic shell-shock and has 
denounced warfare. The United States considers itself to be a ‘power of Freedom’ in the 
world, which at times justifies combat against specific actors to protect freedom. Germany 
sees itself as a ‘power of peace’ and a ‘survivor of Mars’ and views the military as a means 
of last resort and only justified when deployed within a broader context to set the condi-
tions for structural improvements towards peace and stability. To the United States, this 
German strategic culture has a ring of appeasement, while to German eyes American stra-
tegic culture is often viewed with disdain for its destabilizing impact. As US neoconserva-
tive columnist Michael Ledeen said in 2000: 
Whenever I hear policy-makers talk about the wonders of “stability” I get 
the heebie-jeebies. That is for tired old Europeans and nervous Asians, not 
for us. In just about everything we do, from business and technology to 
cinema and waging war, we are the most revolutionary force on earth.1120 
Robert Cooper said that there is a common agreement among European states that the use 
of force is a last resort in foreign policy, while in the United States the use of force could be 
a matter of policy.1121 
The differences in strategic culture appear primarily to be a contrast between Europe 
and the United States. The reason underlying this difference in strategic culture is perhaps 
the most interesting insight from this study. At its most profound, the distinctions between 
American and European transformation policies reflect not a geopolitical reality but rather 
an age-old debate in the social sciences between an emphasis on individual agency and the 
predetermination of human behavior by social structures. Is it the individual actor – the 
agent – who is responsible for the advance of history or are social structures, the collection 
of social, political, economic and cultural institutions within which the individual func-
tions? The dichotomy between structure and agency is apparent in the strategies to pursue 
stability on the one hand and freedom - potentially at the expense of stability - on the other. 
The debate between structure and agency is central to the history of social science, and it 
has informed the development of political cultures. While European polities have well-
developed social democratic and socialist political factions – reflective of an approach to 
society in which structures and institutions play a central role –US politics instead has 
a strong Republican dimension which emphasizes individual freedom and responsibility. 
European states find institutions less worrisome than the United States, which tends to 
view them as encroaching on individual liberties. In global institutions European states 
find security from predatory nation-states, whereas the US views them with disdain for 
limiting the freedom of action of the state. An extreme expression of national sovereignty 
lay at the root of 20th century European disasters and international institutions are believed 
to improve or moderate the behavior of states. The United States however, maintains its 
1120 Michael Ledeen, “American Power – For What?” Commentary (January 2000), pp. 36-37.
1121 Interview with Robert Cooper, Brussels, September 11, 2007.
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Lockean philosophy that the nation-state is the only legitimate actor in international 
politics.1122 As an example, while three-quarters of Europeans and US Republicans favor 
democracy promotion, less than one-third of Europeans accept that this might justify 
the use of force, compared to more than half of polled US Republicans.1123 Unsurpris-
ingly major structuralist thinkers, such as Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas, are 
continental European while libertarians like John Locke and John Stuart Mill have Anglo-
Saxon roots. The continental European mind, it appears, may well be different from the 
American mind. 
At the same time this distinction between structure and agency can be conceived as 
one between revolution and evolution, in which the United States pursues revolutionary 
changes abroad, whereas a structural focus necessitates longer timelines and change grad-
ually evolves from within. Discord between Germany and the United States in the run-up 
to the Iraq War was emblematic of this dichotomy, just as the Dutch ‘balancing’ act in 
supporting both the German perspective and the United States is emblematic for Dutch 
strategic culture which is split between an Atlanticist and European approach. Both phil-
osophical models are exponents of Western liberal thinking, and are different strains of 
liberal interventionism, however they accord a different role to the application of military 
force. The historian Norman Davies has argued that there are different variants of Western 
civilization, specifically separating the United States from Western Europe.1124 Although 
invariably based on common Latin Christian foundations which provide the United States 
and Western Europe with a common value-set, the differences are stark between these 
two models. The ‘American’ variant is based on US leadership of ‘the West’, capitalism, 
freedom and democracy, whereas a ‘Euro’ variant denounces Anglo-Saxon ownership of 
Western civilization favoring instead continental Europe and its model of European coop-
eration and integration which fosters economic prosperity. Davies warns that “a profound 
crisis both of identity and intent” will be the result in the transatlantic community as these 
two variants inevitably clash.1125 While the picture he paints is rather bleak, we see elements 
of this clash in the strategic cultural confrontation in relation to defense transformation.
American political and strategic culture is driven by an adversarial agent-focused 
philosophy of human progress. It is based on two elements; firstly, faith in human liberty 
and its beacon function for US political identity, which provided the ideological fuel for the 
American Revolution yet persists today. Secondly, a view that man is capable of shaping his 
external environment and technology can assist him in this process of social engineering. 
It has fostered a teleological, linear view of history and left American security policy to 
accept, if not to embrace, the use of the military. If the belief is prevalent that agency is 
the defining element for human progress, security can be attained through the pursuit of 
adversaries and having the capability to kill or remove them. Conventional war is essen-
1122 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, Washington DC, October 24, 2006.
1123 German Marshall Fund & Compagnia di San Paolo, Transatlantic Trends Key Findings, 2005.
1124 Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Harper Perennial, 1998), p. 24.
1125 Ibid, p. 27.
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tially agent-focused, designed to destroy an adversary’s military capabilities and removing 
a military threat. In an agency-focused approach conventional warfighting capabilities are 
essential. When threats are identified they can be dealt with through the ability of military 
power to change society. It also produces a sense of optimism about security policy, since 
solutions to problems are – on paper – relatively straightforward, with absolute results.
By contrast, a structure-focused approach holds that human progress is invari-
ably shaped by the structures of society. It relies on internal democratic change and the 
moderating influence of liberal economic trade. Stability is a central objective since it 
creates the conditions for the development of moderating institutions. However it shuns 
the fundamentally destabilizing influence of agency-focused approaches, or the applica-
tion of unilateral military force, instead seeing it as but a necessary shaping element for 
building structures. As such structure-focused stability projection is a soft counterbalance 
to agency-focused power projection. Underlying it is the philosophy that agents are the 
products of structures and act within the confines of those structures. Hence the Euro-
pean emphasis on regulating institutions. Structures can only be changed through slowly 
nurturing new institutions. Where Americans hold that terrorism is an enemy that can 
be destroyed, Europeans see it as the product of structural deficits in society. European 
states are not non-interventionist, rather conform this structure-focused approach they 
are only willing to use military force as a function of a broader effort where the military 
becomes a stability-improving instrument. Such states accept that absolute security is not 
possible and instead attempt to manage a certain level of insecurity, and choose measures 
to deal with threats that are more moderate. It can give the appearance of being more pessi-
mistic about the security environment. Among the two European states, institutionalism 
is exemplified by adherence to the Comprehensive Approach, the integration of multiple 
elements of national power in the 3D Approach and in the German principle of Vernetzte 
Sicherheit. It belies a structural, multilateral focus, where the military is conducive to the 
overarching objective, but secondary to achieving it. 
Both European and the American models have a history of internal success to prove 
their validity. The United States has a strategic culture that rests on the liberating expe-
rience of the American Revolution and European governments advance their model 
of liberal stability projection as a consequence of the success of European integration 
fostering peace and prosperity on the European continent. Under a benevolent secu-
rity environment during the 1990’s the model of European enlargement was integral to 
Europe’s security posture. Exporting stability along Europe’s rim has long been an alter-
native goal of enlargement. “The strategic decision to enlarge the European Union is the 
basis for a comprehensive policy of projecting stability,” German Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer explained in 2000 in reference to the enlargement with ten Central and Eastern 
European states.1126 The acquis communautaire is the explicit example of a structure-
focused approach, based on cooperation rather than coercion. This European Zivilmacht 
is thereby closely aligned with German strategic culture. An outcome of the benevolent 
1126 Joschka Fischer, “Herbert Quandt Lecture at Georgetown University,” Washington DC, 
September 15, 2000.
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security environment was that it created an opportunity to expand the models of Western 
civilization that in effect has provided them with success.
Thus a fundamental disparity emerges in which the United States and European 
countries have a different appreciation of how to use the military instrument for expe-
ditionary missions and also how to measure success. The United States’ agency-focused 
approach has produced an inclination to accept warfare as a policy instrument. Simply put, 
advancing Freedom is accepted to come at the expense of short-term stability. By contrast, 
the structure-focused approach has led European states to denounce using military force 
in isolation as a way to resolve threats. The promotion of stability is threatened by a unilat-
eral use of military power. A structure- and an agency-focused approach to security policy 
leading to stability- or power projection create different appreciations of success. The 
Iraq War could be seen as a success by American policymakers, since it removed Saddam 
Hussein from power and provided the foundation for individual liberty and democracy to 
take root.1127 For European states, the Iraq War is seen as a failure as a result of the turmoil it 
precipitated following the initial invasion and which continues to destabilize the region at 
large. The same dynamic also enables the United States to define its mission in Afghanistan 
as intent on destroying Al Qaeda and preventing its return, whereas for European states 
this does not work. Instead European leaders must show a certain level of stability and 
development to be able to consider the mission a success, as removing Al Qaeda or the 
Taliban is not sufficient.
Aside from the notion that the three states were advancing specific models of Western 
civilization, they also did so in the belief that they were best disposed to do so. They pursue 
the model that has historically been successful to promote their own security. Each state 
under consideration holds that its historical experience is exemplar for the future develop-
ment of the international system, or at least how it should develop. Thus the Netherlands 
held that European integration is a larger version of the process of integration pioneered 
in the Dutch Provinces in the 17th century and later with the creation of the Benelux. And 
Germany holds that its “culture of defeat” and its experience with the destruction of war 
cause it to speak with greater authority on security policy. And the United States acts in the 
conviction that the ideals of the American Revolution are universally applicable and that it 
is the primary guarantor of Western values. 
Europeans and Americans have often disagreed in the past. Examples are US 
attempts to introduce theatre nuclear weapons in Europe, De Gaulle’s withdrawal from 
NATO’s military committee, the US war in Vietnam which led to widespread protests 
in Europe, the stationing of Pershing II missiles and the Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe treaty.1128 Discord is nothing new. One reason however why it is of interest in the 
1127 See for instance “It’s time for the US to declare victory and go home,” Washington Independent, 
July 30, 2009. http://washingtonindependent.com/53224/col-timothy-reese-its-time-for-the-
us-to-declare-victory-and-go-home.
1128 Anthony Cordesmann, “Rethinking NATO’s Force Transformation,” NATO Review (Spring 
2005). Other examples of transatlantic discord are detailed in Paul-Marie de la Gorce, “A 
Short History of Franco-US Discord,” Le Monde Diplomatique (March 2003).
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current international context is that a common existential threat, like Soviet expansionism 
coupled to nuclear deterrence, which sustained default transatlantic cohesion is absent. 
This is a consequence of the system-level change following the end of the Cold War and 
a shift to an expeditionary environment. The end of the Cold War marked the advent of 
interventionism. This has brought the fundamental distinction in strategic cultures into 
the open. The agency-structure dichotomy consists of a political-philosophical distinction 
that goes to the heart of Western civilization. This has significant repercussions for the 
future of transatlantic relations. At a speech at Georgetown University in late October 2006, 
Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot said that the US and Europe “only” disagree on means, not 
the ends of their security policy. The statement was intended to comfort. However, in the 
expeditionary environment this difference of opinion over means touches at the heart of 
the political-philosophical divide and fundamentally gnaws at alliance burden- and risk-
sharing. It is reflected in the strategic cultures that drive the defense transformation policies 
of Western liberal-democratic states. Given the likelihood that the expeditionary environ-
ment will continue it can be expected that transatlantic disagreements over “means” will 
persist and continue to hamper transatlantic security relations. Because the disagreements 
derive from the fundamental character of the states concerned, it cannot be expected that 
these issues are resolved within the current constellation of forces in the security environ-
ment. These distinctions have been present throughout the history of the transatlantic alli-
ance; however they have only come out in the open - and formed an obstacle - since the 
system changed towards an expeditionary environment for Western states. 
29.6  Impact on the Future of NATO
What does this imply for the future of the alliance? Transformation was intent on giving 
the NATO alliance greater cohesion and capability. It instead is the concept around which 
alliance divisiveness became apparent in an expeditionary environment. Transformation 
was not a strategic process coordinated by the international organization. Instead, the three 
states under consideration pursued adaptive strategies in response to changing external 
circumstances, taking domestic, strategic cultural factors into account. These led to unique 
national outcomes. For the time being, as the expeditionary environment continues, it 
appears that NATO is only able to indirectly influence these processes of adaptation. From 
the case studies it becomes apparent that states like the Netherlands or Germany definitely 
took alliance dynamics into account. However, this is qualitatively different from stating 
that these states expected NATO-level guidance to pursue their transformation strategy.
Rather than lead to a concise view of responses to the security environment, trans-
formation policies in the different states were shaped by specific domestic considerations 
which reflected individual understandings of what the military was for in an evolving secu-
rity environment. These unique approaches to military change brought to bear fundamen-
tally contrasting views over the use of the military in an expeditionary environment, and 
contributed to weakening the alliance at a time when it is more active than at any time in 
its history. Of course, if something is hard to do, it does not mean that it is not worth doing. 
However, it does imply that as long as Western states pursue a policy of liberal interven-
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tionism in an expeditionary environment there will be dissension among the transatlantic 
allies along the lines of different strategic cultures and different approaches to the military. 
Along with it, the debate over missions and responses to security threats will be troubled. 
As NATO operations evolve further away from stabilization operations and become 
higher-intensity, the contrasts within Europe and between the US and Europe will become 
more poignant. 
The two models presented above appear to be in competition with one another, 
yet from the social sciences it becomes clear that this philosophical debate is not to be 
resolved easily, if at all. The European and the American model should be seen as comple-
ments rather than alternatives. Both strive for the same results, namely to extend freedoms, 
stability and democracy. However they do so in different ways. 
The distinction is not only between Europe and the United States. The case studies 
of Germany and the Netherlands illustrate sensitive differences within Europe, reflecting 
different histories, geopolitical outlooks and strategic cultures. Perhaps the starkest 
example is the attempt by the Dutch government to avoid a negative perception in Wash-
ington by explicitly diversifying itself from being associated with Germany and its pacifist 
strategic culture by undertaking the mission in Southern Afghanistan. The Netherlands 
retains a hedging policy, by which it avoids both a purely Continentalist and a purely 
Atlanticist stigma.
Both arguments imply that NATO will remain relevant. For one because the objec-
tives NATO allies strive for are similar, and secondly because intra-European strategic 
cultures are too diverse to fully supplant NATO. Yet within an expeditionary context, it 
will remain an alliance at odds with itself. 
In an era where security is defended proactively outside NATO’s territorial realm, 
the participation of member states in operations is essential to maintain the credibility 
of the alliance. This leads to one of the key dilemmas of the expeditionary security envi-
ronment for NATO, namely that for the sake of the alliance a form of ‘active solidarity’ is 
needed. Given the highly political nature of an expeditionary age this is a serious obstacle. 
Strategic cultures complicate this process. What is needed therefore is a reassessment of 
what NATO is, taking stock of the different implications of the strategic cultures, and the 
different views of military force in the new security environment, in order to develop a 
version of solidarity compatible with the expeditionary environment. From this study it 
logically follows that the only way in which NATO will retain commitment of European 
allies is if the organization strengthens its political dimensions, and evolves away from a 
purely military organization. It is the military dimension, and the way in which the mili-
tary is used in complex emergencies which forms the source of friction of strategic cultures. 
The primary reason for friction in the alliance, which is the same reason that has led to 
limited or troubled extractive capacity of the two European states, is the use of the military 
for high-intensity operations. Nor is this dilemma likely to be resolved soon. As European 
allies see the use of force as but one element of a broader range of state instruments to use in 
their security policy, NATO could broaden its pallet in the direction of stability projection, 
an activity it is now de facto engaged in anyhow. Along with the NATO Response Force, 
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a key NATO initiative of transformation towards expeditionary operations yet focused 
on high-intensity operations and thereby lacking necessary European political support, 
NATO could benefit from a NATO Training and Stabilization Force (NTSF). Such a force 
would institutionalize the shifting nature of the security environment towards irregular 
warfare and take stock of the orientation towards stability projection of the European allies. 
It would include members of the Special Forces or other forces specialized in training third 
parties as well as a team of civilian specialists able to assist in reconstruction and devel-
opment activities. The NTSF would operate as a network manager with reconstruction 
agencies and NGOs, but also as a force multiplier for counterterror operations or COIN-
lite. In addition it would have access to a robust protection force, but would primarily be 
geared towards population-centric operations. It would not replace but be institutional-
ized within NATO alongside the NRF, which would continue to function as an engine for 
transatlantic interoperability for high-intensity warfare. The advantage is that the NTSF 
would allow European states to pursue a structure-focused approach, while at the same 
time it would emulate elements of US SOF-ing for irregular warfare. It would also likely 
keep Washington interested in NATO since it would increase the relevance of the alliance 
and be more in line with European strategic cultures, offering a format for transatlantic 
cooperation in a field that Europeans would also be willing to engage in.
Such a recommendation however fails to take account of possible shifts in the secu-
rity environment, which might require a more military NATO, whether Europeans like 
it or not. What is the future for transformation? Two decades ago shifts in the interna-
tional security environment required a recalibration of defense policies. As the benevolent 
security environment gave way to greater US unilateralism and irregular warfare, it led 
to friction with strategic cultures. While the Netherlands desired to play a role of promi-
nence alongside the United States, it became more difficult to do so while also adhering 
to its principles of stability projection. For Germany, as NATO expanded into more chal-
lenging operations, it has had difficulty to match solidarity with the alliance and its posture 
as Zivilmacht. In the United States, the shift in the operational environment was felt 
most strongly in response to the intensifying insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
US Army initially attempted to shift towards sustainable stability operations, however 
given domestic constraints this proved difficult. Instead, by reintroducing the concept of 
SOF-ing in the context of irregular warfare, the Army focuses primarily on high-intensity 
combat operations and training partner nations. To the United States transformation 
encompasses an emphasis on small, surgical SOF-ing for irregular warfare whereas the 
majority of the military remains focused on conventional conflict and pursues the substi-
tution of mass for information in the rest of the military. For Germany, transformation 
continues to be a tedious domestic endeavor that will advance step by step as the security 
environment clashes with its strategic culture. For the Netherlands, having made the shift 
to a broad expeditionary capability transformation is considered finished. Instead finan-
cial hardship will lead to cheese-grating of existing capabilities. Unless the perception of 
the security environment markedly changes, military change efforts will be in the form of 
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modernization and incremental. This does not mean that a modernization program will 
be easy. However it will not be a transformation, as defined in this research. 
Nor is it to be assumed that the environment remains static. As a matter of illustration, 
four brief scenarios are presented that would require transformation of Western forces. If 
the security environment changes and multipolarity leads the international system to be 
formed by multiple rival centers of power in which great power war in strategic regions 
becomes a possibility, the implications could be significant for NATO. Especially within 
the context of financial austerity, hard choices would have to be made.
It would increase the push for high-intensity, smart but expeditionary, capabilities. 
To the United States this would mean a return to initial operational effectiveness transfor-
mation. The plans like the FCS could be dusted off. European states could start to merge 
their remaining conventional capabilities. Given domestic European constraints that 
preclude the use of the military in isolation, and dependent on the level of threat in the 
security environment, for European states this will be difficult to do. Yet if the environment 
disallows liberal interventionism and promotes a realist interest-based defense policy, a 
new strategic transformation may await European states, slowly bringing Europe and the 
US closer again.
The trap of focusing too much inward would have to be avoided. The risk of opera-
tional effectiveness transformation is that it stimulates an inward-looking policy, intent on 
continuously improving own systems, modes of operation and doctrine. It risks misinter-
preting the relative distribution of power and failing to anticipate new modes of opera-
tion that can offset the strengths for which the operational effectiveness transformation 
was initially pursued. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid-2000 have made 
clear that the United States ran this risk as it struggled with counterinsurgency and long-
term stabilization missions. In a multipolar environment emphasis on operational effec-
tiveness transformation for conventional operations would run the risk of being blind to 
non-conventional threats. Such could take the shape of cyber-warfare, weapons of mass 
destruction or extended threats to homeland security. 
Another development that would trigger a discontinuous change in defense affairs is 
the scarcity of energy resources. Not only will this require different modes of operating and 
new missions as a scramble of resource-access occurs, it will also test the ability of states 
to extract resources through innovation to new modes of energy-provision and propul-
sion to keep the tanks running and the frigates afloat. At the same time developing energy 
independence for the armed forces would mean a magnitude level of increase in logistical 
capability, likely to revolutionize the use of the military by NATO states. Greening the mili-
tary is not only ecologically prudent but would vastly increase overall capability and reach 
of the military. 
A further scenario is the possibility of large-scale stabilization missions in countries 
like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. Both states are several times larger and more populous than 
Iraq and Afghanistan, yet suffer from endemic instability. In addition they are of vital 
strategic interest; Saudi Arabia for the oil, Pakistan for their nuclear arsenal. Given the 
difficulties of Western states to staff and continue the stability operations in Afghanistan 
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and Iraq, such a scenario would be very testing. In response Western militaries would 
embrace training partner countries, as the United States has done as part of its strategic 
transformation towards irregular warfare. Teaching other militaries and police forces to 
perform stabilization roles and addressing security deficits would form a potential solu-
tion to the numerical inferiority that Western militaries are confronting. What is needed 
then is substituting mass for training capabilities.1129 Other options to be explored are 
further cooperation with private parties, such as private security companies, or third states 
to provide the training capabilities necessary. It would substantially change the nature of 
NATO; from a crisis-responder to a security enabler. The shift would be in line with the 
Dutch and German emphasis on stability projection however, it would be somewhat more 
troublesome to the United States which could contribute high-end force multipliers but 
would see NATO as but one tool among many, rather than as a cornerstone in its security 
policy. 
Finally, on the basis of their respective strategic cultures, and the contrast between 
the European structure-focused model and the American agency-focused approach, it 
can be assumed that a weakening of NATO may lead to a strengthening of the European 
Union’s ESDP. Several complicating factors however preclude this from occurring. For 
the time being Germany remains too constrained domestically to play a strong role in 
reinvigorating the ESDP. It remains the purview of the French and the British, and the 
British are politically inclined to favor a strong Atlantic security relation over developing 
a full-fledged European alternative. To the Netherlands, the security relationship with the 
United States has proven to be a vital link in order to maintain a credible voice in Europe 
and is likely to remain so. Yet perhaps most importantly, the United States has no interest 
in letting Europe slide away to develop a fully independent alternative of Western secu-
rity policy and interventionism, or it would compromise US strategic freedom of action. 
Therefore Washington will continue to engage with the security policies of European states 
in order to prevent a full-fledged European security actor from emerging. In the end the 
two sides of the Atlantic are condemned to remain entangled in discussions over the use 
of military power along the distinctions dictated by their strategic culture. Although trans-
formation in an expeditionary era appears to be pushing the Atlantic partners in different 
directions, friction without fissure will persist. 
1129 See for instance Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, “US Plans widen role in training Pakistani 
forces in Qaeda battle,” New York Times, March 2, 2008; Steven Lee Myers & Thom Shanker, 
“US May send more Troops to Afghanistan,” International Herald Tribune, May 3, 2008; Craig 
S. Smith, “US Training African Forces to uproot Terrorists,” New York Times, May 11, 2004.

Afterword: 
Death of a Concept
As the Iraq insurgency continued, the most ardent supporters of US operational effective-
ness transformation started to reconsider their perspective. In 2005, the Pentagon’s Office 
of Force Transformation cautioned that network-centric warfare was not a panacea that 
gave war a preordained result.1130 In 2004 Arthur Cebrowski had noted that transforma-
tion had changed from its initial inception in the late 1990’s, and advocated a transforma-
tion of the transformation.1131 He said that the US military should “not simply provide a 
larger sheath of thunderbolts,” which happened to be the focus of operational effectiveness 
transformation.1132 The statements amounted to a substantial difference from rapid, deci-
sive operations which had been the dominant focus before. It was close to a 180-degree 
turn by the transformation guru. 
In the last weeks of 2006, with the Iraq insurgency at its peak and the resistance 
in Afghanistan starting to gain steam, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld left the Pentagon. 
Cebrowski, the ‘father of Network Centric Warfare,’ passed away and the Office of Force 
Transformation dissolved into the behemoth structure of the Defense department. In a 
cover article on December 20, 2006 the New York Times declared that the Bush adminis-
tration had broken with Rumsfeld’s policy of transformation.1133 
Just as a dying star bursts into a supernova before fizzling out, the term had ballooned 
that year. Transformation had come to encompass a wide range of plans. Pentagon policy 
1130 Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington DC, January 5, 2005.
1131 “The transformation started at the beginning of the administration has, itself, been 
transformed. But we must move faster -- increasingly, the pace of transformation is not one 
we set for ourselves. National defense is no longer just about the Department of Defense…
Homeland defense is no longer an abstraction to the average American citizen, nor is it 
conducted solely at long range. This is no longer just about projecting power -- rather, it is 
about exporting security.”Arthur Cebrowski, “Transformation and the Changing Character of 
War,” Transformation Trends, June 17, 2004.
1132 Arthur Cebrowski, “Transformation and the Changing Character of War,” Transformation 
Trends, June 17, 2004.
1133 Thom Shanker & Jim Rutenberg, “President Wants to increase size of armed forces,” The New 
York Times, December 20, 2006.
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included Transforming the Medical Health System, the Training Transformation 
Plan, the Transformational Communication Architecture and the standing up of the 
Defense Business Transformation Agency. A new Human Capital Strategy was described 
as transformational, while the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap detailed a 
Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Transformation.1134 Furthermore 
the Business Transformation Agency, the executive body of the policy-initiative entitled 
Defense Business Transformation, had a sister agency called the Military Health Services 
Office of Transformation which supervised the Military Health Services Defense Busi-
ness Transformation. Other agencies, such as USAID also adopted the term and similarly 
developed a Business Transformation plan. The Department of State also spoke of ‘trans-
formational diplomacy.’1135 As the term was used more prolifically, it also came to describe 
ever more generic initiatives. It was used to denote any change program in the Pentagon 
and beyond. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace in February 2007 
described transformation in almost esoteric terms, saying: “[it] is a continual effort to meet 
new challenges; … It is not an end state. It is a mindset and a culture that encourages inno-
vation and fresh thinking.”1136 The term described so much, it started to lose its meaning. 
And then it finally did. 
A catharsis of transformation started with Rumsfeld’s departure from the Pentagon. 
The post-Rumsfeld leadership of the Pentagon avoided using the term. Secretary Gates 
used it only once, preferring instead to describe the content of the change program for 
which transformation used to be the label. The planning guidance drafted by Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen in October 2007 contained text about trans-
formation without using the word.1137 The term had been tainted by Rumsfeld and was 
considered politically ‘damaged goods’ for its relation to the Iraq War. In the summer 
of 2008, General James Mattis who headed US Joint Forces Command as well as NATO 
Allied Command Transformation removed the concept of Effects Based Operations from 
the US and NATO agenda.1138 The term had fallen from grace because of its association 
with the overly technological approach of US operational effectiveness transformation. 
1134 Department of Defense, “Defense Language Transformation Roadmap,” Washington DC, 
January 2005. http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf. Accessed 
September 7, 2010.
1135 USAID, “Transforming Business,” information on USAID website: http://www.usaid.gov/
about_usaid/bus_trans/bt_plan.html. See also Kennon H. Nakamura and Susan B. Epstein, 
“Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy,” Congressional Research 
Service, Order Code RL34141, Washington DC, August 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL34141.pdf .
1136 Peter Pace, “Posture Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the 110th 
Congress,” Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Congress, Washington DC, 
February 6, 2007.
1137 Michael Mullen, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance for 2007-2008,” October 1, 
2007.
1138 James N. Mattis, “Memorandum for US Joint Forces Command: Assessment of Effects Based 
Operations,” United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk VA, August 14, 2008.
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In September 2008, Secretary Gates explicitly denounced the operational effectiveness 
ideology of the Rumsfeld years: 
…never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions 
of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical 
of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that 
suggest otherwise. Look askance at idealized, triumphalist, or ethnocentric 
notions of future conflict that aspire to upend the immutable principles of 
war: where the enemy is killed, but our troops and innocent civilians are 
spared. Where adversaries can be cowed, shocked, or awed into submission, 
instead of being tracked down, hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by 
bloody block.1139
Not only was the term transformation removed from official Pentagon vocabulary, the 
principle of producing revolutionary change in warfare on the basis of new capabilities was 
denounced. The belief advanced by Rumsfeld, Cebrowski and others that US transforma-
tion could lead to such increased military capability that others would be deterred from 
challenging the US was held to be utopian. Secretary Gates punctured the belief that the 
military could build a ‘revolutionary’ capability such as the Future Combat System. He 
advocated a dose of realism. “FCS, he said “was a revolutionary concept. My experience 
in government is, when you want to change something all at once and create a whole new 
thing, you usually end up with an expensive disaster on your hands... maybe Google can 
do something revolutionary. But we don’t have the agility to do that.”1140 
Today, the only place where the term transformation is used with frequency is at a 
former naval hospital on the outskirts of Norfolk, Virginia. Here several hundred Euro-
pean and American officers formulate NATO’s responses to future threats and attempt to 
coordinate the development of doctrine and capabilities across the Alliance’s twenty-eight 
members. In general they work to prepare the alliance for the future security environment. 
Founded in 2002, when transformation was the buzz-word among security policymakers, 
it lies somewhat lonely as the only NATO headquarters in North America. However, it is 
located just across the street from US Joint Forces Command where transformation was 
first envisioned in the early 1990’s and where the Millennium Challenge 02 exercise was 
organized. It is somewhat ironic that this NATO headquarters should carry transforma-
tion in its name, since the process of military change has been all but easy for the alliance. 
It is symbolic for the evolution of the term that this headquarters is called NATO Allied 
Command Transformation.
1139 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks at the National Defense University,” Washington DC, September 
29, 2008.
1140 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College,” 
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Samenvatting
Nederlandstalige samenvatting behorende bij 
het proefschrift “The Superpower, the Bridge-
builder and the Hesitant Ally: How Defense 
Transformation Divided NATO (1991-2008)” 
Hoe is defensietransformatie door verschillende NAVO-bondgenoten geïnterpreteerd en 
vormgegeven? Wat waren de belangrijkste factoren die hieraan ten grondslag lagen? En 
wat voor invloed heeft dat op de cohesie van het bondgenootschap?  Deze vragen staan 
centraal in dit proefschrift. ‘Transformatie’ was het overkoepelende concept eind jaren 
negentig en het begin van deze eeuw, dat een serie verregaande veranderingsprocessen 
van Westerse krijgsmachten omschreef. Het doel van deze hervormingsprocessen was 
het aanpassen van Westerse krijgsmachten aan de veranderende veiligheidsomgeving als 
gevolg van het einde van de Koude Oorlog, de opkomst van nieuwe technologiën, en de 
verschijning van nieuwe dreigingen. In 2002 werd de term ingevoerd binnen het NAVO 
bondgenootschap. Besloten werd dat alle staten hun krijgsmachten zouden transformeren 
in de veronderstelling dat dit de cohesie van de NAVO ten goede zou komen. Dit was 
echter niet het geval. Er waren grote verschillen in de wijze waarop de bondgenoten de 
transformatie doorvoerden. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt welke factoren tot verschillen in 
transfomatie hebben geleid en wat dit betekent voor de toekomst van de NAVO.
Hoewel de term zijn intrede deed mid-jaren negentig in defensiekringen in de 
Verenigde Staten, is transformatie als concept niet tijdgebonden. In deze studie wordt 
transformatie gedefinieerd als het proces om gerichte, verregaande veranderingen in 
het militair beleid en de militaire organisatie van een staat te realiseren als reactie op 
grootschalige veranderingen in de internationale veiligheidsomgeving. Het doel hiervan 
is een verbeterde aansluiting van het militair beleid, de organisatorische structuur en de 
capaciteiten van het militair instrument enerzijds en de doelstellingen van het buitenlands- 
en veiligheidsbeleid van de staat anderzijds. Niet iedere hervorming van de krijgsmacht en 
het veiligheidsbeleid valt onder transformatie. Het belangrijkste onderscheid, ten opzichte 
van andere hervormingsprocessen, is dat transformatie een grootschalige kwalitatieve 
verandering van de krijgsmacht tot gevolg heeft als reactie op veranderingen in de 
veiligheidsomgeving.
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Verschillende vormen van Transformatie
In deze studie worden twee soorten transformatie geïdentificeerd; operationale effectiviteit 
transformatie en strategische transformatie. Beide vormen hebben grote consequenties 
voor de krijgsmacht, maar zijn fundamenteel verschillend van karakter. In de literatuur 
rond militaire innovaties bestaat al geruime tijd aandacht voor zogeheten ‘Revolutions 
in Military Affairs’ (RMA). Hierin leiden nieuwe technologiën, doctrines en wijzen van 
optreden tot revolutionaire veranderingen in oorlogvoering. De uitvinding van het buskruit, 
de Franse levée-en-masse, en blitzkrieg zijn hiervan voorbeelden. Zij die deze innovaties 
als eerste invoerden, stonden historisch meestal aan de kant van de overwinnaars. De 
introductie van informatie-technologiën en doctrines als netwerkcentrische oorlogvoering 
in de Amerikaanse krijgsmacht kregen veel aandacht omdat het vermoeden bestond dat 
dit eveneens een RMA betekende. Bij een RMA gaat het veelal om de ontwikkeling van 
nieuwe manieren – technologisch, organisatorisch of doctrinair – om de effectiviteit  van 
oorlogvoering te vergroten. Deze vorm van transformatie wordt daarom ‘operationele 
effectiviteit transformatie’ genoemd. De tweede vorm van transformatie komt tot stand 
door het op militair-strategisch en politiek-strategisch niveau beantwoorden van de 
vraag voor welke doeleinden de staat een krijgsmacht heeft. Wanneer dit grootschalige 
veranderingen in de orientatie, het optreden en de capaciteiten van de krijgsmacht tot 
gevolg heeft is er sprake van strategische transformatie. De omslag in het militair optreden 
van de meeste continentaal-Europese krijgsmachten na het einde van de Koude Oorlog is 
hier een voorbeeld van. In algemene zin betrof het een doelbewuste omvorming van een 
krijgsmacht gericht op territoriale landsverdediging naar een expeditionaire krijgsmacht 
die ook elders ter wereld ingezet kan worden. Dit wordt ‘strategische transformatie’ 
genoemd. 
Het onderzoek richt zich op het transformatiebeleid van de Verenigde Staten, 
Nederland en Duitsland na het einde van de Koude Oorlog in de periode 1991 tot 2008. Deze 
NAVO-lidstaten streefden verschillende vormen van transformatie na. De ontwikkeling 
van precisiewapens, innovaties op het gebied van informatie- en communicatie 
technologie en aanverwante doctrines vormden de basis voor transformatie in de VS. Het 
zou leiden tot een krijgsmacht voor het zogenoemd ‘informatie tijdperk’ en grootschalige 
veranderingen in conventionele oorlogvoering inhouden met een significante toename in 
het militair vermogen. Het vormde de basis van de Amerikaanse transformatie gestoeld op 
verbertering van de operationele effectiviteit. In Nederland werd transformatie gezien als 
de uitvoering van een defensiehervormingsbeleid richting een expeditionaire krijgsmacht 
zoals besloten in de Defensienota van 1991 en de Prioriteitennota van 1993. Het was 
daarmee een vorm van strategische transformatie. Zo ook in Duitsland, waar transformatie 
het proces omvatte om Duitse militairen in te kunnen zetten bij missies buiten het Duitse 
grondgebied en daarbij om te gaan met de eigen politieke en militaire geschiedenis. 
Naast de formulering van deze strategiën ontwikkelde transformatie zich in 
de jaren erna in reactie op de veranderende veiligheidsomgeving. De opkomst van 
internationaal terrorisme, de proliferatie van geavanceerde technologiën, de oorlogen in 
Irak en Afghanistan, een toenemende unilaterale houding van de Verenigde Staten en 
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de strategische dreiging van irreguliere oorlogvoering hadden hun impact op de manier 
waarop deze staten met transformatie omgingen. In de Verenigde Staten leidde dit tot 
veranderingen in het transformatiebeleid. In de Europese landen beïnvloedde het met 
name de effectiviteit waarmee transformatie kon worden nagestreefd.
Opbouw van onderzoek
Dit onderzoek richt zich vooral op het politiek-strategische niveau, het niveau van de 
strategische beleidsmaker, de militaire strateeg en de politieke besluitvormer die invloed 
hebben op de toekomstige richting van de krijgsmacht  en besluitvorming rond inzet 
en capaciteitopbouw. Op dit niveau wordt aan defensietransformatie op hoofdlijnen 
richting gegeven. Hierdoor wordt in het onderzoek minder aandacht besteed aan 
afzonderlijke afwegingen binnen krijgsmachtdelen of hoe specifieke wapensystemen een 
effect gehad hebben op militaire innovatie. Het proefschrift betoogt dat variabelen op het 
systeemniveau en binnenlandse strategische culturen aan de verschillen in transformatie 
ten grondslag lagen. De probleemstelling die wordt beantwoord in dit onderzoek is Hoe 
heeft de interactie tussen factoren op het internationale systeemniveau en elementen 
van de binnenlandse strategische cultuur het proces van defensietransformatie in 
NAVO lidstaten beïnvloed en hoe is dit van invloed op de toekomstige transatlantische 
veiligheidsbetrekkingen en de toekomst van de NAVO?
Door middel van drie cases gebaseerd op archief- en bronnenonderzoek en aangevuld 
met semi-gestructureerde expertinterviews, wordt het proces van transformatie en de 
factoren die daarop van invloed waren onderzocht. Per casestudie worden de volgende 
vragen beantwoord:
ӺӺ Waaruit bestond de transformatie die werd nagestreefd?
ӺӺ Welke systeemfactoren en veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving vormden 
de noodzaak voor transformatie?
ӺӺ Op welke wijze heeft de strategische cultuur van de staat bijgedragen aan 
transformatie?
ӺӺ Welke gevolgen had transformatie in termen van organisatie, capaciteiten en 
beleid?
ӺӺ Op welke wijze hebben veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving transformatie 
beïnvloed?
Op basis van neoklassiek realisme, waarbij factoren op het internationale systeemniveau 
(structureel realisme) verenigd worden met binnenlandse factoren (Innenpolitik) om 
het gedrag van staten te verklaren, kan vastgesteld worden hoe een staat omgaat met de 
gevolgen van een grootschalige verandering op het internationale niveau en in hoeverre 
normen en percepties die voorvloeien uit de strategische cultuur van een staat daar een 
rol bij spelen. Strategische cultuur omvat de gedeelde overtuigingen, ideeën en normen 
die samen een gemeenschappelijk narratief vormen rond het gebruik van het militair 
instrument om veiligheidsdoelstellingen te realiseren. Het beslaat de wijze waarop een 
staat het gebruik van het miltiair instrument ziet en is een product van de geschiedenis, 
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geopolitieke situatie, politieke institutites, waardensysteem en historische ervaring 
met de krijgsmacht van een staat. Naast de positie van een staat in de internationale 
systeemverhoudingen is de strategische cultuur van een staat van bepalend belang voor de 
wijze waarop transformatie wordt nagestreefd. 
Transformatie als politiek proces
De Verenigde Staten volgden een transformatiestrategie gericht op het vergroten van 
de operationele effectiviteit van de krijgsmacht en de ontwikkeling van middelen om 
oorlogen sneller, met minder mensen, en met minder gevaar voor de eigen manschappen 
te kunnen winnen. Het politiek-strategische gevolg zou zijn dat het verkijgen van politieke 
steun om militaire interventies uit te voeren vergemakkelijkt zou worden. De interventies 
in Kosovo en de eerste fase van de oorlog in Irak, waar slechts beperkte verliezen 
geleden werden, bevestigden dit beeld. Met de Verenigde Staten als enig overgebleven 
supermacht en als belangrijkste partner in de NAVO was het aannemelijk dat de kleinere 
landen, Duitsland en Nederland,  een zekere mate van kopieergedrag vertoonden in hun 
transformatiestrategie. Hoewel Europese landen inderdaad deels het transformatie-proces 
van de Verenigde Staten kopieerden - onder andere door de introductie van ICT-systemen 
om interoperabiliteit te behouden en door de bereidheid om mee te doen met verschillende 
militaire missies aangevoerd door de VS -  was dit slechts in beperkte mate aan de orde. In 
plaats daarvan stond transformatie in deze landen in het teken van de ontwikkeling van een 
expeditionaire krijgsmacht. Ook ging het hierbij niet om het excelleren in oorlogvoeren, 
maar om het uitvoeren van crisis-beheersings- en stabilisatie operaties. Duitsland en 
Nederland volgden een strategie gericht op innovatie – strategische transformatie – om 
te komen tot een nieuw model van de krijgsmacht en aanverwant veiligheidsbeleid. Het 
zorgde ervoor dat binnenlands politieke factoren en strategische cultuur een belangrijke 
rol speelden in het vormgeven van dit nieuwe model. 
De verandering in het veiligheidsdenken na het einde van de Koude Oorlog 
hield in dat Westerse landen de krijgsmacht buiten hun landsgrenzen gingen inzetten 
in expeditionaire operaties. Dit leidde ertoe dat transformatie ingegeven werd door 
fundamentele politieke afwegingen over de rol van de krijgsmacht als onderdeel van 
staatsmacht. In plaats van redeneren vanuit een duidelijke defensieve instelling gebaseerd 
op territoriale landsverdediging bood de post-Koude Oorlog wereld voor Europese landen 
een andere context, namelijk een waarin de krijgsmacht op basis van een politieke keuze 
ver van huis ingezet wordt om de effecten van regionale conflicten op de internationale 
stabiliteit te verminderen en crisis-beheersingsoperaties uit te voeren. Zo leidde de 
expeditionaire omgeving tot een belangrijkere rol voor de binnenlandse politiek bij de 
inzet van de kriijgsmacht en bracht het de elementen van de strategische cultuur van een 
staat helderder naar voren.
Het Europese integratieproces is een belangrijke externe factor die ertoe geleid heeft 
dat het Nederlandse en Duitse transformatiebeleid dicht bij elkaar liggen. Het veranderde 
de veiligheidsdynamiek in Europa. Na het einde van de Koude Oorlog kreeg dit proces vaart 
en Europese landen vaarden wel bij de versterkte onderlinge economische betrekkingen. 
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Dit ging gepaard met de instutionalisering en juridisering van de veiligheidsbetrekkingen 
binnen Europa. Onderlinge politieke kwesties werden omgezet in juridische, economische 
of institutionele vraagstukken. Dit proces van Europese integratie vormt de basis voor 
vrede en veiligheid in Europa. In het veiligheidsbeleid vertaalde zich dit in een nadruk 
op stability projection, waarbij de krijgsmacht alleen ingezet wordt om de internationale 
rechtsorde te ondersteunen en stabiliteit te bevorderen. Het leidde tot een voorkeur voor 
het uitvoeren van stabilisatieoperaties. 
In de Verenigde Staten was eveneens een politiek proces essentieel voor transformatie. 
Ingegeven door de veranderende systeemverhoudingen, het unipolaire systeem, maar 
vooral ook de mogelijkheden die het ‘informatie tijdperk’ bood, werd operationele 
effectiviteit transformatie gezien als een recept om Amerikaanse dominantie te behouden. 
Het beeld van een kleinere, snellere, en veiligere manier van oorlogvoeren versterkte een 
exponent van de Amerikaanse politieke en strategische cultuur die veronderstelde dat 
superieure Amerikaanse militaire macht een belangrijk middel was om Amerikaanse 
waarden van vrijheid en democratie te verspreiden. Dat neoconservatisme zo een 
belangrijke rol speelde in de Amerikaanse politiek hangt samen met de effectiviteit van 
de Amerikaanse transformatiestrategie in de jaren 1999-2003. De politieke aard van 
transformatie komt terug in de rol die strategische cultuur hierbij gespeeld heeft.
Strategische culturen en Transformatie
Strategische culturen zijn bepalend voor de wijze waarop de relatieve internationale 
machtsbalans en veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving geïnterpreteerd worden door 
een staat en vertaald worden in beleidsinitiatieven. Het Amerikaanse dreigingsbeeld is 
een product van de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur waarbij dreigingen geïdentificeerd 
worden in de vorm van natuurlijke personen. Hierdoor is de Amerikaanse krijgsmacht 
met name ingericht op het opsporen en uitschakelen van een tegenstander. Dit is een 
kernelement van de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur en vertaalt zich in een acceptatie 
van het gebruik van militair geweld om doelstellingen te bereiken. Power projection 
is een integraal onderdeel van deze aanpak, gericht op het kunnen opereren in alle 
mogelijke inzetgebieden en daar miltiair dominant te zijn. De Nederlandse strategische 
cultuur is veelal gericht op stability projection. Het gebruik van het militair instrument 
wordt daardoor niet als leidend gezien, maar als voorwaardenscheppend, met als doel 
om structuren en instituties die stabiliteit kunnen bevorderen te ontwikkelen. Beide 
zijn gericht op interventie, maar stability projection vertaalt zich in een andere mix van 
capaciteiten, minder gericht op het uitschakelen van een vijand, en meer in samenhang 
met andere middelen van staatsmacht. De Duitse strategische cultuur is vergelijkbaar met 
de Nederlandse in zoverre dat het gericht is op het in multilateraal verband bijdragen aan 
regionale stabiliteit en internationale rechtsorde. Daarnaast is de nadruk op multilaterale 
actie en inzetten op het versterken van de internationale rechtsorde een defensief-
realistische methode (soft-balancing) om grootmachten binnen het gareel te houden. De 
Duitse strategische cultuur verschilt echter op fundamenteel met de Nederlandse dat die 
laatste niet eenzelfde historische bagage bezit als Duitsland. Berlijn dienst er hierdoor 
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voor terug om militaire middelen buiten de landsgrenzen en later  - in Afghanistan – in 
offensieve militaire operaties in te zetten.
Een strategische cultuur is multidimensionaal en bestaat uit verschillende 
componenten die - afhankelijk van de internationale veiligheidsomgeving – elkaar 
versterken of tegenwerken. Zo speelt in de Nederlandse strategische cultuur, naast de 
nadruk op stability projection, ook de realistische afweging een rol waarbij het militair 
instrument voor internationale politieke doeleinden wordt ingezet. Solidariteit met de 
Verenigde Staten als belangrijkste bondgenoot speelt hier een centrale rol. Nederland 
zet haar krijgsmacht ondermeer in om politiek krediet op te bouwen bij de Verenigde 
Staten, en een gewaardeerd bondgenoot te zijn binnen de NAVO. Het doel hiervan voor 
Nederland is om ‘aan tafel’ te zitten, serieus te worden genomen door de grotere landen, 
en mee te beslissen op het hoogste internationale niveau. De discussie in 2010 rond 
deelname aan de G20 en deelname in Afghanistan toont dat het hierbij niet uitsluitend 
om het realiseren van veiligheidspolitieke doelstellingen gaat. Tevens speelt een defensief-
realistische afweging hier een rol waarbij Nederland als small power in Europa inzet op een 
sterke transatlantische relatie om zodoende zich staande te kunnen houden in het Europese 
krachtenveld gevormd door de Europese grootmachten. Dit heeft gevolgen voor de typen 
capaciteiten die de Nederlandse krijgsmacht ontwikkelt en de bereidheid van Nederlandse 
beleidsmakers om ook in het hogere geweldsspectrum actief te zijn. Capaciteiten met een 
hoge zichtbaarheid en hoge relevantie voor het bondgenootschap en de politieke bereidheid 
om een rol van formaat te spelen, zijn een uiting van deze dimensie van de Nederlandse 
strategische cultuur. Dit mondde bijvoorbeeld uit in deelname in 2006 aan de missie in 
Uruzgan, waar Nederland de zwaarste gevechten voerde sinds de Koreaanse oorlog. Het 
resulteerde echter wel in een spanning tussen enerzijds solidariteit met de Verenigde Staten 
en het zijn van een relevante bondgenoot, en anderzijds de vraag of met deze “vechtmissie” 
Nederland effectief bijdroeg aan stabiliteit en de internationale rechtsorde. Het uitte zich 
ook in hevige parlementaire discussies over het wel of niet aanschaffen van capaciteiten 
geschikt om hoge intensiteitsmissies mee uit te voeren. De discussies over de aanschaf van 
de opvolger van het F-16 jachtvliegtuig en de tactical tomahawk zijn hier voorbeelden 
van. Deze gespleten strategische cultuur heeft er toe bijgedragen dat er enerzijds in 
Nederland sprake is van een continu strategisch debat en anderzijds dat het niet expliciet 
heeft hoeven kiezen tussen de Atlantische en de continentaal-Europese dimensie van haar 
veiligheidsbeleid. Symptomatisch hiervoor was de positie dat Nederland de Amerikaanse 
invasie in Irak “politiek, maar niet militair” steunde. Dit heeft Nederland strategisch 
gepositioneerd als een transatlantische bruggenbouwer.
In Duitsland verliep transformatie moeizaam. Dit was het resultaat van de 
interactie tussen een verbeterde veiligheidsomgeving na 1991 die het mogelijk maakte 
om mensenrechtenschendingen en regionaal conflict aan te pakken, een transatlantisch 
bondgenootschap dat zich richtte op  expeditionaire crisis-managementsoperaties en 
de Duitse strategische cultuur. Voor Duitsland vormde de notie om solidair te zijn met 
het bondgenootschap een cruciaal element om de Duitse krijgsmacht te hervormen naar 
een expeditionaire organisatie. Echter, het pacifisme dat gepaard gaat met Duitsland’s 
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zelf-aangemeten rol als Zivilmacht, en de politieke en jurdische instituties die hieruit 
voortvloeien, leiden tot traagheid in deze transformatie. De centrale rol van het parlement 
en het Bundesverfassungsgericht in het vormgeven van het defensie transformatieproces 
zien we in geen van de twee andere landen terug. De militaire interventies in de Balkan 
en Kosovo leidden tot grote discussie in Duitsland. Terwijl er bij de eerste een juridische 
uitspraak  aan te pas moest komen om Duitsland deel te kunnen laten nemen in de Balkan, 
werd de besluitvorming rond Kosovo gekarakteriseerd door verhitte parlementaire strijd 
en moest een moralistisch humanitair argument aangewend worden om inzet mogelijk 
te maken. In Afghanistan werden voor het eerst grote hoeveelheden grondtroepen in 
een oorlogsgebied ingezet, echter de term oorlog en daaraan gerelateerde activiteiten 
werden vermeden door de Bundeswehr. Dit resulteerde in spanningen binnen het 
bondgenootschap. Een continu spanningsveld over de vraag of Duitsland gerechtvaardigd 
was om aan de ISAF operatie deel te nemen bleef bestaan. Het maakte Duitsland tot een 
twijfelende, of soms zelfs onwillende bondgenoot. 
In de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur wordt de focus op dreigingen in de vorm 
van vijanden verenigd met een nadruk op technologie. Samen met een sterk geloof in de 
revolutionaire waarden van het Amerikaanse politieke systeem, het Amerikaanse concept 
van exceptionalisme, het streven naar absolute veiligheid en het doel om vrijheid te 
verspreiden, leidt deze focus ertoe dat militair geweld als acceptabel beschouwd wordt om 
bepaalde problemen op te lossen of barrieres voor vrijheid weg te nemen. Het produceert 
een beeld dat geweld, of zelfs oorlog, soms noodzakelijk is, en dat de daaruit voortvloeiende 
instabiliteit op de korte termijn op de koop toe moet worden genomen. Transformatie had 
tot doel om Amerika superieur te houden. Het unipolaire systeem na 1991 en de komst 
van het Informatie Tijdperk samen met deze elementen van de strategische cultuur gaven 
richting aan een Amerikaanse transformatiestrategie gebaseerd op het vergroten van de 
eigen conventionele militaire superioriteit. Het achterliggende idee was dat hierdoor een 
unipolaire wereld met de VS als enige supermacht zou blijven voortduren. De strategie was 
gebaseerd op het vervangen van eenheden ten behoeve van geavanceerde technologiën. Dit 
zou het mogelijk maken om sneller, met minder manschappen, en met minder risico voor 
burgers en de eigen krijgsmacht, oorlogen te winnen, waar dan ook. Toen in 2004-2005 
irreguliere oorlogvoering in Irak, en later Afghanistan, tot grootschalige problemen leidden, 
resulteerde dit in een poging om bij de Amerikaanse landmacht en US Marine Corps 
verandering teweeg te brengen en een capaciteit te ontwikkelen om langdurige stabilisatie 
operaties uit te voeren. Dit botste echter met de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur, en de wil 
om de krijgsmacht juist in te zetten bij hoge intensiteitssituaties. Hierdoor is de nadruk van 
de Amerikaanse landmacht – en in mindere mate de US Marine Corps - komen te liggen 
op de hoge intensiteitsdimensie van irreguliere oorlogvoering. Dit produceert een trend 
om, naar het voorbeeld van speciale eenheden, in kleinschalig verband en ondersteund 
met superieure technologie, snel en doelmatig te kunnen optreden, en als force multiplier 
te dienen voor staten die geconfronteerd worden met binnenlandse opstanden (in het 
onderzoek wordt dit COIN-lite genoemd). De andere krijgsmachtdelen – luchtmacht en 
marine – bleven gericht op het hogere geweldspectrum en conventionele oorlogvoering. 
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Voor de Verenigde Staten leidde ‘Irak’ en ‘Afghanistan’ weliswaar tot een verandering 
van het transformatieproces, maar op een manier die uiteindelijk overeenkwam met de 
Amerikaanse strategische cultuur.
In Afghanistan zien we deze kaleidoscoop van strategische culturen terug en 
kwamen de verschillen in transformatiebeleid sterk naar voren. Dit onderzoek toont 
echter het semi-permanente karakter van de elementen van strategische cultuur. Deze 
zijn constant gebleven onder verschillende internationale systemen.  Ondanks de 
verschillende internationale context is er nauwelijks verschil in de wijze waarop het 
gebruik van de krijgsmacht werd bezien tijdens eerdere militaire inzet in het buitenland. 
De Nederlandse rechtvaardiging voor deelname aan Uruzgan vertoont grote gelijkenis 
met de besluitvorming rond de deelname aan de Koreaanse oorlog, de missie in Albanië in 
1913, of zelfs de politionele acties in Nederlands-Indië. De argumenten zijn vergelijkbaar: 
Nederland voert geen oorlog maar draagt bij aan de internationale rechtsorde en stabiliteit, 
tegelijkertijd is het bereidwillig een rol te spelen waardoor het een betrouwbare bondgenoot 
is voor de grootmachten en zodoende haar eigen internationale profiel vergroot. De 
Amerikaanse visie op en rechtvaardiging van het gebruik van de krijgsmacht is niet 
fundamenteel veranderd tussen manifest destiny,  de Spaans-Amerikaanse oorlog, de 
Koreaanse oorlog of Irak in 2003. Het gebruik van geweld is geaccepteerd om democratie 
en vrijheid te verspreiden in navolging van Amerikaanse revolutionaire principes. Voor 
Duitsland is het evident dat de strategische cultuur semi-permanent is, doordat het 
pacifisme grondwettelijk staat vastgelegd. In de veranderende veiligheidsomgeving is 
echter zichtbaar dat culturele entrepreneurs, zoals Duitse ministers en staatshoofden een 
belangrijke rol vervullen in een proces van langzame strategische herorientatie. Dit toont 
tevens aan dat strategische cultuur niet in steen gebeiteld is.
Samenspel tussen strategische cultuur en internationale 
omgeving
Verschillen in de internationale positie van de drie staten en verschillen in strategische 
cultuur leidden tot verschillende transformatiestrategiën. Het samenspel tussen 
strategische culturen en veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving versterkt of belemmert 
een staat om transformatie na te streven.  Beoordelingen van de veiligheidsomgeving 
kunnen in een bepaalde richting wijzen maar de beperkingen die de strategische cultuur 
oplegt bepalen of de staat deze veranderingen door kan voeren of niet. Strategische 
culturen kunnen daarbij als een keurslijf fungeren. Net zo goed als Duitsland beperkt 
wordt door een pacifistisch strategisch cultureel paradigma, heeft de Verenigde Staten heeft 
te maken met een strategisch cultureel paradigma waarbij oorlogvoering gezien wordt als 
een serie opeenvolgende gevechts-momenten van hoge intensiteit. In 2005 probeerde de 
VS een proces van strategische transformatie in te zetten om te reageren op de dreigingen 
van irreguliere oorlogvoering. Dat deze dreiging opkwam was een logisch gevolg van 
de dusdanige conventionele militaire superioriteit van de Amerikaanse krijgsmacht, 
waardoor tegenstanders naar alternatieven gingen zoeken. De VS faalde er echter in om 
het belang van deze strategische uitdaging in een vroeg stadium te erkennen. Toen het dat 
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eindelijk wel deed, had het moeite om er mee om te gaan omdat irreguliere oorlogvoering 
tegenstrijdig was met de strategisch culturele veronderstelling wat ‘oorlog’ was en wat 
de rol van de Amerikaanse krijgsmacht daarin was. Niet voor niets stond irreguliere 
oorlogvoering lange tijd bekend bij de krijgsmacht als een military operation other than 
war. Het contrast met Nederland en Duitsland kon niet groter zijn. In deze landen was er 
grote weerstand om bij militaire interventies de term ‘oorlog’ te hanteren. In plaats daarvan 
werden euphemismen als politiemissie, stabilisatiemissie of wederopbouwmissie gekozen. 
Dit leidde eveneens tot moeilijkheden toen duidelijk werd dat Europese landen robuust 
moesten optreden, soms door het uitvoeren van operaties hoog in het geweldspectrum. 
Oorlog dus. Dit keurslijf van strategische culturen leidt er toe dat in coalitieverband landen 
met verschillende denkkaders en rechtvaardigingsmechanismen aan eenzelfde interventie 
mee doen. Het betekent dat deze staten niet noodzakelijkerwijs acties ondernemen op 
basis van de operationele realiteit in het uitzendgebied maar juist op basis van afwegingen 
ingegeven door de beperkingen van hun strategische cultuur. 
Effectiviteit van Transformatie
Transformatie is daarmee een fundamenteel politiek proces gerelateerd aan de wijze 
waarop een staat het gebruik van de krijgsmacht ziet en publiekelijk rechtvaardigt 
als instrument om beleidsdoelstellingen te realiseren gegeven de context van een 
veranderende veiligheidsomgeving.  Pas wanneer de papieren plannen die de basis van de 
transformatiestrategie vormen, en de daaruit voortvloeiende nieuwe militaire capaciteiten, 
getoetst worden aan de realiteit van militaire operaties en de daaraan voorafgaande 
politieke besluitvorming kan vastgesteld worden of het transformatieproces effectief 
is. Transformatie is daarmee een combinatie van plannen, de politieke besluitvorming 
en de daadwerkelijke inzet van militaire middelen. Hiermee kan ook een uitspraak 
gedaan worden over de wijze waarop transformatie effectief kan worden nagestreefd. 
Uit het onderzoek volgt dat transformatie moeizaam verloopt wanneer (elementen 
van) de strategische cultuur van een staat tegengesteld zijn aan de doelstellingen van de 
transformatiestrategie. Het succes van de drie staten op het gebied van transformatie 
was afhankelijk van de mate van afstemming tussen de strategische cultuur, de positie 
van het land in de internationale machtsbalans en de aard van de veiligheidsomgeving. 
Wanneer de strategische cultuur geen beperkingen oplevert voor de ontwikkeling van 
een bepaald veiligheidsbeleid gegeven een nieuwe internationale systeemverhouding, is 
de effectiviteit van transformatie hoog. De Verenigde Staten ondervonden een dergelijke 
situatie in de jaren negentig en begin jaren 2000 toen de Amerikaanse strategische 
cultuur, gebaseerd op Amerikaans exceptionalisme en geloof in de bevrijdende kracht 
van oorlogvoering, versterkend werkte op de belofte van een Amerikaanse voorsprong 
in het ‘informatie tijdperk’ en de unipolaire omgeving.  Wanneer strategische cultuur 
en systeemfactoren elkaar belemmeren ontstaat frictie en is het effect van transformatie 
beperkt. Dit was het geval met Duitsland toen het moeite ondervond om een balans te 
vinden tussen een pacifistische strategische cultuur en een veiligheidsomgeving waarbij 
bondgenoten expeditionaire militaire interventies ondernemen. Hieruit volgt dat als een 
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transformatiestrategie geformuleerd wordt dat tegenstrijdig is met de strategische cultuur 
van een staat dan zal dat proces moeizaam verlopen, gaandeweg veranderen, of helemaal 
niet gerealiseerd worden.
De Duitse casus geeft aan dat transformatie traag verloopt als het transformatiepad 
niet, of slechts ten dele, overeenkomt met de strategische cultuur van een staat. De 
Amerikaanse ervaring met strategische transformatie toont dat de strategie, ondanks 
eerdere doelstellingen, zich zal aanpassen aan een model die overeenkomt met de 
strategische cultuur. Enerzijds beïnvloedt strategische cultuur de initiële vormgeving van 
de transformatiestrategie, anderzijds is het een bepalende factor, naast de veranderende 
veiligheidsomgeving, voor de effectiviteit van het transformatieproces. Het leidt tot de 
conclusie dat sommige landen, als gevolg van hun strategische cultuur, beter in staat zijn 
om met veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving om te gaan dan andere.
Het exporteren van verschillende Westerse modellen
Hoewel alle drie de transformatieprocessen verschillend zijn verlopen en strategische 
culturen uniek zijn voor een staat, is het belangrijkste onderliggende onderscheid in de 
strategische culturen het onderscheid tussen de Verenigde Staten en de Europese landen. 
Dit onderscheid is niet gestoeld op een geopolitieke realiteit maar op een politiek-filosofisch 
twistpunt. Het gaat om de sociaal-wetenschappelijke confrontatie tussen de school die 
stelt dat het individu boven alles verantwoordelijk is voor zijn gedrag en zijn toekomst 
kan maken en de school die stelt dat het menselijk gedrag voortvloeit uit de inkadering 
van het individu door social structuren en instituties. De een richt zich op individuele 
verantwoordelijkheden, de ander op de wijze waarop structuren en instituties een rol spelen 
bij de ontplooïng van het menselijk handelen. De Amerikaanse revolutionaire waarden en 
de rol van de VS als voorvechter van individuele vrijheden heeft ook betekend dat binnen 
het veiligheidsbeleid dreigingen ontegenzeggelijk terug te voeren zijn op individuen. Sterker 
nog, dit heeft aan de basis gestaan van het succes van de Verenigde Staten. Voor Europese 
landen is het juist andersom. Het Europese integratie proces is instrumenteel geweest voor 
de wijze waarop Europa zich welvarend en vreedzaam heeft weten te ontwikkelen door 
randvoorwaarden voor het statelijk gedrag te formuleren middels een uitgebreid netwerk 
van instituties. Deze identieke institutionele kaders worden ingezet in het buitenlands- 
en veiligheidsbeleid. Deze twee varianten zijn beiden een product van Westers denken 
maar betreffen wel twee tegenovergestelde modellen. Belangrijk voor transformatie is 
dat Europese landen en de Verenigde Staten beiden interventionistisch zijn en het model 
promoten dat effectief is geweest om henzelf welvarend en veilig te maken; de een door de 
verspreiding van democratische waarden en vrijheden door middel van power projection, 
de ander door middel van stability projection. Deze wederkerigheid toont aan dat zowel 
Europese landen als de Verenigde Staten strategische culturen hebben die de modellen van 
het eigen succes trachten te exporteren. Dit heeft belangrijke gevolgen voor de toekomst 
van de NAVO. Zolang de NAVO interventionistisch is zullen de bondgenoten deze 
verschillende modellen en de individuele rechtvaardigingen, capaciteiten en militaire inzet 
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die gepaard gaan met hun strategische culturen blijven nastreven, uiten en toepassen. Dit 
zal leiden tot een voortdurende frictie en interne spanning binnen het bondgenootschap. 
De verschillen in het transformatiebeleid van de drie landen zijn gebaseerd op 
verschillende reacties op de veranderde internationale veiligheidsomgeving. Deze hadden 
verschillende afwegingen rond capaciteitopbouw, organisatie, strategie en inzet tot gevolg. 
Met alle gevolgen van dien voor de coherentie binnen het bondgenootschap. De verschillen 
in transformatiestrategie zijn daardoor kenmerkend voor de problemen waar het NAVO 
bondgenootschap mee te maken heeft, zeker nu met 28 lidstaten. Het expeditionaire 
veiligheidsdenken heeft daarmee grote invloed op de toekomst van de NAVO. Zo lang 
het bondgenootschap een expeditionaire orientatie behoudt zal overeenstemming 
moeizaam gevonden worden. Sterker nog, de opkomst van de expeditionaire omgeving 
kan als hoofdverantwoordelijke worden gezien voor de aantasting van de cohesie binnen 
het bondgenootschap. Transformatie heeft daarmee iets blootgelegd dat altijd al onder de 
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